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Introduction  
 
The Twentieth century was fertile in experiences on the power of propaganda in war context. From the First 
World War to the Spanish Civil War, the Second World War, the Portuguese Colonial War, the Cold War, the 
war in Bosnia and the Gulf war, there were several occasions where propaganda stud itself as one of the 
combat arms. 
The First World War was the first conflict where the States realized the importance of propaganda as an 
instrument of war, with unprecedented power. It then becomes clear the importance and potential of graphic 
communication. From then on, propaganda stated to be seen as an essential tool, capable to connect the 
battlefront and the home front, a galvanizing instrument capable of making the populations accept the 
“inevitability” of war and the sacrifices that occurred from there. 
From now on propaganda appeared as a representation, often with pictorial expression of the national identity 
in combat, extolling the virtues of national armies and making evil representations of the enemy, presenting 
him in a dehumanized form and instigating hatred between civilians and the military, while eliminating the 
notion of guilt or responsibility of government leaders. Analyzed through the eyes of propaganda, wars always 
emerged as an inevitable consequence of civilizational clashes: we fight for an ideal, we struggle for a 
common interest. 
As the importance of home front grew in contemporary conflicts propaganda became more and more 
sophisticated. Ministries were created to think and manage propaganda, huge sums of capital were invested, 
and all mass media, developed in the late nineteen hundreds and in the first decades of the twentieth century, 
were used by the States: press, radio, television and film. 
Propaganda represented the sacrifice of soldiers in war and praised the power of the country. It has been 
around these images that all over the world entire populations were mobilized on the expectation of victory. 
Through the static image of printed posters or the newspaper news projected in cinemas all over the globe, 
governments sought to promote a patriotic spirit, encouraging the effort of individual sacrifice by sending a 
clear set of messages that directly appealed to the voluntary enlistment in the armies, messages that explained 
the important of rationing essential goods, of the intensification of food production or the purchase of war 
bonds, exacerbating feelings, arousing emotions and projecting an image divided  between the notion of 
superiority and the idea of fear of the opponent. 
From press, in the First World War, to radio in the World War II, to television and cinema from the 1950s 
onwards, to the “real live” coverage of the Gulf War, propaganda proved to be a weapon as deadly as those 
managed by soldiers in the battlefield. That’s why it is essential to analyze and discuss the topic of War and 
Propaganda in the Twentieth Century. 
The conference, organized by the IHC and CEIS20, of the University of Coimbra, was part of the Centennial 
Program of the Great War, organized by the IHC, and the International Centennial Program coordinated by the 
Imperial War Museum in London. It was held in Lisbon on the 11-12th November 2013 and included papers 
delivered by invited speakers and presentations submitted through a call for papers. 
90 papers were presented during two days of intensive work. The presentations were organized in the 
following sixteen thematic sessions: 
 First World War, Propaganda and the neutrals 
 Propaganda, exile and emigration 
 Propaganda and Empire 
 Propaganda war relief and the dehumanization of the enemy 
 First World War: National experiences 
 Propaganda, Science and Cultural Diplomacy 
 Spanish Civil War 
 Press and Propaganda 
 Second World War I 
 Propaganda, History and Education 
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 Second World War II 
 Art, Image and Propaganda 
 The Cold War 
 Visual Propaganda 
 The Portuguese Colonial War 
 Propaganda in the age of digital technology  
This e-book includes a long and more detailed version of the abstracts of the papers presented in each of these 
sections.   
The organizing committee would like to publicly thank Cristina Luísa Sizifredo for the e-book’s design and 
organization.  
To the authors, who accepted our challenge and immediately sent their papers to be included in this digital 
publication, we would like to express our sincere gratitude. This e-book is theirs.  
 
Lisbon, November 2013 
Maria Fernanda Rollo 
Ana Paula Pires 
Noémia Malva Novais  
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Under Propaganda Fire: Spain and the Great War 
 
Javier Ponce Marrero, 
Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria 
 
 
 
In the field of propaganda, it is in the neutral countries where the direct confrontation between the two 
sides takes place, and where each side must advertise itself in order to tip undecided minds in its favor. In 
this sense, during the First World War the propaganda deployed in Spain by the belligerents was something 
more than just a paper war, but one where words were supplemented by images supplied by the new 
technical resources of the day. Employing different approaches, pragmatic propagandists, as well as 
opportunistic and even (frustrated) idealistic ones, used all the means to hand; moreover, assisted by their 
respective diplomatic services, journalists, politicians, intellectuals and professional publicists also 
participated in this story. This was also a struggle marked by a clash of different principles and material 
interests, also quite diverse, supported in this case by vast amounts of money that crisscrossed the face of 
Spain to purchase opinion, especially that expressed in the press, for immediate reward. We shall here 
address the issue from the perspective of Spain’s international relations and foreign policy during the First 
World War and aim to produce some new insights based on the analysis not only of the factors governing 
propaganda in Spain during the war, but also of the objectives, models and instruments of this propaganda. 
In this sense, we shall consider propaganda as an integral aspect of the foreign policy of the belligerents. 
Finally, we shall present some conclusions yielded by this approach. 
 
 
      Determining factors: 
 
Among the factors that constrained propaganda in Spain during World War I we can mention at least 
three: the international position of Spain, internal conflict and the barriers to information in the press during 
the war. Let us look at the elements that determine these three factors. The first one, the international 
position of Spain, is determined by its geography, its trade relations as well as by security issues and the 
progress of the war. Thus, unlike Switzerland, Holland or even the Nordic countries, which were subject to 
direct pressure by both sides during the conflict, Spain’s proximity to the countries that constituted one of 
the two sides situated it in a field of influence which was less balanced and much better disposed towards 
the Entente. In connection to its geographical position, the second element determining Spain’s 
international stance is its commercial relations: its economic and financial ties as well as its dependence on 
trade exchanges of all kinds with the Entente. And the third is the issue of security and the progress of the 
war: Spanish dependence, for defense questions, on the Entente, which could also bring about the main 
dangers to Spain’s security. Spain’s placement in the defensive structure of the Entente had been confirmed 
in the Cartagena Agreement of 1907, according to which Spain, Great Britain, and France committed 
themselves to maintain the status quo of their territories in the Atlantic and Mediterranean and to consult one 
another whenever this was under threat1. Moreover, Madrid had been party with Paris to the Treaty of 1912 
concerning Morocco, which had turned the two countries into partners—albeit unequal ones—in a sensitive 
territory for colonial policies, particularly for the Spanish. 
The second factor governing propaganda in Spain was the conflict within the country, marked by a 
situation that predated the war but that was further exacerbated by it. The situation prior to the war 
involved a political confrontation between those groups that supported the Restoration regime and those 
who hoped to reform it or to drive it into crisis, aggravated by a lack of social and economic development, 
and complicated by regionalist forces. In this situation the war exacerbated the economic imbalance and the 
social differences, which were now manifestly intertwined with the regionalist problem. There was no 
reduction in political conflict throughout the war, which drew in ever more Spaniards who did not strictly 
belong to the social, political and intellectual elites2. 
                                                          
1 Cf. Enrique Rosas Ledezma, "Las Declaraciones de Cartagena (1907): significación en la política exterior de España y 
repercusiones internacionales", Cuadernos de Historia Moderna y Contemporánea, nº 2 (1981): 213-29; and Rosario de la 
Torre del Río, "Los acuerdos anglo-hispano-franceses de 1907: una larga negociación en la estela del 98", Cuadernos de la 
Escuela Diplomática, Segunda Época, nº 1 (1988): 81-104. On the subsequent development of Spain’s international 
outreach, see Javier Ponce Marrero, "La política exterior española de 1907 a 1920: entre el regeneracionismo de 
intenciones y la neutralidad condicionada", Historia Contemporánea , n° 34 (2007): 93-115. 
2 Francisco J. Romero Salvadó, Spain 1914-1918. Between War and Revolution (London: Routledge, 1999); and by the 
same author The Foundations of Civil War. Revolution, Social Conflict and Reaction in Liberal Spain, 1916-1923 
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The third factor determining propaganda were the barriers to information that the Spanish press had to 
work around. On one hand, these barriers were related to the material conditions of information set by 
Spain’s economic problems resulting from the war, and secondly, to the ways of handling such information 
in terms of the origins of sources, the restrictions placed on the freedom of the press, and the pressures 
from an environment polarized into two camps. As far as the economic issues were concerned, the main 
problem was the increase in the price of newsprint, which forced the State to intervene and regulate prices. 
While the press managed at first to address the growth of costs and prevented a rise in retail prices for a 
few years, difficulties in obtaining supplies from countries at war also affected the printing machinery used 
by those newspapers employing advanced technologies that were largely dependent on foreign suppliers. 
Among the material difficulties, we should include a reduction in advertising following the regular 
publication from 1916 onwards, of blacklists of people and firms in countries other than those of the enemy, 
with whom all individuals and companies on the Allied side were prohibited from maintaining commercial 
relations because of their enemy nationality or their association with the enemy. Many advertisers were 
therefore refused for fear of reprisals that might result in the inclusion of the newspapers on such lists. The 
newspapers would thus lose all advertisers linked to the Allies, who, by the way, had a strong presence in the 
largely Entente-dependent Spanish commerce3. 
Regarding the handling of information, the first obvious barrier was the flow of information, which 
although not negligible, it was filtered by the French agency Havas, via the Spanish agency of Fabra4. The 
ways around the partisan approach of Fabra involved sending correspondents abroad and—with the opening 
of the German radiotelegraph agency Transocean, which sent information from its Nauen station from 1915—
using radio to source news from Germany. At the same time there were national restrictions on the freedom of 
the press, which had been put into the legislation for the preservation of neutrality promulgated by the Spanish 
Government since the beginning of the war. Accompanying this declaration of official neutrality on August 4, 
1914 a provision was approved by which the press was to observe neutrality: this promised legal prosecution 
for insults made in the press or at public meetings against foreign sovereigns or similar dignitaries. Later, on 
March 29, 1917, faced with the threat of a possible general strike, a royal decree authorized censorship of the 
press—this time in relation also to the press’ assessments of the warring countries and of Spain’s stance—
which granted a discretionary power to civilian governors, who nevertheless, not always exercise it in this 
way. Prior censorship was maintained intermittently down till the autumn of 1917, but was re-applied by the 
law for the repression of espionage of July 7, 1918 to guarantee Spanish neutrality5. The rule was applied to 
anyone on Spanish territory who collected information for a foreign power or its agents that was harmful to 
other powers, and —in light of the difficult situation caused by the submarine war—it banned the publication, 
dispatch, transmission and circulation of news concerning the movements of merchant vessels. It thus 
increased censorship even from the very centers of telephone and telegraph communications, becoming in this 
way in a very useful and effective tool for the government that complemented previous censorship of 
newspapers, and even substituted for it when such censorship was not being enforced, since in practice, the 
censorship of communications had been in effect since August 19146. 
There was a final barrier to information that was conditional on propaganda, and which in this case both 
reinforce it and came to be reinforced by it. This was the pressure of a public opinion, which became ever 
more polarized into two camps the longer the war lasted and the greater its impact on Spain grew, for 
virtually all newspapers belonged to one camp or the other. The messianic character of the war, the first 
total war, can help us to understand the stances taken in a neutral country, but it was the very intense 
activity of the belligerents in Spain what gradually reinforced this trend. This took the form of propaganda 
for war and acquired great importance by managing to attract the media into one’s camp and to use it to 
defend one’s own interests. In this context bribery was commonly practiced to obtain the support of a 
newspaper, as print was the main tool employed to produce a more favorable image of one group and a 
negative image of the other.  In this sense, the adscription to one group or the other implied the acceptance 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
(London: Routledge, 2008): 1-147. 
3 Cf. “A proclamation prohibiting trading with certain persons, or bodies of persons, of enemy nationality or enemy 
associations”, The London Gazette, 29 February 1916, 2211; and Listas negras referentes a España publicadas por los 
Gobiernos de Francia e Inglaterra (Barcelona: Librería Española, 1916), 1-16. 
4 María Antonia Paz Rebollo, El colonialismo informativo de la agencia Havas en España (1870-1949), Doctoral thesis 
(Madrid: Universidad Complutense, 1988). 
5 Gaceta, 8 July 1918, 81. 
6 José Antonio del Valle, “La censura gubernativa de prensa en España (1914-1931)”, Revista de Estudios Políticos, 
nueva época, nº 21 (1981): 73-126; and Javier Ponce Marrero, Canarias en la Gran Guerra, 1914-1918: estrategia y 
diplomacia. Un estudio sobre la política exterior de España (Las Palmas de Gran Canaria: Ediciones del Cabildo de 
Gran Canaria, 2006), 251-2. 
 15 
of the attack of its opponents, and on the other hand, the inevitable coloring of editorial policy, news items 
and advertisements7. 
 
 
      Aims, models and instruments of propaganda: 
 
In studying the aims, models and instruments of propaganda, we will be considering propaganda as part 
of the foreign policy of the belligerents. Because if in neutral countries they deployed diplomatic activities 
that aimed to win them over or to keep in place policies as favorable as possible to their interests, the 
pursuit of this aim was also aided by the use of propaganda. Therefore, it is in the neutral countries where 
the diplomatic efforts of the warring parties came face to face, and where propaganda became a war of 
propaganda aiming to sway undecided minds in their own favor. This was especially the case after the short 
war turned into a long one, since in the first months of the war due to the expectation of a German victory 
alike that of 1871—which many people took for granted—propaganda had not been fully employed. In the 
case of Spain, this war of propaganda was purely national in the sense that it responded to its internal 
conflicts and that it was seen by the two sides into which Spanish opinion was already divided as an 
extension of their own internal struggles. German sympathizers were recruited from defenders of the 
traditional order, the aristocracy, Church groups and the military, while advocates of political reform, 
Liberals, Leftists and Republicans, anti-clerical groups and most intellectuals felt closer to the Allies8. They 
all believed that the outcome of the war would have a universalizing character, since the victory of one side 
would also lead to the strengthening of the position of their supporters in Spain9. And all this despite the 
obvious differences between the values asserted in Spain and those defended by the warring nations 
themselves.  Let’s consider two examples: strictly speaking, those who defended the existing political 
system and traditional religion in Spain could hardly have seen the German Empire as representing their 
views, with its resemblance to a federation and with a non-Catholic as its Emperor; the other side, the 
defenders of republicanism could not have been comfortable supporting the British monarchy or the even 
more authoritarian regime of the Tsar. There are many more such contradictions that show us clearly that 
the war between the pro- and anti-factions in Spain, having weak convictions in the international sphere, 
drew on its internal conflicts10. This also explains why Spain remained neutral throughout the conflict, and 
why the Government of Dato proclaimed this from the start of the war. 
 
We should also take into account the fact that the disastrous war of 1898 against the United States as 
well as the military attrition in Morocco fuelled in wide sectors of Spanish society the attitude that modern 
large-scale warfare should be prevented at all costs. On the other hand, involvement in such a war would 
place an unbearable strain on the army, on a rigged political system, on a backward economy and a fragile 
social peace, which could threaten the survival of the monarchy itself. With the exception of those who 
wanted to bring about its downfall and cause regime change or, at later dates, even the sort of revolutionary 
process which was to take place in Russia, the rest of the political groups assumed that Spain was too weak 
to participate in the war. Moreover, a majority in Spanish society —illiterate for the most part— remained 
indifferent, without fully understanding what was at stake in the war nor the ideological struggle that some 
people saw it to be. Thus, despite commitments to and the proximity of the Entente, there was a weak 
consensus—even if it ultimately was a consensus—for non-intervention. This consensus—one of few—did 
not prevent such neutrality, which tried to be strict on a diplomatic level, from becoming tinged with 
shades and standpoints as it moved to a press permeated by internal political conflicts. In fact, for the 
educated elite, the war was soon perceived as an ideological war, the outcome of which would leave its 
mark on the future of all of humanity, so that it could not but affect the situation in Spain and its internal 
struggle. Let us now look at how such Spanish context saw the unfolding of propaganda of the diverse 
belligerents. 
 
                                                          
7 José Javier Sánchez Aranda, “Las dificultades de informar en tiempos de guerra. La prensa española durante la I 
Guerra Mundial”, Comunicación y Sociedad VI, nº 1-2 (1993): 173-87 (versión online en 
http://dspace.si.unav.es/dspace/handle/10171/8104). 
8 For the internationalism of Spanish intellectuals and their relation to the press of the period see Paul Aubert, “La 
propagande étrangère en Espagne pendant la Première Guerre Mondiale”, in Españoles y franceses en la primera mitad 
del siglo XX (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1986), 363-80. 
9 See also the classic work of Gerald H. Meaker, "A Civil War of Words: The Ideological Impact of the First World 
War on Spain, 1914 - 1918", in Neutral Europe between War and Revolution 1917-23, ed. Hans A. Schmitt 
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1988), 1-65. 
10 The war between opponents and defenders of the belligerent parties was extensively documented by Fernando Díaz-
Plaja, Francófilos y germanófilos. Los españoles en la guerra europea (Barcelona: Dopesa, 1973). 
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      German propaganda: 
 
If we consider propaganda as part of the foreign policy of the belligerents, that of Germany had as its 
objectives the maintenance of Spain’s neutrality. Being aware of Spain’s dependence on the Entente in all 
respects, the most Berlin could hope for was that Spain be kept out of the conflict. Indeed, it was quite 
impossible that Madrid would accept any offers made by Berlin to enter the war against England and 
France, as it would suffer immediate military retaliation11. Spanish neutrality would allow Germany to 
ensure entry to the Western Mediterranean, as well as to guarantee it neutral shelters in the territories and 
waters of Spain, which were of great strategic importance because of Spain’s position between two 
continents and two seas. Finally, as the war drew on and Allied pressure on Spain intensified, the more 
specific and ambitious objective of German propaganda was to prevent any excessive leaning of Spanish 
neutrality towards the Allies. 
In carrying out this objective, however, Berlin never ceased to use the bait of offers and promised Spain 
economic aid and political support in the post-war period to free Madrid from the guiding hand of the 
Entente. Germany also cautiously encouraged Alfonso XIII to continue his efforts as a mediator in the 
conflict, in order to reassure Spanish hopes for a strengthening of its international position and, 
incidentally, to prevent Spanish sympathies from moving towards the Entente. Moreover, the Auswärtiges 
Amt used vague promises to nourish the idea that Spanish collaboration would be rewarded with the 
annexation of territories and countries that Spanish irredentism saw as a goal of its foreign policy. To 
sovereignty over the Straits of Gibraltar was added by the most naive ones, among them Alfonso XIII, the 
annexation of Tangiers, a free hand in Morocco and a tempting mandate over Portugal, which under the 
form of an union or close association was to become a permanent goal of foreign policy12. 
The model adopted by German propaganda was an opportunistic one, the heir to Weltpolitik and to the 
thrust of German policy in pre-war years 13 . Thus, despite Spain’s poor relations with Germany in 
comparison to those with Great Britain and especially with France, Berlin knew very well how to exploit 
the conflicts that rose out of the close relationship between Spain and the Entente. At the beginning of the 
war, German presence in Spanish society comprised a large colony consisting largely of business people, 
and later during the war, officers and men of the many interned German ships. Added to this was the 
prestige enjoyed by German culture, science, learning centers and universities among Spain’s educated 
elites, many of who had been trained in these institutions. The tools used for propaganda included the 
press, the cinema and displays of German military power14. As far as the press was concerned, we should 
first say that it had been carefully prepared even before the war, and large sums of money had been 
invested in it15. The movies entrusted to publicize the major advances in German industrial and military 
technology. In connection to this, the military spectacle generated by the visit of the German submarine U-
35 to the port of Cartagena in 1916, with a personal message from Wilhelm II to Alfonso XIII, was 
certainly, and above all, a spectacular act of German propaganda, a masterstroke to impress on Spanish 
public opinion the power of the German military. Therefore, while it has been shown that German 
propaganda during the First World War was not especially well organized and coordinated, particularly in 
the neutral countries, Germany’s propaganda activities in Spain were very intense and effective from the 
start of the conflict16. 
 
      Allied propaganda: 
 
The various Allies deployed in Spain propaganda with different objectives, models and instruments. 
French propaganda aimed involvement of neutral Spain in its favor, obtaining specifically a defensive and 
supplier rearguard, with the participation of (Catalan) volunteers. The model was a logical (historical) 
model, continuation of the traditional relation between France and Spain, based on dependence, so in Spain 
                                                          
11 Telegram from Ratibor to the Auswärtiges Amt, 6 October 1914, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Berlin 
(hereafter PAAA), Spanien 61, Die politischen Beziehungen zwischen Spanien und Deutschland,R 11998. 
12 Hipólito de la Torre Gómez, Antagonismo y fractura peninsular. España-Portugal, 1910-1919 (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 
1983). 
13 We have made an analysis of German propaganda as an integral part of Berlin’s foreign policy in Spain in Javier 
Ponce, “Propaganda and politics: Germany and Spanish opinion in World War I”, in World War I and Propaganda, ed. 
Troy Paddock (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming, 2014), approx. 294-323. 
14 Cf. Jens Albes, “La propaganda cinematográfica de los alemanes en España durante la Primera Guerra Mundial”, 
Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez XXXI, nº 3 (1995): 77-8; and by the same author Worte wie Waffen. Die deutsche 
Propaganda in Spanien während des Ersten Weltkrieges (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 1996). 
15  Luis Álvarez Gutiérrez, “Intentos alemanes para contrarrestar la influencia francesa sobre la opinión pública 
española en los años precedentes a la Primera Guerra Mundial”, in Españoles y franceses en la primera mitad del siglo 
XIX, (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1986), 1-21. 
16 Ron M. Carden, German policy toward neutral Spain, 1914-1918 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1987), 55-91. 
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the pro-Allied proclivities were above all Francophile sentiments. The instruments used by French 
propaganda were basically three. Firstly, the press (the liberal-republican link): Spanish publications of 
liberal and Republican orientation were logically Francophile. Secondly, the cinematography (the 
verification of the majority Francophile sentiments): because it is easy to verify that of the movies in favor 
of the Allies that were screened in Spain, the vast majority was French. And finally, we can also mention 
the French cultural influence, exercised through the schools, lyceums and other institutions in Spain. 
In the case of British propaganda, its goal was the collaboration of the benevolent neutrality of Spain, to 
guarantee the use of Spanish waters and infrastructures, serving British naval hegemony, and also the 
security of the Strait, with center in Gibraltar and more sensitive ends in the Canary Islands and the 
Balearics. To counter the German effort, it was a pragmatic model, trying to overcome the contradictions 
represented by the British political monarchical system opposite to the liberal-republican one with which 
the Spanish pro-Allied opinion was identified for the most part, not to mention the international permanent 
obstacle that for a cordial relation meant Gibraltar. To all this was related the coldness of Spanish 
intellectuals with regard to Great Britain, with the exception of Galdós. The instruments for this British 
propaganda were several. First, the press, in which those contradictions were very clear, due to the logical 
bad conscience of the British Embassy in Madrid to support pro-Allied newspapers that encouraged in 
1917 the anti-dynastic and republican movement, but that finally received financial support from the 
British propagandists17. Secondly, the cinematography, which allowed the overcoming of the contradictions 
because of the content, far from the Spanish scene, since it referred to the contenders themselves. 
Finally, the U.S. propaganda had as aim the collaboration of Spain in the North American war effort, to 
which was associated the possibility of a major pressure of the Entente on Spain. The model, different from 
the rest of the Allies, responded to the Wilsonian reformulation of the Manifest Destiny18. It was, therefore, 
a (frustrated) idealistic model, that sought to expand American democratic values to the rest of the world. 
This different model also used different instruments, among which the cinematography (that represents 
very well the idealism) was, unlike other belligerents, the main instrument for the American propagandists. 
Several movies, not related to the war, had to reflect the virtues of the American society and convince, in 
this way, of the kindness of the principles that the United States represented. The second instrument used 
by the American propagandists was the press, that shows the frustration of this idealism, because if we 
know that Marion, the cinematographic businessman in charge of the propaganda in Spain, had been 
instructed by Wilson to detach himself from the methods of other Allies, particularly regarding the bribes, 
everything seems to indicate that finally it became necessary to resort to some type of economic 
compensation. 
 
 
      Some conclusions: 
 
In order to assess the achievements of propaganda with respect to Spain’s neutrality, it will be still 
necessary to analyze the actual room for maneuver open to Madrid’s foreign policy, which such 
propaganda wished to influence. As far as this question is concerned, it is evident that the wriggle room left 
to Spanish neutrality was tiny, this due to internal weaknesses, imbalances and divisions, and to the threats 
to the survival of the regime which involvement in the war would pose. And this is the key to the evolution 
of Spain’s neutrality, despite the propaganda and the pressure exerted. In this way, even though the fall in 
April 1917 of Romanones—when he attempted to bring Spain closer to the Entente—depended on the 
involvement of the German Embassy and German propaganda, it had much more to do with the refusal of 
the King and the rest of his government to break the neutrality. Not even in August 1918, with Germany 
already defeated and Spanish-German relations extremely strained over the submarine question, would 
Spain take the decision to break off relations with Berlin, given the absence of national and international 
ties to face the abyss of war. If we bear in mind the tiny margin for movement open to Spain, or to be more 
precise her impotence, we can judge use of war propaganda in Spain as both a relative success and failure. 
The enthusiastic involvement of so many Spaniards in this propaganda war, on one side or the other, had 
more to do with internal conflicts that saw the war as an extension of these internal struggles. For more 
than four years, the defenders and opponents of the political status quo had numerous new propaganda 
resources at their disposal in the midst of an escalation of words, which magnified the social and political 
unrest. 
                                                          
17  Enrique Montero, “Luis Araquistain y la propaganda aliada durante la Primera Guerra Mundial”, Estudios de 
Historia Social, nº 24-5 (1983): 245-66. 
18 Cf. Gregg Wolper, “Wilsonian Public Diplomacy: The Committee on Public Information in Spain”, Diplomatic 
History, nº 17 (1993): 17-34; and José Antonio Montero Jiménez, “Imágenes, ideología y propaganda. La labor del 
Comité de Información Pública de los Estados Unidos en España (1917-1918), Hispania, vol. 68, nº 228 (2008): 211-
34. 
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To conclude, we can add that the extraordinary build up of propaganda services also had much to do 
with the messianic character of a total war, which meant no stinting of resources, least of all for 
propaganda purposes, which, far beyond the aims of war diplomacy, were greatly overtaken by Spain’s 
own internal dynamics. In this sense, belligerents’s frenetic activity drove a propaganda war which had a 
major impact on Spain’s internal struggle, and which amounted to a civil confrontation of words, ideas and 
principles, concealed beneath political inclinations; a confrontation present in the war and precursor of the 
final crisis of Spain’s political system.  
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Introduction 
 During the First World War Spain quickly became a battleground for both warring sides. With little regard 
for the country’s neutrality, the Central Powers as well as the Entente bribed newspaper editors and journalists, 
bought control over entire publications, fed newspapers with their articles and distributed their own 
publications all over Spain. Although Spain maintained its neutrality throughout the conflict, the ideological 
rift between the supporters of the Entente and of the Central Powers deepened existing divisions in Spanish 
society and caused great instability in Spanish domestic politics. Germany cleverly manipulated both sides of 
Spanish society during the First World War, without pressuring the Spanish government into actively joining 
the war on the side of the Central Powers but ensuring that Spain would not join the cause of the Entente 
either. 
 By outlining the German propaganda effort in Spain, this paper will argue that German propaganda during 
the First World War can indeed be seen as a success. How the network in Spain was built up with the help of a 
rapidly mobilized German community will be detailed and the various official and private propaganda 
institution will be explained. A brief overview is given of the main themes German propagandists employed in 
their propaganda in Spain, as well as mentioning some of the most prominent Spanish journalists and 
newspapers collaborating with the German administration. The heated debate between Spain's supporters of 
the Allies and the Central Powers, often used to the advantage of German propagandists, also expressed itself 
in a series of manifestos which will be given some attention. Political propaganda employed by the German 
embassy at Madrid culminated in the campaign against prime minister Count Romanones which further 
highlights the success of German propaganda during the First World War.  
 
 
Spain at the outbreak of World War I 
 At the outbreak of the First World War the Spanish constitutional monarchy was in crisis. Internal tensions 
and factional infighting that plagued Spain from the end of the nineteenth century would become even greater 
during the war and bring the country close to a revolution. Dissatisfaction with the ruling elite had begun to 
increase after Spain's disastrous defeat in the Spanish-American War of 1898 which not only resulted in the 
loss of the country's last overseas colonies, but also made the decline of the former European power painfully 
obvious to all Spaniards. Spain had lost its former glory and status; now, a minor player in Europe, it had been 
surpassed by more developed and modern nations like Britain, France and Germany. While demands for 
reform were growing stronger, the ruling elite – which had established a thinly disguised oligarchy based on a 
system of electoral fraud, patronage and bribery – tried to maintain the status quo. As the reform movement 
gathered momentum and groups previously excluded from power demanded to have their say in domestic 
politics, a stable running of the country became increasingly difficult. In Spain, the European conflict played 
out as a confrontation of the Germanofilos, supporters of Germany and the Central Powers, and the 
Francofilos, supporters of the Allies. These camps embodied a clash of ideals: the preservation of traditional 
values and a hierarchical society versus modernization and a liberal government. 
 Controversies between these two groups offered both belligerents ammunition for propaganda and allowed 
them to maintain their interests in Spain. Although not a major player in the conflict, Spain's geographical 
position was of great strategic importance since it allowed control over the sea routes to the western 
Mediterranean as well as the eastern Atlantic. The Spanish coastline offered an ideal refuge for submarines. 
The country was also able to provide a wide variety of foodstuffs and military supplies vital for the war effort 
of the belligerents.19 Those advantages turned Spain into a potential ally hotly contested by Germany and the 
Entente powers, with both camps always fearing Spain would join the war on the side of their enemy.  
 
 
                                                          
19 Ron M. Carden, German policy toward neutral Spain, 1914 – 1918 (New York, London, 1987), pp 2–3. 
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German propaganda during the First World War – a failure? 
 
 An examination of the German propaganda effort in Spain refutes the theory Germany’s unsuccessful 
propaganda campaign was to blame for the loss of the war20 – a popular argument most famously brought 
forward by General Ludendorff and Adolf Hitler. In Mein Kampf Hitler described Germany's propaganda 
effort during the First World War as worse than insignificant, insisting the German system of information 
completely failed. Hitler asserted that the propaganda effort carried out was useless and to some extent harmful 
to Germany's cause.21 Ludendorff also insisted that Germany was unable to respond to the overwhelming 
power of enemy propaganda.22 German propaganda abroad, according to Ludendorff, was only implemented 
and carried out with great difficulty achieving very little results.23  Especially in neutral countries, German 
propaganda activity completely failed to make an impact as Ludendorff assessed. In his memoirs he wrote: 
"The way to the soul of the neutrals was barred to us. We did not know how to open it."24 Ludendorff's and 
Hitler's assessment, however, can be refuted – at least in relation to German propaganda in Spain – by the 
following contemporary analysis of a Spanish novelist:  
 
"From the first day of the war the Germans have been campaigning in Spain. From the first they realized the 
tremendous value and power of publicity … They went after public opinion and kept after it with the same precision 
and the same constancy with which they have pursued the rest of their war program. They have spent millions of 
dollars, bought entire control of newspapers and magazines." He concluded "The Allies have not conducted a campaign 
in my country at any time."25  
 
Mobilizing the German community in Spain and setting up a propaganda network 
 
 German propaganda during the First World War benefited from Spain’s fraught domestic situation as well 
as strong pro-German sentiments in Spanish society. The network that was set up on the Iberian Peninsula was 
largely facilitated by a small but very active German community who helped to influence Spanish public 
opinion via the press. With the outbreak of the war the Auswӓrtige Amt made concerted efforts to gain Spain’s 
favor and ensure the country’s neutrality. The embassy at Madrid, led by ambassador Prince Maximilian von 
Ratibor und Corvey, became the headquarters for all German propaganda activity. Ratibor himself never tired 
in his pursuit of courting Spanish public opinion and defending the German cause. Within the first weeks of 
the war he arranged for pro-German articles to be placed in the Spanish press since German news and 
publications only reached the country at the end of August 1914.26  
 Attempts by the German government and private residents to influence Spanish public opinion had already 
been made prior to World War I, albeit on a very modest scale. At the beginning of the twentieth century the 
Spanish press was mainly supplied by the French news agency Havas and its Spanish subsidiary, Fabra. 
Reports or news from Germany rarely made it into Spanish publications. Alexander Bruns, director of the 
Berlitz language school in Madrid, identified this as a problem and though his attempts to establish an office of 
the German news agency Wolffsche Telegraphenbureau in Madrid in 1906 failed, Bruns managed to place 
German news in Spanish newspapers. 27  By 1908 he had gained support from the Spanish government 
regarding an improved news exchange between both countries.28  
 Besides Bruns, another active German propagandist was August Hofer, the manager of a printing business 
in Barcelona, who had lived in Spain since 1906. Hofer also blamed the lack of a direct news exchange 
between both countries for the negative portrayal of Germany in the Spanish press and argued French ideas 
were being forced onto Spaniards.29 From 1910 onwards he supplied Spanish papers with German news, with 
                                                          
20 Peter Grupp, 'Voraussetzungen und Praxis deutscher amtlicher Kulturpropaganda in den neutralen Staaten 
während des Ersten Weltkrieges', in W. Michalka (ed.), Der Erste Weltkrieg, Wirkung, Wahrnehmung, Analyse 
(München, 1994), pp 799–824. 
21 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (London, 1972), p. 106. 
22 Erich Ludendorff, Concise Ludendorff memoirs, 1914–1918 (London, 1933), p. 14, p. 168. 
23 Ibid., pp 174–5. 
24 Ibid., p. 169. 
25 The New York Times, 18.3.1917. 
26 Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin [hereafter PA] R11862, Spanien No. 46, Bd. 1, Presse, Ratibor 
to Bethmann Hollweg, 12 October 1914. 
27 PA, R11866, Spanien No. 46 geheim, Bd. 1, Subventionerung spanischer Zeitungen, Radowitz at Embassy 
Madrid to Reichskanzler von Bülow, 20.6.1906. 
28 PA, R11867, Spanien No. 46 geheim, Bd. 2, Subventionerung spanischer Zeitungen, Oberndorff at Embassy 
Madrid to Reichskanzler von Bülow, 5.12.1908. 
29 PA, R11868, Spanien No. 46, Bd. 3, Subventionierung spanischer Zeitungen, Report A. Hofer regarding 
suggestions for the organisation of a Spanish-German news service for the press, 5.3.1912. 
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little success, however.30 It can be said that beside official diplomatic efforts, the German community in Spain 
played an important role in fostering German Spanish relations during the conflict. Thanks to the work of 
private propagandists such as Hofer and Bruns before 1914, Germany was able to quickly establish a network 
that would help to ensure Spanish neutrality benevolent to Germany and the Central Powers.  
 The German embassy at Madrid was grateful for the work done by privateers and was heavily reliant on 
their contacts in Spain. In November 1914 the ambassador was able to report to the Auswӓrtige Amt on the 
early successes of German propaganda which, as he pointed out, were only achieved with the help of the 
German communities in Barcelona and Madrid. 31 Amongst those private propagandists was Carl Coppel, 
owner of a watch factory in Madrid, who published regular information leaflets under the title Por la patria y 
por la verdad which reported on the course of the war.32 The British Foreign Office also attributed the success 
of German propaganda to the "army of agents" recruited from German residents in Spain.33 With the outbreak 
of the war members of the German colony initiated campaigns to spread pro-German news in Spain in an 
attempt to win over Spanish public opinion by influencing the press.34 Pro-allied publications were targeted 
with German propaganda in the hope that editors might prefer printing German news instead of writing their 
own articles.35 German publications were also sent to influential Spanish personalities. For example, at the 
opening of the Cortes in November 1914, the German embassy sent out official documents relating to the 
outbreak of the war to all senators and deputies.36  
 
Official and private propaganda institutions 
 
 In the early stages of the war the German propaganda initiative was far from coherent and private 
initiatives worked alongside and often in competition to official German propaganda institutions. The central 
bureau for German propaganda abroad during the First World War was the Zentralstelle für Auslandsdienst 
(Zfa) [Central administration for services abroad] which operated under the supervision of the Auswärtige Amt 
that in addition maintained its own news department also responsible for propaganda abroad. The Zfa 
produced and distributed propaganda material such as pamphlets, posters, newspapers, magazines and books. 
It also had a department for photographs, illustrations and films. The propaganda of the Zfa mainly targeted 
neutral countries like Switzerland, the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries and the United States but also 
included to some extent propaganda in Spain.37  
 A private news service especially dedicated to Spanish and Portuguese-speaking countries was founded in 
Frankfurt am Main in August 1914. The service, which was managed by personalities from industry, banking, 
press and the diplomatic world, hoped to curb the influence of Reuters and Havas and supplied material to 
private news services in Spain as well as the embassy and the consulates.38 Other official German propaganda 
institutions were the German military, which was in charge of censorship. In Spain the main German 
propagandists were the embassy at Madrid as well as the various German consulates which collaborated with 
the Auswärtige Amt and other private propaganda operations. 
 Amongst those private services was August Hofer’s Deutscher Nachrichtendienst für Spanien [German 
news service for Spain]. Founded in August 1914, it was to emerge as one of the most important German news 
services operating in the country. 39 Thanks to access to a radio transmitter, Hofer was able to receive 
telegrams from Germany which he would translate and then print and distribute to Spanish newspapers as well 
as sending them to South and Central America. 40  He also published a daily newspaper called 
Correspondencia Alemana, the weekly illustrated paper La Neutralidad and Germania, which appeared on a 
fortnightly basis.  
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 Beside his active role in press propaganda, Hofer was also involved in promoting German culture in Spain. 
In order to combat the negative, militaristic image employed by the Allies, German propagandists were 
conscious of the need to highlight Germany’s cultural achievements. Although German officials did not take 
cultural propaganda too seriously, they nevertheless hoped to make a positive impression on neutrals by 
stressing the country’s success in the areas of culture and science. Themes of cultural propaganda ranged from 
town planning, industry, religion, philosophy, to literature and theater. 41  Hofer, for example, organized 
lectures on new technological developments, Germany's social policies and talks about German music which 
were accompanied by piano recitals. 
 While Hofer was operating from Barcelona, in Madrid the vice director of the German electricity company 
AEG, Wilhelm Rautzenberg, was also running a news service. Other subsidiaries of AEG in Spain carried out 
similar propaganda work in collaboration with the head office in Madrid.42 In contrast to Hofer’s service, 
which was specialised in the fast transmission of German news, Rautzenberg’s service translated longer 
articles from German publications and tried to place them in Spanish newspapers.43 AEG had been a well 
established company in Spain prior to 1914 and therefore, its propaganda service was able to build on existing 
business connection and mainly focused on newspapers in which the company placed advertisements.44  
 The propaganda activities of the German community in Spain were also noted by outside observers. The 
Times reported in November 1915 of an ant-like industry organized with the involvement of all German 
residents.45  Another article published in The Times, in February 1916, described them as "a veritable army in 
discipline and cohesion. There is not an idle man among them …. Every German is a natural tout and 
canvasser for his country …".46 It is difficult to give a precise figure of how many Germans lived in Spain 
during the period of the First World War since residents were not obliged to register with the embassy or 
consulates. British estimates saw the German community between 50.000 and 80.000 strong.47 According to 
German statistics these estimates seemed to have been exaggerated. Before the war there were approximately 
7–8.000 Germans residing in Spain. During the war those were joined by refugees from Cameroon and 
Portugal bringing the total number of German residents to around 10.000 to 30.000.48 Although the British 
and French communities in Spain were far larger than the German, the Allies failed to capitalize on this 
advantage and did not mobilize their communities from the start of the war leaving the field to Germany and 
the Central Powers.49 This could be explained by the economic advantage the Allies held in Spain which was 
often used to pressure the Spanish government in cooperating with the demands of the Entente. Britain in 
particular depended on Spanish supplies of iron ore and pyrites. In return, Spain urgently needed coal and 
cotton as well as other supplies which could only be obtained from the Allies.50  
 
Main themes of German propaganda  
 
 Themes of German propaganda mainly focused on fostering the idea of a defensive war, justifications for 
the violation of Belgian neutrality and reasons for the continuation of unrestricted submarine warfare. Other 
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popular topics frequently highlighted in pro-German articles were the export of contraband to the Allies and 
the use of Spanish ship space for England and France. German propaganda in Spain also appealed to the 
country’s colonial ambitions in Morocco, Gibraltar and Portugal, which in the past had been subject to 
negotiations with the Allies and often led to Spain drawing the shorter straw.51  
 The German media campaign successfully presented the Central Powers as defenders of traditional, 
Catholic values and supporters of the Spanish monarchy and ruling order. By portraying the Allies as followers 
of left wing republican and anarchist groups,52 German propagandists ensured Spain would enforce its policy 
of strict neutrality and not join the war on the side of the Entente. Since joining Germany in the war was not a 
possibility, the Germanofilos showed their support for the Central Power’s by defending strict neutrality. Their 
support was hidden behind declarations of patriotism and rejection of any outside interference into Spanish 
affairs. Left-wing publications on the other hand argued a departure from neutrality would negatively impact 
on the working classes.53 
 
Spaniards collaborating with the German administration 
 
 The propaganda network the Germans had built up in Spain depended on the collaboration of Spanish 
journalists and newspaper editors as well as businessmen, politicians and diplomats. Some of those 
collaborations were achieved with bribery. Since many Spanish newspapers were struggling financially due to 
rising prices in paper, financial contributions by German diplomats and private propagandists offered a 
welcome relief during times of economic hardship. Further pressure was put on newspaper editors when 
German businesses stopped buying advertisement space in pro-Allied newspapers, ensuring a loss of 
circulation amongst these publications.54 Many Spanish editors and journalists, however, were more than 
willing to make a contribution to the German war effort in the hope this would be to the advantage of Spain. 
The main Madrid papers controlled by the German embassy were La Tribuna, Correo Español, ABC and 
several smaller publications. Pro-allied newspapers such as El Imparcial, El Heraldo, Vanguardia, the 
republican papers Diluvio and España Nueva were also to some extent influenced by German diplomats.55 
Although the collaboration with Diluvio was not seen as very successful, the embassy maintained its financial 
support in order to avoid the paper being taken over by the Allies.56  
 Spanish journalists and writers who collaborated with the German administration, such as Ricardo Leon for 
example, not only received financial rewards but were also facilitated in trips to Germany and the Western 
front. Leon was lavished with attention by German officials during his stay in Germany. He was able to visit 
different social and industrial facilities and was also introduced to German politicians. In return, it was hoped 
that the positive reception he received would lead to a favorable portrayal of Germany in the Spanish press.57 
The Vanguardia correspondent Enrique Dominguez Rodiño, reporting from Bremen, was also a frequent 
collaborator of the German administration and received financial support from the Auswärtige Amt.58 Javier 
Bueno, who prior to the war had been the longtime editor of the anarchist paper El Radical and a confidante of 
Radical Republican leader Alejandro Lerroux,59 changed his political direction during the war and started 
writing pro-German propaganda for La Tribuna and other Spanish publications.60  
 
War of the manifestos 
 
 The conflict between Spain’s Germanofilos and Francofilos during the First World War led to a series of 
manifestos which showed support for either of the belligerents and also often attacked the opposing Spanish 
camp. The frenzied discussions carried on in these publications were aptly described as the war of the 
manifestos.61 One of the most important ones, Manifiesto de los intelectuales españoles, appeared in Iberia on 
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10 July 1915 and was written in support of the Allies.62 It was attributed to writer Ramón Pérez de Ayala and 
expressed solidarity with the Allied cause - the only cause that also represented the interests and ambitions of 
the Spanish nation.63 As a response a pro-German manifesto followed, penned by Literature Nobel prize 
laureate and well known Spanish playwright Jacinto Benavente. It was published in La Tribuna on 18 
December 1915 under the title Amistad Alemana-Española. Besides expressing admiration for the German 
state and German culture, it also claimed that German and Spanish interests were harmonious while at the 
same time affirming Spanish neutrality.64 In the manifesto Benavente pointed out that French militarism was 
far worse than German while stressing that France and Britain had never been friends of Spain, citing their 
failure to come to Spain's aid in the Spanish-American War. Therefore, Spanish neutrality should not be 
viewed as betrayal or disloyalty to anybody. The playwright also expressed the wish for peace and for Spain to 
be independent from any outside influence.65 Amongst the 16.000 signatories of the pro-German manifesto 
were intellectuals, scholars and religious figures.66 The manifesto was reproduced by August Hofer’s news 
service which distributed 30.000 copies of it in 1916.67 The text was also reprinted in the German press as ABC 
was able to report.68 It appears, that many manifestos came about independently and were only subsequently 
used for propaganda purposes by the belligerents.  
 The year 1915 also saw the publication of the Manifesto de los amigos de la unidad moral de Europa, 
authored by Eugenio d’Ors, it advocated for European unity. In April 1915 Catalan artists, writers, 
intellectuals, politicians and industrialists published a manifesto in España declaring their solidarity with their 
neighbour France.69 To highlight the anniversary of the destruction of the University of Louvain a number of 
Spanish lawyers, law professors and journalists produced a Catholic manifesto also published in España on 
23.9.1915.70 At a later stage of the war, on 18 January 1917, the manifesto of the Liga Anti-Germanofila 
appeared in España.71 The Liga Anti-Germanofila especially attacked those who claimed to defend neutrality. 
Signed by leading intellectuals such as Miguel de Unamuno, Manuel Azaña, Luis Araquistáin and Melquíades 
Álvarez, the manifesto accused the Germanofilos of hiding behind the concept of neutrality which simply 
served to mask their devotion to Germany and their hate for the Allied countries.72 The Liga was founded in 
the hope to clear up persisting opinions that Germanophilism meant neutrality while being pro-Allied stood for 
interventionism. Germanophilism was viewed by the Liga as false, as anti-neutrality. The type of neutrality 
defended by the Germanofilos, according to the manifesto of the Liga, would have enabled Germany to 
continue taking advantage of Spain by violating international law. Stating that they were not anti-German but 
in opposition to the German state which to them represented the negation of small nations in its foreign 
policies, the negation of democracy and the civic spirit in general, the Liga Anti-Germanofila vowed to fight 
Spain's internal enemies.73 
 
Political propaganda 
 
 Alongside a very active press propaganda campaign, German diplomats used their political contacts to 
assert their influence on Spanish politics. They resorted to election bribery, a common feature of Spanish 
politics at the time, in order to ensure a balance between Francofilos and Germanofilos in the Spanish 
government. Similarly to the German propaganda effort, no costs were spared to influence neutral Spain. Until 
the end of the war, German expenditure for propaganda in Spain far surpassed that of the Allies.74 At the 
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beginning of 1917 the British overall investment in propaganda in Spain was approximately 24,000 pesetas. In 
1916 the German embassy had paid 35,000 pesetas per month to El Dia alone.75 In June 1915 state secretary 
von Jagow confirmed to ambassador Ratibor that any amount of money would be at his disposal to win over 
leading Spanish politicians.76 As already could be seen, rather than forcing Spain to side with the Central 
Powers, Germany was cleverly portrayed as a champion of Spanish neutrality, fostering an anti-interventionist 
mood in Spain and therefore avoiding the country defecting to the side of the Allies. While trying to advance 
neutrality amongst the working class movement in particular, the German diplomats also exacerbated divisions 
within Republicans and Socialists.77 
 To limit British influence in Spain political propaganda using events such as the 1916 Easter Rising in 
Ireland was employed. The Imparcial printed an article entitled A tribute to green Erin pointing out the close 
ties between Ireland and Spain calling for sympathy for the defeated Irish.78 Concerned by the negative press 
against Britain, the Foreign Office tried to stop proposed services in Barcelona which were to take place in 
honour of the Irish revolutionaries killed in the rebellion. 79 Anti-British activity initiated by the German 
embassy, however, did not stop at propaganda but also targeted British diplomats deployed to Spain. When 
news of a possible recall of British ambassador Sir Arthur Hardinge reached Ratibor, the German ambassador 
tried to keep his British colleague in office since he deemed him harmless. According to Ratibor, Hardinge had 
failed to gain sympathies in political and society circles and even managed to look ridiculous at times. The 
German ambassador spread rumours about Hardinge’s recall in the Spanish press stating that pro-German 
circles are pleased about the development. Ratibor hoped his tactics of reverse psychology would prompt the 
British to keep Hardinge in Spain.80 Hardinge indeed remained in the country until the end of the First World 
War and was only replaced in 1919. 
 
The campaign against Count Romanones 
 
 The ‘highlight’ of German meddling in Spanish domestic affairs, however, could be the events that led to 
the resignation of Count Romanones’ in April 1917.81 While the German contribution to the prime minister’s 
fall should not be overstated, it is necessary to point out how a feverishly organised campaign by ambassador 
Ratibor helped to turn public opinion against Romanones and increased his isolation even within his own 
party, the Liberals. The Count, who favoured intervention, had made his pro-allied stance clear from the outset 
of the war. He was unable though to break off relations with Germany and the Central Powers, but instead 
tried to curb German activities in Spain which angered ambassador Ratibor. Romanones also faced an 
increasingly pro-German public opinion and felt that towards the middle of the war support for the Allies in 
Spain was waning.82 German diplomatic correspondence gives the impression of a personal vendetta carried 
out by the ambassador who abandoned all rules of diplomacy in his pursuit of Romanones’ downfall. In his 
memoirs Count Romanones remarked that Germany showed a tenacity unlike any other country in its attempts 
to drag Spain into the war. His adversary Ratibor, according to Romanones, carried out the instructions of his 
government with more zeal than discretion.83 The Äuswärtige Amt was also of the opinion Ratibor’s methods 
to remove Romanones were too dangerous and could have compromised the position of their diplomats on the 
Iberian peninsula.84 
 At the beginning of September 1916 Ratibor requested permission to do everything necessary to dispose of 
the pro-allied prime minister,85 causing a discussion amongst diplomats in Berlin and the OHL about how to 
proceed in the matter. General Ludendorff demanded that Ratibor be authorized to find a way of removing 
Romanones without putting pressure on the Spanish king.86 The Auswärtige Amt had to give way to requests 
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from the military supreme command and prompted Ratibor into action. The German military leadership gained 
substantial power during the war which allowed them to have a decisive say in political matters. The military’s 
interference in diplomatic relations with Spain highlights how political considerations were subjugated to 
military demands despite the risk of turning a hitherto friendly, neutral state against Germany. In November 
1916 the ambassador was able to confirm his plan to remove Romanones, consisting of supporting the 
neutrality campaign, instituting press propaganda and influencing Alfonso XIII, was in place.87  
 The press campaign launched against the prime minister used his success as a businessman to portray him 
as a greedy war profiteer claiming he was involved in contraband trade. According to Romanones’ critics, the 
interest he held in the Spanish mining industry was not compatible with his duties as prime minister and 
represented a threat to the country’s neutrality. 88  La Nación printed several articles defaming the prime 
minister. In a particularly strongly worded article from May 1917 titled "The true enemy" the publication 
called for a destruction of "all the germs of influence of the Count Romanones in Spanish politics" and stated 
"The whole nation knows this man [Romanones] is her enemy therefore they keep attacking his intrigues, his 
declarations and his obvious intentions."89 Romanones later described the press campaign directed against him 
as something no other politician has had to suffer before. "Germany not only torpedoed our merchant navy but 
also torpedoed me with great eagerness.", the Count resumed.90  
 Romanones tried to curb the campaign by enforcing censorship and prohibiting the publication of some 
newspaper editions. Though effective, the Äuswärtige Amt expressed concern over Ratibor’s methods and 
urged him to keep up the appearance of a civil relationship with the prime minister, who had complained about 
his constant interference in Spanish politics. 91  Count Romanones’ position was becoming increasingly 
precarious and eventually he was forced to resign in April 1917.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 German influence on Spanish public opinion ensured a heated debate over neutrality which further widened 
the gap between Germanofilos and Francofilos. Contemporaries even described the conflict as a civil war of 
spirits which did great harm to Spain.92 Widespread German propaganda activity in the face of great allied 
economic advantage as well as much larger British and French communities in Spain, is further proof for the 
effectiveness of German propaganda during the First World War. The effort organized by German private 
propagandists and diplomats refutes the claim of Allied superiority in the struggle for neutral opinion.93 In 
Spain the German administration with the help of private residents staged an efficient and determined assault 
on public opinion.  
 Undoubtedly the Allies had hoped their advantageous position in Spain would render an intensive 
campaign unnecessary. The country’s dependence on British coal was frequently used as a bargaining tool not 
only to receive vital goods and resources in return but also to put pressure on Spain to align herself with the 
Allies and curb German influence. Various Spanish governments during the war, however, did not diverge 
from a policy of strict neutrality and avoided an open declaration of sympathy for one of the warring parties. 
This can also be attributed to the efforts of portraying Germany and the Central Powers as champions of 
Spanish neutrality and to a clever manipulation of the ideological differences within Spanish society. Although 
Allied economic supremacy ensured Spain would not join the Central Powers either, the lack of effective 
Allied propaganda countering German efforts meant that insufficient measures were taken to convince the 
conservative Germanophile elements of Spanish society of the merits of democracy and liberal ideas. As 
Spain’s civil war of words continued, German diplomats aggravated the conflict between the different 
oppositional movements and the ruling regime even further.  
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In the first year of the conflict, the Foreign Office was keen to promote and extend, "as a matter of 
patriotism", a retaliatory campaign against companies and individuals who acted in opposition to national 
interest in neutral countries. Indeed, the enhancement of that policy was strongly held by merchant 
communities, who saw an opportunity to take an advantage of their identity as Britons abroad. This aspect 
allows to explore broadly not only the challenges issued to the "war of words" waged in neutral merchant 
states but also to see, in a new light, the warfare in peripheral theatres. We propose, then, an approach to one of 
the most compromising points for the running of the British propaganda machine during the First World War: 
national ambitions and moves towards neutrals. 
 
British Winning Strategies and War Aims 
In spite of latest remarkable contributions, the neutrality still remains an understudied topic by comparison 
to those related to belligerent societies, which have traditionally been the focus of the international scholarship 
from diverse military, political, economic, social and cultural views. Thus, a hundred years later, the diversity 
of “neutrals and neutralities” in the First World War strikingly continues to offer, in many ways, an open field 
to do research and put into perspective. Particularly the study of the propaganda is fruitful to test, within the 
scope of war schemes and targets, the expectations of warring sides about neutral states. Marc Frey’s works 
already gave the primary emphasis on the importance gained by the northern neutrals (Holland and 
Scandinavian countries) to the belligerent war economies and eventual plans for peace. German Mitteleuropa 
and British maritime blockade were two main issues in political and diplomatic correspondence during the 
conflict.94 
 However, both sides were not on equal terms to fight on that vital ground. Due to her overwhelming 
merchant fleet and financial resources, Great Britain took the lead of the economic warfare in the autumn of 
1914. Even in such an early stage, neutrals became not as much an essential source for military supplies and 
rear consumption as an integral part of the strategy for a potentially "Greater Britain". From then on, the 
postwar configuration, if we put the controversy of the "short-war illusion" to one side, was crucial to British 
statecraft and decision makers' mentalities. In such a view, the economics had a deep impact on initial queries 
relative to neutral press. Incidentally, it would challenge the alleged British intentions of entering the war to 
safeguard the integrity of neutral and small nations.  
On those bases, in the following introductory pages, we will briefly put the propaganda outline in the 
context of three issues converging at the British national appeal launched in August 1914: naval hegemony, 
commercial retaliation and their effects on neutral rights discourse. These three main points were against the 
backdrop of the arguments to legitimize the mobilization of the British community, depending always on either 
neutral or belligerent interests at play.  
 
So, these are necessary preliminaries to deal with: 
 
1. The prewar planning in the Committee of Imperial Defense (CID) and the concept of warfare 
consequently entailed upon since 1904. Clearly then, the discussions showed the antagonism between 
departments which would eventually have been engaged in war as well as inner dissensions of their own, 
particularly within the Admiralty. A prime significant example was the dilemma over how to tackle naval 
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coercion against Germany. There were two main positions on whether naval constraints should merely be 
restricted to a close-coastal blockade or not. Against the conventional blockade policy the more aggressive 
idea of warfare arose, within the scope of what has been called "Fisher naval revolution" or unlimited use of 
economic retaliation. In other words, sea trade routes should be tampered with preventing all neutral 
commerce from Germany. That proactive policy was based on the belief that Britain's opponents, being aware 
of their weaker battle fleets, would primarily target British trade. According to Lambert's works, maximalist 
economic warfare was "no longer a component of naval strategy but rather had become the foundation of 
national grand strategy". 95  Nonetheless, Lambert's interpretations have been discussed by other naval 
historians.96 The terms of this scholarly debate exceed our concrete research purpose. But what appears more 
appealing here is the inclusion of the neutral issue in prewar high-level planning. In 1912, the formation of the 
so-called "Committee Desart" demonstrated that the neutral concern essentially had to do with discussions on 
"Trade with the Enemy" and retaliatory measures in wartime. In this sense, attention should be drawn to the 
updated sights put forward by naval history which, borrowing recent Seligmann's words, has evolved from "an 
old-fashioned, largely technical and thoroughly unimaginative narrative-based sub-genre" into a renewed field 
offering "new interpretations of historical events with a maritime dimension".97 British propaganda activities 
during the First World War were definitely affected by both maritime and economic dimensions. 
 
2. Foreign Office guidelines on an issue as sensitive as neutral rights, in conjunction with British merchant 
lobbies in neutral markets in 1914-1915. The neutral issue was a controversial cornerstone of the alleged 
"British Grand Strategy" well until into 1916. Overall, the more self-motivated civilian mobilization did not 
only make a difference to Home Front and Front Line, it also affected another front: the "Neutral Front".98 The 
early mobilization of British merchant residents in neutral countries, fuelled by a deep feeling of national 
community under siege, was embodied to a great extent in the Chambers of Commerce created after the start 
of the conflict and, in an advanced stage, in the Federation of British Industries. Commercial organizations 
intended to run propaganda quite independently of home needs. Their initiatives would dispute the consistency 
of the London political discourse.99 For instance, Dehne has depicted this reality in South America.100 Britons 
would have been let down by home authorities' negligent attitude towards German business circles in Brazil, 
Argentina or Uruguay.101  At that moment, the Foreign Office official position was that Great Britain could 
under any circumstances afford to undermine their claim that she had entered war in defense of neutral 
nationalities. That principle was diplomatically vital as Harcourt and Grey posed in relation to Dutch 
neutrality.102  
Paradoxically from Hoffmann's thesis, re-elaborated later in imperialist terms by Kennedy and his 
followers in the 80s, the idea of economics was put through the definite “realities behind diplomacy” resulting 
in the conflict.103 However, the supposed British decline in 1914 has been argued to a greater or lesser degree 
by scholars. From an iconoclastic view, Ferguson for instance challenged the idea that the history of Europe 
between 1870 and 1914 might be seen as a history of Anglo-German rivalry.104 Contrarily, the city financial 
strength as true muscle of international trade, the hegemony over naval merchant routs, shipping and freight 
insurances, coal victualling or cable communications, made Great Britain have a clear advantage over her 
rivals. So the flaws in the old-fashioned model of relationship between economics and international policy 
demand further knowledge on the role of the Foreign Office, either it restrained  from most aggressive plans 
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towards neutrals or it challenged the orthodox "business as usual" prevalence.105 Likewise, political claims on 
"tardy trading with the enemy” legislation might be confronted with the different domestic lobbies seeking to 
influence legislators on that particular issue.106  
Nevertheless, in the present state of research, there are works that already address attention to the existing 
balance of power between British residents in neutral countries and the politicians and bureaucrats at home. 
They especially deal with peripheral contexts under British political and economic hegemony, such as South 
American nations, Spain or Portugal.107 On those particular backgrounds, the running of the supposed Grand 
National war strategy might be put to the test, just to establish its quality, performance and shared aims 
between central and peripheral communities. Overall, various "types of patriotism" would have been in 
operation.108 
3. Neutrals in the Grand National strategy. Actually, this is the point that brings up the main issues to be 
dealt with in the following pages. What did that supposed national strategy consist in neutrals? What about 
their incentives? What were the overlaps and major obstacles for the propaganda achievements on that field? 
To dig into these themes, we should start with the way in which frames of mind about German harassment 
were initially shaped. The necessity of articulating unfolded aggressive self-defense policies turns to be in the 
focus, in combination with the extent in which new standards proved to be adaptable to each neutral context.  
To that aim, attention will be paid to three significant stages: (1.) the previous months to the war, from 
February to June 1914; (2) the very beginning of the conflict, October 1914; and, finally, to assess propaganda 
handicaps (3) between July 1917 and March 1918.  
 
Waging "War of Words": Is it All about Business? 
 
 "MERCHANT PESSIMISMS" FORGES NATIONALTHREATS 
 
In September 1914 a compilation of the "Dispatches from his Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin respecting an 
official German organization for influencing the press of other countries" was presented to both houses of 
British Parliament. It was a collection of confidential reports issued between February and June 1914 by the 
former ambassador at Berlin, William E. Goshen, dealing with an alleged German project for a powerful secret 
association, so-called "Association for World-Commerce", to the aim of promoting industrial prestige and the 
spread of political influence.109 By then, the cabinet was to clarify the steps to be made to fight German 
propaganda. At the same time, the Neutral Press Committee was created under the Home Office sphere.110  
But, paradoxically, the pre-war German plans appeared to be not so much an aggressive proposal as a 
defensive one. Their promoters declared that they intended to fight the "dark forces" operating by means of 
hostile propaganda against German progress in world markets. So, their "Association for World-Commerce" 
was to remedy that "evil with persistent pro-German propaganda in the countries most being complained 
of".111 Funding for the project was to be provided by a particular group of companies, while their technical 
agents would be responsible for advising entrepreneurs in foreign markets. Particularly, Goshen pointed to the 
launch of the German American Economic Society, the German Argentine Association and the German 
Canadian Society. 
 Nonetheless, despite the secrecy in which the bidding was conducted, the design of the strategy caused 
great controversy. Internal dissensions soon appeared between the Central Association of German Industrials 
and its main rival, the Federation of Industrials, to the point that by March 1914 several important members 
had resigned their seats.112 Late in spring, it was claimed that lines of work, regarding the German reputation 
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abroad, had "been transferred to another more delicate and more or less secret organization".113  So, British 
concerns were raised about not only the official encouragement "commanding enormous revenue for the 
purposes of a pro-German newspaper propaganda" but also the under covered nature of that budding 
organization. In other words, propaganda was then linked with the incoming process of intelligence-gathering 
activities in the dawn of the foundation of the secret services. Commercial intelligence was indeed the starting 
point of a subterranean "war of words".  
From February 1914 onwards, some meetings would have been held by the head of the Press Bureau of the 
German Foreign Office, Dr. Hamann, with members of leading holdings in attendance, namely the North 
German Lloyd, the Hamburg-America Company, the Deutsche Bank, Siemens, Krupp...etc.114 Eventually, that 
secret organization would also have entered into agreement with the Agence Havas, which in future would 
only publish German news coming from Wolff Telegraphen Bureau. Besides, Wolff would receive that news 
exclusively from the propaganda organization to be founded. Similar arrangements would be intended with 
Reuter wherever it kept the primacy as a news agency.115  
However, that British confidential information might be brought into question. Reports might be 
considered less accurate than had intended to be presented in September 1914.  Although the Deutsche Export 
Review had published in June further stuff on a syndicate for supplying news and spread “the knowledge of the 
true state of German industry and of Germany's cultural achievements", it was also remarked that the syndicate 
used the organization already in existence. 116  Moreover, those dispatches informed of an alleged private 
company with such a "conveniently vague purpose" as promoting the German industrial prestige. It seems that 
there was as much of conjecture in German formulations as in British perceptions of them:117   
 
Whether the evil exist or not -the money will be spent on secret service to popularize Germany abroad. It does not 
seem to have occurred to the promoters of the scheme that they are preparing the ground for a vast system of 
international blackmail- hardly a proper way to reach the desire end.  
 
But apart whether accurate or not was thinking on an inimical blackmail system, what appears more 
interesting are the countries where the alleged system was to be implemented in. These were chiefly the South 
American states and those of the Far East, where Great Britain, once the war broke out, first left behind the 
"business as usual" by approval of trading with the enemy exceptional laws covering British monopolist 
practices. 118  In those peripheral and quasi colonial theatres, the conflict had no sooner flared up than 
international law and neutral rights blurred. So in the end, British counter-measures sought to be modeled on 
German ones. There was by far a pattern to repeat in the mobilization of national merchant communities 
abroad.119  
On the eve of the First World War, growing merchant insecurities, whether being unfounded or not, were 
thus reversely reflected in the German and the British. How would this affect propaganda course?  
 
THE MOMENT OF TRUTH 
 
In the autumn of 1914 the propaganda system, despite being started without any clear conception, was in 
operation in neutral countries. At this initial stage, our object is to measure the position being occupied by the 
commercial issue in procedures. The memorandum by Max Müller on leading neutral countries press, 
addressed in October to the Foreign Office, can enable us to follow some useful examples. 
Consistently with British pre-war naval and economic planning, Scandinavian and northern European 
neutrals, bordering on the enemy, were soon spotlighted. Closed attention was firstly paid to Sweden because 
of the apparently pro-German bulk of opinion, in particular in the conservative and military sides. Despite the 
intensity of German campaigns and the "natural" hostile feeling aroused with the inclusion of iron ore in the 
British contraband list, Müller's document stressed on the counteracting measure that a bilateral commercial 
agreement might offer (what indeed would not be as easy as thought then). Strikingly, it was also suggested 
that in business questions, Swedes were neutral.120 In that sense, Müller put across some views regarding 
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Swedish position, mainly coming from an electric firm in Norway. More examples of Scandinavian press 
claims on neutrality were given (most of them indirectly through correspondents in Sweden).  
Generally, neutrality was perceived as a political state of military and economic dependency on 
belligerents, which would limit the freedom of neutral speech and press. The Danish example was very clear.  
Although the public opinion in Denmark would definitely be anti-German, the strong commercial connections 
between the two countries “would restrain the Danes from any two uncompromising expression of their 
feelings in this respect".121 However, exceptions were made. The Norwegian "spirit of independence" would 
not hesitate to express conveniently its opinions freely and favorably for the Allies, raising objections "to be 
spoon-fed with readymade opinions either from one side or the other" and particularly by Wolff Bureau and 
Björnson agencies.122 But the Morgenbladet had also published a leading article against the press campaign 
being conducted from both sides to wage their particular "war about the war". Moreover, it was pointed out 
how the Norwegian Journal of Commerce and Navigation of the 29th September had taken “a strong exception 
to the action of the British Government in declaring iron ore contraband of war".123 Concerning Holland, as in 
other neutral countries, the newspapers would have been "deluged with German papers, pamphlets, and 
circular letters" while "there was a great feeling of irritation at the measures taken by Great Britain to check 
any trade through Holland with Germany".124 German propaganda was taking advantage of British restrictions 
on neutral trade. That was also the case in the United States where commercial and maritime blockade matters 
caused main political controversies.  Later, it would be suggested that propaganda work should be closely in 
touch with the Ministry of Blockade. 
Regarding British retaliatory measures, Swiss arguments were singled out by Müller. Some newspapers 
stressed on the inconvenience of expressing  anti-British feeling because of the negative effects on the export 
trade of Switzerland after the war, “as it must not be forgotten that the British Empire provided one of the best 
markets” for Swiss production. 125  The Swiss economy was indeed very dependent on the British naval 
restraints in the Mediterranean. Since August 1914, the Gibraltar flotilla stopped and examined almost all ships 
which left America bound for Italy and Switzerland, monitoring and putting pressure on the Portuguese and 
Spanish international transit trade.126  
Moreover, the campaigns promoted by German consulates and the Deutsche Lloyd Company in Italy were 
noticed.127 In October 28th the British Consul at Venetia put German attacks down on paper. He asked 
"whether any steps had been taken to combat the German methods" at the same time he pointed out that it was 
foreign to British nature to imitate German course of action.128 Precisely, British merchant views on Italian 
public opinion were a distinguished source of political information.   
So at the beginning of the "war about the war" in neutral countries, the commercial issue became quite 
noticeable while political and economic arguments were mixed together, having an effect on British self-
representations of being a neutral defender. The Danish press, for instance, discussed rumors about British 
Government’s plans to violate their neutrality, remarking the contradictions of those alleged plans coming 
from a nation “that has actually gone to war to protect the neutrality of another small country".129 All in all, 
interferences in domestic affairs of neutrals tended to imply violating international law, as it was very apparent 
in British actions towards sea trade. In spite of evidences, the memorandum concluded expressing in positive 
terms and evading most controversial aspects derived from commercial and maritime interferences affecting 
neutrals. But, unfortunately for the British propaganda scheme, it would not be possible to evade those aspects 
for ever. 
 
 THE THORN OF DOUBLE STANDARDS (1917-1918) 
 
In July 1917 the work on neutral press was considered to be unsatisfactory. Several reports pointed to the 
neglect of the special psychology and prejudices of the countries to which the propaganda was being sent.130 A 
carefully inspection of what had been done until then hardly revealed any such accurate propaganda. The 
extracts used to be "constructed on somewhat mechanical lines". Once again, attention would be paid to 
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commercial affairs in every country. The Department of Information, hosted by the Foreign Office, made a 
plea for a "business section". Although some breakthroughs came from Sweden, much of the stuff appeared "to 
have no distinctive aim or value".131 The same was said about Holland and Spain, where propaganda had 
shown a lack of "intimate knowledge" of domestic affairs. According to the information provided in the 
memorandum, many complaints had arrived from Spain about half-measures and conflicting actions. So, 
broadly speaking, the propaganda scheme inside neutrals was not going entirely to plan even in the last months 
of the war. 
In March 1918, a wide range of severe structural weaknesses were highlighted; notwithstanding, two key 
issues were the scant British share in foreign publishing markets and the neutral ignorance of the British 
political system and values.132 At that time, it was intended to give more facilities to special correspondents to 
bear testimony to the British "ideals of political liberty and justice". But, overall, commercial propaganda 
remained a noticeable issue. It should clearly be improved in countries like Switzerland, where propaganda 
had mainly been confined to the subsidizing of the Swiss Export Review, "largely instrumental in giving 
[Britons] a hold over the "Zürcher Post".133 Moreover, in regard to advertising, keeping British "peace aims to 
the fore and take into account after war commercial enterprise" was considered a requirement for all 
operations, "by whatever means".134  
But paradoxically, British enterprise had vigorously been engaged in propaganda aims since the onset of 
war. The point was the inconsistency between the expressed attitudes and the actual behavior through 
dominant positions in neutral markets. Particularly, the use of the dreaded blacklist entailed important revenues 
but also disadvantages for the national sake.  
The blacklist was a register of natural and legal persons, with whom nationals were prohibited by their 
government from contractual union. The extension of British blacklisting affecting neutral companies offered 
powerful political counterarguments in the propaganda field, so the issue became a thorn in advertising the 
British cause 1917 onwards. The British followed a double standard policy. Supposedly, they were pursuing in 
neutral countries the same monopolist policies they denounced in the Germans. War turned into a stage to do 
more business than usual, capturing markets at the expense of non-inimical interests.  
This was for example a case for the legitimacy of the Allied cause in Spain, where it was common to hear 
talk of the British “blacklist business”. 135 But German agents found a particularly fertile field to win over 
public opinion in South America, especially in Argentina where the veto system might have worked harshly. 
Dehne showed how British Chambers of Commerce played there a key role with a "more constructive form of 
participation in the war effort" promoting an aggressive "anti German" commercial policy.136 The Foreign 
Office would also have tilted an ear to the merchant patriots who wished to foster national trade in the South 
American republics.137  
But the intended patriotic policy against the enemy trade did not always run for the benefit of the British 
reputation. A memorandum brought to the Foreign Office put it plainly:138 
 
The gravest mistake in policy has been the introduction and method of operating the Black List in Argentina. The 
Policy of our Government at this time should surely be one of expediency and I say emphatically that the operation 
of the black list in the Argentine attacks the sovereignty of that people, alienates the commercial community, 
damages British prestige and British commercial interests, and has failed entirely in its avowed objects -to cripple 
and kill German trade. 
 
On those terms, the Black List would have failed to erode German commercial houses because of the use of 
"cloaks". While vetoes were damaging neutral pro-British companies "to almost an exaggerated point", pro-
German interests went easily ahead. This was the case of the company Salaberry and Bertheche. As long as 
Salaberry was the Argentinean Minister of Finance, it would be impossible to put the firm on the Black List.139  
The memorandum also stressed on the kind of communications that blacklisted firms received from the 
British commercial attaché: 140  
 
of a such nature which would lead one to believe that one was living in a country under the jurisdiction of England 
instead of being a neutral country under an independent Government.  
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Deep concern was specially raised on how vetoes ruined British prestige while "best friends which England 
has ever possessed out there" were being lost. Moreover, Argentines in high positions would be losing their 
sympathy for England “on account of their utter disgust of [British] methods" and their inconsistencies.141 It 
was argued that no amount of propaganda might wipe out the damage. 
 In the end, a radical revision of merchant policy was unsuccessfully recommended. The author of the 
report probably was observing not only a state of things in common to neutral countries; also he was upholding 
some local and partisan interests considered to be adversely (or rather unfairly) affected by the application of 
blacklisting.  
However, the point here is to highlight the extent in which British policies applied to neutrals were difficult 
to reconcile with the chosen rhetoric of respect for neutral rights. The influence of some lobbies in the Foreign 
Office, in conjunction with commercial engagement "from bellow", turned war into a stage to do more 
business than usual capturing neutral markets (and not only at the expense of the enemy). That questionable 
way of thinking brought undesirable effects for the propaganda work. All in all, it would not be easy to correct 
some miscalculations or flaws in the British mobilization in neutrals due to the primacy of the partisan views 
on trade rivalry. The national trenches of commercial warfare were dug, under misconceived incentives, before 
the real war had broken out. Commercial warfare might primarily be considered a state of mind crashing into 
the enemy one.  
So the "war of words" or the "war about the war" was no such a simple task as it was thought in 1914. 
There was also a neutral counterpart willing to send a feedback. So, in this aspect as in many others, the Great 
War represented a great testing ground for all belligerent and neutral strategies. 
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Introduction 
 
The British Encyclopedia defines political propaganda as a systematic manipulation of people’s 
convictions by spreading verbal or nonverbal images. Though samples of propaganda could be found even in 
the code of laws compiled on the order of the Babylonian tsar Hammurabi, and the term itself, as it is well 
known, dates back to the famous Catholic organization “Congregatio de propaganda fide” created by the Pope 
Gregory XV in 1622, it was the First World War when the belligerents used political propaganda on an 
unprecedented scale. 
It is difficult to maintain that this theme slips attention of modern historians. At present we have a number 
of published studies by both European and North-American academic scholars who dwell upon such topics as 
organization, methods of implementation and consequences of propaganda’s influence upon the public opinion 
in Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Austria-Hungary and the USA.142 However, Russian effort in this 
field during the Great War is much less known not only to modern public at large but even to professional 
historians.143 
Taking into consideration the deficit of room in a conference paper for a comprehensive analysis of the 
problem in question, I have chosen a topic which deserves a particular study – the Russian official propaganda 
upon neutral countries. What were its aims? What methods did the imperial government apply to influence the 
European public opinion, especially in the non-warring states? Was Russian propaganda effective or not? And, 
finally, how can we appreciate Russia’s contribution to the Entente effort to defeat the Quadruple Alliance in 
the sphere of propaganda? Obviously, the examination of all these questions enables us to reconstruct some 
key episodes of the psychological war as an important integral element of the first global clash of great powers 
in the twentieth century. 
 
 
Russian Propaganda Machine: Establishment, Aims, and Procedures 
 
Above all, it should be stated that although the tsarist government did not make any special preparations for 
a psychological war before 1914, a special Press Department was established in the Russian Foreign Ministry 
as early as in 1902. Its staff supplied the higher leadership of the empire with monthly reviews of foreign 
periodicals. After the First World War had broken out, the Department of Press was obliged to inform Sergei 
Dmitrievich Sazonov, who headed the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in the beginning of war hostilities, and the 
members of the Council of Ministers about all current events, particularly, those regarding situation at the 
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fronts. By the mid 1916 the staff of the Press Department had been increased up to twelve officials engaged in 
reviewing newspapers and magazines which were published in sixteen languages.144 
Apart from the Press Department, the world war gave prominence to another state body – the Main 
Directorate for Press at the Ministry of Interior. It was set up in 1865 and continued to monitor Russian mass 
media, using censorship as a principal method of blocking any objectionable piece of information as well as a 
brain-washing methodic applied to control public opinion, especially in the periods of internal disorder like it 
was in the course of 1905 revolution or external troubles similar to how it happened in the summer of 1914.145 
Doubtlessly, one could not expect the Foreign Ministry Press Department or even less the Ministry of 
Interior Main Directorate for Press to conduct propaganda in the war period, because the activities of that kind 
lay far beyond their functions. Therefore the Head of the Russian Supreme Headquarters (in Russian – Stavka) 
General Nikolai Nikolaevich Yanushkevich suggested in August 1914 to confer the Interdepartmental 
Committee on the measures to counteract dissemination of mendacious rumors about Russia and its army. The 
meeting was attended by high-ranking officials from the principal ministries – Foreign, War, Navy, of Interior 
and Finances along with the head of the Petrograd Telegraph Agency (PTA) – one of the major in Europe 
before WWI. Among other issues on the agenda, the participants lively debated the problem of recruiting staff 
of foreign periodicals (correspondents, journalists), especially in neutral countries, for the needs of the Russian 
political propaganda. They agreed to subsidize such periodicals so that they would assume a friendly position 
towards Russia. Oddly enough, but any qualms of improper recruitment of self-interested correspondents were 
not taken into consideration by the members of the Committee, who projected the main propagandist effort to 
be applied to mass media in Stockholm, Christiania, Copenhagen, the Hague, Bern, Bucharest, Rome and 
Washington. On 14 (27) August 1914 the tsarist Council of Ministers approved the decisions taken by the 
members of the Interdepartmental Committee and adopted some drastic measures to implement “truthful and 
favorable pieces of news about Russia and its army” into the public opinion of the neutral states.146 
It is essential therefore to indicate Russia’s aims in directing propaganda upon neutrals. Firstly, the tsarist 
government strove to prevent such countries as Bulgaria, Romania and Sweden from siding with the Central 
Powers. The second goal correlated with the first one – to entice new allies, meaning the same countries – 
Italy, Romania, Greece, and as a distant perspective – the USA. Thirdly, Russia was doing its best to block the 
purveyance of supplies for German and Austrian armies in the non-warring states along with their shipping of 
strategic raw materials to Russia’s opponents. The next task was to inform the neutrals about success at the 
fronts achieved by the allies and by the tsarist armies most of all. It should have gone hand in hand with the 
disclosure of falsifications about alleged military achievements of the Central Powers. Lastly, it was important 
to draw attention of all the Europeans to war crimes committed by German and Austrian advancing troops and 
occupation administration towards civilians in the front zone, including destruction of cultural heritage – 
historic monuments, public libraries, churches and cathedrals on the territory of Belgium, Northern France 
Serbia and western provinces of the Russian Empire.  
The Russian Foreign Ministry’s activities in the sphere of political propaganda were arranged according to 
the following procedure: after reviewing confidential reports by Russian diplomatic emissaries in neutral 
countries, experts in Petrograd would compile telegrams rebutting enemy’s allegations and send them through 
the PTA to the European capitals, Washington and Tokyo. If a nugget of information was of top significance, 
its content was examined and approved by the Foreign Minister himself or at least by his deputies. In particular 
cases, political telegrams needed the Council of Ministers’ agreement. The addresses of these telegrams were 
Russian diplomatic missions and state or private telegraph agencies, such as: Reuter (London), Havas (Paris), 
Ritzau (Copenhagen), Associated Press (Washington), Kukusai (Tokyo), etc. Interestingly, Reuter became the 
closest partner of the PTA during WWI, albeit, on the other hand, the two agencies rivaled in Denmark or 
Netherlands.147 
It should be noted that apart from diplomats Russian military used the PTA’s facilities too. Thus, Stavka 
and the Main Directorate of the General Staff (MDGS) – the central coordinating organ of the War Ministry in 
intelligence and strategic planning – used to dispatch their official messages to Russian military attaches 
accredited at the supreme headquarters of the Entente powers and at the capitals of neutral states. 
However, there existed another channel of political propaganda – the so called Balkan Telegraph Agency 
(BTA), which was set up in Romania by the Russian Ministry of Finance as a private company. The principal 
task of the BTA was to closely cooperate with French and Dutch mass media in order to propagate news to 
Paris and Amsterdam through the Balkans. Although the Foreign Ministry’s bureaucrats did not have much 
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delight in communicating to the BTA, they frequently used its network of correspondents, especially in 1914-
1915. Yet the entry of Bulgaria, Romania and Greece in the First World War, on one side, and the defeat of 
Serbia and Montenegro, on the other, had substantially limited the scope of the BTA’s activities by the 
beginning of 1917.148 
 
 
Reorganization of the Russian Propaganda Bureaus in the Course of War       
 
After a few months of war, it became clear to the leadership of the Russian Empire that the organization of 
propaganda upon neutrals required a kind of restructuring. In fact, a lot of military experts regarded it to be 
primarily passive and cautious, instead of turning into aggressive and effective weapons of psychological war. 
They criticized both the Foreign Ministry’s officials and the PTA staffers for the deficit of initiative and 
imagination. The majority of experts were of the opinion that the news about Russian war effort lacked 
arguments and rapidity, while the Polish, Jewish or Ukrainian problems were glossed over by tsarist 
authorities. Judging by the contest of propaganda messages, their authors attempted to draw the reader’s 
attention to the inexhaustibility of mineral resources, human potential and financial assets of the Romanovs’ 
Empire, which was doomed to gain victory over all external enemies because Russia’s economic and military 
supremacy would only increase in the course of WWI .149 
However, the state of affairs in the field of propaganda could not satisfy both Stavka and the General Staff 
of the Russian army. The letter addressed to Sazonov by General Aleksandr Petrovich Vernander, the Assistant 
of the War Minister, reflected the critical reaction by the military circles to the conduct of political propaganda 
in Europe. On 31 January (12 February) 1915 Vernander proposed to the Foreign Minister not to confine the 
propaganda effort in neutral countries with the exposure of false rumors and other Russophobe pieces of 
information concerning the most painful problems, such as failures of the active army on the front or the 
increasing dissatisfaction expressed by various social strata with regard to the political crisis in the empire. 
Vernander called upon Sazonov to diversify the content of telegraph messages by more positive information 
about Russia in order to make elites and ordinary people in non-belligerent states less hostile towards the 
autocratic Russian state. The Assistant of the War Minister pointed out to the significance of a bilateral 
rapprochement between Russia and Sweden, Denmark or Netherlands through the establishment of societies of 
friendship, chambers of commerce and joint ventures. Finally, he insisted on close collaboration between the 
MDGS and the Foreign Ministry in the sphere of propaganda, including their combined allocations on relevant 
projects.150 
In the letter of response, Sazonov expressed his content to reinforce Russian influence upon public opinion 
in neutral countries, but offered to the General Staff a kind of limited cooperation in the exchange of 
intelligence between two departments, yet under the supreme control exercised by the Foreign Ministry. 
Evidently, the initiative of this kind could meet the interests neither of Stavka nor of the MDGS, as it 
demonstrated a prolonged interdepartmental correspondence. In fact, the mentioned bureaucratic frictions 
seriously hampered reorganization of the structures responsible for Russian political propaganda abroad.151 
Nevertheless, to counteract German propaganda through central Swiss newspapers, the Russian emissaries 
set up a special information bureau “Die Neue Korrespondenz” and a news agency called “Radio” in the end of 
1915. Their activities were sponsored jointly by France, Britain, Italy and Russia. At the Entente conferences 
in Chantilly near Paris, which were held in the course of 1915, the allies decided to wage a propagandist 
campaign on a mass scale so that it could disclaim news published in German and Austrian periodicals and to 
supply leading newspapers in Switzerland and other neutral countries with pro-Entente pieces of information 
with the assistance of the said bureau and agency.152 
While criticizing the methods used by the Russian Foreign Ministry in the psychological war against 
adversaries and finding no sympathy with diplomatic officials, Stavka and the MDGS, in particular, were 
bound to set up their own organizations of propaganda. Originally, this function was relied on the General-
Quartermaster Section of the MDGS, which disseminated their press-releases through the PTA channels to 
European countries. However, in August 1915 Stavka founded its own information agency under the name of 
“Nord-Züd” with its branches in Stockholm, Copenhagen and Bucharest. Significantly, the agency staff was 
engaged not only in carrying out political propaganda but in collecting intelligence as well. Soon the branches 
of the “Nord-Züd” progressed in Switzerland and Netherlands during WWI. Based noth on military 
intelligence and news circulating in open mass media, the “Nord-Züd” bulletins were cabled to the branches 
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abroad for further transfer of information to editorial boards of newspapers and magazines in neutral countries. 
Apart from making news on current events, Stavka and the MDGS edited and propagated in such states a 
number of agitation pamphlets stigmatizing the military policy of the Central Powers.153 
Early in 1916, the same MDGS again endeavored to smooth conflicts between the Russian military and 
diplomatic service. The high-ranking military experts submitted a report to the tsar and the Council of 
Ministers drawing their attention to the increased effectiveness of German propaganda. They suggested to 
adopt a comprehensive program of agitation aimed at countries with a neutral status, e.g. publication of photo 
albums, production of documentaries reflecting daily routine on the front-line and in the rear of active troops, 
carrying out radio broadcasting on heroic deeds by Russian combatants and exposing cruelties committed by 
enemy soldiers on the occupied territories. After the report was discussed at the very top of the state 
bureaucracy, another Special Committee including representatives from both the War and Foreign Ministries 
was set up to primarily focus its activities upon neutrals.154 
  Many contemporaries commented on the intensification of Russian propaganda effort in Europe during 
1916. It may be explained by the Foreign Ministry Press Department’s reorganization similarly to how it had 
been done in France and Britain. Besides, the department’s new administration sought to use the allies’ 
experience in fixing contacts with newspapers of different political orientation, interviewing top military 
commanders and statesmen, not excluding the deputies of the Duma, and disclaiming mendacious rumors 
spreading about neutral countries by the opponents. The establishment of a new independent publishing house 
should also be taken into consideration, which was obliged to wage propaganda on the territory of neutral 
states through the recruitment of famous academic scholars, writers, journalists, etc. Its composition would 
consist of three chief departments – that of foreign policy, economic and cultural.155 
Yet in reality, only the departments of photo and film production, information work with Russian and 
foreign press and advertisement were founded. In addition, the Foreign Ministry constantly expanded the 
networks of correspondents in neutral countries while increasing financial subsidies to central and local papers. 
Their activities were of the most success in Denmark, Netherlands and Switzerland. According to modern 
calculations, the total expenses of the Russian Foreign Ministry on the conduct of political propaganda during 
WWI aggregated 1,000 000 roubles, that was equal to 500, 000 US dollars or 100, 000 British pounds.156 
But the lack of interdepartmental cooperation still hindered the Russian propaganda effort in Europe, 
especially after the War Ministry representatives had ceased to attend regular conferences of the above 
mentioned Special Committee since May 1916. Instead, they initiated publication of the propagandist leaflets 
which were dispatched to Russian official military agents in neutral countries. In addition, they set to produce 
documentaries, competing in this way with the members of the so-called Skobelev Committee for the 
Wounded, the public organization which monopolized this field of propaganda activities long before the war. 
The broadcasting of news through army radio stations, in spite of their low capacity, became another trend in 
the propaganda campaign by the military administration. 
The progress of the “Nord-Züd” agency seemed to be most impressive, taking into account the reshuffle it 
underwent in June 1916 when Stavka transferred the control to the MDGS. The fact was that a new method of 
work with information was invented: the agency staffers got in touch with small private press bureaus abroad, 
recruited local journalists and did not hesitate to publish their materials even in left-wing periodicals, e.g. those 
in the social-democratic spectrum of political parties. According to the statistics, the “Nord- Züd” managed to 
publish ca 2750 lines in Danish papers during a fortnight in July 1916. Simultaneously, it succeeded to place 
their bulletins of news nearly in all central periodicals of Sweden, varying from conservative to socialistic, 
even in those funded by the Central Powers. The apogee was reached in Romania and Switzerland by the mid-
1916. Suffice it to say that by March 1917 the “Nord-Züd” provided telegraph information to 14 principal 
Romanian periodicals and 30 Swiss newspapers.157  
 
Effect of the 1917 February Revolution in Russia on Political Propaganda 
 
After the democratic revolution broke out in Russia in February (March) 1917, the General Staff 
determined to further aggrandize the activities of the “Nord-Züd”, e.g. on the territory of the USA, where it 
was to get in contact with such world-known news-makers as the “Associated Press” (AP) and the “United 
Press International” (UPI). In summer 1917 the Russian representatives negotiated with the prominent 
transnational company “Western Union” on the matter of utilizing its telegraph stations for propaganda as well 
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as on the publication of news bulletins in some Japanese and Chinese periodicals.158 At the same time, the 
Russian Foreign Ministry began to set up press bureaus at the diplomatic missions in Paris, London, Rome, 
Washington, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Christiania, and Bern. The Committee of Allied Press Contributors was 
also established in Petrograd in the fall 1917 to better coordinate propaganda work done by the Entente powers 
in neutral countries.159 
Any further stimulation of propaganda activities on the Russian side ceased because of the Bolshevik coup 
in October (November) 1917. The new government headed by Vladimir Lenin sought to redirect the general 
propaganda campaign from disclaiming the policy carried on by Germany and Austria-Hungary, which signed 
the peace treaty with Soviet Russia in Brest-Litovsk on 3 March 1918, to stigmatizing Russia’s former allies – 
Britain, France, the USA and Japan. Under these circumstances, the activities of the Foreign Ministry Press 
Department and the agencies controlled by the General Staff came to an end while the PTA was restructured 
into the Russian Telegraph Agency (known as the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union since 1925). Its main 
task became the propaganda of world revolution among workers in the West and colonial people in the East. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
One can draw to the conclusion that, despite the lack of experience and coordination with the allies, 
interdepartmental conflicts, insufficient financing and some other problems, the Russian government was faced 
with in the beginning of WWI, it managed to establish various propaganda bodies either in the structure of the 
Foreign Ministry or under the auspices of the Supreme Headquarters (Stavka) and the General Staff. The year 
of 1916 marked a culmination of Russia’s effort to carry on propaganda in neutral countries through various 
structures which subsidized foreign journalists and set up private news agencies sponsored also by the Entente 
powers. 
The archival documents reveal that Russian propagandists were most active in the Scandinavian states, 
Switzerland and Netherlands. The branches of such agencies as the PTA or “Nord-Züd” did well even in the 
USA, though most successfully only through 1917. 
   This study makes it clear that the real problem was mentality of Russian ruling elites, rather conservative 
in understanding the significance of propaganda influence upon neutral countries. However, the effectiveness 
of propaganda activities carried on by the allied powers, not excluding Russia, might be proved by the fact that 
Italy, Romania and Greece finally sided with the Entente, while Sweden, Denmark and Netherlands remained 
neutral through WWI. The contribution of those experts, including Russian civil officials and military officers, 
engaged in propaganda activities of the Entente powers to this aim seems substantial, though underestimated 
by modern scholars.  
Besides, the abundance of methods approbated by administrators of propaganda campaigns in the long run 
of the First World War laid the foundations for one of the Soviet brain-washing machine – one of the most 
powerful and effective in the twentieth century.  
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Summary 
 
 The Second World War was the most significant conflict of the twentieth century, either by the degree of 
military technology or by the unprecedented mobilization that were undertaken the people, assuming as true 
example of total war . The conflict went out of the trenches and moved up so fast and spread  to various fields 
(economic , diplomatic , political , social , cultural ),  making the  home front  one of the most important scene 
of war . In this new kind of war the support and loyalty of the population became decisive in the development 
of the conflict, thereby giving a key role to the advertising.  Thus, the war came to readers, listeners and 
viewers who were transformed into soldiers without weapons, essential pieces in war industries and the 
maintenance of morale. 
Poland was the scene of the beginning, middle and end of the conflict during World War II. This situation has 
decimated a significant portion of the population, leading another part to a mass escape, transforming the 
country from a multiple battlefronts, where the belligerents sought through advertising to get the sympathy and 
support of the Polish population to their causes. 
This work will focus on the analysis of journalistic texts announced on International Affairs called the Journal 
Daily News (1925-1945). The focus of the research will be directed to the message and the imagery of the 
texts, without forgetting the balance quantity. Efforts will be made to show how advertising was used to 
criticize the opponents, while the values defended were known . The uplift of the machines of war and strife in 
their respective military conquests also had their spaces in the newspaper, at least while the conflict is found 
deadlocked. It also will be shown, how news involving the European journals reflected in the national press 
and consequently were received by Polish Immigrant Centers in South of Brazil  
 
Keywords: Polish immigrants; World War II ; Advertising 
 
 
Initial Considerations 
 
Trying to present explanatory reasons that justify the displacement of thousands of people from one 
continent to another does not require an immediate and simple answer.   The implication is even greater when 
it presents as central authors these Polish immigrants. The displacement of thousands of Polish people in the 
interwar period (1918-1945) was an encouragement to men and women that run away from unemployment, 
hunger and violence warmongering that was present in the daily lives of Europeans. The first Polish people to 
arrive in Brazil was in 1875. 
This article seeks to analyze the impact of the news and facts about World War II in the Centers of Polish 
Immigration in Southern Brazil.  As you know, in the nineteenth century, like other European countries, 
Poland was in serious economic, political and social crisis which forced thousands of individuals travel to the 
New World . Also, in this paper, we seek to identify the impact of World War II through the state press in 
collective living spaces.  
__________________ 
* PhD in History. Professor at University Estadual do Rio Grande do Sul – Brazil. 
 
The text is divided into 3 parts: Polish Immigration in Brazil and movements between the wars, the 
country (Brazil)  of the immigrants in World War II and the War Press . 
 
1. Polish Immigration in Brazil and movements between the wars 
The reasons of Polish Immigration were several and deep. In the nineteenth century, like other European 
countries, Poland was in serious economic, political and social crisis, which forced thousands of individuals 
travel to the New World. However,  in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,  Poland was considered  a 
powerful nation, politically organized and  with considerable economic development. 
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This positive Polish scene was due to the export of  tar, cereals,  wood and sawdust to Western Europe, 
particularly the Netherlands, England and northern Germany,  a fact that increased the income of the nobility, 
as well as the cities . 
In the political sphere, this was a period of vigor and absence of external threats. The few wars were only 
found on the northern border of Poland and Lithuania. However, we observed the growing interest of Prussia 
and Russia to the Polish nation. The correlation of forces was not favorable to Poland. 
The growth of the Polish nation awoke the attention of his neighbors:  Austria, Prussia and Russia, which 
triggered a series of invasions, fragmenting the political and economic stability. This led many Polishes to 
leave the country in search of worthy and free life. 
 The Poland of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had characteristics antagonistic to those of their 
larger neighbors: Prussia and Russia. While these countries centered power, the Polish nation knew the 
weakening of central power. The Polish army was constituted mainly of peasant militias maintained and 
controlled by the nobility, which was used by the central government in defensive wars. (WACHOVICZ,1974 
. 83) . 
 The overall situation was ripe to change. However, the nobility did not allow the reduction of their power, 
nullifying attempts to change the Diet (House). Diet - Sejm - was governed by anachronistic laws who referred 
the country to a political disorganization. 
The liberum veto was presented as a defense of the liberties of minorities. He gave the right to every Member 
of the Sejm to annul a parliamentary decision. Generally, the veto was exercised for the benefit of the nobility. 
In voting concerning tax bill, the veto prevented the tax should be extended to nobles. The veto power 
precluded the Polish parliament to legislate based on the power of majority. Any group annulled the 
parliamentary work; no matter how important was the decision. (POLSKA AGENCJA INFORMACYNA, 
1991, p. 4 ) . 
Among the main reasons for the migratory movement, it can be mentioned the excess of  labor in the 
villages and towns, the high population growth, lack of land for new generations, the absence of agrarian 
legislation, the rural exodus to the industrial centers due to rural mechanization, political and religious 
persecution. Undoubtedly, the major reason for immigration was the possibility to immigrate to a country 
where they could become a landowner. (WENCZENOVICZ, 2002, Chapter I) 
There was also the action of propagandists and recruiters immigrants who were known as "recruiting agents”. 
These people spread through various regions of Poland, for the purpose to stimulate people to emigrate. Spread 
articles, booklets, brochures and press released about the exceptional conditions offered by Brazil. 
In Poland, as noted, such agents found favorable field work due to the numerous economic and political 
problems - three shares territorial and social lived by the Polish population of the time. The Kingdom of 
Poland and Galicia were the regions that most felt the effect of the action of recruiting agents. (Urban, 2004, p. 
24 ) 
In Poland it was almost impossible to become a landowner. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the 
political and economic power was in the hands of the nobility. The small and middle bourgeoisie progressed 
with difficulty, while the high bourgeoisie linked to the high nobility, quickened his step, without questioning 
the current structure. "The Polish peasants, under the rule Prussian or in other fields, lived in a very 
hierarchical social system. In a village social classes were distinct and their mobility very hierarchical.” 
(WACHOVICZ, 1974, p . 86). Obligated to farm the land, the peasant ceded much of his work as income. 
In this context that blocked social mobility since the subaltern segments, the peasant was seen and known as a 
simple arm strength, generating of work. His aloofness to almost everything that was located outside their 
village and surroundings – okolica, supported by the aristocracy and the clergy, humpered him to fight for 
imposing the division of land and agrarian laws. 
 
Living as a community semi-feudal the Polish had few opportunities to belong to social institutions. The 
municipality and the parish were his world. His participation in the social institutions was very limited. 
Restrictive government measures meant that their participation in municipal administration were as a passive   
spectator. (WACHOVICH, 1974:86) 
 
Also the small owner found himself in big trouble. "In the economic area, the situation of Polishes became 
even more excruciating. Property and territorial taxes were so heavy that the owners couldn’t afford it and 
because of this they were forced to sell their small properties. "(Stawinski 1976: 15). For decades of years the 
Polish economy had its foundations in agriculture, with emphasis on some basic products such as potatoes, rye 
and wheat. The Posmânia and Vorpommern were good examples: They were essentially agricultural regions, 
with a number of fledgling industries. 
The agrarian character of Poland and the lack of land explain the fact that the vast majority of Poles who 
left for Brazil to be peasant. "The peasant, greedy for land, which drew their sustenance comes to look  for it 
where it exists in abundance, in America. This is the great aspiration of those who choose Brazil as their new 
habitat. Ninety percent of those who came to this country are farmers."(WACHOVICZ 1974: 27)  
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Two major periods characterized the Polish migration to Brazil between 1890 and World War I , appointed 
by the historiography of " Brazilian Fever " . The first was from 1890 until 1897, when the Brazilian 
government provided free transportation for immigrants through contracts with shipping companies, and the 
second began in 1906. 
The first groups of Poles headed to Parana and Rio Grande do Sul.  São Paulo, Minas Gerais and Espirito 
Santo also received Poles, who were scattered by the urban centers and the coffee farms. From 1897 to 1906, 
fell sharply the number of Polish immigrants, immigrants arrived just isolated, usually drawn by friends and 
relatives residing in Brazil. 
It is noted that the second period begins around 1906, when Brazil , needing cheap  and large labor for the 
construction of roads , railways, notably São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul , it goes back to its former policy of 
providing free passage to those who wished to immigrate . 
You can point in the history of Polish immigration a periodization of the detailed steps of the migration 
process. This is divided into seven periods : 1º - until 1869 - beginning of mass emigration; 2º) 1869/90 - the 
first phase of mass emigration ; 3º) 1890/1914 - Brazilian stage of fever; 4º) 1914/1918 / 20 - fall of emigration 
caused by World War I and national events ; 5º) 1918/1939 - emigration directed actions related to the Polish 
state ; 6 º) 1939/1945 - step refugees of war ; 7º) 1945 - contemporary stage. "( Smolana 1996: 23 ) . 
 
2.  Brazil of Immigrants in World War II 
 
Since the beginning of World War II, the ideology of the “Estado Novo”, established by Getulio Vargas, 
pointed to a probable alignment between Brazil and the countries of the Pact of Steel - Germany and Italy. In 
1937 Vargas had installed a dictatorship in the country, based on a centralizing and authoritarian constitution, 
which kept many points in common with the fascist dictatorships. The declaration of Vargas himself 
commenting on the invasion of Poland by Nazi army, on September 1st, 1939, showed some sympathy for 
Nazism to provide for a better future: 
 
"We marched for a future different from all that we have known in  economic, political and social organization. 
Passed the era of liberalism improvident demagoguery of sterile, futile of personalities and sowers of disorder." 
( VARGAS : 1939-1943 Tomo. I) 
 
Repression: this was the political order in Brazil at the time of World War II. The New State decreed on 
November 10th, 1937, closed the Congress, imposed press censorship, arrested political and trade union 
leaders and placed intervening in state government.  With a populist style, Vargas set up a consistent schedule 
personal propaganda to create the Department of Press and Propaganda (DIP), clearly inspired by the Nazi 
propaganda machine designed by Joseph Goebbels. The Time of Brazil introduced in Brazilian radios and 
ironically called by intellectuality “Foreign Alone ", showed the government actions, hiding political 
repression practiced against a not organized society of that time. Vargas created the minimum wage and 
established the Consolidation of Labor Laws ( CLT ), among other social benefits, which led him to be called  
" father of the poor " by the low-income population . ( FAUST , 2006 , Chapter IV ) 
In 1940, one year after the outbreak in Europe, the war has not threatened directly Brazil.  The Nazi 
ideology, however, fascinated men who operated the New State to the extent that Francisco Campos, the 
author of the 1937 Constitution, even proposed to the German embassy in Brazil conducting a " anticomintern 
exposure ", with which he intended to demonstrate the failure of the communist political model . ( 
Cytrynowicz : 2000 . Chapter I ) 
Later, the police chief Filinto Muller sent Brazilian police for a “stage " in the Gestapo . Goés Monteiro, 
head of the Army Staff, went further. Participated in maneuvers of the German army and threatened to break 
with England when the British seized the ship Siqueira Campos, that brought to Brazil the weapons bought 
from the Germans. 
There are differing interpretations of the posture Vargas front the outbreak of World War II. The traditional 
view sees the president as a skilled politician, who postponed as much as he could to formalize a position on 
the conflict, where it could gain from the economic point of view, from both sides. The great dream of the 
President was the industrialization of Brazil and he intended to obtain external resources.  In 1940 the Minister 
Souza Costa published a Five Year Plan, which provided for the retrofitting of the railways, the building of the 
Paulo Afonso hydroelectric, the installation of an aircraft industry and the construction of Steelworks in Volta 
Redonda. ( COGGIOLA : 2002 . Chapter III ) 
Another view considers the position of Vargas front war as an expression of a contradiction in that the 
country depended more strongly the U.S. economy and at the same time has a structure similar to the policy of 
the Axis countries. The favorable position in Germany could jeopardize the country's economic development 
since the Nazis, despite advancing in Europe, in South America were of secondary interest. On the contrary, 
the defense of the U.S. interests could compromise the internal politics of Vargas. 
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However, the U.S. pressures were intense, it had the support of other Latin American countries and used 
different mechanisms from that which was considered the most efficient - the release of funds for construction 
the Volta Redonda hydroelectric - to a new relationship model, called "policy of good vicinity" by President F. 
Roosevelt U.S.   Intellectual Brazilians visited the U.S. and even General Goés Monteiro showed their 
appreciation for the structure of the country. 
 
3. Press the War 
 
On September 1st, 1939, Poland was invaded by the Nazis. The operation, also called Operation Fall 
Weiss, began in the early hours of the morning when a German battleship opened fire on the Polish garrisons. 
A few hours later, Nazi troops advanced through Polish territory by the North and the South.  The justification 
for the invasion was a response to a Polish attack made to a German radio station. However, it was later proved 
that it was just a pretext for invasion.  Against the Germans attacks, France, UK, Canada, New Zealand and 
Australia declared war on the Nazis on the 3rd of September. On September 17th, the Soviet Union declared 
war on Poland and it also invaded the country by the East. The Second World War then began to take shape. ( 
Cytrynowicz : 2000 . Chap II) 
The German army, the Wehrmacht, used their best units to invade Poland . Using the tactics of Blitzkrieg, 
the Germans attacked with 630,000 soldiers from the North and over 886 000 soldiers for the South. The 559 
infantry battalions that Germany had, quickly broke the defense lines of the Polish and began the siege of the 
capital on September 10th. To make matters worse, the Soviets attacked with over 800,000 soldiers. ( Ferraz : 
2010 . P. 39th ) 
Poland had 376 infantry battalions and about 950,000 soldiers. The Poles could spread the forces over the 
border with Germany and retreat to the Vistula River to establish a defensive line or mount the defense directly 
in the line of the river. The Polish general Rydz - Smigly chose to start with the borders, but the army was not 
able to stop the efforts of the Nazi invasion, as well as the Soviets. (POLSKA AGENCY INFORMACYNA. 
Poland, 1991. ) 
Polish cities were quickly surrounded and the territory was completely dominated on October 6th, 1939, 
causing leakage of rulers for England. For Germans, the operation was training where they could correct errors 
for greater war to come. The German army was reformulated and techniques Blitzkrieg became even better. 
About the beginning of the war news were published in various media: newspaper, broadsheet, radio and 
television. The twentieth century was rich in experiences about the power of advertising in the context of war. 
Since the World War I, the Spanish Civil War,  the World War II,  the Cold War, the Bosnian War and the 
Gulf War, there were many occasions when advertising has emerged as one of the combat arms . ( Ferraz, 
2005 , Chapter II ). 
 The World War I (1914-1918) was the context in which the states first realized the importance of 
advertising as a tool of war. It became evident the role, the importance and potential of graphic 
communication. The propaganda came to be regarded as an essential tool, able to make a link between the 
battlefront and the home front, instrument of persuasion and predisposition of people to accept the 
‘inevitability ' of war and the sacrifices that stemmed from there. 
The advertisement appeared as a representation, often with pictorial expression of national identity in 
combat, extolling the virtues of national armies and “diabolizando” the enemy, representing him so 
dehumanized, instigating hatred between civilians and military, while eliminating the notion of guilt or liability 
on the part of government leaders. In the eyes of propaganda, wars have always arisen as an inevitable 
consequence of civilizational clashes, legitimized in the eyes of the collective: it is fought for an ideal, fight for 
an interest. 
As the front was growing in importance in contemporary conflicts, the control of public opinion through 
propaganda has become more sophisticated. Ministries were created to think and manage advertising, invested 
hefty sums up and took advantage of all means of mass communication developed between the late nineteenth 
century and the first decades of the twentieth century placing them at the service of the States: press, radio, 
television and film. 
The advertisement represented the sacrifice of soldiers in war and praised the power of the countries. All 
over the world was around these images that mobilized entire populations around the achievement of victory. 
Through the static image of the printed posters or movement of newspapers, current affairs projected in 
cinemas scattered all over the globe, governments sought to promote patriotic spirit , encouraging the efforts of 
individual sacrifice by sending a set of clear messages and direct that appealed to voluntary enlistment in the 
armed forces, the rationing of essential goods, the intensification of production or purchase of bonds or war, 
exacerbating feelings, arousing emotions and projecting an image split between the notion of superiority and 
the idea of fear by the opponent. 
Since the Press, in World War I, the radio, in World War II, television, film and advertising, especially 
from the 50s, advertising can be proved as deadly as the weapons handled by the soldiers at war. 
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The font used for the study was the newspaper called Daily News.  The option to use the newspaper Diário 
de Notícias was due to availability and to be a journal of significant movement in areas where concentrated 
Polish immigrants. We used copies of the years 1925-1945 and in them, specifically the news that focused on 
the question of war in Europe and around the world. 
The Daily News incorporated the Associated Newspapers of Assis Chateaubriand - the largest media 
conglomerate in Brazil, in the decades of 50 and 60 - which circulated from 1925 until December 30th, 1979. 
This newspaper and “Correio do Povo”  were the most significant newspapers in Porto Alegre and vied for 
market leadership in the whole state of Rio Grande do Sul. The main difference between them was in the 
editorial: The “Correio” was characterized by economic strength and a sober and conservative editorial line, 
while the “Diário”- almost always in financial trouble - to counteract the power of mail - obtained wide 
acceptance owing to their agility in movement and concern to present notes on the economic, political and 
social Europe. As an example can be cited the coverage made during periods of world conflicts, because there 
was in the periodic news about the situation of most countries involved in the conflict. It is also noted a visible 
difference between the two newspapers in terms of graphics and editorial. 
There were several news about the theme.  Since the movement of troops on European soil until the flight 
of Polish citizens of the great world conflicts. Among the news announced a great diversity was centered on 
Polish soil. Poland, provide space for major disputes, was highlighted in each new edition of the print and 
broadcast media. 
 
Poland refused the proposal: the last 23 hours of the official radio Warsaw issued a government statement 
rejecting the German formula (September 1st,1939 ) ; 
Poland and the five bastions of the Polish resistance: Colonel Ulrich , General Gluchowski , Kasprvrycki 
General , Colonel General Beck and Skladkowski ( September 3rd, 1939 ) ; 
Poland with the blessing of God will march to final victory ((September 4th, 1939). (Diário de Notícias: Porto 
Alegre, 1939) 
 
Even though the news involving the conflict in Europe were merely informative, and some even copied from 
other newspapers columnists through the 'International’, can be observed that the preoccupation with the war 
was not diminished. Below two news start and end of World War II which reported the situation of Poland in 
the conflict: 
 
The errors of Polonia 
The susceptible pride, stubbornness patriotic, the exaggerated fear  to seem submissive of the German 
impositions  has made the men of the Polish government to practice grave errors. Remember, to this purpose , 
the facts. 
 In the spring of this year, in the government of the Reich, Poland  proposed a general systematization  of the 
mutual relations.  Berlin demanded the return of Danzig in Germany as “a free city”,  and the granting of a road 
and a railway line enjoying the rights of extra- territoriality,  drawn trough the famous "corridor ". In exchange, 
Reich offered to Poland the broadest protection of their economic rights, a free port of any size, consider the 
declaration of final borders between Germany and Poland, and a non-aggression pact. 
They were  proposed that, in all fairness,  could be defined as equal and moderate. However, the Polish 
government men sinned first, considering them as a subpoena, as an imposition, and committed the first fatal 
error, of not accept them, even as a basis for discussion. Perhaps, on the day immediately or in the following 
weeks, they had committed the notion of levity , but it was too late to deal with Germany on that basis and that 
state of souls . 
Subsequently these episodes, Hitler gave his speech of April 24th in response to the  message of Roosevelt . 
In that speech the fuehrer announced the refusal of Poland to accept the German proposals, describing such 
denial in such terms that did understand his deep heartache consequence of  Polish t attitude . 
Likewise, he said verbatim “If the Polish government, however, can interest the stipulation of a new regulation 
on contractual relations with Germany I'm ready to join.” 
 It was a new opening to   unequivocal offer of negotiations . And once again the men of Polish government, 
interpret it as an imposition, as a bully and committed the second fatal error: to drop it.. Again, maybe the day 
after, or the week after , they had a sense of levity committed, but also here it was too late to grab the wheel 
fleeting occasion ... 
 Today Hitler speaks no more, no more calls and nothing else offers. There is, however, and is certainly always 
validates the solemn declaration that he set out in that speech of April 24th : " I feel the deepest horror of war 
and my horror is even greater for any agitation in favor of a war . Besides, would not know for what reason 
should I make a war. " 
 This solemn declaration  provides always a basis for dealing with Hitler on a plane of absolute candor,  
recognizing soon preliminarily to everything else, the total rights of Germany over Danzig . 
 Oh, may the men of Polish government to silence stubborn pride and love susceptible own! Otherwise, 
tomorrow, as usual,  they  inside their rough country will feel the severity of the mistake , on this occasion , 
however, will be too late to be hopeless ... Giovanni Ansaldo ( Director of " Telografo " Livorno ) - Official 
Daily News ( 03/09/1939 ) 
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Unfortunately no solution for the Polish case. 
 
 SAN FRANCISCO, 9 (From Salisbury Harison, diplomatic correspondent of the United Press) – Motolov 
returned today airway to Moscow and he was the last hope of being resolved, in San Francisco by the debates 
of the great powers, the Polish problem. Also left the ambassadors Averil Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark 
Kerr, representatives of the United States and England, and the Commission of Moscow that with Molotov, 
was assigned to understand up on the reorganization of the Polish government, as decided at Yalta. 
 Harriman Clark Kerr when arrive in Moscow, it is presumed , they will consult on the Polish question. Before 
leaving, they met Stettinius and Eden. Others who  also travelled were General Alphonse Juin, Chief of the 
French and Rene Pleven, French Minister of Finance and National Economy, who were called to Paris for 
consultations on the termination of the German resistance, and the new responsibilities of France in the 
administration of territories  that has to occupy. The French Foreign Minister, Mr. Didault, stayed in San 
Francisco.  
 
 Before their departure, the foreign commissar of the Soviet Union, Mr. Molotov, in a speech on the radio, 
paid tribute to UN soldiers who gave their lives to bring the war to its victorious end. Then Molotov said: 
 
“We will continue forward towards a lasting peace. The Day of Victory over Germany of Hitler arrived. On 
this day all our thoughts are directed to the heroism of the weapons that have achieved the victory over the 
enemy. On the day of the German attack on the Soviet Union, our government declared : " Our cause is just . 
The enemy will be defeated. The victory will be ours. The victory over German fascism is of tremendous 
historical importance. We won this glorious victory under the leadership of the great Stalin”. 
Diario de Noticias (05/10/1945). Journal Brazil 
 
 
3.1 Poles in southern Brazil and the impact of World War II 
 
As already pointed out in this article the reasons for coming thousands of men and women from Poland to 
Brazil were diverse and deep. Most of these immigrants had little or no schooling which will track the 
movements distanced in economic, political and social after leaving the country of origin. 
Those who left the country because of the war had any more reason to try to find news and information 
about the conflict. Many have friends and family involved in war activities; however the way to receive the 
news of the war outside Europe contained a mixture of elation and sadness. You can identify this characteristic 
of detachment from national and international news by the Polish immigrants also when analyzing the content 
of a report written by Tadeusz Skowronski - Polish diplomat - who took office in 1938. This describes the 
condition of the Polish- Brazilian, danger was distant (Poland) and also distant on Brazilian soil on their 
nationalist policies triggered by Vargas. (Report Tadeusz Skowronski, 1938) 
In Brazil the Polish immigrant was not of concern to the government considering that the Poles considered 
themselves enemies of the Germans and Russians in their own homeland, and this behavior would give the 
posture of neutrality in and outside Poland. 
Consistent analyzed the primary source - Daily News Newspaper - it can be seen in the concern also alert 
to the 'exiles’, term used in the news that were intended audiences of immigrants in the weekly publication 
from October 1939 to January 1946 . These notes brought the movement of troops on European soil, types of 
weapons and strategies used by the two great powers - Germany and Russia. 
 
Final Thoughts 
 
This article has attempted to show that, far from ethnicity and historiographical victims of history, Polish 
immigrants in Brazil were firmly integrated in national policies and often softened phase warmongering 
experienced by his country of origin. The first waves of immigrants were much more concerned in populate 
and colonize their lands that to be concerned about the two world wars. 
The waves that entered in Brazil in the interwar period were subject minimally to receive news of the war. 
Through the letters, newspapers and information they received news by the pastor not always real and current. 
During World War II, the few Polish immigrants who remained in the urban area reported several strategies to 
face the New State and the intimidation and xenophobic nationalist regime of Getúlio Vargas, and made it with 
little or no resistance. 
It is known that the years from 1937 to 1945 were years of change and identity sedimentation of a 
community that fails to consider immigrant and "foreign" to affirm themselves as Polish- Brazilian, with 
distinct ideological and practical. This scenario was all the time recorded in the media spoken and printed 
especially Diário de Notícias, used as main sour of research in this paper. 
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of Colonial Rule 
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With a growing number of Nigerians participating in formal schooling and mass education programs from 
the Second World War onwards, control of the means of literacy and book provision became an urgent matter 
to the government of the British-ruled colony. Policy-makers and administrators viewed literacy as a gateway 
to access and influence Nigerian attitudes towards Britain and, more generally, so-called Western economic 
and political ideals. Propaganda, therefore, became a key tool to foster support amongst Nigerians for their 
imperial rulers. This paper examines the British colonial government’s efforts to devise a propaganda policy 
for southern Nigeria and to discover the most effective means of distributing the resultant literature to readers 
in the waning days of colonial rule. Looking first at the reading rooms built throughout Nigeria in the 1940s 
and then at attempts to develop more covert methods for the distribution of British propaganda and other 
literature, I show that providing Nigerians with access to particular reading material became a matter of state 
security for the British administration in the last two decades of colonial rule. 
The outbreak of the Second World War and the British enlistment of African soldiers generated an 
increasing amount of interest in Nigeria about events happening in Europe and the other theaters of war. The 
colonial government responded by opening an Information Center in Lagos in 1942. Harold Cooper was sent 
from London’s Central Office of Information to run a propaganda program in the colony, the first time an 
administrative position was dedicated to such a cause.160 The following year, a War Information Office was 
established and staffed by Nigerian publicity officers, including the journalists Anthony Enahoro and Cyprian 
Ekwensi, who were hired to write propaganda pieces.161 The colonial government began opening propaganda 
reading rooms around Nigeria soon after. Initially, most rooms served only to house periodicals and bulletins 
put out by the War Information Office and the Public Relations Office [PRO] in London, a government bureau 
charged with circulating information throughout the colonies. One Information Officer wrote that these reading 
rooms were available to all people “who are profoundly interested in the progress of the war and desire 
enlightenment and education.”162 Unlike later British Council and United States Information Service libraries, 
these wartime reading rooms were supposed to serve a mass reading public and not only the educated elite.  
British officials were anxious to make to their own propaganda material accessible to eager readers, who 
otherwise relied on the local press for news of the war. A British administrator was quoted in the minutes of 
the Ife Native Authority Advisory Council as saying,  
 
he considered it most important that a Reading Room should be established where literature could 
be made available for those whose intellectual food was all too frequently limited only to the Daily 
Press. Reading played a most important part in the widening of mental outlook.163  
 
The reading rooms were also intended to support continuing education for the dramatically increasing numbers 
of primary- and secondary-school graduates and to provide resources for new adult literates who were 
participating in mass education schemes of the 1940s and 1950s. They also hoped that the reading room 
program would serve as the nucleus for the permanent libraries that the United States-based Carnegie 
Corporation was looking to sponsor in Nigeria.164 
Propaganda reading rooms were categorized as A, B or C class, based on the size of the town and perceived 
demand for a room, and funded accordingly. The central government granted funds for furniture and reading 
material and Native Administrations paid for the spaces and staff. Reading room managing committees were 
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made up of Nigerian community leaders, but a British officer always had veto power over their decisions. The 
reading rooms were often housed in temporary structures or shared space with post offices, courtrooms or 
government rest houses. They usually consisted of a few shelves for books and periodicals and benches that 
served as display surface and seating for patrons. Books were often kept locked up, although readers could 
check them out, sometimes for a small fee. Propaganda posters and maps hung on the walls. Larger reading 
rooms had separate reading and recreation spaces. One British Council librarian praised the reading rooms as 
“places where people could go for quiet reading.”165 Foreign literature workers emphasized the need for a quiet 
place to read, in stark contrast to the noise and activity of Nigeria communal space. Reading was a skill to be 
practiced indoors and in silence. The rooms might include a space for meetings and programs, but the act of 
reading was imagined to be solitary. In fact, reading room sponsors were heavily invested in the idea of readers 
practicing “personal choice and individual responsibility” through their usage of the space.166  
Attendants of the Ibadan and Ilesha reading rooms, both located in southwestern Nigeria, described the 
popularity of war-related material such as War in Pictures, a magazine published by the Ministry of 
Information in London and issued in a Yoruba language version.167 Information officers and prominent town 
citizens also procured general interest books or donated from their own libraries to the rooms. Wartime reading 
room committees further outfitted the spaces with battery-powered radios, because they recognized the need to 
combine their advocacy of literacy with the use of technology in order to reach and interest greater numbers of 
people. The committees welcomed the mobile film units traveling throughout the colony during the war for the 
same reason.168  
In the decade following the Second World War, the reading room program was validated as a larger 
collaborative project of the central colonial government, local administrations and outside funding agencies. 
Galvanized by the public’s favorable response to PRO publications and the additional propaganda reading 
rooms that were opened in Nigeria during the war, officials expanded the project as more money became 
available to fund social projects in the post-war period. London’s Central Office of Information retained a 
domestic function after the war, and information services passed to agencies within the colonies. A Public 
Relations Office was opened in Lagos and then in other cities.169 The colonial government tasked these offices 
with rallying support for Britain as Nigeria moved towards independence, especially after the adoption of the 
1946 Richards Constitution.  
Reading rooms, as extensions of the PRO, were first and foremost intended to connect Nigerian readers to 
Britain through literature and other forms of media. They did this by housing British-published books and 
books that espoused general British values, rather than offering what administrators considered to be 
inflammatory literature. A 1944 letter from the Ife-Ilesha Division District Officer to the Resident in Oyo 
preserves a rare catalog of books actually present in a reading room during this period. The District Officer 
reported that adventure and detective novels, history books and “particularly books about the Empire” were 
popular among the patrons of the Ilesha Reading Room.170 In his estimation, they were not as interested in 
reading poetry, essays and other “Belles lettres” literature. In a 1944 letter to the British Council representative 
in Lagos, the Oyo Reading Room Committee requested mostly books relating to Africa and colonial politics. 
Committee Secretary J.O. Alabi wrote that they wanted a copy of Malcolm Hailey’s An African Survey and 
Diedrich Westermann’s The African Today and Tomorrow, among other scholarship.171 They asked for only 
three works of fiction: Shakespeare’s Collected Works, Paradise Lost and Robinson Crusoe. Two years later, 
an Oyo Division District Officer, in reference to the reading rooms at Oyo and Iseyin, said patrons frequently 
consulted books for new readers and textbooks on English composition and Commercial Correspondence.172 
The Nigerian readers who frequented the reading rooms seemed to have valued the availability of textbooks 
and other instructional material above all else. In 1948, a British tutor “found that Nigerian students were often 
well acquainted with the standard text-book material on History Economics and Co. to an extent which English 
adults normally are not.”173  
                                                          
165 Ethel Fegan, “A Library System in Nigeria” (Africa Committee Precis, April 28, 1942), 1, Section IV, Part 26, Reel 532, 
CMS. 
166 Patrick Harries, Butterflies & Barbarians: Swiss Missionaries and Systems of Knowledge in South-East Africa, 1st ed. 
(Ohio University Press, 2007), 187, 190. See Robert Darnton, “History of Reading,” in New Perspectives on Historical 
Writing, ed. Peter Burke (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), 157–186. 
167 Information Officer, Lagos, Letter to Oyo Resident, April 22, 1943, Oyo Prof 1: 3140, Vol. II, NAI. 
168 The Colonial Film Unit was established in 1939 to produce propaganda films to rally African support for the Second 
World War. See Tom Rice, “From the Inside: The Colonial Film Unit and the Beginning of the End,” in Film and the 
End of Empire, ed. Lee Grieveson and Colin MacCabe (Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 135. 
169 Otubanjo, Amujo, and Melewar, “150 Years of Modern Public Relations Practices in Nigeria,” 16. 
170 DO, Ife-Ilesha Division, Letter to Resident, Oyo Province, August 30, 1944, 132, Oyo Prof 1: 3140, Vol. II, NAI. 
171 J.O. Alabi, Letter to F.N.L. Williams, June 19, 1944, Oyo Prof 1: 3140, Vol. II, NAI. 
172 Oyo Division DO, Letter to Oyo Province Resident, September 5, 1946, Oyo Prof 1: 3140, vol. III, NAI. 
173 Nigeria Union of Teachers File No. 182, University of Oxford, Delegacy for Extra-Mural Studies, Reports for the 
 51 
It is not clear how effective the reading rooms were as spaces for the dissemination of cultural propaganda 
for colonial rule. Nevertheless, between 1944 and 1952, the British colonial government sponsored the 
establishment of reading rooms in all regions of Nigeria. It sought to protect its privileged position in Nigeria 
by making British literature and Western-oriented textbooks available to a large population, in the hope that 
such accessibility would ensure the fealty of Nigerian readers to their departing colonial rulers. African 
educators, government staff and chiefs also advocated for these reading rooms, as both a concession to the 
demands of constituents and a stopgap measure to provide books for the ever-increasing number of students.  
In the decade before Nigeria’s independence from Great Britain, the colonial power busily laid the 
groundwork for maintaining a strategic presence in the country. As the Cold War intensified in the 1950s, the 
protection of a nation’s economic and political interests in the world became a matter of national security.174 
Literature was identified as an avenue to inundate the wider Nigerian public with a pro-British message that 
would benefit British businesses, education services and government policies, even after the colonial period 
hastened to an end. This effort was an intensification of work begun by the government in the propaganda 
reading rooms of the Second World War. Before the 1950s, Britain’s main concern lay with nationalist 
agitation and therefore their propaganda countered that so-called enemy, which existed most visibly in the 
local press.175 Public Relations Officers were instructed to continually tour their areas and personally distribute 
government-approved literature. An Oyo regional officer declared, “the very fact that this action was taken 
would do much to counteract the anti-gov’t press which is, I am convinced, read largely because no other 
source of information or political comment exists.”176 Such an attitude downplayed the agency of Nigerian 
readers in choosing locally produced literature. It also reflected British notions about Nigerian readers, who the 
colonial rulers believed to be uncritical consumers of literature.  
Until the mid-1950s, the British government regarded its African colonial territory as “firmly in the 
Western orbit by virtue of its colonial and post-colonial ties to metropolitan Europe.”177 However, increasingly 
vocal proponents of non-alignment and Nigeria’s looming independence gave Britain reason to be concerned 
with the influence the Soviet Union and the United States might have within the new country. Those two 
leading powers of the Cold War developed propaganda programs targeting West Africa in the late 1950s, 
indicating that they also saw the region as a new battleground in their evolving conflict. In response, C.G. 
Eastwood, the Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the Colonial Office, posited “the best defence [sic] against 
hostile political penetration by the printed word is to form the reading habits of the newly literate and direct 
them towards British sources while we are still in a position to bring influence directly to bear on the 
situation.”178 British government officials and other proponents of literacy education and publishing in Africa 
aspired to move beyond the provision of literature and actually shape the ways that Nigerians thought and read. 
With little time to prepare for the transition to independence, the colonial government wanted to set systems in 
place that would feed inexpensive and/or subsidized reading material through commercial publishers to the 
Nigerian market. The colonial government also looked to set up and fortify public libraries in order to have an 
influence on reading materials for the more educated citizens of the new Nigeria.  
The development and distribution of literature was a key global political strategy in the post-war era for 
Great Britain. Books and pamphlets, along with other types of media, were meant to promote British political 
and social norms even as the nation’s direct global political power waned. In a brief for the Minister of State, 
the cabinet of the Committee on Oversea Information Services (COIS) argued “our journals and books carry 
British ideas and prestige abroad and are worth a great deal more to us than the value of the foreign exchange 
they earn as exports.”179 As communist doctrine gained currency among the African coastal elite, these British 
administrators, as well as missionaries, expanded their concern about the moral dangers of literature to include 
the political danger of certain books to African readers. The colonial government began subsidizing book and 
paper imports and encouraging propaganda production to counteract such supposedly pernicious influences, 
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whereas in the past they had mostly left literature provision to private entities such as the Christian missions. 
This strategy was heavily utilized in Nigeria, especially as the Cold War escalated in the mid-1950s.  
During this period, the Nigerian government’s relationship with the USSR was characterized by mistrust 
and skepticism, since Britain had in fact “succeeded in imprinting this concern [alleged communist infiltration] 
in the minds of those local leaders who were to carry the country into the postcolonial era.”180 Within the 
Action Group, the ruling party of the Western Region from 1952, leaders Obafemi Awolowo and Samuel 
Akintola both opposed any Soviet assistance.181 The Soviet Union was equally critical of the Western Region, 
describing the Action Group as “feudal marionette princes of Yorubaland committed to monarchical 
institutions” who only represented “the upper strata of the bourgeoisie in the Western Region and the Yoruba 
feudalists.”182 Nevertheless, after Josef Stalin’s death, the USSR had developed a policy of cultivating positive 
diplomatic relationships with African governments, seeing their professed neutrality as an invitation to Soviet 
assistance.183 In order to counteract what they viewed as the monarchical tendencies of the African educated 
elite political leadership, the Soviet government increased their propaganda efforts in the region. 
The COIS brief elaborates on the importance of providing government financial support for the British 
publishing industry’s exports to critical markets: “Despite our general distaste for any forms of State subsidy to 
commercial activities oversea, we suggest that this is a case which may have to be carefully considered in the 
light of other countries’ practice.”184 The British government was aware that both the Soviet Union and the 
United States had programs to support literature distribution in markets where they were trying to consolidate 
their influence. The United States Information Agency had first assigned an Information Service officer to 
Lagos in 1951 and opened United States Information Service centers (as the USIA overseas branches were 
known) in Ibadan, Kano and Enugu during that decade. The USIA service in Nigeria far outstripped that 
elsewhere in Africa. It operated libraries and produced and placed print, radio and film media in local markets. 
The United States was more overt than Great Britain in its censoring of the book collections placed in its 
libraries. The influence of U.S. government policy on the services of USIS made the libraries and information 
centers a target of foreign protests.185 In Nigeria, it seems that the conflict was between foreign powers and not 
with the Nigerian public. The Soviet Union, which dedicated most literature propaganda resources to librarian 
training, Great Britain and the United States, which both focused their money on model libraries and library 
technology, worried about how each of the others was using book provision and library/librarian training to 
exert their influence. 
Beginning in 1951, Britain’s Foreign Office explored the possibility of a propaganda campaign to counter 
Soviet Communist influence in West Africa. The perception that communism was increasingly attractive to 
West Africans worried officials. In Nigeria, they cited the “tone” of Nigerian newspapers as evidence for their 
concern, blaming newspaper editors for publicizing communist ideology. One such newspaper editor was 
described as “a potential Communist since he feels that the world’s goods are not properly distributed.”186 The 
Foreign Office counter-communism strategy covertly supplied the West African book market with literature 
that promoted British policies and social practices; they would do this by distributing the literature ‘under plain 
cover’ to individuals – initially religious leaders, and later booksellers. These individuals were to serve as the 
middlemen between the government and the wider reading public. Colonial governors from Gambia, Sierra 
Leone, Gold Coast and Nigeria sent literature distribution lists, which included missionaries, pastors, 
politicians and journalists, to the Secretary of State in London. The governor of Sierra Leone, however, 
hesitated to participate, stating that anti-communist literature would only arouse interest in an ideology that 
had otherwise attracted little attention in the colony. His reluctance suggests that ‘the Communist threat’ was 
more imagined than real.187  
British colonial officials were confident that it would take some time after their political handover to a 
Nigerian government for communism to have any real impact there and in other colonial possessions; even so, 
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they were anxious to fortify a pro-British contingent in the country. Up until the moment of their departure 
from Nigeria, these officials were devising ways to ensure that pro-British literature filled library and 
bookshop shelves. While the literature they introduced into Nigeria in the 1950s and 1960s seems to have 
addressed a threat that existed mostly in their minds, it shaped how and what Nigerians were reading during 
that period. 
A 1957 report by the British Council Executive Committee stated that Soviet publications in English and 
local languages were appearing for low prices in markets in South East Asia and Nigeria, “with very dangerous 
possibilities.”188 Both the British and Soviet governments considered these places effective targets for their 
propaganda. The Nigerian government had already committed to a proactive response to Soviet overtures to 
Africans within the colony. However, their first plan – to send pro-British literature to individuals – was 
scrapped when officials in the British West Africa colonies raised the concern that the propaganda campaign 
would no longer be covert when boxes of books arrived anonymously on the people’s doorsteps. Nigerian 
officials, however, liked the scheme and willingly submitted lists of booksellers who could be used to 
disseminate such literature. There seems to have been a number of sellers who would accept any saleable 
material. 
Officials at the Nigerian Secretariat in Lagos felt that there were enough booksellers that they did not have 
to rely on people outside of the trade to carry out the program. The list sent to London divided sellers into 
“respectable agents” and “tainted agents” who “dabbled in Communist literature but are probably ready to take 
booklets from any source, provided they can see a profit in it.”189 The former included forty-two bookshops, 
twenty-seven in Lagos and the Western Province. Eight of the ten latter shops were located in Lagos. Using 
these contacts, the Ministry of Defense and External Affairs initiated the program in 1952, providing “counter-
material” such as This is Soviet Russia, South-East Asia and Its Future and Why Communism Must Fail to the 
booksellers.190 The first pamphlet is a particularly interesting attempt at anti-Soviet propaganda, consisting of a 
series of primary source documents that illustrate communist views on religion, which were meant to appall 
African readers. Publishers of additional government-approved material began sending literature directly to 
booksellers in Nigeria by July of the same year. 
C.Y. Carstairs, the Director of Information Services in the Colonial Office, expressed concern that the 
“purely ‘anti’ stuff” being sent from publishers to booksellers in Nigeria “might do more harm than good.”191 
He believed that ninety percent of the propaganda literature should promote British political and social 
practices, while ten percent was dedicated to denigrating communism, but his philosophy was at odds with the 
strategy of the Foreign Office, which focused almost exclusively on distributing anti-communist propaganda 
from 1951 onwards.192 Despite his conflict with the Foreign Office, in 1952 Carstairs arranged for Stephen 
Watts, a former MI5 officer and editor of the Foreign Office Information Research Department’s ‘Background 
Books’ series, to tour West Africa – including Nigeria – under the pretense of investigating the potential book 
market for Batchworth Press.193 In reality, Watts was to visit booksellers and assess who might be willing to 
knowingly disseminate anti-communist and pro-British literature for the government.194 Carstairs agreed to the 
secretive mission because he was frustrated that the Colonial Office did not have more control over the content 
of literature appearing in Nigerian bookshops, in spite of Britain’s privileged position in the country. Watts’ 
Background books were blatantly anti-communist, but they were also cheap and widely available. Carstairs, in 
line with the Foreign Office, thought that they would be an effective means of promoting Western values 
because they could be circulated through local shops, rather than obviously handed out by the government. 
Based on Carstairs’ concern with finding a more unobtrusive way of getting propaganda into Nigerian hands, it 
seems that the Nigerian reading public had given the Colonial Office reason to think that they did not simply 
accept the message of British propaganda at face value. 
That same year, the Nigerian Co-operative Supply Association received a Colonial Development and 
Welfare (CD&W) grant of £4,200 to improve literature distribution throughout the colony. Colonial officials 
hoped that private industry would eventually take an interest in providing books for African markets that 
promoted British ideals, but they realized that they would have to fund the growth of distribution networks in 
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the interim. W.H. Ingrams, the Secretary of State’s Adviser on Overseas Information, had toured Nigeria in 
1951 and determined “one of the reasons why undesirable (including subversive) literature found a ready 
public was because the distribution of good books was so inadequate.”195 The terms of the grant stated that all 
book purchases, therefore, had to be approved by the Nigerian Education Department, which served as a 
gatekeeper of sorts.196 As evidenced by Ingrams’ report, the parameters for literature deemed appropriate for 
African consumption were narrow, excluding a body of work that extended far beyond the subversive 
communist literature so feared by the colonial government.  
In order to distribute suitable books over the widest area and combat the infiltration of non-approved 
literature, it was decided that the CD&W grant would be used to fund the expansion of an experimental book 
van project already being run by the Co-operative Supply Association in Western Nigeria. The specially 
outfitted van traveled between villages and towns of the southwest, displaying books, stationary, games and art 
material for sale. Officials planned to use the CD&W grant to add a second van and a permanent bookstall and 
then conduct an efficacy study, in the hope of expanding their enterprise to other parts of the colony. The first 
book van had not been turning a profit and they anticipated that the additional sources of revenue would allow 
the project to eventually become self-supporting; all profits from books sales were to be used for promotion of 
the project. In a memo collating the responses of the regional PROs to the proposal to open a bookstall, 
however, their feedback was universally negative. “The unanimous opinion is that street bookstalls would not 
pay in this country,” wrote Ibadan PRO G.W.P. Thorn. “There is not yet sufficient demand for books. Existing 
reading-rooms are not well patronised and the small bookshops, which do exist in the towns, barely pay their 
way.”197 Their response trivializes the existence of those reading rooms and bookshops in every town and 
village. It also highlights the contradictory messages that Nigerian readers received from workers in literature 
development and book distribution, that Nigerians were not really reading and that they were reading the 
wrong material.  
Officials invested the CD&W grant in an experimental project that was supposed to help develop strategies 
for book distribution specific to the geography and desires of the Nigerian reading public. A profitable 
program would be self-perpetuating and could be relied on to make pro-British literature available to readers 
after the political handover of the colony. However, initial feedback from the Co-operative Supply Association 
showed that stationary and other non-book materials were the project’s main source of revenue, making 
officials wary of opening further bookselling venues. In the decade prior to Nigerian independence, the British 
government was finding that the lack of a book distribution network made it difficult to depend as heavily as 
they would have liked on literature as a source of influence. It should also be noted that the failure of the Co-
Operative Supply Association to sell many books could be ascribed, in part, to their subject matter. A 1964 
brief from Britain’s Overseas Information Office Book Export Committee stated, “Experience has shown that 
it is very seldom that a book can be found which both projects Britain and sells well.”198 
The British government had long relied on its position as the administrative power in Nigeria to eclipse the 
influence of the other countries that were trying to generate a positive relationship with Nigerians through the 
use of propaganda. This paper has attempted to trace the efforts of the colonial government – as minimal as 
they were at times – to develop a concomitant propaganda policy for southern Nigeria in the final decades of 
colonial rule. The Low-Priced Books Scheme, the most successful British program in terms of length and 
number of British-published books distributed to Nigerian readers, was in fact instituted long after colonial 
rule had come to an end. It had begun in 1959/60 in India and Pakistan. The English Language Book Society 
(ELBS), a partnership between the government’s Book Development Council and the British Publishers 
Association, expanded its program of providing low-priced books to African nations, including Nigeria, in 
1965 “to maintain British influence in countries in which English is the language of communication and where 
it is threatened by the supply of foreign government-aided books.”199 The British government was well aware 
of Soviet, Chinese and American efforts to provide subsidized books in the English language to areas of 
British influence. A policy document for the Low-Priced Books Scheme described its target markets as “in the 
early stages of political evolution, in need of and responsive to the influence of maturer countries, but sensitive 
about the way in which it is exerted.”200 Although the original program was intended to distribute general 
literature and textbooks promoting British achievements and practices, the ELBS eventually focused its 
resources on providing tertiary-level textbooks. A report by the Central Office of Information (COI) reasoned 
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that customers in target countries read only for education and examination purposes and not for pleasure, 
which would have necessitated subsidies for general literature.201  
The British Council in Nigeria assisted the COI in determining the books to be included in the Low-Priced 
Books Scheme, which typically made them available in participating markets for about one-third of the normal 
price. The COI report reveals the frustration felt by government officials regarding their lack of control in the 
book markets of territories that had so recently belonged to them. While administrators acknowledged that the 
scheme would undercut the sale of other British books in these markets, they countered that “it is better that 
one or some British books shall be available at a competitive price than none at all.”202 And in response to the 
point that the scheme would create expectations for artificially low-priced books in all areas of literature, the 
report simply stated that the British government was not the only entity flooding the market with subsidized 
books. In light of the propaganda being distributed by other world powers in Nigeria and recognizing their 
diminished capacity to have an influence in the newly independent country, British officials called the subsidy 
program, like the reading rooms and propaganda distribution efforts that had preceded it, “an indispensable 
weapon in the battle” to make sure that Africans were reading British books.203  
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1. The Necessity of Constructing an Image of the Enemy 
 
After the signing of the armistice with the Allies – announced on 8 September 1943 – Italy found itself split 
in two: in the centre and north there were the occupying Germans; in the south, the Allied troops who were 
slowing pushing up the peninsula. Alongside the Germans was Mussolini, who, after having been freed on 23 
September 1943, went about setting up the Italian Social Republic (I.S.R.), a new Fascist state. In southern 
Italy the Southern Kingdom was created, with Victor Emanuel III and Pietro Badoglio at its head. In northern 
Italy, finally, an armed resistance movement sprang up to oppose the German occupation and the newly created 
Fascist government. So it was that in Italy, between 1943 and 1945, in addition to the war between regular 
armies (German and Allied), a civil war was also being fought204. 
One of the main weapons of Republican Fascism in this civil war was propaganda. Not all Italians were aware 
what it meant to face an armed resistance movement. The I.S.R., therefore, found itself on the one hand having 
to construct a representation of the Partisan as an extremely negative element that was to be “inserted” in 
Italians’ minds to justify the ongoing struggle. On the other, Mussolini had to extrapolate from military thought 
all those ideals of gallant, loyal warfare which Fascism had propagandized for twenty years. 
This was a one-sided representation that had a very specific purpose: to provide a unified image of the Partisans 
by demonizing all those that might be their human characteristics. It was a necessary process because only in 
this way would the I.S.R. succeed in isolating the figure of the Partisan in Italians’ minds, thus succeeding in 
denationalizing all his connotations and consolidating the representation of an individual who was alien to 
Italian culture, driven only by the “bloody creed” of Communist ideology and “Jewish-Allied” propaganda. 
A key role in this process was played by the Ministry of Popular Culture, which, starting in the winter of 1943, 
resumed working at full speed to churn out material responding to the new political and military necessities: the 
war against the Allies; the anti-Jewish campaign; building up an Army; the anti-Partisan struggle; the 
opposition between the I.S.R. and the Badoglio Government 205. The Ministry was entrusted to Fernando 
Mezzasoma, a 36-year-old Roman, former secretary of the National Fascist Party and a member of the Party’s 
intransigent wing 206 . The post of Chief of Cabinet of the Minister of Culture was assigned to Giorgio 
Almirante: this journalist was responsible for overseeing posters, flyers and promotional publications in 
general207. Through these men and their subordinates, Fascist propaganda regained control of its principal tools 
of “battle”: posters, postcards and newspapers. 
 
 
2. Posters 
 
The I.S.R. fought an authentic “war on walls”. Its posters were disseminated to influence the internal front, 
becoming a true tool of battle. The themes touched upon can be summarized as follows: 
 
1. Betrayal by the monarch and Badoglio; 
2. Loyalty to and confidence in the Germans; 
3. Patriotic mobilization and enrolment in Fascist formations; 
4. The Risorgimento roots of the I.S.R.; 
5. The enemy’s cruelty and disloyalty; 
6. Militarization of work; 
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7. Female presence208. 
 
The posters regarding the insurgency, the Partisan’s image and the fight against the Resistance were 
included in the category of the “enemy’s cruelty and disloyalty”. Through one of Fascism’s top illustrators, 
Gino Boccassile, the “partisans” or “bandits” or “rebels” were depicted as highwaymen, as people devoted to 
robbery and burning down villages. An activity that, as represented by the same artist, could only be punished 
with death by means of the Fascists’ iron fist. 
The three best-known wall posters during the I.S.R. were centred on the theme of the fight against the 
Partisans and the civil war. The first was entitled “Fratricide!”; a second, bearing the slogan “To every traitor, 
to every saboteur”, depicted a firing squad carrying out a death sentence (a warning for all members of the 
Resistance as to what would happen to them if they were captured); and a third was entitled “Bandits and 
Rebels, here is your end!”, in which an iron fist crushed a group of Partisans while, in the background, a village 
was going up in flames209. 
 
3. The Press 
 
3.1. Language 
 
To understand the Italian Social Republic’s representation of the Partisan one must first consider the lexical 
forms that the newspapers of that period used to identify those who took part in the Resistance. It was a work of 
recognition that, already for the Fascist chroniclers, was difficult because «giving the status of combatants, 
even if sold out to the enemy, even if mercenaries, is honouring them too much» and using the «most scorching 
words would hardly be sufficient to describe them: our language doesn’t contain terms foul and filthy enough 
to describe them»210. 
As the war events proceeded and the Partisans’ actions grew more numerous, however, the Fascists were 
forced to come up with terms that identified these individuals. Definitions like “rebel”, “patriot”, “bandit”, 
“straggler” and “partisan” began to be used. Following the killing of the philosopher Giovanni Gentile, 
“outlaw” and “terrorist” came into use as well. 
Each term provided a different perspective on how Republican Fascism perceived the enemy. “Rebel”, for 
example, identified the political choice made by those who, following the 8th of September, decided to engage 
in armed struggle against Fascism and the Germans. 
 
You were born of the treason, of the dung strewn on the honour of the Homeland by the hands of the 
pettifoggers, whether in uniform or not, but all supported by the slavering, anachronistic, oh-so-tolerant 
monarchy, by spontaneous germination, oh rebel211. 
 
 
In particular, the I.S.R.’s propaganda identified with the term “rebel” the ideological link with the Southern 
Kingdom, i.e., with those who had signed the armistice with the Allies. 
 
You, after months of primitive life, after days of sterile, sad exile, after having recognized that your flesh is 
not in service to your idea but serves only to cover, even if only with tatters, the derision of those responsible 
for so much degeneration, after it has been imposed on you, to be able to replenish the ranks, to march 
alongside apolitical marauders, authentic jail birds, who fight simply for the survival of their ugly bandits 
outlawed by society. You, therefore, who were once a brother, don’t you see that the Homeland has arisen 
again, that the Dead, whom together we saw fall in battle, have put themselves at the head of the ranks of the 
nascent republic to restore honour and life to Italy?212 
 
The term “bandit”, instead, was used by the I.S.R. in more than one way: on one hand, to indicate the 
membership of a person in a Partisan band, and on the other, to describe their “illegal” and “criminal” action.  
 
In the eyes of the Fascists, the chief “renegades” were precisely the “bandits”, because through their actions, 
funded by the Allies, they led to the “death” of the homeland and to the realization of the Anglo-American 
political project but, even more so, to the Soviet one. 
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All these actions are not part of an honest, open struggle, but are authentic methods of bandits without a 
homeland and devoid of any sentiment, who only obey, because they are in their pay, the headquarters in 
Moscow, London and Washington which impart orders in this sense 213. 
 
Another term often present in Fascist propaganda, also for references to history, was that of “patriot”. 
Identifying the enemy as a “patriot” meant recognizing the type of struggle engaged in: a patriotic war. The use 
that the propaganda of the Italian Social Republic made of it, however, was in a negative sense, aimed at 
underscoring the differences between the two opposing formations. 
 
We do not hold these adversaries in honour: we do not recognize their claim to being partisans, much less 
patriots. They are not soldiers of any ideology, not even the most subversive or absurd one: they are criminals, 
bandits, jail birds many times over, those who torture and stab, shoot their revolvers into the faces and bodies 
of their victims until they are unrecognizable, stone them like enraged Jews stoned the first Christian 
martyrs214. 
 
The I.S.R. put the term “partisan” on the same level. This category included those who «more properly [...] 
declared themselves Communists, under Slavic influence and at the orders of Moscow and the Italian 
Communist Party [...]»215. The word “partisan” began to constitute a problem for Fascist propaganda when it 
was linked with the term “Garibaldian”. Once again the Risorgimento question re-emerged powerfully. The 
I.S.R. responded by distancing itself from those who defined themselves as “Garibaldians” since, as was 
pointed out in newspaper columns, «today’s Garibaldians instead constitute, with few exceptions, the cream of 
the riff-raff, for cowardice, arrogance and dishonesty; men who demand everything from the Homeland but 
offer it nothing in return, and would like to see it dismembered and at the enemy’s mercy216. The anti-Partisan 
propaganda was aimed at convincing the Italians that, if Garibaldi had been alive during the Social Republic, 
he would have sided with Republican Fascism, participating in the struggle against the Resistance movements. 
 
From these passages everyone can deduce that if he were to rise up from his final resting place on Caprera, 
the great leader of the Risorgimento would take up “the ancient, terrible fasces” alongside Mussolini, Duce of 
Republican Italy. with complete disregard for the aforesaid bandits and their sympathizers. 
 
Two other terms were central for the process of dehumanizing the Partisans carried out by the press: “outlaw” 
and “terrorist”. In the first case, “outlaw” identified those who had chosen to hide out in the mountains, 
evidencing their legal personality. A status that appeared undeserved because of the actions they carried out. 
 
It is the sign of a destruction of moral values, so that human life loses its meaning every day, and 
extinguishing it through violence becomes a game217. 
 
More important was the use of the term “terrorist”. It was exploited by the propaganda of the Social Republic, 
on one hand, to provide an explanation for the violence of the Partisans, and on the other to complete the 
process of their denationalization. According to the Fascists, the figure of the “terrorist” did not belong to 
Italian culture, as it was characteristic of the Communist and Slavic world. A vision, therefore, in which racial 
elements and political components converged. 
 
For some time now the agents bought with London’s sterling and Moscow’s roubles have embraced 
assassination of the Slavic, Balkan type. The cut-throats use bicycles to sneak up on their victims from behind 
and then quickly disappear218. 
 
The propaganda added the terms “cut-throat” and “saboteur” to that of terrorist. Both found legitimation in 
the types of actions carried out. “Cut-throat”, for example, referred to those who engaged in the activities of the 
resistance cells of the Patriotic Action Group (GAP) in urban centres. “Saboteur” was instead used to indicate 
those who carried out terrorist activity aimed at causing damage to infrastructure. 
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3.2. The “Human” Representation of the Partisan 
 
But for the propaganda of the Italian Social Republic, who made up the ranks of the Partisans? Who 
constituted the “human” component of the Resistance? 
Initially, the Fascists identified the Partisans as «disbanded soldiers, prisoners of war who had escaped from 
concentration camps, political and common criminals freed from prison»219. As the weeks passed, the I.S.R. 
created some identifying categories: 
 
- stragglers; 
- escapees from concentration camps; 
- escapees from prison; 
- common criminals; 
- anti-Fascists; 
- draft dodgers and deserters; 
- political commissars. 
 
Without the shadow of a doubt, the most interesting types are represented by the concentration camp 
escapees, common criminals, anti-Fascists and political commissars. 
In the case of the former concentration camp detainees, the Fascist propaganda associated these persons with 
the image of the Slav. The ex-prisoners captured during the campaign in the Balkans and in the ensuing years 
of occupation were accused of taking part in armed struggle. 
The common criminal, instead, constituted the backbone of the Resistance formations, both for their 
numerical presence and for the operational component. According to the I.S.R., it was among these that «the 
squad commanders and the great majority of the members of the Patriotic Action Groups were recruited»220. 
 
Let us be clear: they were assassinated by common criminals who disguise themselves with the red star, just 
like sinister-looking characters used to hide behind the black neckerchief of the ruffian221. 
 
The last two “human” categories identified by the I.S.R.’s propaganda are those of the anti-Fascists and the 
political commissars. Enzo Pezzato, editor of La Repubblica fascista, described the anti-Fascists as «groups of 
people with disparate ideas and programmes, united only by their shared struggle against us: soldiers who 
believe themselves bound by oath, leaders of old political tendencies, youths led astray by clever propaganda, 
thinkers and party men, malcontents and failures, sell-outs to the enemy». A type of individuals who, according 
to the propaganda, constituted a marginal component because the majority were either members of the local 
National Liberation Committees or had found refuge in neutral countries. Anyone who had chosen to carry out 
activity in the bands was considered an active anti-Fascist. 
Finally, there was the figure of the political commissar. In the imagery of the I.S.R., the political commissar 
was the enemy par excellence because he propagated Bolshevik values. 
 
They have arrived from enemy headquarters. They are usually foreigners (aside from a few renegades) and 
have either a military rank or the clear role of political commissar. 
 
The I.S.R.’s reporters considered the political commissar the person who held the “power” in the Partisan 
band and the person principally responsible for the mounting civil war in Italy. Indeed, if initially “banditry” 
was to be considered «above all a sad lack of moral character», with the political commissar it had «become a 
tool for political and military struggle; a tool in the hands of foreigners and rigorously circumscribed for the 
purposes desired by these foreigners»222. 
 
 
3.3. Political Representation 
 
In order to understand the construction of the image of the Partisan it is necessary to analyze its political 
and ideological component as well. Initially, the I.S.R. did not have clear ideas about the political composition 
of the Resistance movement. 
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They have a single incentive for their action, the fear to go to the front. They only care about performing their 
professional activity as well as possible and with the most guarantees223. 
 
As the months went by, though, the propaganda identified political and ideological elements according to 
which it was possible to distinguish three types of Partisans: 
 
- the “Badogliano”; 
- the “Independent”; 
- the “Communist”. 
 
The “Badogliano” was the individual who, par excellence, had appropriated the title of “patriot”. Those who 
declared themselves Badogliani had chosen to continue to honour the oath sworn to the King and to Badoglio, 
the two highest figures who, according to the Fascists, had betrayed Italy and led to civil war. The 
“Badogliano” was considered responsible for horrendous crimes, in particular against the civilian population. 
This image served to provide a justification for the harshening of the military tactics employed by the I.S.R.. 
The second politico-ideological figure of the Resistance identified by the I.S.R. was the “Independent”. These 
were people who, in the Fascists’ view, had made the choice of resistance more «out of necessity to obtain aid 
of a financial nature or even only moral support» than to fight Nazi-Fascism224. 
For Fascist propaganda the image and the idea of the “Communist” was central, however. The maximum 
expression of demonization and denationalization of the enemy was reached precisely in the construction of the 
image of the “Communist”. 
First and foremost, the “Communist” was considered to bear the main responsibility for the civil war in Italy. 
 
 The land of Saint Francis and Saint Benedict is red with generous blood: in various points of Pistoia province, 
armed criminals, apparently in the pay of Communism and the enemy, have brought death to the homes of two 
very worthy priests, who, alongside love for God, had elevated the equally sacred cult of the Homeland. 
 This is a crime without a name committed by the enemies of God and of the Homeland, negators of every 
principle of good225. 
 
According to the I.S.R.’s propaganda, the “Communist” was under the direct orders of Stalin and this could 
only lead to a Sovietization of Italy226. As Umberto Scaroni, an officer in the Republican National Guard, 
wrote, the “Communist” fought for «world Communism, including the Yugoslavian Communism on our 
eastern borders» and operated «without respect for international law, but rather following the canons of 
revolutionary warfare long theorized in Moscow [...]»227. In the post-war period, the representation and the 
identification of the Partisan as a “Communist” became further entrenched among the die-hard veterans of 
Salò, in particular due to a series of publications by the Neo-Fascist historian Giorgio Pisanò228. 
The propaganda was thus aimed at making the “Communist” appear to the population as one who could live 
only in a climate of hatred and terror, as an individual whose ideology was founded on ruthlessness, as a person 
used to finding himself at ease in the turmoil of civil war. For Republican Fascism they were “beasts with red 
neckerchiefs” who exploited war like a gigantic rite of celebration of the fiendish instincts unleashed by 
ideological hatred. 
Naturally, the political representation focused on the “Badogliano”, the “Independent” and the “Communist” 
had the purpose of convincing the Italian people that the resistance movement was anything but a homogeneous 
organism, especially from the standpoint of political thought. 
 
As a result they are disorganized, lawless, chaotic groups that manage to prevail here and there through 
criminality and terror. They don’t have a shared goal, nor are they driven by the same ideas. All the shades and 
colour gradations of the political rainbow are present among the ranks of these paladins of a cowardly, 
capitulatory Italy at the mercy of the foreigner’s lash. Everything divides them, therefore, political convictions 
and aspirations, and if anything unites them it is nothing but the fear of being forced to fight for Italy and a 
murky anti-Fascist acrimony that for them is more important than anything else and above all the Homeland229. 
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According to the Fascists, the sole political belief that animated the Partisans was killing. 
No idea has guided the arms, no ideal principle; not even a desire for vendetta or the mirage of booty. Only a 
sadistic, perverted need to kill, the pleasure of destruction, a taste for blood and wickedness230. 
 
For the propaganda of the I.S.R., their ideology was subordinate to “violence” and “thirst for blood”. The 
ideological components that should have justified rebellion and attracted consensus became only confused, 
contradictory formulae used as a pretext to pursue their actions of insurgency and banditry. 
 
 
3.4. “Usages and Customs” of the Partisan 
 
It now seems clear that the I.S.R.’s propaganda was focused on providing an image of a Partisan movement 
made up of «a hodgepodge of diverse people, united only by the cement of enemy propaganda and by a shared 
moral disorientation». This end was pursued also by identifying the “usages and customs” of the Partisans. 
Diminishing, isolating and deriding the Resistance fighters was a fundamental step for achieving their complete 
denationalization. 
 
There isn’t a boy who is permitted to go off to urinate who doesn’t arm himself swaggeringly and put on his 
fiercest look. There isn’t a commander of five men who doesn’t have some pompous title, one of those that 
requires a serious mnemonic effort to remember. There isn’t a rebel worth his salt who doesn’t feel the need to 
give himself as bizarre and strange a hair-style as possible. 
 
These images, which could give rise to mirth, were fundamental for showing the Italians that the Resistance 
was comprised of individuals who could not be considered Italians, not even in their “usages and customs”. 
Embarrassing descriptions emerge, for example, in which the Partisans are compared to American Indians: 
 
And finally, I would point out that it still fills me today with hilarity when I recall certain hair-dos worthy of 
the redskins: a cropped red feather stuck in the eagle of a Party official’s cap; the cap of the SS worn backwards 
and with the visor painted red; tricolour Muslim-style turbans, and so forth231. 
 
The Fascist propaganda also examined the noms de guerre adopted, arriving at the conclusion that they were 
the result of pillaging Italian history and geography without restraint. 
 
Reading from the information reports the list of the names that the various bands have attributed to themselves 
seems like going through the list of teams taking part in the kiddies’ league contained in the pages of a sport 
newspaper. 
 
The image that was supposed to emerge, therefore, was that of an individual who could not be considered a 
combatant because it was the Fascist who incarnated the “true” Italian, also in “usages and customs”. For the 
I.S.R., the Partisan was something extraneous to Italian civil society. 
 
 
3.5. The Representation of Partisan Violence 
 
The last element used by I.S.R. propaganda to construct the image of the Partisan was the theme of the 
violence committed by the Resistance. The Fascist representation gave this technique a strong political valence, 
identifying it as a tool of “Communist” struggle. This representation was developed on the basis of a few very 
distinct types: the violence of ambushes; the violence of assassins; the violence of robberies; violence against 
the dead and women. 
Starting with the violence of the ambush, it emerges that, for the Fascists, this form of combat was a tool used 
by “cowardly” individuals, who raised «a bloody banner that does not know the glory of combat but the sadism 
of assassination, that does not wave in the sun like our flames but sows hatred in the darkness»232. The ambush, 
moreover, did not distinguish between military and civilian objectives. Precisely this fact was used by the 
propaganda to reinforce the image of a “cowardly” individual motivated by “deep hatred” and an “innate sense 
of cruelty”. 
 
                                                          
230 Due nostri operai uccisi dai partigiani, in «La Repubblica fascista», 14 August 1944. 
231 E. Pezzato, Rapporto sul ribellismo-l’organizzazione, in «La Repubblica fascista», 5 August 1944. 
232  L’Alfiere, Legionari: Giorgio Baroni, Romolo Barbieri, Emilio Leonardini, Bruno Geminiani, in 
«L’assalto», cit. 
 63 
And yet near San Piero in Bagno, a lorry that was transporting a group of these sufferers was stopped and 
assaulted by an array of “rebels” who, indifferent to begging and supplication, robbed the unfortunates of every 
possession, then abandoning them to their sad fate. 
This, apparently, is part of the plans of liberty and justice that the admirable “rebels” are implementing while 
eagerly awaiting what is supposed to be the supreme liberty of the Russians, British and Americans233. 
 
More space was devoted to the technique of assassination because it was able to make a greater impression on 
the popular imagination. Assassination was considered by the Fascists something alien to Italian culture but 
strongly rooted in Slavic and Communist societies. The killings demonstrated that these individuals were 
unwilling to suspend their criminal activity in the face of anything and for this reason were not to be considered 
Italians. Their Italian citizenship was only acknowledged in a negative sense, as the “worst”, “Badoglian” and 
“Levantine” expression of the nation. Thus, through the image constructed by the Social Republic’s 
propaganda, this clash took on all the characteristics of a conflict between “barbarism” and “civilization”, 
between the “civilized” Rome and the “barbarian” wave that was fast approaching from the east234. 
Also the violence that the Partisans committed on the bodies of the dead were the confirmation, according to 
the Fascist chroniclers, of the adversary’s profound “bloodthirstiness” and “savage” nature. 
 
They have often abused the dead; either out of the desire to steal, which has driven them to shatter jaws in order 
to pull out gold teeth and to cut off fingers to remove rings, or even just out of that sadistic pleasure that has led 
them to disfigure the corpses of those who had fallen fighting against them, and in particular by kicking them in 
the face. 
 
Lastly, the I.S.R.’s propaganda took robbery and violence against women into consideration. Robbery was 
denounced as an act aimed at extending the conflict to the civilian population. 
 
One could write a treatise per day on the Partisans’ robberies. What is necessary to note is only that they do no 
damage to the Fascists, unless indirectly and in small part, and to the Germans not at all. They only harm and 
starve the population. 
 
Not pursuing any military objective, therefore, robbery was viewed as a criminal activity because it allowed 
people to enrich themselves, to supply clandestine dealings and the black market. Naturally, the I.S.R.’s 
attention to this type of offence was useful for the process of expelling the Partisan from the Italian cultural and 
social fabric. 
 
Some have managed to set aside in this manner a sizeable nest-egg, which, despite being Communists, they 
have no intention of sharing with their less able or less fortunate comrades235. 
 
On the topic of violence against women, the Fascist propagandists drew up a representation aimed at 
sensitizing public opinion, among both the military and civilians. They wanted to demonstrate that in case of 
victory, the Partisans would have brought with them a type of “values” that also included violence against 
women. A violence that, from the perspective of the I.S.R., could not be justified in any way. 
 
Brought to the camp they are raped and abused by the entire band: 65 men. Then the poor creatures are sent to a 
concentration camp as hostages. All three of them pregnant236. 
 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Summarizing what has been stated above: 
1. According to the Fascists, the phenomenon of the Partisan was the fruit of the moral decay resulting from the 
armistice and of a form of corruption in which the nation’s authentic values were dissolved. 
2. The Partisan bands were nothing other than a composite, variegated collection of individuals who engaged in 
criminal activity. 
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3. The Garibaldian myth on which some bands based their existence disintegrated in the face of the lack of 
cohesion and discipline of the bands themselves. 
4. The Partisans pursued objectives imposed by the Allies. 
5. The Resistance acted in a way that was deleterious to the population, contaminating it morally, starving it with 
requisitions and destruction, exposing it to the danger of reprisals. 
 
So an extremely complex image of the Partisans emerges, a clear demonstration of how diligently Fascist 
propaganda worked to demonstrate that the Resistance was the “sick” part of the nation. Although this 
representation had the purpose of demonization and denationalization, the means and the effort deployed to 
achieve this goal are a clear demonstration of how preoccupied the Social Republic was by the progress of the 
Partisan movement and of its taking root in the civilian population. As a result, in addition to with the armed 
forces, Mussolini decided to fight it also with the weapon of propaganda. A war, however, that, besides being 
lost on the actual field of battle, was also lost from the propagandistic standpoint. 
 
 
Annex 
 
 
 
 
                     
Image 1. “Bandits and Rebels, here is your end!”. Poster.                 Image 2. “To every traitor, to every saboteur”. Poster 
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Image 3. “Fratricide!”. Poster.                                                        Image 4. “The Paschal lamb of the godless”, in  
                                                            «La Voce Repubblicana», 6 April 1944. 
 
 
Image 5. “Report on the rebellion”, in «La Repubblica Fascista», 3 August 1944. 
 
 
 
Image 6. “The Treacherous murder of Eugenio Facchini. The crimes of the homeless”, in «Voce di Romagna», 30 January 
1944. 
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Despite the fact that the Army Medical Department (AMEDD) mission is to “conserve the fighting 
strength,” military physicians do provide care to civilian populations.237 Historically this has included both 
domestic and foreign civilian populations during times of peace and conflict. It began as protective public 
health policy and later shifted towards direct patient care. The original iteration of these programs involved 
both formal and informal medical care of civilians by the US military only when ground forces were in that 
area and needed to “pacify” local residents as part of larger strategic operations. Later, the training and 
strategic value of these programs were recognized, and they were expanded to peace time, short-term training 
missions. Currently, the U.S. military is conducting Medical Civic Action Programs (MEDCAPs) around the 
world. In fact, the Southern Regional Command (SOUTHCOM) has over seventy MEDCAPs that are 
performed on an annual basis.238  During the Vietnam War, military medical personnel saw and treated over 40 
million local civilians.239 
This paper examines the use of medicine as a tool of propaganda used by the US military. The clear 
strategic intent is apparent in the doctrine that shaped these programs, the reports and narratives of participants 
and the primary source documents. The general purpose of these missions has been to use medicine to “win the 
hearts and minds” of civilian foreign populations, fostering positive international perceptions of the US, its 
government and military, while simultaneously expanding the American sphere of influence. This paper will 
provide a historico-ethical analysis of these programs, specifically focusing on the MEDCAPs of the Vietnam 
War. Medical civilian assistance programs were formalized under the name Medical Civic Action Programs or 
MEDCAPs during the Vietnam War with the explicit purpose of accomplishing strategic military goals, as 
outlined by Psychological Operations (PSYOP). PSYOP have been understood as influencing the behaviour of 
foreign audiences in order to support the national objectives and strategies of the U.S. government. This is 
accomplished using information and specific missions that influence the emotions, motives, reasoning, and 
behaviour of target audiences. MEDCAPs were understood to be a key component of psychological warfare 
operations. This belief continues today. Military command believes that these operations are indispensable 
because they allow for the use of an important “non-lethal weapon.” 
The US Army has provided such medical care to civilians both formally and informally under many names 
throughout its history.240 The term “medical civilian assistance program” will be used throughout this paper as 
an umbrella term to cover all programs and missions during which uniformed personnel provided medical care 
to civilian populations as part of their military duties. This paper will focus on the Vietnam War as it 
represents both the point in military history when MEDCAPs and other medical civilian assistance programs 
were formalized under this name and when it is possible to see medicine increasingly used as a strategic 
military tool or often-termed “non-lethal weapon.”  
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The Vietnam War  (background) 
 
The Vietnam War involved unconventional warfare, which involved an insurgency or guerilla force. Unlike 
the World Wars, Vietnam did not comprise of a front-line in the classic sense, fought for and slowly 
progressed or retreated. As Robert Wilensky states, “the real battle [in Vietnam] was for the heart and minds of 
the civilians.”241 Both sides of the conflict were fighting amongst the civilian population and needed their 
support, a population that lacked access to any western medical care but was in desperate need of it. These 
facts highlight the usefulness of civilian medical assistance programs to military goals. The military could use 
their medical resources to fill a gap in the host nation’s infrastructure and address a desperate basic need in the 
civilian population. In fact, the Special Forces considered medical care to be their “most valuable anti-guerilla 
asset.”242   Thus, the Vietnam War created conditions under which the strategic goals of these programs would 
come to dominate or be emphasized because of their military value.  
Civilians were intimately intertwined in virtually all aspects of the war, leaving them severely affected by 
its violence.  The Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army went to considerable lengths to increase the toll 
of civilians dead and wounded.243 In fact, during the Tet offensive, over 7,500 civilians in 102 communities 
were killed.244 At the same time 16,211 were wounded, 95,000 houses were destroyed with over one million 
residents left homeless.245 Estimates for these losses place property damages at over $173,663,000, with the 
majority of damage taking place in civilian residential areas.246 When the second wave of attacks centred on 
Saigon, another 433 civilians were killed in that city alone while over 6,600 were wounded. Another 18,250 
homes were destroyed, and nearly 125,000 persons left homeless. 247  Civilian casualties continued in the 
subsequent campaigns against Saigon as another 515 civilians were killed, almost 4,500 wounded and 176,000 
left homeless.248 The Vietnamese medical system could not handle this burden. Thus, the United States and 
forty-two other nations contributed medical care to civilians.249 The United States military contributed an 
enormous amount of money and manpower to the medical care of civilians throughout the Vietnam War. 
Although this was not the first time that the United States military provided medical care to foreign civilians, 
Vietnam represented the largest scale of such endeavors to date. It was because of the type of war in Vietnam 
that we see medical civilian assistance programs become formalized and so widely used. Thus, many medical 
civilian assistance programs were formalized by the US military during this period: these include the medical 
civic action program (MEDCAP), the military provincial health assistance program (MILPHAP) and the 
civilian war casualty program (CWCP). 
Their strategic value was also recognized during the Vietnam war as these programs could employ medical 
treatment projects garnering immediate impact and achievement of specific goals. Civilian Vietnamese 
populations living in the rural provinces had virtually no access to Western medical care. In fact, prior to 
American military involvement estimates place the number of Vietnamese physicians at around only 900.250 
Unfortunately, the majority of the western trained Vietnamese physicians were in the Army and not available 
to civilian population, meaning a patient to physician ratio of 1/93,000.251 Thus, the US military could use its 
resources to bring western medicine to this population, winning hearts and minds, fostering positive 
relationships, expanding their sphere of influence and even using medical treatment and personnel to gather 
intelligence. The use of medicine as a strategic tool came to dominate the policies and strategies of American 
medical efforts in Vietnam.252 Since civilians were so intimately intertwined in the war, and this population 
lacked medical care, yet was suffering from both rampant disease and the effects of war violence, medicine 
was recognized as an important tool in the "pacification" program of the Vietnamese civilians.  
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At this point, it is vital to understand what is meant by the term "pacification" within the US military. 
According to Tran Tho, an author published by the US Army Center of Military History, “Pacification is the 
military, political, economic, and social process of establishing or reestablishing local government responsive 
to and involving the participation of the people.”253 Thus, since the Vietnamese lacked access to established 
western medicine, the US military saw an opportunity to use medicine to reestablish a U.S.-friendly local 
government (GVN). American military resources were employed to win the Vietnamese civilian population 
over to their side. They had identified a void that they could fill, a way to use medicine as a weapon in their 
war for the people and win the hearts and minds. They would pacify the people with the western gift of 
modern medicine. Unfortunately, this marriage of military and medicine would mean the subversion of 
medical goals so that strategic goals could be emphasized.  
 
Medical civic action program (medcap) 
 
Many historians and commentators have acknowledged the medical civic action program as the best known 
of the medical civilian assistance programs in Vietnam. In fact, the MEDCAP was so well known that it made 
its way into the pop-culture consciousness of America. In a scene in the famous film Apocalypse Now, Kurtz 
discusses his own experiences participating in this program.254 Kurtz was a highly decorated member of the 
Army Special Forces, who became a renegade and gained a reputation as a feared man. Interestingly his 
recollection is one of horror and discontent, presenting an exceptionally dark tale of Viet Cong retaliation to 
villagers welcoming MEDCAP teams. 255 Although the story presented in this film cannot be verified by 
historical data, this excerpt is useful in showing the widespread recognition and knowledge of medical civic 
action programs outside of the military. In part, MEDCAPs were widely known because they were often used 
as public relations campaigns and photo opportunities for the United States military. Photographs of soldiers 
caring for sick children were always welcome in hometown newspapers, and unit newsletters. Many in 
military command recognized this as one of the many strategic benefits to these programs.256  
The American Embassy in Saigon and the US Military Assistance Command in Vietnam (USMACV) 
developed the Medical Civic Action Program jointly. It has been described in general terms as a "sick call at 
US military dispensaries... [sometimes involving] major surgical operations requiring extensive 
hospitalizations."257 In January 1963, MEDCAP became an operational program under the Department of the 
Army.258 Initially, MEDCAPs were the domain of US military advisory teams and Special Forces personnel; 
however, the program was soon expanded to include regular American military units. Initially, MEDCAP 
teams traveled to selected hamlets and villages alongside members of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam 
(ARVN) where they would establish temporary clinics. 
In 1965, the buildup of American forces meant the U.S. could expand the use of MEDCAPs. 259 This 
expansion led to a division in the MEDCAP between MEDCAP I and MEDCAP II. MEDCAP I (the original) 
involved American military personnel working closely with Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) 
physicians and medics. In this original iteration, Americans played only a supervisory and advisory role. 
However MEDCAP II involved the direct participation of American military medical professionals in patient 
care, with little or no involvement from the ARVN.  MEDCAP II grew to be a large and expansive program.  
In fact, during the first three months of 1968 approximately 188,441 civilians/month received outpatient 
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treatment from MEDCAP personnel.260 By 1970, MEDCAP II personnel had been treating 150,000 to 225,000 
outpatients per month.261 
  
Medcap: programmatic intent/ goals 
 
The general purpose of both iterations of the MEDCAP was the establishment and maintenance 
of a "spirit of mutual respect and cooperation," while achieving the two-fold main official objectives: 
(1) "to create a favorable image of the Vietnamese Army and central Vietnamese Government in the 
eyes of the people and (2) the improvement of hamlet echelon medical care for the civilian 
populace."262 The aims of creating a favorable image of the Vietnamese Army/Government, and the 
US government “winning the hearts and minds” of the people are understood to fall under the 
purview of psychological operations (known under the acronym PSYOP). According to Army 
doctrine, the use of military psychological operations are in practice “Restricted to the political and 
military goals of the nation that uses it.”263 
MEDCAPs were understood to be a key component of psychological warfare operations. This 
belief continues today. Military command believes that these operations are indispensable because 
they allow the application “of power without necessarily having to shoot bullets.”264  At this point, it 
is critical to understand the term “psychological warfare.” The mission of Psychological Operations 
or PSYOP have been understood as influencing 
“the behavior of foreign target audiences (TAs) to support U.S. national objectives… 
PSYOP accomplish this by conveying selected information and/or advising on actions 
that influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of 
foreign audiences. Behavioral change is at the root of the PSYOP mission.” 265   
Importantly, another key programmatic goal was to improve cooperation and increase mutual 
respect between the military and the civilian population of Vietnam and the United States. 266 
MEDCAP II emphasized this third strategic goal, fostering positive perceptions of the American 
military and American government amongst the Vietnamese civilian population and increasing the 
American sphere of influence.267 Other official goals included gathering intelligence, and securing 
areas by eliminating the enemy from the vicinity.268 These goals were both formally written and 
practically recognized and employed by commanders and units. They have also been recognized 
and written about by authors, commentators and historians of this program.269  
The prioritization of strategic aims over medical goals is perhaps most apparent in a military 
communication held at the Vietnam archives at Texas Tech University. This communication describes a 
corpsman's recommendations to maximize psychological warfare efforts. It states, "Since we have two areas in 
which MEDCAPs are conducted, bring plenty of placebos such as vitamins, etc. to make them think they are 
getting something."270 The statement "to make them think they are getting something"271 highlights an essential 
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component of the Vietnam MEDCAP that led to much physician discontent: intentional dishonesty and the 
prioritization of strategic goals to the detriment of medical aims. Vietnamese civilians were led to believe that 
they were receiving medical care when they were not. Physicians were used for psychological warfare 
operations while the medical care they were providing was restricted. In this way, these programs were not, in 
fact medical, but rather as one physician described them "medical show-business."272  The intent was often not 
to improve health or eliminate disease but rather purely strategic aims of psychological warfare: winning 
hearts and minds, expanding the American and GVN sphere of influence and gathering intelligence.  
 Strategic intent is also made clear in the selection of hamlets where MEDCAP teams were sent. The 
selection process was not based on medical need or necessity but rather strategic or military goals. MEDCAP 
teams were sent to those hamlets identified as "key hamlets" by the Governments of Vietnam and the United 
States.273 This designation was based on their economic, social and political importance to the provinces in 
which they were located.274 MEDCAP teams would use medicine to win over the civilian population, and 
tactical teams were used to eliminate the enemy in the vicinity, hopefully with the help of intelligence gathered 
from MEDCAP patients.275  
 
PROPAGANDA 
 
The clear strategic intent was also apparent in the information provided to the civilian patients. During 
MEDCAP operations medication was not dispensed in regular bottles, rather it was dispensed in special 
envelopes specifically designed by the psychological operation battalion. These envelopes listed not only 
specific directions for taking the prescribed medication, as well as warning labels, it also included messages 
meant to win the civilian population over to the side of the Government of Vietnam and the United States. One 
such envelope was inscribed with the following text: "The Viet Cong kill the people and steal their rice while 
the GVN looks after the people and provides medicine for them."276 Another medication envelope included the 
text; "The Government of Vietnam is looking after the people's health by providing them medical care. The 
Vietnamese and American Navy Medical teams are constantly striving to help the people."277 The importance 
of these documents cannot be dismissed as a single unit reports handing out over two million leaflets over the 
course of their deployment.278  
Loudspeaker announcements, gifts and t-shirts that promoted similar messages, specifically crafted by 
psychological warfare operations units complemented these pamphlets and medication envelopes.279 All of 
these propaganda efforts happened in conjunction with MEDCAP operations. Other information pamphlets 
were handed out to civilians within the Vietnamese hamlets as part of the psychological warfare operations. 
One such pamphlet was used to explain the presence of the MEDCAP team to the Vietnamese civilian 
population, and makes the strategic goal clearly apparent. The document is translated as,  
“A medical team has been sent to your village to help you. Come with your family and friends if 
you are sick or injured. The medical team will help you get well. The Medical team was sent here 
by the government of South Vietnam because the Republic of Vietnam wants to help your family 
get rid of sickness and pain. The Medical team must be protected. The Viet Cong want to destroy 
the medical team because the Viet Cong do not want the government of South Vietnam to help the 
people. The Soldiers of the ARVN 9th Division are here to protect the medical team so the medical 
team can help you. Please help us to protect the medical team. Please tell the soldiers where the 
Viet Cong hide themselves, their weapons and their food.”280 
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This explanation highlights several strategic goals of the MEDCAP and poses serious ethical dilemmas. 
The document clearly explains the MEDCAP team as there to benefit the people of Vietnam and aligns their 
work with the host government, thereby accomplishing their goal of promoting positive conceptions of the 
GVN and the US government. Problematically, this document emphasizes the idea that medical care and the 
treatment of disease are a priority, when we know that it was often secondary to the overall mission regarding 
psychological warfare.  This seems to use the goodwill surrounding medical care and practice for strategic 
ends. The document also informs the civilian population of the need to protect the MEDCAP and requests 
intelligence from the patients as a means of protecting the medical team and ensuring medical care for the 
village. The collection of intelligence was a widely recognized benefit of MEDCAP and often a prioritized 
goal, which physicians found problematic as we saw earlier. 
 
INTELLIGENCE GATHERING 
Many operational reports note using MEDCAPs as a means of gathering intelligence. 281 Commanders 
recognized the special relationship of the provider and patient, and the willingness of those receiving medical 
care to share information. Medicine was a good way to build trust with locals who desperately wanted western 
medicine and placed trust in medical personnel. MEDCAPs were also occasionally used to gather intelligence 
regarding missing persons.282  
One author, writing an analysis of his command in Vietnam, described emphasizing psychological 
operations and intelligence activities in his medical program due to their wide acceptance within the civilian 
population.283 According to this author, these programs sought to gain intelligence regarding the infrastructure 
of the Viet Cong, the current status of security and pacification, as well as to establish rapport with local 
leaders and officials while gauging the improvement of the American and GVN image. He states, "the 
Integrated Civic Action Programs paid off with impressive results; some of our most meaningful intelligence 
was gained in this way."284  
Interestingly, later studies would show that little valuable intelligence was actually gathered from 
MEDCAPs.285 Dr. Robert Wilensky examines the topic of intelligence in his analyses of Vietnam MEDCAPs, 
concluding that these programs did not contribute any information that was pertinent or affective to decision 
making at the operational level.286 Although there are numerous anecdotal accounts of intelligence gathering at 
the unit level, there are no higher-level intelligence reports indicating information gathered through assistance 
programs. 287   As Wilensky concludes, operational-level intelligence data was not gathered or it was not 
recorded and thus under utilized. Either way, the benefits of intelligence gathering as a goal of MEDCAPs are 
difficult to evaluate. 
Records regarding intelligence gathering are not the only data making the success of MEDCAPs difficult to 
evaluate. Although during the Vietnam War many considered MEDCAP to be a success, later analysis has 
been highly critical due to the nature of the data and record keeping. In fact, the overall success of medical 
outcomes of MEDCAPs can be difficult to analyze due to the nature of the records that were kept. Records for 
these programs evolved, or rather devolved into a quota system, listing basic statistics and numbers. 
Commentators have speculated that this is due to the fact that medical civic action was "one of the most 
popular and easily publicized [programs]."288 Thus, the demand by headquarters for numbers to publicize led 
to the system of recording simply the number of patients seen, or immunized. There was also a significant 
amount of competition amongst Colonels to put up big numbers for civic action, which some speculate led 
numbers to be rounded up.289 Unfortunately, this means that there is little narrative or qualitative information 
included in after action reports (AARs) and other official documentation and that even the quantitative data 
cannot always be trusted.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The use of medicine as a tool of strategy and propaganda poses many moral and ethical dilemmas. These 
activities proved morally problematic for the military physician who was left to balance his competing twin 
roles of both physician and soldier.290 This prioritization of military or strategic goals displaced medical goals 
to be a secondary byproduct of the intelligence, propaganda or PSYOP mission. There is much evidence for 
program participants that this emphasis on strategy negatively affected both the doctor-patient relationship and 
the patient’s care. One military physician felt that prioritizing intelligence gathering harmed the trust that 
patients had in the health care team, and believed that this cast a shadow over the entire MEDCAP operation. 
The prioritization of strategic goals was problematic because his experience proved “when you are using 
medical activity” to gather ”information that reduces your trust of the population that you are taking care of… 
a lot of people didn’t even want to bother with you… [the intelligence gatherers] make it very difficult for you 
to have any credibility at all”291  
Interestingly, while outsiders have condemned it and participants have expressed dissatisfaction, many 
military writers have called for greater use of medicine as a ‘non-lethal weapon.’ They see its potential use in 
strategic planning. 292 This call is being reignited in the contemporary discourse. Security policy has shifted 
towards stability operations that often prioritize medical operations such as this. Stability operations, including 
Humanitarian and civic assistance has become an important part of the military mission. National policy has 
emphasized and prioritized these types of missions  within the American armed forces. According to 
Department of Defense (DOD) Instruction 3000.05 Military stability operations (MSOs) are a “core U.S. 
military mission,” that “shall be given priority comparable to combat operations…”293 After the Cold War, 
American global dominance has left the nation with increased international responsibility.294 The United States 
had abandoned its isolationist approach and taken an active role in the development and stabilization of nations 
around the globe. This policy seems to recognize that global role, while making use of new non-violent 
techniques in the US military toolbox. Now stability operations are as important to national security policy as 
combat operations as the US recognizes the strategic importance of stability and the value of civic action of 
military operations other than war (MOOTW). These types of missions and operations include a wide variety 
of programs, focusing on civic action. Health and medical care have been recognized as a powerful tool for 
diplomacy and strategy to bring safety, security and stability to populations and nations that lack medical 
infrastructure and health care.295  In light of this, it is crucial to examine the history of medical civilian 
assistance programs. AMEDD has been used and deployed as a strategic tool in programs similar to medical 
civilian assistance programs throughout Army history.296  MEDCAPs and other medical civilian assistance 
programs are still taking place around the world.  Close analysis of past programs can guide institutional 
knowledge and better current and future versions of this program. 
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Au Pays de la Marseillaise. French propaganda and the question 
of Alsace-Lorraine during First World War 
 
Joseph Schmauch, 
University of Strasbourg 
 
Introduction 
 
Studying the French experience of “psychological warfare” about Alsace and Lorraine invites one to look 
into the origins of a conflict opposing France and Germany for an extended period of time ranging from 1870 
to 1945. From that second date onwards, Alsace-Lorraine ceases to be the cause of a territorial quarrel. Though 
they had been French since the 17th century, the departments of Bas-Rhin, Haut-Rhin and the northern part of 
Lorrain were annexed to the German Empire by the Treaty of Frankfurt, which ended the French-German war 
of 1870-1871. This annexing of territories led to a deep fracture between republican France and imperial 
Germany. In the decades that separate the French humiliation of 1871 from First World War, this situation is 
regarded as painful in nationalist circles. Alsace and Lorraine remains also still dear to French hearts, “Faithful 
Alsace from which the moan of the vanquished rises”, as Jules Ferry puts it297.  
 
Map of Alsace-Lorraine after 1870. Source : Beaugency, Lycée Villon. 
 
Alsace-Lorraine was at that time well present in French national and symbolic representations. How was it 
typically represented? First, the Alsatian landscape, an unchanging, idealised vision of it, in which you can see 
a pretty village with its half-timbered houses; the large headdress of young Alsatian women was another well 
known symbol, going as far as influencing Parisian dress-fashion.  
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« Chez moi », drawing by Hubert Clerget, in Charles Grad, A travers l'Alsace et la Lorraine, Paris, Hachette, 1884. 
 
 
Jean-Jacques Henner, L’Alsace. Elle attend, oil on canvas. Source: Paris, Musée Jean-Jacques Henner. 
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Alsace and Lorraine were also part of the French urban world; in most French cities, you could pick out 
“Alsace-Lorraine” streets or “Strasbourg” avenues and boulevards298. French newspapers also used to deal 
with this subject, most of the time from a nationally and politically prejudiced standpoint. Last but not least, it 
appeared in school handbooks (Lavisse) as well as in publications for young people (Le Tour de France par 
deux enfants), where it was featured as a French lost paradise. Amongst these widespread clichés was the 
theme of the annexed populations' unwavering faithfulness to France. In 1914, these mental representations 
were nevertheless not strong enough any longer to make people wish for a revenge; fifty years of peace had 
largely dulled the resentment against Germany. 
 
And what was the situation on the other side of the Vosges Mountains? In Alsace as well as in Lorrain, 
except for a few politicians, the vast majority of the population do accept the faits accomplis, preferring the 
preservation of peace to an armed conflict about the future of the region. The annexation to the German 
Empire resulted in industrial prosperity, integration into a dynamic economic area and social progress. In the 
political field, the protest movement from the first decades had turned into a demand for autonomy, partially 
satisfied by the German government (a constitution and a regional parliament called Landtag were granted in 
1911, but the local authorities were still appointed by Germany)299.  
 
 
 
Strasbourg: the cathedral, governors’ palace and parliament buildings, postcard 90 x 140 cm, [v. 1914]. Source: Strasbourg, National and 
University library. 
 
In the field of arts, if the adoption of German culture -as wanted and hoped for in Berlin- is failing, an 
original Alsatian personality is taking shape, centred on the notion of double culture (Doppeltkultur). The 
majority of people remain aware of a common heritage with France, keeping in mind the democratic benefits 
of the French Revolution and the epic dimensions of Napoleonic Wars. Tensions between Alsatian and German 
people even appear as of 1913, due to the attitude of the Prussian soldiers garrisoned in Alsace (the Saverne 
affair). 
 
As the First World War breaks out during the summer of 1914, the question of Alsace-Lorraine takes 
another turn. Quoting Marc Bloch, a historian: “During the first days of battle in 1914, the image of Alsace-
Lorraine suddenly raised up from the discrete shadow where, a few days before, it was still hidden.300 ” Very 
early in the conflict the French government become concretely concerned with Alsace-Lorraine, since the 
offensive of summer 1914 allows the French armies to occupy the southern part of Alsace. The authorities 
nevertheless will wait until the fourth year of war before a specific propaganda policy for Alsace-Lorraine is 
actually implemented.  
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I. Focusing public attention on the “lost provinces” : from observation to action 
 
a. French reflections on war propaganda 
 
The creation of a specific office in charge of propaganda about Alsace-Lorraine is best understood in the 
broader context of the “psychological warfare” engaged in by French institutions. The first organism of this 
kind is initiated by Philippe Berthelot, the Cabinet director of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and is 
called “Maison de la Presse” (the Press House); it is created in 1915. At that time, the French propaganda 
concerning the war is very limited: it is unquestionable that Great-Britain or Germany have attached more 
importance to it.  
 
The coming to power of Georges Clemenceau, with Stephen Pichon as the Minister of Foreign Affairs (16 th 
November 1917) allows the creation of a new agency, which is called General office for Information and 
Propaganda (Commissariat general de l’Information et à la Propagande), with Antony Klobukowski at its 
head301. This reorganization has to be ascribed to the personal interest that Clemenceau and his circle of 
acquaintances have for propaganda, in which they see a great war instrument. For General Mordacq, the 
director of the military Cabinet of Clemenceau, “the whole war has shown the strength of propaganda as a 
means of action, against the enemy as well as on the interior front.” At the end of 1917, the budget of this 
general office, principally formed by secret funds from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Quai d’Orsay), reaches 
an amount of 25 million francs (in comparison with the amount of one million in 1914). 
 
b. Countering German propositions for Alsace-Lorraine 
 
This renewed interest for Alsace-Lorraine from the summer of 1917 and onwards is closely related to the 
own reflections of the German government about the future statutes of Alsace-Lorraine. As soon as the war 
begins, some German circles try to take advantage of the conflict to sort out the question of the Alsatian-
Lorrain situation. The imperial government first follows the wishes of the Great Headquarter 
(Oberheeresleitung) and the Prussian ministry, aiming to incorporate Alsace-Lorraine to Prussia; but they have 
to face Bavaria's and Saxony's opposition to any Prussian expansion without compensation to the other 
German confederate states. In the summer of 1917, the war is still going on and Alsace-Lorraine appears as 
one of the main obstacles to conclude peace. More than ever, a solution to this question has to be found302. 
Erzberger, a representative from the Christian-Democracy (Zentrum) proposes the idea of a Grand Duchy and 
some Catholics suggest placing a member of the Wittelsbach family on the throne of Alsace-Lorraine! Finally, 
no decisions are made. In a context of German initiatives, the French government want to promote the idea of 
a French Alsace-Lorraine in case of a victory of the “horizon blue” troops. 
 
The French government consider they have strong arguments for this; a Conference of Alsace-Lorraine, 
involving Alsatian politicians, artists and French high-ranking civil servants, have indeed been active since 
1915 in order to conceive an administrative program for the after-war in Alsace-Lorraine, should the French 
troops win. The definition of a specific propaganda for Alsace-Lorraine is thus to be understood in a broader 
political context, and is meant as a reminder that the French government doesn’t forget the return of the “lost 
provinces”, and beyond them, the question of “eastern marches”. 
 
c. A strategic report 
 
The first alert concerning the global ignorance about Alsace-Lorraine is given to the Ministry of War by a 
military report whose author remains unknown. This report underlines that: 
 “During the conquest of Alsace, the ignorance as well as the haughtiness of our officers and soldiers 
toward Alsatian-Lorrain people have been the cause of unfortunate incidents, which proved harmful to 
military operations as well as to the relations between Alsatians and the troops303.” 
 
Three years after the war declaration, one is forced to recognize that Alsace is totally unknown in France: 
people only have a romantic image of it, far away from the reality. The first contacts with the population 
during the campaign of Alsace have been difficult and have led to frictions. In southern Alsace, French soldiers 
have been facing Alsatians who barely spoke French, and sometimes got a poor welcome. The relations 
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between Alsatian refugees and the French population have also often been bad, mainly because of the 
Alsatians' language and regional accent. 
 
This same report defines an agenda for the propaganda that should be carried out about the question of 
Alsace-Lorraine, in order to promote the idea of it being returned to France, and to convince the civil 
population of how just a cause it is for which the “Poilus” (French soldiers) are fighting.  
 
II. The “Bureau spécial d’études d’Alsace-Lorraine” and its action 
 
a. A specific propaganda agency 
 
In this context a specific agency, specialized in the propaganda about Alsace-Lorraine, comes into being; it 
is called “Bureau special d’études d’Alsace-Lorraine”. From the start, the particulars of this agency are 
surrounded by the utmost secrecy, and the name of the Bureau itself should not reveal the aim and the military 
origin of its activity. The agency is characterized by a double purpose: it constitutes an organ of information, in 
charge of a mission of documentation about Alsace-Lorraine, “well-informed about what is said, done and 
published on this question in France as well as abroad”304, in order to document the Minister of War and his 
offices; it is also an organ of propaganda, in charge of conceiving and spreading a doctrine about the question 
of Alsace-Lorraine. This agency gives instructions, information and impulse to personalities or structures 
already organized outside of it. This method has the advantage of “using existing resources and means, for the 
benefit of the propaganda done by the agency305.” 
 
At the beginning, the agency's staff is composed of officers and civil or military personalities whose origin 
is Alsatian or Lorrain and who have volunteered to join the French army. The “Bureau” is reorganized for the 
first time in January 1918, and gets integrated to the civil Cabinet of the Ministry of War306.  
 
At first, this “Bureau spécial d’études” is limited in scope to the French territory, even if its aim is also to 
reach the soldiers of the Allied Forces. The “Bureau d’études” is aware of Germany's headstart over France 
concerning propaganda about Alsace-Lorraine and they feel they have to strike back. A specific campaign of 
propaganda is also planned for the neutrals, and particularly Switzerland. The aims set by the “Bureau 
d’études” come down to the following: “To convince the opponents, to warm up lukewarm people, to better 
inform people who think they know, but in fact don't. To arouse and maintain everybody's interest for the 
Cause307.” 
 
b. Pamphlets, films and dolls: an overview of actions that were undertaken 
 
Actions concerning the press. – At that time, the main source of propaganda lays in newspapers; informing 
journalists and key personalities, with whom one is in relation, constitutes the most important part of a 
propagandist's job. At first, the press service of the “Bureau d’études” collaborates with the “Maison de la 
Presse”, supplying this national organ with books, pamphlets and brochures for its international sections. It 
aims to make the French press able to risposte to articles published in German or Austrian newpapers, and 
particularly in the Strassburger Post. This Press service can base its analyses on German newspapers, obtained 
from the French embassy in Berne or from the intelligence service established in Réchésy near Belfort and 
headed by doctor Pierre Bucher. From spring 1918 onwards, the press service sends its articles directly to 
newspapers; about thirty articles concerning Alsace-Lorraine are published the same month in different 
national or local papers. In addition to those, some articles are sent to the French military mission in Russia, to 
the French embassy in London or to the headquarters of the North-African troops308. 
 
Pamphlets and brochures. – The publishing services have to coordinate the publishing of pamphlets and 
other documents intended to reach the general public. The principal brochures written by the “Bureau 
d’études” are entitled French Alsace according to History, Love and Right (L’Alsace française suivant 
l’histoire, l’amour et le droit), meant mostly to be read by the troops, Away From the Eagle’s talons (Hors des 
serres de l’Aigle), which takes the example of two Alsatians voluntarily enlisted in the French army, and In the 
Land of the Marseillaise (Au Pays de la Marseillaise309). Several notes, brochures and maps dealing with 
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different topics in relation with Alsace-Lorraine are published, and systematically translated into English in 
order to be handed out to the British and American troops310.  
 
Pamphlet entitled French Alsace according to History, Love and Right. Source : Departmental Archives of Belfort Territory. 
 
 
 
Albert de Dietrich, Au pays de la Marseillaise, Paris, La Renaissance contemporaine, [s.d.], 10 p. Source: Strasbourg, Strasbourg, National 
and University library. 
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From its creation in July 1917 to the end of the war, this office diffuses two million brochures, six million 
pamphlets, ten million postcards, while 600 articles are published. A specific campaign also targets scholars: 
more detailed books are sent to secondary school’s headmasters, as well as to teachers of literacy, history and 
geography. Some pamphlets and brochures are also sent to doctors and dental surgeons, in order to reach as 
many civilians as possible. Also, the “Bureau d’études” is interested in hospitals, and particularly in military 
health units, in which there are many wounded soldiers.  
 
Poster entitled “To hasten victory and make them return [to France], Suscribe !”, 1918. Source: French National library, Gallica. 
 
Lectures given in France and abroad. – The “Bureau d’études” organises lectures and gives subventions to 
different specialized societies like the Erckmann-Chatrian society (Société Erckmann-Chatrian) or the 
Republican League of Alsace-Lorraine (Ligue républicaine d’Alsace-Lorraine). From June 1917 to September 
1918, more than 500 lectures are given311. These lectures take place all over France, for instance the lectures in 
Normandy given by the French league (Ligue française) or those given in south-western France by Benjamin 
Valloton312.  
This program of lectures is also directed to foreign countries. In the autumn of 1917, the society The Effort 
of the Allies (L’Effort des Alliés) organises lectures with lawyer Paul-Albert Helmer in London, Edinburgh, 
Glasgow, Aberdeen and Dundee. Baron de Dietrich and Abbot Wetterlé tour extensively around England in 
order to reach workers through the British Worksmen League. The Patriotic league of Alsatian-Lorrains of 
London carries out an intense campaign of diffusion, with theatrical performances and films, relying on active 
and efficient networks like clubs, Quaker communities and trade unions. The relations that have been 
established with the Alsatian-Lorrain societies located in England and in the United-States proves to be very 
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useful. In all Spanish-speaking countries, this propaganda is carried out by the society America Latina, which 
translates pamphlets and brochures into Spanish313. 
 
 
 
 
Brochure entitled Alsace-Lorraine, A Question of Right, lecture given by Whitney Warren in New-York the 14th march 1917. Source: 
Departmental Archives of Belfort Territory. 
 
In 1917, one month after America's entry into the war, André Tardieu, a diplomat, is sent to Washington by 
President Raymond Poincaré in order to explain what the French war purposes are:  
“When I arrived in Washington, It immediately became clear to me that, despite the great affection for 
France, the Alsace-Lorraine issue was misunderstood by most people. To many Americans, Alsace was 
a German-speaking country, and that settled the argument314.” 
 
André Tardieu organizes fifteen thousand lectures in English and presides over a great ceremony in 
New-York, to which a company of infantrymen takes part. Meanwhile, former mayor of Colmar Daniel 
Blumenthal reorganizes and unifies all the Alsatian-Lorrain associations of America315.  
 
Among the propagandists of the Alsatian-Lorrain cause, we can mention indefatigable Abbot Emile 
Wetterlé. This Francophile priest, a former member of the Reichstag, made the choice to go to Paris in order to 
serve the French government, participating in the debates of the Conference of Alsace-Lorraine. As far as war 
propaganda is concerned, Abbot Wetterlé multiplies the lectures, publishes a book about personal memories of 
his316, as well as an Alsatian novel317. Wetterlé denounces the hold of pangermanism on the annexed provinces 
                                                          
313 Archives nationales, Paris, AJ30 111. Propaganda agenda of the “Ligue patriotique des Alsaciens-Lorrains” in London. 
314 André Tardieu, La Paix, Payot, 1921. 
315 Minutes of the Conference of Alsace-Lorraine, 29th session, December the 24th 1917. Blumenthal gives a report about this trip to the 
Conference of Alsace-Lorraine.  
316 Emile Wetterlé, Les coulisses du Reichstag, Paris, 1918, 240 p. 
317 Emile Wetterlé, Au service de l’ennemi, 1917, 131 p. 
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and tackles the subject of a possible return of Alsace-Lorraine to France and the issues that this situation would 
raise. His analyses are careful and show great concern about avoiding a simplistic point of view, which would 
inevitably lead to mistakes on the day of reintegration. He nevertheless contributes to spread the image of 
Alsace-Lorraine as being a region ever faithful to the mother country, suffering under German yoke, where 
people have shown their patriotism through exodus or resistance to adopting German culture. 
 
 
 
Portrait of Abbot Wetterlé, member of the Reichstag, [press photography, Rol agency]. Source : French National library, Gallica. 
 
 
Commercial propaganda. – It aims to spread articles of propaganda widely through trade. It first targets 
food-selling stores and groceries, whose products are able to penetrate in every home. One can also find 
images supplied by the “Bureau d’études” in chocolate packages, boxes of tea, coffee, rice or tapioca, or on 
stickers, stamps and advertisings wrapped on different sorts of products318. This commercial propaganda also 
concerns bookshop and stationery goods (notepaper, exercise books for pupils, almanacs), toys (dolls, 
drawings of people to cut out designed by Hansi), cardboard items (all sorts of boxes for sweets or cakes), 
jewellery (crosses or thistles of Lorraine, coats of arms of Alsatian cities), and also fashion (accessories from 
the Alsatian traditional costume, headdresses reminiscent of the Alsatian ribbon with its big knot). The Parisian 
department store Le Bon Marché accepts to slip a propaganda item in every mail-ordered article, which 
amounts to about 250,000 items each month319. Thousand of cotton dolls, called Hansel and Suzel, are also 
sold for Christmas320. 
                                                          
318 Archives nationales, Paris, AJ30 107. Industrial and commercial propaganda.  
319 Archives nationales, Paris, AJ30 103. Bureau d’études d’Alsace-Lorraine. A note about the competition organised by the department 
store Le Bon Marché. These objects are often manufactured by wounded soldiers and manufacturing units of the Red Cross. 
320 Archives nationales, Paris, , AJ30 107. A note about the dolls called Yerri and Suzel, 1918. 
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Advertising poster entitled French women. Hurry up, that needy girl can get an Alsatian or a Lorrain doll this year, Henry Royer, 
Departmental Archives of Belfort Territory, 11 Fi 11.24. 
 
Military Propaganda. – Even though not considered essential at first, the diffusion of pamphlets by soldiers 
soon proves to be very efficient. In the second semester of 1918, three million postcards are sent to the 
military, as well as 300,000 brochures adressed to officers, who had to comment them to their troops. 
Preference is given to useful objects: calendars or postcards, which stand good chances to be kept in the 
soldiers' possesions321. Popular books and propaganda brochures can be found in soldiers' association libraries. 
Lectures are also given on the front, in order to clarify the Alsace-Lorraine issue for French soldiers; and the 
“Bureau d’études” take good care not to overlook the American troops stationed in France. 
 
Propaganda and cinema. – A specific section is also in charge of the propaganda by the film industry, with, 
among others, an historically inspired tragedy (Fidélité), a comedy (Kattele’s wedding, Le Mariage de 
Kattele), a comical film in several episodes (Alsatian Humour, L’Humour alsacien). The same section also 
edits news flashes and short-feature films that are shown in theatres before the beginning of films322. These 
propaganda films all have the same purpose: to make people love Alsace. The Vosgian valleys, under French 
administration offer ideal and bucolic scenery for all the films set in Alsace during the war. 
 
                                                          
321 Archives nationales, Paris, AJ30 106. A note about the propaganda to be done for the armies. 
322 Archives nationales, Paris, AJ30 103. A note adressed to the “Bureau d’études d’Alsace-Lorraine”, April the 8th  1918. 
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Poster of the film Alsace, a Great Patriotic Film, by Gaston Leroux and L. Camille. Source: French National library, Gallica. 
 
 
c. The “Bureau d’études d’Alsace-Lorraine” facing low morale 
 
In the spring of 1917, France goes through a time of sustained low morale, touching the Parisian region, as 
well as a vast part of southern France, including the principal regions of war-related industrial production. The 
prefect’s reports all insist on the behaviour of working classes, mentioning several strikes or pondering about 
their significance, even if signs of defeatism don’t appear clearly323. So in the summer of 1917, the “Bureau 
d’études” launches a campaign to raise the morale of the population. Lecturers go all over the country, but 
more particularly to cities and departments where the influence of pacifism has to be fought. They come across 
great difficulties in industrial cities like Saint-Etienne or Lyon and can notice the indifference toward the 
Alsatian issue in regions far away from the borders or less concerned by the social consequences of war. They 
can also observe that zimmerwald’s pacifist theses are gaining ground in the public opinion324. The lecturers 
nevertheless get a warm welcome in many French regions, attesting to the patriotism of rural and traditional 
regions like Savoy, Auvergne, Brittany or the eastern France. Patriotism and faith in victory remain vivid in the 
middle classes, among civil servants and representatives of the bourgeoisie, the main audience at conferences. 
 
Logically, the “Bureau d’études” decides to start a specific action intended to workers and working classes' 
militant structures. A report about Alsatian-Lorrain propaganda in far left environments recommends to 
intensify the cinematographic propaganda, and to lavishly hand out pamphlets especially conceived by 
                                                          
323 Jean-Louis Robert, « Luttes ouvrières en France pendant la Première Guerre Mondiale », in Cahiers d’histoire de l’Institut Maurice 
Thorez, 1977. 
324 Ibidem. A note on the minority party.  
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personalities approved by working classes. The “Bureau” has also planned to send agents, whose role is to 
establish contact with the general secretaries of trade unions and cooperatives, to industrial centers325. 
 
III. “Get people to know Alsace-Lorraine better and love it”: The principal themes of propaganda 
 
a. Which guidelines? 
 
The guideline given to the “Bureau d’études” is clear: “Get people to know Alsace-Lorraine better and love 
it”, and so demonstrate that Alsace-Lorraine is still attached to its Motherland and underline the suffering 
endured by Alsatian-Lorrain people under German rule. But as was pointed out quite appropriately by Maurice 
Barrès, “it is easier and better to get people to love Alsace-Lorraine than to get them to know it well326.” 
 
During its 28th session, the Conference of Alsace-Lorraine votes a report by Albert Helmer dealing with the 
main orientations to be given to the French propaganda about Alsace-Lorraine. This report positions this 
discussion on a juridical field, insisting on the fact that France desires to recover Alsace and Lorraine, not by 
will of conquest, but because 1871 Germany has flouted public rights. The Conference warns both the “Bureau 
d’études” and the agencies in charge of propaganda against the fact that official speeches on Alsace-Lorraine 
tend to drift away from this principle, promoting an excessively sentimental message. France has to redress an 
injustice, because France's rights have been ridiculed as Germany has carried out a war conquest, and did so at 
the very moment when the right of peoples to self-determination was championed on a large scale. 
 
The three main principles of the French propaganda should be: the concept of people’s liberty and their 
right to self-determination, proclaimed during the French Revolution; France's national unification; the wish of 
the Alsatian-Lorrain people to be French. These conclusions lead the Conference to define a very clear policy 
about the possibility of a plebiscite; France shall tolerate no plebiscite in the reconquered provinces: allowing a 
plebiscite would be tantamount to ratifying the Treaty of Frankfurt, which was marred by violence327.  
  
b. Eternal and faithful Alsace : an analysis of the arguments used 
 
Now what is really being said? Studying the French propaganda material dealing with Alsace-Lorraine 
highlights the following themes. The juridical arguments expressed by the Conference of Alsace-Lorraine 
(people’s right to self-determination) appear in good place, linked with the themes of national unification, 
security regarding the borders and Paris, and last but not least, the wealth of the provinces to reconquer328. But 
the favourite argument still remains the faithfulness of Alsace that especially appears in brochures written by 
Alsatian and Lorrain people themselves during the war. In The Question of Alsace-Lorraine (La Question 
d’Alsace-Lorraine)329, Christian Pfister and Ernest Lavisse, both teaching in the Sorbonne, demonstrate with 
historical arguments that Alsace and Lorraine have been French since the Gauls. If Alsace has become 
German, it’s because it was snatched away from France in 1871 “against her will”330. This theme has also been 
popularized by the patriotic song Vous n’aurez pas l’Alsace et la Lorraine (“You won’t get Alsace and 
Lorraine”) that says “You may make the plain German, but our hearts you will never get”. It appears one more 
time in a publication called “How our brothers of Alsace and Lorraine have behaved since 1870” (Comment 
nos frères d’Alsace et de Lorraine ont agi depuis 1870), published in Paris in 1918, that aims to demonstrate 
that all Alsatians have served the Motherland, “Those who have remained”, as well as “Those who have left”: 
the first ones by maintaining a French presence to face the German “immigrant” population, the other ones by 
demonstrating solemnly against the annexation. 
 
                                                          
325 Ibidem. A report about the propaganda carried out in far left circles, May the 2nd 1918. 
326 Minutes of the Conference of Alsace-Lorraine, 25th session, October the 1st  1917. 
327 Ibidem, 28th session, December the 3rd 1917.  
328 Archives nationales, Paris, AJ30 337. Activity programm of the “ Bureau d’études d’Alsace-Lorraine” for the first trimester of 1918.  
329 Christian Pfister and Ernest Lavisse, La question d’Alsace-Lorraine. Illustrated by Hansi, Paris, A. Collin, 2nd éd., 1918. 
330 This same expression “Despite ourselves” shall design, during World War II the Alsatians enroled unwillingly by nazis in the German 
army.  
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Brochure entitled How Alsace and Lorraine protested, by the “Comité de l'effort de la France et de ses alliés”, Paris, Impr. J. de Cussac, 
[1918], 19 p. Source: Departmental Archives of Belfort Territory. 
 
 
 
A history of Faithfullness: solemn oaths, a painfull ordeal, saucy heroism, ill. by Hansi and Zislin. Source : French National library, 
Gallica. 
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Particularly representative of this image of an eternal and faithful Alsace is the work of Jean-Jacques Waltz, 
a draughtsman better known by his pseudonym Hansi. His talent lies in his capacity to give a synthetic image 
of Alsace, but he does it with a renewed humoristic touch, intended to deliver a strongly hostile message 
against the German presence. Whether they be represented at the Gauls' time or in a contemporary context, 
German people are always caricatured as predators and intruders, stealing house-clocks, and they are 
associated with a ridiculous way of life. The usual message is “Germans are brutal”, but Hansi rather uses a 
satiric tone to point out that “Germans are stupid”. But like his fellows involved with the French government, 
Uncle Hansi’s message is only efficient in the short run; he too contributes to spread the image of “an eternal, 
red-white-blue, and smiling Alsace”331.  
 
 
 
German tourists in Paris, by Hansi, postcard 9 x 14 cm. Source: Departmental Archives of Haut-Rhin, 9 Fi 09. 
 
The permanence of these themes probably lies in the French definition of citizenship, which supposes a 
voluntary adhesion to the National State, in opposition with the most recurrent themes of the German 
propaganda, which insist on the linguistic and cultural community between Alsace-Lorraine and Germany (the 
latter thereby achieving complete unification). And the French propaganda isn’t interested either in the 
Alsatian political and cultural evolutions since 1871, or in the specific local character of the people, which are 
only understood as proofs of an anti-German behaviour.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In order to fight the sustained period of low-morale, discouragement that settles in after 3 years of 
murderous war and touches an ever-increasing part of the French population, and in order to respond to the 
doubts relative to the future of Alsace-Lorraine, the French Republic engages on a “psychological warfare” to 
                                                          
331 Georges Bischoff, « L’invention de l’Alsace », in Saisons d’Alsace, n° 119, 1993, p. 34-69. 
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claim Alsace-Lorraine back. In fact, Germany had shown the way for quite some time now. To back its claim, 
France supports the idea of a “victory of right” that alone can erase the 1870 humiliation, guarantee the future 
security of Europe and the respect of people’s rights to self-determination. The propaganda on Alsace-Lorraine 
is directed to everybody: to French citizens, who have to be cheered up; to neutrals, to convince them that 
France's cause is right, or at least that they should feel sympathetic to it; and even to the enemy, in order to 
weaken its strength, to provoke revolts or at least internal oppositions. One can conclude by stating that this 
propaganda has been quite efficient: the themes of the faithful Alsace waiting for its liberator, the images of 
Hansi or Jean-Jacques Henner are still clinging to Alsace as we picture it. But by spreading and popularizing 
these themes, the propaganda is only achieving a short-term victory: these “little lies” and pious images don’t 
contribute to increasing people's knowledge about the actual situation in Alsace-Lorraine. In November 1918, 
in the days following the Armistice, the French people would discover Alsace-Lorraine the way it really is, 
shaped as it has been by half a century of German presence. 
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Heroes wanted! 
Propagandistic war efforts and their failure in Austria-
Hungary during World War I 
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The beginning of the First World War was a decisive change for the until then common imagination of war. 
New or modernized weaponry, with extremely augmented lethality, striking distance and accuracy, changed 
combat and by that the reality of warfare; the anonymous mass dying of men on the battlefields in the Hölle 
der Materialschlachten332 (hell of battles of materiel), caused by an invisible enemy by the use of poison gas, 
machine gun-fire or artillery pieces that would deploy their deadly salvos kilometers beyond the frontline, 
were the consequences. First World War implied the “Ende der Alltäglichkeit”333 (end of everydayness) and 
trench warfare changed the ways combat was conducted. The soldiers in the trenches perceived the 
industrialized warfare as shock. The plain soldier at the frontline was challenged to come to terms with the 
changed reality of war, dominated by the industrialization and rationalization of killing, where the involved 
masses of humans and material were decisive. This modernization implied the loss of importance of individual 
action, which did away with centuries old and valid patterns of military behavior. Due to the situation at the 
front, the plain soldier was not able anymore to prove himself as individual fighter in a duel.334 The one on one 
melee as part of „gentlemanly codes of warfare and killing“ 335 , always expression of disciplined and 
controlled male use of force and closely linked to the term “honor”, soon became obsolete in the age of mass 
armies. One had to come to terms with this new kind of warfare. The great powers had to find a way to cope 
with the many dead which this “Great War” caused and give some meaning to their perishing. This was a new 
challenge for all countries at war that afflicted the entire societies and integrated them into the war efforts. This 
way especially the “Great War” implied the necessity to develop and apply instruments to influence the own 
society in order to secure the conduct of warfare. Especially propaganda grew in importance during this first 
total war. Thereby it was of importance to adjust this propaganda not only to the necessities of warfare, but to 
the specific problems the individual states and their societies had to face during an industrialized war. 
The presented article sheds light on the specific situation of Austria-Hungary within the described context 
and analyzes the structure and justification of the state propaganda. It furthermore scrutinizes the consequences 
and problems that resulted from the construction and the usage of “new” wartime heroes, exemplifying this 
phenomenon with aviation as a new means of warfare. 
The following questions are to be answered: How and why was the image of war heroes constructed in the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy during WWI? What role was intended for them in wartime society (especially in 
the context of an all-encompassing national war hero)? Who were the key players in all propagandistic efforts? 
And why did the Austro-Hungarian way fail? 
 
 
Situation in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
 
In 1914 the situation, which the multi ethnic state encountered, was in a geostrategic and socio-political 
way problematic. The Danube-Monarchy was not only facing a war on multiple fronts but also had to cope 
with internal nationalistic tensions. It thereby had to be stated “[…] that we are facing two wars, one to the 
exterior and one to the interior”.336 But much more than that, Austria-Hungary was a hopelessly old-fashioned 
state and could not live up to the challenges an industrialized war would imply. One therefore had applied for 
                                                          
332 JÜNGER Ernst, Feuer und Blut. Ein kleiner Ausschnitt aus einer großen Schlacht, Magdeburg 1925, p. 81. 
333 HÜPPAUF Bernd, Fliegerhelden des Ersten Weltkriegs. Fotografie, Film und Künste im Dienste der Heldenbildung, in: 
Zeitschrift für Germanistik 3/2008, p. 575-595, here p. 575. 
334 Regarding the meaning of the duel see FREVERT Ute, Ehrenmänner. Das Duell in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, 
Munich 1991. 
335  MORGAN Davis H.J., No more Heroes? Masculanities, Violence and the Civilising Process, in: JAMIESON 
Lynn/CORR Helen (ed.), State, Private Life and Political Change, Basingtoke 1990, p. 13-30, here p. 13. 
336Extract from a speech of the delegate Thaddäus Tertil from 1st of July 1917 in front of the Viennese Parliament. 
Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen des Hauses der Abgeordneten des österreichischen Reichsrates im Jahr 
1917, vol.1, Vienna 1917, p. 642, cited in HOLZER Anton, Das Lächeln der Henker. Der unbekannte Krieg gegen die 
Zivilbevölkerung 1914–1918, Darmstadt 2008, p. 9. 
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quite some time before the outbreak of the First World War a “Politik der Eindämmung”337 (containment 
policy), especially with regard to South-Eastern Europe. The internal frictions between the different 
nationalities caused the Imperial Council to be adjourned in March of 1914. When the system of alliances was 
triggered with the assassination of the Austrian successor to the throne, the global catastrophe – 
“Weltenbrand” – could not be stopped anymore. At the beginning the great powers expected a “short” war and 
were addressing it in the old-fashioned way as a mere “engagement” that would be finished swiftly. 
Nevertheless, within a short period of time the Danube-Monarchy had stumbled into a war on three fronts, 
which would have been lost without the help of the German ally and a well-functioning internal state system. 
Very soon one was confronted with elevated numbers of casualties: only within the time-span from August to 
December 1914 189.000 Austrian soldiers were killed, more than 490.000 wounded and 278.000 were 
declared missing in action or taken as prisoners of war on the Eastern front.338 With this bloodshed the 
majority of the professional officers and soldiers had been lost, so that one had to resort to the military reserve 
force, the “civilians in uniform”. For these some kind of incentive had to be created. Furthermore, war was 
afflicting society as a whole, with new restrictions, the revocation of civil rights, public surveillance and 
deprivation. To these challenged the state had to find publically effective answers, for “the own population has 
to be unified and morally strengthened in order to enhance its fighting power and stamina.”339 As decisive 
tools in order to reach these goals, the state controlled propagandistic presentation and interpretation of war as 
well as its exaggeration were applied. 
 
Propaganda in the Danube-Monarchy 
 
At the outbreak of war there did not exist a consistent or well-considered state propaganda in Austria-
Hungary and was conducted by various different individual persons and institutions. When the fighting started, 
there started a flood of wartime poems, stories and publications, mostly originating from private initiatives. 
Only gradually the state took over the effort, partly using the already existing private endeavors. Within the 
army, two institutions were created, which had to deal with propaganda: the Kriegspressequartier (War-Press 
Quarter, KPQ) and the journalistic “literary group” in the War Archive of the Austrian State Archive. Both 
sustainably influenced and controlled the information system in Cisleithania during the First World War. It 
was up to them to decide which news, which events and connected to these, which informational content at 
which moment in time and to which extend could be published. They were the decisive creators of the various 
figures of heroes, stylized individual persons as “heroes” by deciding about whom special reports could be 
published and looked after the dissemination of the images they had created via the media. 
The Kriegspressequartier (KPQ) was created in 1914 as a subunit of the Army’s Supreme Command 
(Armeeoberkommando, AOK) and directly responsible to the general staff. This unit was responsible for the 
entire military press service and was influencing the entire information system of the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy by issuing official and unofficial reports, oral or written information to the press, public 
presentations, the publishing of various printed publications and the communication with all press offices. In 
its function as the chief or rather advisory censorship office of the Army in the various theatres of war, as well 
as of the Kriegsüberwachungsamt (Office for Wartime Surveillance) 340  in Cisleithania and of the 
Kriegsüberwachungskommission (Commission for Wartime Surveillance) in Hungary, the KPQ was 
influencing the depicted/photographic coverage of the war.341 The increase of importance of the KPQ during 
the First World War can be measured in numbers: whilst the KPQ consisted at the beginning of the war of only 
one department, the number of its departments had risen to 12 by 1918.342 Already late in the fall 1914 its 
members amounted to 880 persons.343 This number can be attributed to the many artists, painters, illustrators, 
photographers, authors and journalists accredited to the KPQ in order to be able to practice their professions. 
For many of them the “duty with the quill” was a way to evade a front assignment. 
The representatives of the KPQ on the one hand delivered reports from the frontlines to the various 
newspapers, detailed accounts that were coined with the predicate “reported from KPQ”, inter alia about 
                                                          
337  RAUCHENSTEINER Manfred, Österreich-Ungarn, in: HIRSCHFELD Gerhard, KRUMREICH Gerd, RENZ Irina 
(eds.), Enzyklopädie Erster Weltkrieg, Paderborn et.al. 2009, p. 64-86, here p. 64. 
338 RAUCHENSTEINER, Österreich-Ungarn, p.68. 
339 LASSWELL Harold D, Propaganda Technique in the World War, London 1927, cited in SAUERMANN p. 341. 
340  See SCHEER Tamara, Die Ringstraßenfront. Österreich-Ungarn, das Kriegsüberwachungsamt und der 
Ausnahmezustand während des Ersten Weltkrieges, Vienna 2010. 
341 MAYER Klaus, die Organisation des Kriegspressequartiers beim k.u.k. Armeeoberkommando im Ersten Weltkrieg, 
phil.Diss, Vienna 1963, p.4 and following.  
342MAYER, p. 48 and following. 
343 BROUCEK Peter, Das Kriegspressequartier und die literarischen Gruppen im Kriegsarchiv 1914–1918, in: AMANN 
Klaus/LENGAUER Hubert (eds.), Österreich und der Große Krieg 1914–1918. Die andere Seite der Geschichte, 
Vienna 1989, p. 132-139, here p. 136. 
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violations of international law or atrocities committed by the enemies, and on the other hand reports about the 
morale along the frontlines, coined with “approved by the KPQ”. 
The “Heeresbericht” (Army report) published by the Army was the basic source for the various articles 
written by the journalists. As these were not allowed to participate in the combat action, they had to rely on 
this scars information. The mostly very brief pieces of information were enhanced with a lot of window 
dressing by the members of KPQ: 
 
“There were true virtuosos in the field, who, with nothing but Hartleben’s travel guide through Galicia and 
a map, were able to vitalize their reports with the truest features of land and people. Enforced by a 
remarkable fantasy they translated the dry information of the booklet and the runes of the general staff’s 
map 1:100.000 to the most descriptive reality, described the character of the landscape, […]”344 
 
The second institution that was of importance in this context was the Army’s Archive in Vienna. Before the 
war the Archive had published scientific works in the field of military studies, but now the propagandistic duty 
for the fatherland became its utmost priority. The newly founded “literary group” was to influence the masses 
with its publications. It also had a “literary” pretension, which could be ascribed to the personal background of 
individual members of this group. With Maximilian von Hoen, until 1917 the commanding officer of the KPQ, 
a media and public relations specialist was assigned with the lead of this institution. As commander of the 
“literary group” Colonel Alois Veltzé was called upon, who was to take decisive influence on many of the 
wartime publications. During the course of the war Rudolf Hans Bartsch, Rainer Maria Rilke, Stefan Zweig, 
Franz Theodor Czokor, Alfred Polgar, Leopold Schönthal, among others, were assigned to this group. 
The longer the war lasted, the more rose the necessity to produce relevant and actual, propagandistic 
publications that would cover the various aspects of war and at the same time influence and mobilize the 
population. The members of the literary group delivered for example essays to the KPQ or “Streffleur’s 
Military Newspaper”, supported the monthly “Donauland” that was especially propagated in the neutral 
foreign countries by the State Department, or published articles in the various dailies. 345  Max von Hoen 
described his function as follows:  
 
“It is a flattering and grateful task to be the intellectual leader of the great mass and with a higher 
perception of the duties attached to this appointment to be able to act as a kind of teacher.”346 
 
Most publications of the “literary group” aimed at “leading” the population and “guiding” it towards the 
right direction by conveying values as willingness to sacrifice, bravery, self-sacrifice and love to the 
fatherland, demonstrated with different examples. Still, many of the publication projects planned by this group 
could only be realized with delays or never came into existence, due to very different reasons. A circular 
decree issued by the War Ministry to the high commands of the front armies that asked for the sending in of 
accounts of combat actions to the press service and the raising of the “appropriate interest”,347 inspired also 
the “literary group” to pick up this idea. It chose different examples from the many applications for rewards 
that regularly arrived in the Army’s Archive, literarily enhanced these “heroic deeds” and forwarded the essays 
to the press service for further dissemination to the dailies. The result was two collective publications of these 
“heroic deeds” that were published under the title “Our Officers” and “Our Soldiers” or “Heroes of the Red 
Cross” in 1915. 
With the secondary title “Episoden aus den Kämpfen der österreichisch-ungarischen Armee im Weltkriege 
1914/15” (Episodes from the Battles of the Austro-Hungarian Army in the World War 1914/15) more than 200 
applications for rewards were chosen, redacted and published in a feuilletonistic way under the aegis of Emil 
von Woinovich and Alois Veltzé, with the collaboration of Rudolf Hand Bartsch, Franz Karl Ginzkey, Viktor 
Hueber and Stefan Zweig, telling “short, clear, pithy accounts of the combat act”.348 
These works were intended to show quite plainly to the Austro-Hungarian population the different 
situations in which the men from their midst, regardless of their descent, had proven their bravery in combat. 
Everybody was said to be able to become a hero, regardless of his descent: “In these days, in which nearly 
everybody is soldier, immense things happened. The hearts of heroes flourished […]”349 every deed that 
                                                          
344STROBL Karl-Hans, Geschichten und Bilder aus dem österreichischen KPQ, p. 56 and following. Translation by the 
author. 
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346 VON HOEN Max Ritter, Die Presse im Kriege, In: Donauland, 1.Halbjahrgang, March until August 1917, p. 29-31, 
here p. 29. 
347ÖStA/KA, Hoen Chronik, p. 25. 
348 Unsere Offiziere, p.3. 
349 Ibidem, p.2. 
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exceeded the mere performance of duties would be rewarded and any application for reward “[…] reports from 
the loyalty, the willingness to sacrifice, the heroic sense of a faithful soldier […].”350 
With the ongoing war also a suitable handling of the own casualties had to be found. In order to honor the 
fallen in June of 1915 there was produced the first of 160 projected volumes under the title “On the Field of 
Honor”. Already a month later the second volume could be published. It was planned to edit these volumes 
also in Polish, Czech, Romanian and Italian language – a project that was not realized due to the financial 
situation. A similar fate overtook the series “Austria-Hungary in Arms”, that was planned in ten volumes and 
rich in illustrations – only five volumes were to be realized. Also of the twelve planned volumes of the “Honor 
Book of all Decorated of the Austro-Hungarian Army in the World War” was published only in three volumes 
until l918. 
The propagandistic works composed by this group were intended to “lobby” for the Army in the home 
country and abroad. Still in May 1917 a circular regulation of the AOK was issued. Within this regulation it 
was ordered that “press, photography, film and all other appropriate means of propaganda from now on only 
can aim at one goal: to serve the glory of the Army and the Navy […].”351 
Special attention was paid in this respect to the so called “Heldenwerk” (Heroes’ Opus). This publication 
project was planned at an early stage as “a honoring of the decorated heroes of the Austro-Hungarian 
Army”.352 For this means a board was created, to which belonged among others the War Minister Alexander 
von Krobatin. With this publication a monument for the heroes of the First World War was to be placed: 
 
“The heroic sons of Austria-Hungary, which distinguished themselves by extraordinary deeds for the glory 
and honor of our dear fatherland and are decorated for this with the highest recognition of the superior 
warlord by conferment of orders and decorations, are to be honored [highlighted, annotation of the 
author] by a literary monument for everlasting times.”353 
 
Originally a monumental opus should be published in 1914 – just as the title makes believe. After 
disagreements and a corruption affaire many members of the board stepped down, among others also 
Alexander Krobatin. By that the work on this project was strongly handicapped and even stalled for some time. 
Only after inspection and clarification of the events the works were continued, but the planned deadline of 
publication could not be met anymore and instead of the originally considered single publications finally four 
volumes of this “monumental opera” were published. 
In each of the four volumes a lot of space was dedicated to the receivers of the various military decorations. 
Under the category of “heroes” soldiers were presented who were decorated with the different medals for their 
deeds. In alphabetic order the respective merits were presented that were decisive for the conferment of the 
medal. This was mostly followed by photographs of the decorated. The information for this category might 
have come from the numerous applications for reward that were send to the Army’s Archive and also served as 
source basis for the “literary group”.354 
The most prominent Austro-Hungarian authors and poets participated in this “renaissance of heroism” 
triggered by the First World War – nevertheless mostly with limited success. Especially striking was the fact, 
that both institutions within the Army were poorly coordinated and furthermore influenced and hindered by the 
lethargy and unwillingness of the political apparatus. By no means the kind of propaganda reflected the change 
in warfare, was not up to date and did not match to the social and political problems already existing during the 
prewar era. It therefore was surprisingly ineffective. This fact is underlined if taking into account the 
construction of war heroes and their use for propagandistic means. Due to the lack of own initiative, inexistent 
coordination and unresolvable differences one rather resorted to German heroic depictions than to Austro-
Hungarian constructions.  
 
Construction of heroes 
 
The heroic designs were especially coined by the kind of warfare and were intended to fulfill certain tasks. 
They were always in the centre of the propagandistic efforts. Particularly the mechanization of war deeply 
changed the until then known image of war and had far reaching consequences on the form of warfare, society 
as a whole and naturally the soldiers in the trenches on the frontlines. Their mass dying on the “fatherland’s 
altar” was reinterpreted to the greatest duty to the fatherland and presented as heroic ideal of manhood. The 
much tried, known commonplace of “heroism”, which possessed for centuries a strong potential of motivation, 
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now was connected with the “new” image of war and enhanced with new values and qualities, in order to offer 
new possibilities for identification and to get to terms with the reality of the “machine war”. Everyone could 
sacrifice his life for the state and become a hero. Heroism became generally accessible and also desirable: the 
survivors were decorated for their heroic deeds, the dead included into the public commemorative culture. The 
new heroes should inspire the youth with their willingness to sacrifice and their idealism to follow their 
example to sacrifice their lives for the common good and to die the “heroic death for the fatherland”. With the 
mass dying and the increasing worship of war heroes (“sacrifice heroes”), the necessity for something 
“special”, for a counterpart rose, for, the masses of dead could not be used in order to create the heroic myth 
around an individual. In addition, this development was a novelty for the Danube Monarchy. Due to its ethnic 
composition it previously was impossible to find a generally valid heroic figure. Therefore, it was mainly the 
Emperor who could be used in order to create a heroic myth for the entire state that would be accepted by all 
nationalities. Nevertheless, the Habsburg Monarchy was forced to react to these developments: 
At the beginning of the war the various newspapers of the Monarchy publishes reports about the “heroic 
deeds” of the soldiers on the battlefields, there were created even special columns in some of the newspapers, 
as for example the Militär-Zeitung (Military-Newspaper). These columns related to the traditional armed 
services of the k.u.k. Monarchy and conveyed equally traditional heroic images that often overlapped with the 
image of the leader as a hero. The main focus of the regional newspapers lay upon reports about individual 
heroic deeds of the locally stationed military formations but at the same time contained as little military 
information as possible.355 Again, the KPQ controlled everything that was published. With the course of war 
the media coverage of these “heroic deeds” decreased significantly and became quite scars. The losses simply 
were too high. The already described publications of the “literary group” appeared during the early stages of 
war and finally were discontinued. From this resulted the problematic situation of an outright gap in the public 
representation und perception of war which had to be filled elsewhere. 
 
Aviator heroes 
 
One chance to fill this gap seemingly lay with aerial warfare and its protagonists, which had been born by 
industrialized warfare. They acted as a kind of alternative model to ground warfare. In the air, war appeared to 
be less menacing; atrocities remained attached to the battles on the ground. The new type of warrior, the 
aviator, seemed to regain the possibility for individual actions and decisions. 
At the latest with the appearance of single seated airplanes in 1916, the aviator could be perceived as lone 
fighter, who, in contrast to the mass armies on the ground, had his fate in his own hands and also could convey 
this image in the public perception. He furthermore mastered the new technology and seemingly came along 
with the challenges of mechanized warfare. By that he combined new and old patterns of interpretation and 
beforehand accomplished unimaginable achievements. With aerial warfare a space had been created that 
offered on the first sight opportunities to prove manhood and where glory and honor were seemingly easy to be 
earned. The immediately visible individual achievements could be exploited in a crowd-pleasing manner. The 
fight in the air was depicted as an honorable duel between two equal enemies that chivalrously and fair 
confronted each other, until one emerged as victor. What the horse meant to the knight now meant the plane to 
the pilot and the machine gun replaced the sword. Just as the medieval knights also the flying protagonists 
were believed to follow certain values and rules of engagement. By that a link to something very remote in 
time was established, that never really existed in this way.356 It was a mere idealistic imagination of chivalry 
that was transferred into a time in which this concept was believed to be lost. Whilst “for the individual 
soldier, war became a lengthy wait for certain execution within the confined space of pre-dug graves”357, the 
pilot stood as “individualist in the midst of mass dying.”358 This war 
 
“with its incredible mass effects has something impersonal as no other before. We perfectly know that it 
bears all over the front heroes in numbers and size as hardly any other time in human history, only that the 
glory of the single one dissolves in the entirety, it is remarkable how few the names are that became loved 
in a popular, shining way during these two years. One exception are the combat pilots. Their most 
successful men are known to the public with names, are loved with names, all their deeds are closely 
followed and the public cheers them, when the number of their victories rises.”359 
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 95 
 
Whilst these “aviator heroes” reached enormous popularity in the German Empire and the aerial warfare 
against the arch-enemy France had a nationalistic twist, this new dimension of war only played a secondary 
role in Austria-Hungary from the very beginning. Whilst there was only limited Air force activity on the 
Russian and also the Serbian fronts, this changed with the buildup of a new theatre of war against Italy. Still, 
the Air force was also then a marginal occurrence. It therefore does not surprise, that aerial warfare only 
played a secondary role in the coverage of the Austro-Hungarian media. This might have been due to the 
disesteem of the military use of aviation prior to the First World War. Then, aviation was coined as quite 
pacifistic in Austria-Hungary, the perception of its military value lagged way behind its civilian usage. 
Furthermore, aviation would never gain importance for the nation,360 a nation that never existed until 1918. 
This disesteem also continued into the First World War. Though there appeared some isolated reports on aerial 
battles in the media, they were described as of minor importance for the general warfare. The Air force was 
only acknowledged in its reconnaissance role. This attribution was further strengthened by the fact, that the 
KPQ did not install any reporters at the Air force who would have been able to give first-hand accounts. Single 
newspapers, as for example the “Kleine Zeitung”, had an own column for aerial warfare, but this was 
published on a very irregular basis or the focus was less set onto persons from the own Air force but much 
more onto events on the German Western Front. Often one could find reports about the victories of 
Richthofen, Boelcke or Immelmann in the Austro-Hungarian media, whilst the k.u.k. aviators mostly 
disappeared in anonymity. This public ignorance was also reflected by the self-awareness of the k.u.k. 
aviators: only this way it becomes understandable, that there hardly exist any memoirs of theses aviators until 
present.361 In contrast to the immense worship that built up around the German aviator heroes in the German 
Empire, the KPQ and other state institutions reacted too late to these developments and misunderstood the 
potential of aviation. Only from 1917 on reports about aerial victories or lists of downed enemy planes were 
published in the newspapers. By that, the most successful k.u.k. aviators, measured in aerial victories, were not 
known to the general public. Their followers were limited to the milieu from which they originated. Reports 
were mostly to be found in professional technical journals or aviation journals. Here, the most successful 
fighter pilot of the k.u.k. Monarchy, Godwin von Brumowski, and the most successful k.u.k. naval aviator 
Gottfried von Banfield found their followers. But also the German aviator heroes were used for comparison. 
Both Austro-Hungarian pilots were described as very dutiful, disciplined and of strong will and with their duty 
for the fatherland as the utmost impetus. Hereby one must not forget that both, just as their German comrades, 
were professionally trained warriors that had been socialized in a certain manner. Both were prepared to go all 
the way to the most extreme, the self-sacrifice – Brumowski survived four crashes on the front. Banfield, who 
was nearly hindered from further flying after a crash, had a nervous breakdown when he was informed about 
this diagnosis that meant that he would not be able to fulfill his duty and serve the fatherland anymore.362 His 
“numerous, almost rushed, heroic aviator’s deeds”363 are put into the foreground especially in the reports of 
the Aeroclub. A recurring motive in the depiction of theses aviator heroes is the fight out of an inferior 
position. The media does not conceal that the k.u.k. Air force was outnumbered on the Italian theatre of war, 
but used this fact propagandistically: just as David against Goliath also the Austro-Hungarian aviators are 
victorious in their fights. This presentation sharply differs from the one used for the German aviator heroes. 
Also within the description of the Austro-Hungarian aviator heroes, the motive of chivalry was not to be 
missed. The official “Heldenwerk” is one of the few state publications, in which Brumowski is mentioned. 
This contemporaneous publication put it this way: 
 
“[…]Captain Brumowsky [sic!], acclaimed and admired everywhere, accomplished performances equal to 
those of Immelmann, Bölke [sic!], and Richthofen. He was a champion of the air, his red fighter plane 
always cheered by his comrades-in-arms and feared by the enemy. No one would have attributed this 
ruthless combat performance to him, this monocle wearing, seemingly naïve, puerile character with blonde 
hair and blue eyes. Like a bird, his desires were flying – and the air in general –, noble and chivalrous in 
combat, he resembled a figure from the time of troubadours and jousts/tourneys.”364 
 
The reference to the German aviator heroes is an interesting feature of this statement. By crating this 
reference also part of the heroic glory gets transferred to Brumowski. This perception can be also observed 
with the Austro-Hungarian aviators themselves. Only this way one can understand that after a short stay at the 
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German Western Front, close to the workshop of Richthofen’s “Flying Circus”, Brumowski had his plane 
painted red, just as Manfred von Richthofen’s plane, and by that was trying to connect to the German aviator 
hero’s myth. 
Brumowski and Banfield both were “refused” one thing: to die the hero’s death for the fatherland and by 
that be incorporated into the canon of sacrifice. Both survived the First World War. 
 
“[…] With Brumowski [sic!] we have in Austria-Hungary our ‘Ace of Aces’, the born warrior, the born 
bird-man, who dominates his machine just as an eagle his wings and who’s heart does not shake, when 
bullets of the enemies’ machine guns perforate his wings. 
It is only astonishing, that the best of our best so far did not gain any popularity. What kind of national 
heroes are the German flyers Boelcke, Immelmann and Richthofen! It’s the same with the French, British 
and the Italians, where successful fighter pilots are worshipped. Only with us it is possible, that a man 
gains 35 aerial victories without becoming a celebrated hero of his country. Oh yes, one knows Brumowsky 
[sic], one remembers his name, but the man in the street, the people, do not know anything about him. That 
is shameful and sad at the same time.”365 
 
Examplified with the aviators one can identify clearly the immobility of state propaganda that could not 
react to the new theatre of war in the airspace and put forward relevant measures only in the context of German 
developments. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Austro-Hungarian propaganda apparatus was created very late and rudimentarily as an instrument to 
steer the public opinion in the Danube Monarchy. This is an expression of the lack of capability and 
opportunity of the multi ethnic state to answer to international developments, especially in the bellicose field. 
This circumstance was among the reasons for the breakup of the Habsburg Empire. 
Regardless of overlapping personnel, no cooperation of the protagonists of the various institutions 
entrusted with propaganda can be identified. They worked in a parallel manner, uncoordinated and by that little 
effective. By that, a breakup of old-fashioned directives was rendered nearly impossible. The element of the 
creation of heroes is a clear proof for this, as changes in the international sphere in this respect never were met 
with appropriate measures. Especially the example of aviation gives a clear impression of the situation. By 
orienting along the German Empire – not only militarily – the propagandistic value and the multiple 
opportunities that the creation of own aviation heroes could have offered to the Habsburg Monarchy were 
ignored. The outdated military apparatus, sticking to old traditions or the disrespectful treatment of the own 
Air force, that never was imputed with any importance; surely are factors for the unsuccessful creation of 
heroes in Austria-Hungary. Whilst the German aviators were known to any child and by that were bearing an 
elevated potential for motivation in order to acquire military offspring, this chance was willingly thrown away 
in Austria-Hungary. It furthermore would have been very hard to implement due to the ethnic differences. 
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The First World War in Lisbon – The fights of everyday life 
 
Ana Dâmaso, 
IHC – FCSH - UNL 
 
 
 This communication is the result of the research work within the framework of the master thesis in 
contemporary history with the same theme. The research sought to understand how the First World War was 
received by the city and district of Lisbon and what are the consequences felt by the population: how the life of 
a worker and a family has changed with the coming of the war. The main sources of research were based on 
correspondence received and dispatched from Lisbon Civil Government and the Ministry of the Interior, as 
well as any correspondence from the municipality of Lisbon. File service orders of the Guarda Nacional 
Republicana and the analysis of some newspapers as A Capital helped to complete the research. 
 
In the early 20th century the District of Lisbon included also the now district of Setúbal, and was a major 
pole of attraction of migratory flows of people coming from the country to the city. The first world war came 
to a shakeup in the city and district of Lisbon which, like the rest of the country suffered the consequences of 
the war almost immediately. Fiduciary circulation requirement led to a brutal increase in inflation during the 
war intensifying the situation already lived with further increasing of prices. The number of crimes and 
offences committed between 1914 to 1919 through the analysis of records of captures of the Lisbon District 
File gives us the example of this, with a greater number of crimes happening in the years 1916 to 1918 (greater 
outbreak of thefts in 1916 and 1918 and most transgressions in 1917), maintaining however the prospect of 
increased crimes within the four years of war between the studied period.  
The prisoners we found are mostly arrested for theft or trespass, being that in the year 1916, arose in the 
registers the category of "vagrancy" that would keep up with important values and who has become an 
increasingly common phenomenon practiced by children, youngsters and elderly people without jobs. With the 
substantial increase of beggars were created in Lisbon a few nursing homes (some had other functions as little 
hotels suffering a transformation after the beginning of the conflict) that offered the possibility of overnight 
stay, complete with clothes and food that however, were often crowded and with few possibilities to expand 
monetary or maintain open. 
These values become also a mirror of the situation in which the country found itself and in this case the city 
of Lisbon. The insults the police, the law transgressions and thefts have become common practice in a period 
of economic crisis and entry into the war and where were at risk not only the supply of food, but also the very 
functioning of factories and services.  
To the problems with theft, trespasses, desertions and insults joined the various letters and telegrams 
addressed to the Civil Governor of Lisbon and the Interior mostly with problems related to lack of food. The 
lack of flour was becoming fraught with bread, the main food of most families, becoming scarce, of worse 
quality and increasingly expensive. To the lack of bread joined the olive oil, meat, fish, milk, sugar, and 
potato. Requests for transit guides multiplied increasingly asking for the transport of coal, flour, olive oil 
among the several counties or asking for flour of the colonies.  
The situation becomes desperate with some municipalities making multiple requests with a few days apart, 
the municipalities that have food for only a few days and who feared the rupture of stock. Barns were built a 
throughout the country, in several counties trying to find a solution to the pressing problem of the lack of food, 
as well as their maintenance and storage (fearing the black market and the problems of hoarding that grew 
exponentially with the periods of food shortage in stores). 
Despite the construction of barns the lack of money and the means to keep them open and functioning 
makes them unsafe and requests for its refueling also multiply. In a telegram of July 31, 1918 received by the 
civilian Government of Lisbon is requested the opening of a credit to the Administrative Commission of the 
municipality of Cascais to the construction of the Municipal Barn. This situation is repeated in several other 
cases.  
Sometimes even the municipalities have to address the Interior Ministry asking for flour. The impossibility 
of buying bread for themselves and for the family became a common situation. Hunger is the main reason of 
dissatisfaction and therefore more crowd trouble. Let's take as an example the letter sent by the administration 
of the municipality of Santiago do Cacém in July 30, 1917 the civilian Government of Lisbon where it is 
broadcast that a group of men and women armed with hammers and clubs if they drove to the Town Hall 
demanding a reduction in the price of flour. The administrator alarmed at the unrest and with few guards 
available managed a deal with producers for a few days, leaving the final decision in the price of flour for 
another week. The situation in July 1917 in Santiago do Cacém is not unique. In Alcácer do Sal in September 
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1915 the lack of bread in bakeries and flour shortages led to the County Administration to warn the civilian 
Government afraid of the crowd trouble that could arise for public order. 
In these cases the action of the populations is direct: a large group of men and women of the city heading to 
town hall or even to the municipal barns asking for solutions: more flour, more bread or lower prices of food 
or materials. These claims may end with violent conflicts which may continue until their demands are at least 
taking into consideration. The manifestations of people are repeated when you give also the output of food 
(especially flour and olive oil) to other municipalities of the country.   
The National Republican Guard is often called for aid to counties that have more problems of internal 
conflicts, however the answer of the guard is sometimes delayed, because as we saw by the case from the 
administrator of the municipality of Santiago de Cacém, the number of existing guards in their own localities is 
insufficient. As early as August 1914 was the information for all municipalities to inform the Ministry of the 
Interior police needs relations in the localities. This information sought to figure out which localities most in 
need of police backup. Of the 24 responses obtained 18 are positive asking for more agents. The reasons are in 
General by the danger of theft and black market, some municipalities also referred to the distance between 
parishes as a security problem. The most urgent cases arise in Almada, Seixal and Vila Franca de Xira due to 
proximity to the capital and factories, and a large part of the population of these counties are workers and may 
suffer with the closure of factories during the period of the conflict. 
Policing becomes an obstacle difficult to overtake. The guard was already reduced number, condition that 
was aggravated with the military uprising to war. Even with the actual increase in the guard, the city in 1911 is 
more dangerous and with more habitants than had seen to date, and in 1914, 1664 guards for the whole city 
became ineffective. The situation does not improve within the country as we have seen in the case of Santiago 
do Cacém. Lisbon's own Civic Police sends the civil Governor a warning that there are 207 vacancies unfilled 
as Guard 2nd class in May 1915 without any way of being addressed, as demonstrated by the excerpt, 
“"though they seek by all means call individuals who are able to satisfy the necessary requirements to enlist as 
guards, little has achieved, due perhaps to the period of turmoil we're going through, not the most desirable, 
and mainly for being poorly paid.”” 
In March 1917 the Civic Police of Lisbon makes new appeal due to vacancies unfilled in the police asking 
for a decree that allows during the wartime requirements for entry into the war are more extensive with the 
required minimum height of 1m and 58cm. The civil security, even in matters of everyday life constituted a 
difficulty with lack of policing on the streets, municipal markets (which was sometimes conflicts between 
merchants and shoppers due to supply problems already enlightened). The employees of the Ministry of the 
interior sent a letter to the Minister requesting the provision of a pistol and the munitions for each employee as 
a means of precaution and personal security against burglary and existing dangers on the street. 
The problems increase even more when the problems of food and supplies, gather the problems of partial 
or total closure of the factories, leading to unemployment of several workers. In Setúbal, Almada and Loures 
the month of August 1914 was quite troublesome. The specter of war and the start of restrictions of raw 
materials did terminate (even for short periods of time) some factories in the early days of the month to close 
or to diminish the production . The worker's response was immediate with manifestations and strikes. In 
Setubal and Almada the administrator warned that the workers are worried about food prices and insecurity of 
their jobs with the closure or reduction of work in factories. In Loures public order has been changed due to 
the short closure of the crockery factory in Portugal. The guard constituted only by two men had some 
difficulties to contain the protesters. The class of Longshoremen at the port of Lisbon sent a request in 
February 1, 1915 calling for the Civil Governor help for their workers, because with the beginning of the war 
the work has decreased and some workers with family can't be in full time, thus losing part of his salary. 
In March 1916 the company Henry Bucknall & Sounds – Limited participated in the Civil Governor the 
remission of some staff at the factory due to the adverse effects of war on his Old Margueira Cork factory in 
Cacilhas. The Board had already diminished to 3 work days and sometimes called "contract work". However 
had to withdraw the measures due to strong protests by workers adding another day of work. Despite all the 
attempts the situation got worse with the stocks to accumulate in the factory. The solution passes through the 
total closure or a reduction of workers. The company warns in advance the Governor because problamy are 
going to happen some problems of public order when the decision is made public.  
In March 1916 the administrator of the municipality of Cascais is also asking job for several workers who 
were fired without any prior notice, being currently go through various difficulties. The lack of raw materials 
is one of the biggest concerns and reasons for the closure of factories as well as the lack of disposal of the 
products. The situation is aggravated by the conditions imposed by England on the export of coal, whose lack 
was also feeling. In March 1916 the rationing that English be asked Portugal current and consumption need of 
imported coal for England in continental Portugal, Cabo Verde Islands and Açores e Madeira in order to 
prevent accumulation of coal in foreign countries. 
Also in 1916 in the month of February in Almada are requested more elements of the National Republican 
Guard as more factories shut down and the workers are appalled. In Barreiro, also in February 1916 the 
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situation is identical to asking if guards to guarantee public safety. As we have seen companies also respond to 
workers in order to compensate the strikes and conflicts, giving explanations about the current situation asking 
for understanding and calm, trying to finish the claims of their workers. The Portuguese Industrial Company 
however makes an appeal to their workers to finish with strikes by appealing to his patriotic vein, respect for 
their country and for the soldiers who are fighting for it in a distant country. The commercial and Industrial 
Association of Sines follows somewhat the same idea of Portuguese Industrial Company, sending a letter to 
the Government warning that Civil unrest have taken place in the village for workers who do not have their 
concern the homeland and the law but rather the complete disarray thus preventing the progress of the working 
classes and the factory itself. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
“"These are the demonstrations of patriotism of all peoples. Is this the feeling that primarily defines its 
character. He's not even more alive even deeper than ours. Europe goes through its most formidable historical 
and painful crisis. For our part, we are convinced that no repercussion of tremendous struggle committed will 
produce between us; but, under any circumstances, should we proceed in order to reconcile the feelings that we 
have to friendly Nations and to our ally. “" in A Capital, August 3, 1914  
 
The words edited by the newspaper on August 3 would unfortunately prove as erroneous. The war that had 
begun in the distant point of Europe would quickly turn into the greater confrontation seen to date and with 
unimaginable consequences. As already mentioned in the course of this work, the perception of the war effort 
within the society went on to involve a military, economic, political and social effort. We could not separate 
the war effort of any of these parameters. 
The Portuguese economy, like that of all other countries, suffered a fall. The eternal external dependency 
and poor merchant dictated serious consequences in terms of supplies and caused chaos in the cities. The war 
that was in Flanders and in Africa was a monster far compared with the monster sense every day: the 
widespread hunger and the closure or reduction of work in factories that gave the daily life of the families a 
sense of constant insecurity. The strikes, clashes and letters to the Governor resorted to sending cereals, to 
decrease in prices and improving living conditions. The robberies in warehouses, shops, grocery stores are 
synonymous of the desperation felt by the populations.  
The main cause of the scourge meaning by hunger revolved around the war, whose cause many were 
ignorant, and ineffective Governments that couldn't respond to felt needs. The waves of diseases that occurred 
between 1914 and 1918 increase the sense of insecurity for the population, particularly the pneumonic 
influenza.  In the midst of all these consequences – almost directly related with the beginning of the conflict 
(with the exception perhaps of pneumonic influenza), the fight against the war became secondary. The fight 
against hunger and the work was essential even though the situation was desperate due to the same. However 
the war had begun without the consent or authorization of the population that just wanted to continue their 
normal lives.  
 
 
 
Bibliography  
 
Becket, Ian, 2007, The Great War, London, Pearson Longman. 
Costa, A. Celestino, 1962, A Evolução de uma cidade. Lisboa., Edição da Câmara Municipal de Lisboa. 
Pinheiro, Magda, 2011, Biografia de Lisboa, Lisboa, Esfera dos Livros. 
Pires, Ana Paula, 2011, Portugal e a 1ª Guerra Mundial. A República e a Economia de Guerra, Casal de   Cambra, 
Caleidoscópio. 
Winter, Jay, 1995, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning. The Great War in European Cultural History, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Journals 
Portugal na Guerra, Junho a Novembro, 1917 
A Capital, Agosto, 1914 a 1919 
 
 
 
 
 100 
Life and Honour 
the propaganda  to the Portuguese involvement 
in the World War I, in Braga 
 
  
Amadeu José Campos de Sousa, 
CEIS20- UC 
 
 
In Africa, the Portuguese and German armies fought for colonial territories since 1914, even though there 
was not an official war declaration between the two countries. As it is well-known, everything will change 
between the years of 1916 and 1917. Portugal will quit its neutral position and start to struggle at the English 
and allies side in the European soil. This happened in the great clash that was happening in the summer of 
1914. The purpose of this lecture is to unveil some proposals such as meetings and conferences, evoking 
opinions and declarations that were conveyed in the press of Braga since 1916 onwards.  
On the 10th March 1916, Portugal declares war against Germany, this to react to Germany’s announcement 
in the previous day and as a consequence of several German ships’ arrest in the Portuguese ports. The 
Portuguese involvement in the European war was then about to happen. While the signs of a dark and 
mournful life turned up, in Braga there were plenty of public opinions made not only individually, but also in 
groups or institutional, along with the open propaganda or the subtle press appealing to the patriotism and 
courage of knights. In fact, avoiding conflicts, due to the formation of a government Sacred Union, the 
majority of opinions and initiatives will shape themselves to support and involve the country in the war. 
Although there were some that were against or even without enthusiasm – probably because of their German 
sympathy and the possible loss of their rights -, they would call for a return. 
Now, I present the facts and examples. 
In a month the official involvement of Portugal in the war was considered by the newspaper O Rebate, 
which was the official paper of the democrats in Braga, on the 17th April 1916, writes the declaration of PRP 
[Portuguese Republican Party] justifying the Portuguese military involvement in the conflict around Europe 
since 1914. In that declaration it is said that our condition of English allies couldn’t allow continuing with the 
endless impartiality. This situation didn’t match with the juridical international terms, being Portugal forever 
dishonoured and losing the world’s respect if it didn’t accomplish the duty of loyalty imposed by England. In 
the same edition of 17th April in O Rebate a priest called Pires Lage, appeals to the soldiers’ contribution in the 
name of their glorious homeland. He even quotes from the PRP declaration previously mentioned, the 
commitment they should have as English allies towards German’s anger. Consequently, they should be 
together and honour the Portuguese history, which is plenty of heroes. He declares: 
 
A vibrating shout rises from my chest to spread towards the world: We are Portuguese. 
Being Portuguese is more than being born in Portugal; it is to reproduce the best examples that nobody has 
ever  tried; it is to reply the outrage of others; Portuguese are heroes and great. 
(...) 
Portugal neither provokes nor withdraws 
What reasons have set to Germany to start a war? 
Nobody knows because they don’t exist 
Those who had reason were us to react to their outrage that took place in Africa. 
(...) 
We are English allies and never will we break the agreement trust; never will we fail the Portuguese 
reputation. 
(...) 
The inner fights were over and Portugal never splits; (...) 
I am a priest, I’m portuguese. As a priest I identify myself in the clergy of France that once defeated 
abandons the cassock, takes the sword and believing in God and the Country dies as a winner. 
I’m portuguese and as such I long for complete the tribute that duty and humanity laws require. 
(...) 
“ If we are Insulted, we will react. 
If we are pushed to the war we will only as winners.” 
Hurray Portugal. 
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Hurray the allies366. 
 
At a really hard moment to the country, it was imperative to bring together the influence of the Church and 
of those who were related so that the government could benefit. At that time, while in the country the govern 
of the Sacred Union gathered the evolutionists and democrats, all contributes were positive, as it is said by 
Pires Lage367.  
The sympathetic position of the church of Braga in harmony with prelates and other Catholic hierarchy is 
revealed in the Catholic press in Braga, even though they weren’t defined by a favourable point of view to the 
English side. It is exposed in a publication by the Acção Católica (Catholic Action) on 25th March,1916. Here 
we notice the sympathy towards the war announcement made by our country to Germany a fortnight before. 
As an “editorial column“, Francisco Velozo, who was the director of this magazine, shows his support to the 
Portuguese decision to start  the war due to the fact that something had to be done to preserve the colonies by 
the end of the clash. He also regretted that the Sacred Union member was not more representative of the 
nations policy throb. According to Velozo the problem is that we are with England till the end or the death368.  
In this issue of Acção Católica in the article  “Porque” [“Because”] J. Faria de Machado considers the 
opportunity and inevitability of our entrance in the war. Faria Machado didn’t seem too convinced of the 
benefit we could have with that. He thinks it wasn’t the proper moment but the unavoidable English pressure.  
Up to that instant, our country using an active neutral position provided weapons and food supplies to the 
English people. Machado also adds that our weapons and supplies were not what the English expected since 
our army was barely prepared. The English wanted more than anything else to guarantee the control of the 
ports and routes of Lagos, Madeira and Azores and the entrance of Portugal in the conflict could assure that. 
With these routes the English could keep the Strait of Gibraltar away from the German submarines and the 
control of the Atlantic routes which made possible the South America direction, according to Machado’s 
words. It’s hard time and the unit is essential, so Machado admits, but sooner he threatens saying that the 
leaders are to blame for the results that might be reached: 
 
We are, at last, in a war. We don’t want; it’s no good to discuss the advantages or the disadvantages of our 
involvement. (...) All of us know we must be helped and it’s a duty to save Portugal. With our faith, our 
devotion and blood we help our glorious country to overcome and succeed this dangerous crisis. After that, 
when the victory is celebrated, time will be enough to get revenge. Peace will be of inevitable justice... 
Meanwhile, hurray Portugal!369  
 
In the early 1917, just the days before the first soldiers of CEP start the combat, Gazeta de Braga, the 
democrats’ official newspaper in the city, warned the soldiers that they would go to the war to find their death, 
but it also advised that they had a huge mission, they would defend their Homeland and the Republic. The 
Homeland – Love! The Republic - Freedom!), provided them with confidence as if they were defending their 
mothers, wives, sisters370. 
While the press in the town was analysing the Portuguese involvement in the war, according to the local 
Democratic Party structures, as it was already focused in the PRP leaflet, other reactions were seeking to ignite 
the patriotic sense among the soldiers persuading them, their families and people in general to  grasp the 
combat. This influence emerged in public events like meetings and conferences. 
                                                          
366 Pires Lage (priest). Pro Patria (Pro Homeland).  O Rebate. Braga. Nº 20 (1916/17/04), p.1 . 
367 Later this “priest” Pires Lage abandoned his clergy role.  In an article identified O Negócio do Milho [The Trade of 
Maize] the local newspaper in Braga, A Cidade [The City] issued on the 14th August 1919 (2nd edition, p.1), wrote that he 
had been fired out of Caixa Geral de Depositos [a portuguese bank] in Terras de Bouro where he had the position of 
council administrator. 
368 Cronica da Semana. Acção Católica [article “Week Chronicle” in the magazine Catholic Action]. Nº 143 (1916/03/23), 
pp.612-613. To add, it must be recorded that Francisco Velozo had already foreseen in august 1914 the inevitable entrance 
of Portugal in the clash, on the side of England. In the same Ilustração Católica [Catholic Illustration] on 15/08/1914 
(edition nº 59) ”Cronica da Semana” wrote: While the European conflagration (destruction/devastation) increases every 
day, we must look around us. It seems that throughout the country there is a shadow of nightmare. Portugal slept for eighty 
years, as the shepherd of Anunzio’s Tragedy and awakes for a life he doesn’t recognize.(…) We lay ourselves, thus, in the 
English mat like Austria is in the back side of Germay , and Russia in comparing to France.(…) 
 
369 MACHADO, J. Faria de – Porque [Because]. Catholic Illustration. Braga. Year III, nº143 (1916/25/3), pp.612-614. 
370 In this proselytism for the Portuguese interest in the war the Gazeta de Braga (year I, 1917/01/21, nº. 8, p. 1) exhorted 
the appeal to the Portuguese written by José Vale on 8th January in O Mundo [The World],  the national newspaper of PRP. 
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On the 25th March 1916 – two weeks after the declaration of war to Germany - in Braga there is a meeting 
to support the Portuguese navy and army, to Brazil and even the ally countries in which there have been about 
three thousand people371. 
One week later, on the 2nd April, a meeting, appealing to the Portuguese participation in the war, took place 
in Avenida da Liberdade (in the main avenue of the town).This was supported by the North Patriotic Union. 
From the local Theatre balcony, speakers with a different political position would grant unity to the initiative: 
José Maria Oliveira, Dr. Santos Silva, the catholic Teixeira Andrade, Alberto Velloso d’Araújo, Mário de 
Vasconcellos, a medical fifth-grader, and the Mayor, Eurico Taxa, persuade the demonstrators to accept the 
Portuguese government’s decision. Several favourable “hurrays” were listened in the meeting when Eurico 
Taxa read a telegram to be sent to the president of Portugal.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1)  A meeting to support the involvement(participation)of Portugal in the   World War I (promoted by the 
North Patriotic Union on the 2nd April 1916) 
 
                                                          
371 A girandole of fire, three bands, the firemen and many other local personalities liven up the demonstration that passed 
by the Civil Government (where there were speeches of the Police Commissioner, Barroso Dias, Fernando Moreira and the 
priest Pires Lage) then passed by the headquarters (where once more Alberto Guimarães, Pedro Oliveira and Manuel 
Oliveira said their speeches).  The demonstration goes straight up to Avenida Central [Central Avenue] and honours  the 
Brazilian consul with the speeches of Abílio Mesquita and Simões d’Almeida, this one a local remarkable reference as a 
republican militant since the Ultimatum era. 
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2a 
 
2b 
 
2a/2b) The soldiers of Braga leaving to the War in April 1917 (train station of Braga) (Archive Aliança Photography) 
 
 
It is also required to give the example of propaganda actions done in Braga such as the one organized on 
2nd June 1917 by the local Portuguese Women Crusade372, in which the minister Alexandre Braga evoked the 
external Portuguese policy,   suggesting that avoiding to get involved in that fight besides being a utopia, since 
nobody is neutral but the one who has the power to guarantee his own neutrality(impartiality) ,(...) it would be 
a such coward attitude that we would only deserve the humanities’ disrespect and the lost of territorial 
integrity. A. Braga also confessed that, as a demagogic attempt to seduce, women of Minho who he got used to 
admire the Patriotic love and strength represented the county he would choose to live in Portugal. He argued 
that if we were for Germany we would be betraying England which would have conditions to punish us for the 
flock with her fierce enemy373. In this conference Alexandre Braga’s speech got a political affiliation and there 
were simultaneously other cultural and entertaining activities, like poetry, songs and a play. 
As propaganda occurred, it was imperative to avoid the spread of demobilizing and dissuasive news among 
the public opinion. These were opposing to the war effort. In an order to the Civil Governments on 14 th May 
1917, The Ministry of Interior made clear that censorship could be done in all or just part to the trained 
official stuff of the  Civil Governments itself 374. In Braga, a claim was made to several retired  soldiers to 
                                                          
372  Maria Vitória d’Amorim Machado, the civil governor’s wife, was the leader of Portuguese Women Cruzade in Braga 
and Laura Guimarães d’Oliveira (supposed to be the vice-governor’s wife, Bento d’Oliveira) was the vice-leader. 
373 Extracts of the article ”Uma bela noite de arte. O sarau da Cruzada das Mulheres Portuguesas …” [A beauty night of 
art. The soiree in the ‘Portuguese Women Cruzade’: A remarkable speech made by the respectable Minister of Justice, 
Dr. Alexandre Braga. A brilliant and great declaration of lively patriotism]” in Gazeta de Braga no. 26 (10/06/1917), 
pp. 1 and 2, and the article Conferência do Sr. Dr. Alexandre Braga no Teatro Circo [Dr. Alexandre Braga’s Conference 
in Theatro Circo], issued in Gazeta de Braga edition no. 27 (23/06/1917) pp.1 and 2.The speech excerpts here assigned 
to Alexandre Braga are based on the report of the responsibility of Gazeta de Braga, which may not be reproduce the 
minister’s exact words. 
374 Archive of the district of Braga, Civil Government General Correspondence, Box 22 (1917-18). 
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perform the role of censors but this task wouldn’t seem attractive. Some of them may have refused to do so 
because of the democratic ethic scruples. However, there was a feeling of sacrifice due to the war and that was 
also observed in the allied countries and this fact didn´t convince the candidates since their work wouldn’t be 
paid. This circumstance turns out to be difficult to recruit censors. It is in a sarcastic manner that Gazeta de 
Braga of 4th October 1917 regrets that situation: 
 
There have been nominated several retired officials to censor the local press. 
Some have held up for a period of time, but there were substitutions and these shied away arguing diseases, 
myopia and other excuses. 
However, there were among them some who intended to take all paid possible posts. Everything is worth! 
As the censor commission doesn’t drip, - they don´t want it. 
Then!375 
 
In various ways, as we could see, the encouragement to heroic dedication with one’s life to the 
service of history and country, both in the press or in meetings and muffling the voice of 
disagreement, lifted the support to the war in Braga. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
375 Censorship Commission, Gazeta de Braga, Braga. N0. 35 (04/10/1917), p.1. 
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Propaganda and cultural reconquest: 
The German scientific associations and the impact of the Great 
War on the sciences, Argentina, 1914-1930 
   
 
Diego Ballestero,  
Susana V. García  
and Irina Podgorny, 
Museo de La Plata/CONICET 
 
 
On August 28, 1921 from the neighborhood of Belgrano (Buenos Aires) Mr. H. Dillenius wrote to his son-
in-law, Robert Lehmann-Nitsche, professor of anthropology at the universities of La Plata and Buenos Aires 
and, since 1897, head of the eponymous section of Museo de La Plata. He was furious. His anger was due to 
the name of the new ship of the German shipping company Hamburg Süd: "Cap Polonio", whose first trip to 
the Rio de la Plata was to begin a few months later. It was a very irritating name that "sounded like Poland, the 
country of the incendiaries and the land of high treason" (Podgorny, 2002). Lehmann-Nitsche reacted by 
sending an article to the Deutsche La Plata Zeitung, a German newspaper of Buenos Aires: “'Cap Polonio' 
nicht 'Cap Polen’” (“Cape Polonio, not Cape Poland”), where he explained that the steam ship was so named 
for Cape Polonio, in the eastern cost of the Republic of Uruguay. Hamburg Süd had a "Cap" series of ocean 
liners (Cap Trafalgar, Cap Finisterre, etc) by adopting this name, the company wanted to render tribute to one 
of the countries the ship was going to stop by.  
Lehmann-Nitsche wondered why no one had thought of another cape of the Southern cone. The name 
sounded as "Poland", at least in German, and for that reason, the Germans in Argentina feared that it could be 
used by the French propaganda to mock at them. The lack of a good command of Spanish led to a political 
error: rather than choosing a neutral name, they picked one up that was inconvenient for Germany. Why did 
they not christen her as a Uruguayan national hero, such as Lavalleja or Artigas? Moreover, the Cap Polonio 
had been bought back by Hamburg Süd from the British in 1921, after her use as German auxiliary cruiser in 
the Great War and her confiscation by the Allies in 1919. Not only that, until 1923, with the use of the "Albert 
Ballin", the Cap Polonio was the largest ship in the German merchant navy and the most iconic of all. The 
name, in that sense, seemed highly inappropriate, even for the Germans living thousands of miles from the 
scenes of the aftermath of the war.  
The Great War and its aftermath, indeed, would impact on Argentine scientific and educational institutions, 
an aspect that even today was not extensively treated by historiography (García and Podgorny, 2000). In this 
paper we summarize some of the conflicts related to the tensions between Argentine and German scientists, 
living in Argentina, and enrolled in German cultural propaganda.  
In a context that was favorable to French culture and British interests, the “Deutsche Wissenschaftliche 
Verein” (Association of German Scientists) of Buenos Aires, through its publications, argued that the history 
of science and education in Argentina were inextricably linked to German culture. In this paper, we examine 
the reactions of Argentinan scientists, nucleated at the Sociedad Argentina de Ciencias Naturales, to the 
German cultural and political agenda in Argentina. We refer to the activities and initiatives promoted by 
German scientific societies during and after the Great War, when they attempted at the scientific and “cultural 
reconquest” of these territories. In particular, we refer to the role and networks of Robert Lehmann-Nitsche, 
who lived in Argentina between 1897 and 1930 and was involved in several conflicts within the University of 
La Plata. Lehmann-Nitsche was part also of German anti-republican movements, concerned about the 
consequences of the Treaty of Versailles and the destiny of the “Deutschum” (Podgorny, 2002).  
This paper is based on the analysis of primary sources, Argentine newspapers, and scientific publications- 
It extensively uses Lehmann-Nitsche’s personal archive (Leg. LN), kept at the Ibero-Amerikanisches Institut, 
SBB (Berlin). Lehmann-Nitsche was a collector of memorabilia of his Argentinean life: he compiled 
newspaper clippens, posters, and pamphlets. Together with his letters, these materials constitute an important 
source for examining the activities undertaken by German associations in Argentina, their networks, and how 
German and Argentinean scientists combined heir own interests with patriotic loyalties. 
 
The beginnings of the war 
 
The impact of the European war on scientific disciplines was resounding worldwide not only because of 
the deaths and the disruption of academic exchanges, but also because the war generated new spaces of 
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cooperation between science and industry. This global dimension of the Great War, explains why it impacted 
on the daily scientific life of countries such as Argentina, thousands of miles away from the war main 
scenarios. Scientific exchanges and international conferences, scholarships, foreign teachers contracts were 
cancelled everywhere.  The purchase in Europe of books, journals or laboratory supplies was disrupted 
(García, 2010). Some scholars quitted their academic and/or scientific positions for the battlefront376.  
At the beginning of the Great War, following the policies of cultural modernization of Argentina, several 
educational institutions and state technical departments had been staffed with European and American 
professors. By 1914, there were German professors acting at the National Academy of Sciences of Córdoba, in 
La Plata Museum and the Institute of Physics of the National University of La Plata (founded in 1906), at the 
National Institute of Secondary Teachers created in 1904, in the Bacteriological Institute at the National 
Department of Hygiene and in the national and provincial geological services (Podgorny, 2001).  
On the other hand, as part of Prussian Foreign Department’s Kulturpolitik, since late in the nineteenth 
century, German professors teaching abroad had been engaged in the promotion of bringing tohether the 
German community leaving out of Europe (Pyenson, 1984, 1985a). Thus, the first association of German 
scientists in Buenos Aires was established in 1897 as the Deutsche Akademische Vereinigung (DAV). While 
all activities were conducted in German, for joining this association the membership criteria relied upon 
academic training and authorship of scientific works. Neither the language nor the nationality appeared as 
important to become a member. But once the war began, science and arts were transferred to the practices and 
realm of Kulturpropaganda (García and Podgorny, 2000) and these criteria were going to change.  
One of the first incidents related to the War, occurred in 1914, when national socialist Senator Enrique del 
Valle Iberlucea, General Secretary of La Plata University, accompanied by a delegation from the Ateneo 
Popular, visited La Plata Museum377 (García and Podgorny, 2000). At the main entrance, the porter requested 
the visitors to check their canes: neither umbrellas nor canes were allowed within the halls. Del Valle Iberlucea 
refused, claiming that his position at the University was more than enough to back the safety of the exhibits. 
Lehmann-Nitsche, as “superior chief in charge of the guard” tried to intercede, obtaining as a response a series 
of insults: “You have no right to be here, insolent, here we are not among your Prussians, we are a republic. 
You are not an Argentine, you belong to the Kaiser, you are a German, or rather an animal”378. This situation 
ended up with a police report and a duel of honor that was not accepted by Del Valle Iberlucea. He replied in 
the socialist newspaper La Vanguardia379. La Vanguardia and La Gazeta, on the other hand, used this incident 
to accuse the extremely patriotic attitudes of the Germans380. Newspapers such as La Union (Spanish version 
of the Deutsche La Plata Zeitung381), La Sociedad (publication of the Catholic La Plata Regional Center from 
the Argentine Social League), and the Argentinisches Tageblatt questioned Del Valle Iberlucea’s reactions382, 
describing him as a person “with little understanding of German nature”383 and criticizing this manifestation of 
anti-German feelings on the University campus. They claimed the universities should remain neutral. The 
authorities of the University of La Plata initiated a summary proceeding that soon was going to be forgotten, 
perhaps to counter balance the growing tensions among Argentine professors and scholars. Indeed, by 1915, 
some newspapers began to question the German sympathy of certain members of the government, who backed 
                                                          
376 For instance. German geologist Walter Schiller, who had arrived in Argentina in 1905 to direct the Mineralogy Section 
of La Plata Museum, came back to Germany to fight for his country between 1915 and 1919. Upon his return, he was 
incorporated as a professor and head of department of the Museum Institute. The Italian physiologist Mario Camis, 
hired in 1913 by the University of La Plata, returned to Europe to fight for Italy shortly after the launching of the 
physiology laboratory he had requested. (García, 2010) The Congress of Americanists was suspended during the war. 
377 The Ateneo Popular, founded in 1910 by Del Valle Iberlucea and other socialists, included in its educational program for 
workers annual visits to scientific institutions in La Plata (Barrancos, 1995). 
378 “Incidente Dr. Lehmann-Nitsche-Del Valle Iberlucea”, Bahía Blanca 27/11/1914; La Gazeta 21/11/1914; La Tarde 
21/11/1914; La Unión 23/11/1914. In Spanish, “alemán” (German) sounds –or can sound- as “animal.” 
379 Del Valle Iberlucea claimed it was just a pretext, an expression of hostility that characterized how German professors at 
La Plata related to him. According to Del Valle Iberlucea, this hostility started as a consequence of his lectures on 
German imperialism offered at the Facultad de Filosofía y Letras of Buenos Aires, where he was professor for 
"Universal History", “Die führenden Kreise der hiesigen Sozialisten”, Argentinisches Tageblatt, 19/11/1914. 
380 They accused Lehmann-Nitsche of using the rules of the La Plata Museum for the sake of “German jingoism and 
imperialism,” “Incidente Dr. Lehmann-Nitsche-Del Valle Iberlucea”, La Gazeta, 19/11/1914; La Vanguardia 
19/11/1914.  
381 This journal, funded by the German embassy, was founded to reply the Allies’ propaganda (Hoffman 2009). 
382 “Sobre un incidente”, La Unión, 20/11/1914; La Sociedad, 29/11/1914. 
383 His attitude was seen as an example of the resources that appealed to the Socialist Party, “Die führenden Kreise der 
hiesigen Sozialisten”, Argentinisches Tageblatt 19 y 21/11/1914. 
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German scholars384. At the same time, they questioned their research, especially those works devoted to 
Argentinean culture, as the folklore studies conducted by Lehmann-Nitsche385. 
In a context where most Argentine intellectuals supported the Allies, German cultural propaganda was 
carried out by several media. One of them was the Society of German scientists, led by the educator Wilhelm 
Keiper, director of the National Institute of Secondary Teachers,386 an active promoter of Kulturpropaganda 
and the hiring of German scientists (Pyenson, 1985b). In 1915, as a result of the war and the new role of 
science, the society changed its name to become “Deutscher Wissenschaftlicher Verein” (DWV). With this 
change, the “new” association inaugurated a period of intense activity. New statutes were given and the 
principles of affiliation changed: German scientists were now brought together not by academic life but by 
their mother tongue. To become an extraordinary member it was enough to demonstrate the command of the 
German language. Membership increased: while in 1914 the society had 150 members, late in 1915, there were 
more than 500. In 1925, the society offered free Germanl anguage lessons for university students of natural 
sciences and began to publish a magazine about Argentinean culture and geography, the Zeitschrift des 
Deutschen Wissenschaftlichen Vereins zur Kultur-und Landeskunde Argentiniens, directed by Dr. H. Koch and 
W. Keiper. Several companies and industries of German capital advertised on its pages, plenty of petitions to 
send money to Germany and obituaries of those who died on the front. Through its publications and 
conferences, the DVW argued that the history of science and education in Argentina was inexorably tied to 
German culture. As part of this policy of promotion of German culture, late in 1915 the society organized a 
German scientific expedition to Patagonia, presented as another German service to Argentina. The reports of 
this expedition, published in 1917, mentioned that they were inspected by British warships. It happened almost 
at the same time that the sinking of the Argentinean sailing ship Monte Protegido by a German submarine, an 
event that provoked demonstrations and the looting of Buenos Aires German Club. 
Later, the sinking of other two Argentine ships would question the neutrality maintained by the 
government387, to such an extent that many Argentinean intellectuals requested to break diplomatic relations 
with Germany. On the other hand, the German ambassador in Buenos Aires was involved in a diplomatic 
affair: the American newspapers published his offensive opinions about the Argentine government 
(Weinmann, 1994). All this would aggravate the situation of German professors and experts living in 
Argentina. In 1916 the contracts of several German researchers were not renewed, such as those who worked 
for the geological and topographical service of the Province of Buenos Aires and in the National Institute of 
Secondary Teachers. (See Newton, 1977) 
Similar situations occurred in other South American countries: in Brazil, Hermann von Ihering was 
dismissed from his position as director of the Museu Paulista (Lopes, 1997). In Chile, German folklorist and 
philologist Rudolf Lenz mentioned to Lehmann-Nitsche that “the situation, in general, is not favorable to us,” 
conceding, however, that “the situation is not as bad as yours”388. Lenz was not so wrong. By 1916 La Nación, 
La Prensa and La Razón, three influential newspapers from Buenos Aires, reported a meeting held at the 
residence of Argentinean physician Carlos Madariaga “to render a sympathetic homage to the Allies,” namely 
two albums, one for the Medicine Faculty of Paris, the second for the Central Library of the Catholic 
University of Louvain.389 This was irritating for Argentine Germans: as it is well known, in August 1914, 
German troops stationed in the Belgian village of Louvain. The city and its buildings—including the university 
and library—burned. As a result a great outcry grew in the international community. The Allied press went 
crazy, with British editorials proclaiming "Treason to Civilization" and insisting Germans had proved 
themselves descendants not of the great author Goethe but of the bloodthirsty Attila the Hun. These arguments 
were to be read everywhere, and were a beloved topic of the socialist party press. Also in Argentina.  
                                                          
384 “El “paleontólogo” (Dios libre y guarde) Leman Nietzche, y sus fósiles, el Dr. Bosch y el Dr. Gómez”, Crónica 
15/1/1915. 
385 The newspaper Crónica (15/01/1915) reviewed Lehmann-Nitsche’s Adivinanzas Rioplatenses (1911), saying that it was 
"so hilarious as a stewpot with "Sauerkraut" and questioning the subsidy of 50,000 pesos of the National Government 
to the University of La Plata to pusblish a series to commemorate the national centennial, namely the “Biblioteca 
Centenaria,” a collection of lengthy monographies on Argentine history, archaeology, and folklore prepared by the 
members of La Plata Museum. Adivinanzas Ríoplatenses was one of the volumes published in this collection (García, 
2010). Two years later, Lehmann-NItsche`s work was criticized by La Pelea Nacional, 27/10/1917, in this case, it 
attacked his Santos Vega, as the peak of the systematic destruction of " Argentine native traditions” (Ballestero, 2013).  
386 In 1904 the Argentine government hired several professors from Germany to create the National Institute of Secondary 
Teachers (Instituto Nacional del Profesorado Secundario), a national teacher-training school based on the model of 
Prussian pedagogical seminaries (Pyenson, 1985b). The institution was endowed with resources and laboratories; most 
of the German professors were paid in “pesos oro.”     
387 As a result, Brazil, Uruguay and Cuba broke with Germany and entered into the war.  
388 Leg.LN, Rudolf Lenz to LN, 23/2/1915, Box N-0070 b 420. 
389 “Tributo a los aliados. La iniciativa de los médicos argentinos”, La Nación, 11/8/1916; La Prensa, 10/08/1916; La 
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The DWV considered Dr. Madariaga’s initiative as an expression of hatred towards the members of the 
German local community, convening a special meeting to decide how to respond390. Finally, a manifesto was 
published in the German academic journals and Argentine newspapers, requesting the representatives of the 
German and Austrian government to send copies to the universities391. Published in German and Spanish, the 
manifesto questioned the tone used by the intellectuals gathered in Madariaga’s house, noting that they “put 
down the German people and science, with unsubstantiated and unreasonable affirmations, distorting historical 
facts”392.  
Until 1916, scientific societies and universities in Argentina remained institutionally neutral. But in 1917, 
following the events mentioned above, scholars’ associations began to take on an active role. Not only German 
scientific societies, but also Argentines decided to change their names: “Physis”, a society founded in 1911, in 
1915 renamed itself as “Sociedad Argentina de Ciencias Naturales”. The section “Chronicle” of its newsletter 
published the disasters of war related to science. The Society advocated for a neutral tone, trying to keep the 
intrinsic international character of science: the war threatened the lives of German, French and English people 
alike. It also lamented the consequences of the military conflict: “the war that fourteen months ago whips 
across Europe, making felt its effects in all kinds of activities. Sciences, requiring international collaboration, 
have been particularly affected”393. The Society also gave a prognosis of the outcomes of the war in the long 
and medium term: Observations of nature were suspended and unrecoverable data were going to be lost, as had 
already occurred in the field of astronomy, seismology, meteorology, fishery, and oceanographic studies. In 
international conferences met in the Americas, the absence of European participant was noticed. Other 
meetings were suspended. The war undermined the possibility of an international community, and the Physis 
society, through its activities of collegial friendship, tried to reduce these effects.   
But in 1916, the tone changed: that year the Sociedad Argentina de Ciencias Naturales held its first national 
meeting. They analyzed the contents related to Argentine nature that had to be included in school education, as 
well as they encouraged the creation of national parks and regional museums. It was also discussed the need to 
train local professionals to solve the country's problems, the need of more job positions for Argentines, and the 
defense of national graduates (García and Podgorny, 2000; Podgorny, 1997). In his opening discourse, Ángel 
Gallardo (1918-9), Director of the National Museum of Natural History, greeted the creation of provincial 
scientific centers and the expansion of scholarship all along the country, celebrating the beginning of a new 
period of “scientific autonomy”. 
Contributors to the DWV interpreted this meeting in a different way. The 6th Volume of the Zeitschrift des 
Deutschen Wissenschaftlichen Vereins published a review that remarked the “leading role” of the German 
scientists in the consolidation of “Argentine” earth sciences and their fundamental role in other disciplines394. 
As a reply, a letter published in Physis, the journal of the Sociead Argentina de Ciencias Naturales, proposed 
that a different balance has to be made to “correct misunderstandings that can become annoying, preventing 
the introduction of ideas of dominance of in our scientific democracy”395. This reaction of the Sociedad 
Argentina de Ciencias Naturales was related to the attempts to create an Argentinean scientific tradition. From 
this point of view, the German Kulturpropaganda became intolerable: the professionals of Argentine natural 
sciences wanted to be rooted in their own tradition and to celebrate their own Argentine fathers (García and 
Podgorny, 2000). In view of this reaction, the Zeitschrift’s director minimized the opinions of his colleagues, 
inviting to exchange publications and news between the two societies. However, in 1917, the DWV ratified his 
position. For that reason the association of German scientists - despite being an Argentinean society – was 
started being called “a foreign society” and the academic relations between the Sociedad Argentina de 
Ciencias Naturales and the DWV were suspended396. This event closed a cycle of neutrality on the part of the 
institutions, which had hitherto adhered to the universal ethos of science. So while Lehmann-Nitsche’s incident 
from 1914 was treated as a personal conflict between individuals, by 1917 the scientific associations were 
contending about the cradles of knowledge and the origins of Argentine science. The Great War undermined 
the dreams of peace and international friendship promoted by science and, although in the postwar period the 
academic relations were restored, the principle of loyalty to the homeland would remain still for a while. 
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393 Physis, vol. 2, n° 9 (1915): 65. 
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395 “A propósito de un juicio sobre la Reunión de Tucumán”, Physis, vol.III, 1917, p. 293-6. 
396 “La reunión de Tucumán y la revista de una sociedad extranjera”, Physis, vol. IV, 1918, p. 9. 
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The cultural reconquest 
 
After the War, the relations of Argentina towards Germany, as Weinmann (1994) stated, were recovering 
normality. By 1920, the DWV restructured its magazine: adopting the name of the bird that reborn from its 
ashes, it was divided into two publications, one in German (Phoenix), the other in Spanish (Fénix). The first 
wanted “to familiarize the German public with the history and current situation of the countries of Latin 
America, while the issues published in Spanish wish to contribute to the dissemination of scholarly work made 
by the German science and its representatives living in different parts of the world”397. In this way, in August 
1921, a meeting was organized in honor of the centenary of the National University of Buenos Aires. In Fénix, 
the service of some disciplines, such as geology, was commented. Shortly after the war, it reviewed the 
importance of new discoveries for the military.  
On the other hand some intellectuals and German scientists living in Argentina actively participated in the 
anti-Republican movement of the country. The definition of “the German” was one of their biggest concerns, 
and as seen in the reaction to the “Cap Polonio”, enmity to the promoters of the treaty of Versailles was 
evident in each of their interventions. Lehmann-Nitsche, for example, participated in the following 
associations in favor of the Kaiser and Empire: “Deutscher Kriegerverein”, “Schwarz-Weiss-Rot” and 
“Deutschnationale Volkspartei”, under the roof of the Deutsches Vereinhaus (Podgorny, 2002). He also 
contributed by donations to “Andreas-Hofer-und Südmarkbund” and “Deutscher Offiziere Nationalverband”, 
whose constitution was notoriously opposed to the Weimar Republic and the “Jewish capital” (Podgorny, 
2002). 
These movements extolled warriors and patriotic courage (Elias, 1997) in the same way that Lehmann-
Nitsche, at La Plata Museum, praised the heroism of the Native indigenous chiefs, who had defended their soil 
against the invaders. Lehmann-Nitsche also participated in the local group of the Deutscher Volksbund für 
Argentinien (DVA, founded in 1916) and attended meetings of the DWV to write “What Germany actually did 
during the war.”398 These associations were called on to supply the lack of bibliography, collections and 
instruments that German universities were suffering as a consequence of the war. The same happened in the 
United States, where the German anthropologist Franz Boas promoted an Emergency Society for German and 
Austrian Science and Art. Boas wrote to Lehmann-Nitsche in order to organize with “some of your South 
American friends” a commission to buy South American books to be sent to the libraries of the countries 
which most needed them399.  
Lehmann-Nitsche also organized conferences for the DVA meetings, in response to the request of Keiper, 
who would publish Der Bund, the official publication for the resumption and expansion of German trade in 
Argentina.400 There many papers were published on the early presence of the Germans on the Rio de la Plata 
and its role in the history of the region401. Such propaganda was part of DVA internal discussions. One of the 
first problems was the name of the group. According to Alemann, a member of this association and owner of 
the Argentinisches Tageblatt, it was to be called “Germanic Union”, emphasizing the language and culture. 
Keiper, meanwhile, argued that the Union should have a link with the German Empire and promoted the 
“German Union” (Hoffmann, 2009). In this sense Lehmann- Nitsche emphasized the importance of language 
when it comes to define, characterize and classify a race and urged German families abroad to transmit the 
spirit, the will, the feelings and German national character. (Ballestero, 2013)  
In the 1920s, Lehmann-Nitsche was involved in organizing the visits of the geographer Karl Theodor 
Sapper, the prehistorian Hugo Obermaier and Americanist Walter Lehmann, to promote among Argentines the 
true image of German research (Podgorny, 2002)402. As part of the activities of the Argentine-Germanic 
Cultural Institution, founded in 1922, they lectured at the universities of Buenos Aires and La Plata, in the 
German institutes and at the private residence of Lehmann-Nitsche in La Plata. So the farewell speeches 
offered by him and his wife, described Obermaier as the “prototype of the legendary German scholar” with a 
systematic scientific education, a “true and noble character”, far from arrogance and particular ambitions403. 
Scientific progress was proposed as a mission, in which the German scholar “driven by the noblest sovereign 
impulse of curiosity, and their desire to enjoy the knowledge” crossed “the limits of the homeland, the 
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contours of the continent, into the spiritual conquest of the world, the universe”404, namely the essence of the 
“Deutschtum”. 
It still remains as an open question how to evaluate the effect of these conferences and cultural activities. In 
1930 Lehmann-Nitsche would retire and return to Berlin, where he died in 1938, without having left disciples 
in Argentina or in Germany. Shortly before quitting Argentina, Lehmann-Nitsche had tried to arrange the 
hiring of a young German zoologist at the School of Natural Sciences of the University of La Plata. The city of 
La Plata soon was wallpapered with posters, exorting Argentine students to defend their future: “Graduates of 
the country: it is time to react!” (Podgorny, 1996) No Argentinean student was ready to leave an available 
work position for a foreigner. In that sense, it is certain that the work and actions of the Argentinean Society of 
Natural Sciences had awakened the need to close the labor market for the national graduates. 
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"The Intellectuals and propaganda against the Estado Novo" 
 
 
Cátia Pereira, 
Faculdade de Letras- UP 
 
 
"Mutilated and prohibited, or simply tolerated" - this was the fate of the works developed through 
intellectual Portuguese over the period 1926-1974. 
The scheme looked intellectuals as a social and political danger due to latent capacity can influence public 
opinion and subvert the values and purpose of their propaganda , and why the state with the help of New 
Censorship , exercised control, pressure and intimidation on intellectuals. The intellectual, even with these 
obstacles, there is a resistance and a growing opposition to the current regime in Portugal. Intellectuals in this 
period could not give free course to their creativity, nor claim the full force of his style, without this, the 
moment of thinking, creating or writing, that the fruit of their labor would necessarily be examined by men of 
Censorship of whose subjective and disputed assessment criteria depend on a lot of your future. The State 
indicated a new “official art “that hindered any other manifestations that you were outside. This contributed to 
a strong isolation of the national artistic and international information reaching up to the intellectuals was 
greatly reduced. 
In the background, we find resistances intellectuals who lived cultural and ideologically outside the Salazar 
regime? Oppositions that were made? Came that means? Alignments that aesthetic? That ideological and 
political alignments? And as the regime responded to these strengths and these oppositions? 
It was in 1933 that the system first drew the lines and general methods of creating the cultural policy of 
National Propaganda Secretariat (SPN), headed by António Ferro. 
But that was based on this policy? 
The "Politics of the Spirit" was based on three pillars. The first consisted in the use of culture as a means of 
propaganda, the cultural movements should be geared towards glorifying the regime and its leader. The second 
was an attempt to reconcile old traditions and old values with modernity that time, articulating a nationalist 
ideology of sailors, saints and knights with the modernist and futuristic ideas of Antonio Ferro and partners. 
Thirdly and lastly, taking into account the foregoing, the cultural program of the regime sought to establish a 
national culture and popular based on their roots and ideals of the regime. 
According António Ferro,  
 
«Revoltados (os artistas) revoltam-se ainda mais e caem, quase sempre, na loucura das formas, na 
telaenigma do pintor de Balzac, do «chef-d'oeuvre inconnu». Para evitar essa legítima revolta é que o 
Secretariado da Propaganda Nacional se julga no dever de não os abandonar, de seguir, atentamente, todos 
os seus movimentos. Este organismo do Estado (...) quer chamar a si, em nome da ordem e do equilíbrio, o 
modesto papel da irreverência oficial, isto é, quer representar a atenção carinhosa do Estado para com 
aqueles artista de quem ele próprio desconfia...»405 
 
This speech is the response of iron, not precisely the opponents of the regime, but the opponents cultural 
style and he personifies the action he develops. 
But,  
 
«Salazar, referiu nas entrevistas que então concedeu a António Ferro três grandes argumentos para 
justificar a existência da Censura: a necessidade de se evitarem “ataques injustificados” à obra do Governo; 
o interesse em se “moralizar” a Imprensa, no âmbito dos “ataques pessoais e nas desmandas de linguagem”; 
e o objectivo de se manter o debate doutrinário, mesmo no terreno político, no campo da “doutrina pura, 
doutrina sem acinte, doutrina de boa fé, de intuitos superiores e reformadores”, cortando-se pela raiz a 
“doutrina com aplicação imediata, a doutrina subversiva, demasiado habilidosa, claramente habilidosa.»406 
 
The S.P.N. began to call themselves S.N.I. (National Secretariat of Information). Continued to organize 
exhibitions, but after 1946 many renowned painters fail to attend these shows and put themselves on the side 
of those who criticized the regime. Without the contribution of famous painters, exhibitions SNI lost interest 
and eventually become extinct in 1961. 
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Despite censorship continued to be intransigent, the end of the same policy gave Portugal a diversification 
of current ideas and expressions largest in the cultural field. 
The '50s and '60s were marked by a calm tensions between what was left of the official cultural policy and 
the new aesthetic currents. 
The cultural policy of the regime was conditioned in the 60s at the beginning of the Colonial War, the 
malaise domestic and international isolation. The New State abandoned once its cultural dimension, support 
the artists and their projects, adopting an attitude of mere censure against all creative activities. 
It can be stated that, 
 
«nem as alterações impulsionadas por Marcelo Caetano, no quadro político dito de “renovação na 
continuidade”, e designadamente a lei da Imprensa, que estabelecem os princípios fundamentais do regime 
jurídico da imprensa, nem o Estatuto da Imprensa, que extinguiu a Direcção dos Serviços de Censura mas, 
ao mesmo tempo, instituiu o regime de Exame Prévio, vieram, no essencial, alterar a situação anterior.»407 
 
And also add that, 
 
«dificuldades que os autores portugueses enfrentavam no período caetanista do “Estado Novo”, apesar da 
tão propaganda política de “liberalização” do mais adiante, que nunca se verificou uma alteração de fundo 
na censura durante o período “marcelista”, quer a nível dos critérios de actuação quer do espírito que a 
norteava.»408 
 
In this political and cultural panorama we can see that 
 
«os intelectuais portugueses tomam parte no combate pela democracia e por uma cultura nacional e 
progressista. Continuamente têm eles feito prova do seu descontentamento, contra o regime salazarista e a 
sua política reaccionária e de obscurantismo».409 
 
Despite several studies, the intellectuals, the period from 1958 to 1974, have not yet been the subject of a 
specific study and assembly. However, we note that there are investigations, which led to some biographies of 
men who were considered intellectuals at the time and proved in several important moments in history for the 
political and cultural, and is in the context of Neo-Realism movement associated with either the component or 
the literary arts , and especially the history of anti-fascist resistance, which will draw a new configuration of 
the figure of the intellectual assigning, so the mission to raise awareness in the masses soak them. The Neo-
realism helped to publicize the counter- cultural image of Portugal in relation to what was imposed by the 
Estado Novo. 
The Neo -realism was considered as the only possible way of "fighting and resistance to Salazar," 
according to Joaquim Namorado. Remains in the decade after the fifty -themed a new social realism. The neo -
realist fiction is considered a discovery of rural life, regional or otherwise, but viewed with eyes to which the 
picturesque interest mainly due to social conflicts accurate. Issues such as the Paradise childhood, frustration 
male individual or, in particular, female often serve as the basis for development tangential to neo-realism. 
Currently, neorealism is devalued by its character pamphleteer and supporter. Fundia individual problems 
with the community. The works were ideological inscription and also overcoming polysemic. We can say, it 
was an art of social intervention where the cultural factor of political struggle against the dictatorship and the 
political system were patent. It was a form of counter cultural image of Portugal in relation to that imposed by 
the state also generated a new configuration of a new type of intellectual. Junction with the popular scholar. 
In conclusion: more than an intellectual current, than a response to this or that artistic movement , and an 
expression of a political force , the neo-realist movement was an expression of solidarity, taking a position at 
the suffering aggravated by the Portuguese people . 
 However, not all men or women dealing with culture and cultural issues in the service of a regime and its 
governing bodies can be either yesterday or today, considered as 'organic intellectuals'. This is because the 
intellectual is not only a cultural and ideological interventionist, but is also someone who thinks and reflects on 
one's own culture. Thus, we can say that some cultural activists are mainly "political officials", or "political 
officials", or, so to speak, are mere "cultural workers". The culture only serves as a means to embody the 
ideology, characterized by further breeding character than the direction of production. It was to bring culture to 
the people, and to do so it was necessary to be willing to get off the pedestal in order to know better the people 
themselves and the masses themselves. 
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The intellectual intervention has indelibly marked our century, and in particular the New State in the period 
1958-1974, at a time when the urge to discover new worlds for Culture was in the imagination of various 
intellectuals, which after post - war and the experience was the Democratic Unity Movement (MUD), wanted 
to find new forms of civic and cultural intervention. These anxieties proliferated various gatherings in the city 
of Porto, in cafes, pastry shops or even in art galleries and emerge successively several institutions, which were 
remarkable for their intervention and values created, and that they had the intention to create a public space of 
intellectual activity politically tough: the Cineclube do Porto, Teatro Experimental do Porto (TEP), Árvore. 
Also highlighted the importance of the Association of Journalists and Men of Letters of Porto. 
There was an active minority who did not conform, either from the beginning or when the personal 
circumstances or the next became unbearable, and also when reaching the age to think for himself, he had 
access to culture and information, this case students/scholars generally derived from the urban bourgeoisie. 
The siege was pressed, the open contestation was increasingly risky, but authorities had no great illusions 
about the support that could count in the city, and even less when again deteriorated living conditions. 
Despite the crackdown, the city of Porto remains uneasy: strikes in 1954, monitoring by the PIDE which 
led to arrests and trials, both critical spirits have watched as young people and students. 
The unease grew Porto but their expression could not move from marginal. The Porto knew, with the 
candidacy of General Humberto Delgado, who was now the bastion of opposition. 
But still necessary affirmation of a cultural specificity. The twentieth century new opened new avenues for 
cultural and artistic life of the city of Porto and was given unprecedented importance and complexity. This 
field had a certain typicality, leaking their ways of conceiving art and culture spread along the lines of the old 
heritage tripe eating. 
You could say that Lisbon, Coimbra, Braga had always constituted the intellectual centers much more solid 
than the Porto. The mercantile bourgeoisie of Porto favored the more practical aspects of culture, preferring a 
valuation technique to theoretical speculation. 
However, according to Luis Antonio Ramos de Oliveira, the Portuguese culture owes much to the humus 
Porto. 
In the 50s, isolated pathways arise again. Although with more solid, culture Porto pursuant resumed being 
hard way of early century. 
According to Luís António de Oliveira Ramos, 
 
“o Porto, considerado individualista e rebelde à tutela, em compensação organizou uma rede multiforme de 
sociabilidade sobre a qual assentou grande parte do seu modo de actuar na vida colectiva. Foi antes de mais 
através de academias, clubes, tertúlias, associações, cooperativas, grupos informais ou devidamente 
estruturados que a Cidade Invicta desenvolveu uma maneira especifica de se exprimir. A convivialidade 
reveste outras formas e não se pode concluir esta evocação do Porto sem parar mais uma vez num café, 
num tasco ou numa pastelaria, num desses lugares de encontro onde se alimenta como que em permanência 
a alma da Cidade Invicta.” 
 
It further states that, 
 
“Claro que não é novidade pois foi neles que se formou o Porto romântico e que se cristalizou a boémia 
literária do virar do século, mas o século XX perpetuou bem a tradição. Era no tasco e no café – conforme a 
hora, o bairro, a categoria social – que se preparava uma greve ou um panfleto, que se conspirava em prol 
da república e/ou ditadura ou contra ela. No tasco, mais discreto durante a ditadura apesar do batente 
imposto para a vigilância policial, podia-se aproveitar a outra extremidade do balcão ou da sala do fundo 
para desabafar com cuidado, transmitir notícias, organizar redes de entreajuda. O café sempre foi o sítio 
privilegiado para ler o jornal, tecer negócios discretos, descansar as pernas num intervalo entre as compras, 
engraxar os sapatos, estudar isolado ou em grupo horas a fio, já que as escolas não ofereciam condições 
para o efeito, nem sobretudo a atmosfera de liberdade convivial de que sempre precisou a juventude.”410 
 
 
In the '60s and '70s, artists dared break the scholarship and cultural backwardness official political regime 
of the time , there was a complicity developed with independent cultural institutions that shaped the artistic life 
of the city who was then abandoned by the government initiatives, and met the representation of galleries , 
bookstores and other exhibition spaces . You need to live up to that time, and that means browse, search and 
show you what it was courage, boldness and experimentation within the microcontexts artistic. And yet, we 
can say that there is never an attitude localist, closed in on itself.411 
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In the second half of the twentieth century , cultural life is organized on the initiative of its artists and 
people , in order to manifest a clear independence against a regime and condemned a situation that the city and 
the country to a true desert in regard to institutional initiative. 
Discover and present the cultural context of the city of Porto in the decades of 60/70 involves questioning 
the reasons for a specificity of situations it originated. The local history of the city reveals cultural factors that 
identify with the national situation. 
The State indicated a new "official art" that hindered any other manifestations that you were outside. 
Conditioned an entire artistic situation severely limited by the lack of freedom, repression and uncensored. 
Strong isolation of the national artistic and international information greatly reduced. 
In the city of Porto, this isolation is increased via the subordination of the city due to the centralized 
administrative, political, economic and cultural state that gave New Lisbon, while "capital of the empire", in 
fact a continuation centralism history that country has always expressed from its origins. 
In Porto, no initiatives or institutional settings relief the cultural level. In this context the artists and 
intellectuals find themselves sent for a peripheral context, what will be reflected in many of their attitudes and 
leading to the emergence of alternative cultural spaces, independent of the official culture of the regime 
through projects of cultural citizenship. 
The cultural initiative constitutes itself as the enjoyment of difficult. In the 40 exposures d' d’Os 
Independentes (1943), the appearance of the Cineclube (1945), the 50s are seen at the Porto rich in figures and 
protagonists in local and cultural activities: Fenianos, Ateneu, TEP (1953), SEM, adding the gatherings that 
happened regularly in the bookstore Lello in Primus, the Rialto, the Palladium and the Majestic as well as 
galleries gallery Alvarez, Divulgação, and several initiatives of the Escola de Belas-Artes . Also the magazines 
- a Serpente, Gazeta Literária, Lusíada, Bandarra, Revista do Norte, Notícias do Bloqueio... and even daily 
newspapers: Comércio do Porto, o Primeiro de Janeiro. In 60 years, the foundation of the Árvore (1963). 
The resistance and opposition to the New State was found throughout the country and Porto no exception. 
In the public space of the city were the cafes that played a central role in defining this identity so special Porto. 
It was at the Rialto (1944), which Egito Gonçalves, for example, met with other members of the group who 
edited the News of the lock. Egito Gonçalves was one of the protagonists of the true cultural resistance, the 
period in which directed the TEP. Shortly thereafter, recurs with Árvore (1952-54), "reaped by PIDE in your 
room number "and , years later, still the " Plano (1965-68) , some of the literary magazines that helped , they 
too , the configure this Generation 50 that where subjected to strict surveillance PIDE , saw many writings 
banned by censorship."412 In the intellectual, cultural and literary magazines occupied a very important and 
Censorship was aware of its circulation , although very limited . Between publishers, stood out to Lello and 
Editorial Inova , Cruz Santos , which was a project of cultural resistance from the 60s and 70s and that made 
permanently forward to censorship , looking to publish titles that challenged the closure intellectual , aesthetic 
and political that sought to impose dictatorship . 
At the end of the dictatorship in the last 60 years and the first 70, he was a new generation, open to 
contemporary creators, and that makes a very fruitful international career. The Associação de Jornalistas e 
Homens de Letras do Porto, born in 1882, however, in the 60s, launches A Gazeta Literária, which featured the 
most respected employees. In 1945, it founded the Film Society of Port would play a central role in the cultural 
formation of successive generations that did not conform to the restrictions of censorship. The attempt at a film 
authors, "reflecting the film society movement of the 50s , assists in this period the emergence of a new cinema 
copyright, breaking with the populist filmmaking in acute crisis."413 The 50s were the dark years when it 
comes to Portuguese cinema coming to receive a certificate of intellectual immaturity. The film society 
movement was the only significant cultural event in the field of film release, 50 and 60, which embodied 
resistance to the regime. Despite the constant surveillance that were submitted, the movie clubs persisted in its 
dual task, ideological and aesthetic, to guide the public taste and spread the movies, because of the inertia of 
censorship or distributors, or had restricted movement still ignored in Portugal. 
In 1948, there is the Teatro Universitário do Porto. In 1953, it creates the Teatro Experimental do Porto. A 
country subject to a censure particularly iron in the shows meant that crushed both political freedom as 
castrated artistic creativity, with a perverse obsession with every manifestation of what is considered to be 
immoral, TEP , as assessed Carlos Porto contributed decisively to bring the portuguese theater scene of what 
was experienced by Europe and the Americas. 
With the 60, were noticeable changes that occurred in the city at the fine arts. After over a decade of 
changes in the Escola de Belas-Artes, a new generation of artists joined the artistic creativity ideological 
principles of democratic participation and dissemination of the arts to create another of the pioneering 
institutions that the Port was able to create under the dictatorship. The Árvore, "a cooperative artistic activities 
, was born in 1963, as part of that”- in the words of the institution - "great cultural renewal of the city of Porto, 
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battle of nearly two decades against desertification , immobility and aging existing structures and 
dissatisfaction dashed hopes that open with the end of World War II starkly revealed." 
In conclusion, we have seen thus throughout the twentieth century, the structuring of the intellectuals as a 
social category, but gravitating to large social groups, but also witnessed a disruption which hit a more 
significant minority sectors of the intelligentsia, as students or writers and artists, sensitive to the problems of 
his time, leading to the involvement and active engagement in the affairs of the city. 
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‘Britain is not out of date’: Actividades de Propaganda Cultural 
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Sumário: 
O presente artigo centra a discussão nas actividades de propaganda cultural desenvolvida pelo Reino Unido em 
Portugal, durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial. A inauguração do  British Council em Lisboa em 1938 tornou 
possível para o Reino Unido intensificar e dimensionar a imagem do país como uma nação moderna, dinâmica, 
na vanguarda do comércio, da indústria e da cultura, ao contrário da imagem que a Propaganda do Eixo 
pretendia difundir sobre o Reino Unido. Assim, o artigo aborda as actividades culturais desenvolvidas pelo 
British Council, nomeadamente as exposições e filmes exibidos e as personalidades convidadas. O objectivo é 
discutir as leituras a que essas actividades se prestavam, as escolhas e as suas publicitações serviam os 
interesses de ambos os países, nomeadamente do governo britânico e do governo português. No caso do 
governo português, salienta-se que este vivia a sua primeira década de afirmação de um regime com um 
ideário definido e com uma posição oficial de neutralidade política durante a Segunda Guerra. 
Palavras-Chave: British Council; Propaganda; Cultura; Posição. 
Abstract:  
This paper discusses the British activities of cultural propaganda in Portugal during the II World War. When 
the British Council was set up in Lisbon in 1938, the UK was able to promote the image of a modern, dynamic 
nation, the cutting edge of trade, industry and culture, unlike the image of the UK promoted by the Axis 
propaganda.  Therefore, this paper focuses on the cultural initiatives promoted by the British Council in the 
pursuit of establishing whether they served the interests of both countries, particularly the interests of the 
British and the Portuguese governments. As far as the Portuguese government is concerned, the Estado Novo 
was going through its first decade, having set its ideological framework and made political neutrality as its 
official stance during the II World War.  
 
Quando o British Council  foi oficialmente inaugurado em Lisboa, no dia 23 de Novembro de 1938, os 
convidados e representantes oficiais provinham particularmente das esferas diplomáticas, políticas e culturais 
de Portugal e do Reino Unido. Destacavam-se Júlio Dantas, presidente a Academia de Ciências, Carneiro 
Pacheco, Ministro da Educação, os presidentes da Junta Nacional de Educação e do Instituto de Alta Cultura, o 
Embaixador britânico, Lord Lloyd of Dolobran, presidente do British Council, membros do corpo diplomático, 
académicos e individualidades das sociedades portuguesa e britânica.  A cerimónia de abertura realizou-se na 
Academia de Ciências, em Lisboa e foi seguida da inauguração de uma exposição com cerca de 1.433 livros 
ingleses, aberta ao público durante 15 dias, finda o qual os livros foram distribuídos por escolas portuguesas. 
Lord Lloyd, ao despedir-se de George West, o recém-nomeado director do British Council em Lisboa, 
tentou motivar a equipa, apelando para tentar colocar alemães contra italianos, pois queria os alemães fora de 
Portugal no Natal. Um dos objectivos principais para abrir o British Council em Lisboa era contrabalançar as 
actividades de propaganda alemã num país em o interesse por questões inglesas era pouco significativo.  Desta 
forma, a realização de actividades que focassem a nação inglesa seria mais bem sucedida se essas fossem 
reforçadas por encontros bilaterais e por elogios públicos sobre a nação portuguesa. Em 1938, por ocasião da 
inaguração do British Council, Lloyd of Dolobran teve encontros oficiais com Salazar e com o Presidente 
Carmona. No seu regresso a Londres, os seus comentários elogiosos sobre Portugal foram advertidamente 
ouvidos e lidos por fontes diplomáticas portuguesas. Afinal, conforme  citado pelo The Daily Telegraph, o 
British Council  “are doing their best to demonstrate … that Britain is not out of date and finished, but 
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accomplishing great things in trade, engineering, art, music and literature”.414 Por outro lado, Lloyd mencionou 
igualmente o orgulho justificado de Portugal na sua história e império colonial, não obstante a sua 
sensibilidade a qualquer discussão sobre essa matéria, referindo-se às figuras políticas extraordinárias, 
particularmente Salazar, um governante “moderado, poderoso e progressista”, cujo regime era plenamente 
apoiado pelo povo português.415  
Podem-se distinguir três tipos de iniciativas de propaganda cultural. Por um lado, o ensino e promoção da 
língua inglesa; por outro lado, iniciativas que envolveram personalidades ou grupos artísticos e que 
representaram a nação culturalmente avançada; finalmente, os convites a personalidades com currículo 
relevante em áreas culturais, com assumidas posições políticas ou iniciativas que combinaram a política e a 
cultura.  
Em 1939, o British Council cooperava com a recém-criada Sociedade Anglo-Portuguesa, fundada para 
responder à necessidade de reforço das relações bilaterias entre Portugal e o Reino Unido. Esta Sociedade 
funcionava nas instalações do British Council, na Travessa André Valente, 13, em Lisboa. Cooperavam  no 
propósito comum de mostrar a nação britânica como uma nação moderna, progressista e com forte apego às 
suas raizes e tradições históricas. Ser-se associado do British Council implicava ser-se igualmente membro da 
Sociedade Anglo-Portuguesa, facto que reforçava a cooperação entre ambas as instituições.  Por outro lado, o 
British Council cooperava igualmente com o Secretariado de Propaganda Nacional na distribuição de folhetos 
desta instituição.  
Desde o primeiro momento que o British Council se distinguiu pelo propósito do ensino e promoção da 
língua inglesa. Essa foi uma das suas primeiras preocupações, em particular num país em que as ligações 
históricas entre Portugal e o Reino Unido se traduziam fundamentalmente num discurso retórico 
oportunamente utilizado consoante as circunstâncias, mas em que o ensino e o interesse pela língua inglesa não 
eram proporcionalmente relevantes. Após a inauguração do British Council, planeou-se o início das aulas para 
o ano civil seguinte. Estavam organizadas em seis níveis, dirigidas para cidadãos portugueses, brasileiros, 
ingleses e americanos com idades superiores a 17 anos. Cada nível estava dividido em três períodos de oito 
semanas cada. Eram três aulas semanais de uma hora cada. Em Coimbra, o ensino da língua inglesa era bem 
sucedido, mal-grado as circunstâncias não serem particularmente propícias. A turma de primeiro ano de lingua 
inglesa tinha cerca de 30 alunos, enquanto que a de segundo ano tinha cerca de dezasseis alunos e a de terceiro 
ano tinha cerca de oito alunos. Esta discrepância de número era explicada pelo facto de a estrutura dos curso 
universitário em Humanidades favorecer o ensino da língua alemã em detrimento da língua inglesa. 416Assim, 
considerou-se que a promoção deveria abranger igualmente as escolas secundárias a nível nacional, onde os 
alunos poderiam escolher a língua inglesa. 
A promoção da língua inglesa baseava-se numa lógica de atribuição de prémios. O programa inicial do 
British Council destinado a Portugal estava orçamentado £ 5.838 libras e incluía uma variedade de prémios em 
livros. Realizar-se-ia um concurso de redação nas escolas secundárias onde o Inglês era ensinado. Cada 
prémio, escolhido a partir de uma selecção de livros sugeridos pelo British Council, tinha o valor médio de 10 
xelins. Seriam oferecidas visitas de estudo de duas semanas a Inglaterra às quatro melhores meninas e aos 
quatro melhores meninos. Finalmente, os planos contemplavam igualmente a atribuição de duas bolsas para 
dois funcionários dos serviços colonais estudarem cursos de Administração Colonial no Reino Unido. O 
Instituto para a Alta Cultura comprometia-se a pagar metade do custo de £300 por aluno. Esta era uma forma 
de reforçar as relações bilateriais. Aliás, o IAC ocupava-se igualmente da atribuição de duas bolsas de pós-
graduações de cerca de £250 cada, tarefa inicialmente atribuída à  Embaixada, mas que, no fundo, patenteava a 
colaboração existente entre o British Council e o IAC. A Sociedade Anglo-Portuguesa instituiu um prémio 
para o melhor estudante de inglês da Universidade de Lisboa. As bolsas de estudos pós-graduados  estavam 
abertas a candidatos de ambos os sexos, preferencialmente com idades inferiores a trinta anos e solteiro. A 
primeira mulher que recebeu a bolsa para estudar Inglês na Universidade de Bristol foi Fernanda Amélia 
Monteiro da Gama Ochôa (licenciada em Filologia Germânica pela Universidade de Lisboa em 1938). 
  Para além de Lisboa e Coimbra, houve igualmente a preocupação de iniciar a promoção do ensino da 
língua no Porto, onde a comunidade britânica residente era significativa. Aliás, esta comunidade sugeriu, 
através de um memorando enviado para o British Council que seriam benvindas aulas gratuitas à noite para 
empregados, dactilógrafas e logistas, uma sala de leitura, convite a personalidades distintas e visitas de estudos 
para premiar os alunos mais brilhantes. Estas seriam formas de incentivar e despertar o interesse pela língua 
inglesa. 417  Outras sugestões, que demonstravam um comprometimento com o Estado Novo, incluíam o 
desconto sobre a tarifa das aulas, atribuído a quem era membro da Mocidade Portuguesa e da Liga de Ex-
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Combatentes. É de salientar que a inauguração de um Instituto Britânico no Porto foi mais tarde, em 1943, em 
plena II Guerra, o que dava conta da importãncia crescente de Portugal nos planos de desenvolvimento do 
British Council. 
Para concluir, o número de membros do British Council subiu de 1.086 em 1939/1940 para 1.753 em 
1941/1942. Contudo, este número desceu significativamente em 1942 para 1.034. No final da II Guerra, o 
número de membros cifrava-se em 786.  Em 1942, o British Council era já reconhecido em Portugal como o 
Centro autorizado para cursos e exames de proficiência em língua inglesa de Cambridge.  
O British Council organizou diversos eventos que promoviam o Reino Unido como uma nação 
culturalmente dinâmica, e simultamente progressista e consciente da importância da tradição histórica.  Em 
1942, a biblioteca do Instituto possuía cerca de 6,000 livros sobre os costumes e mentalidade britânica e sobre 
as relações anglo-britânicas. A escritora britânica Rose Macaulay (1881-1958), passou cerca de dois meses em 
Lisboa, em 1943, a fazer pesquisa na biblioteca do British Council para o seu livro They Went to Portugal 
(1946) que focava a comunidade britânica residente em Portugal. 
Paralelamente,  e como forma de patentear um certo modo de vida inglês, era servido chá apenas para 
membros do Instituto entre as quatro e as seis horas. A publicação mensal Britain Today, distribuída em 40 
países, disponibilizava as versões escritas em língua inglesa e francesa em Portugal. Os assuntos variavam e 
iam desde o planeamento urbanístico de cidades até a actividades de lazer. O primeiro número em português, 
traduzido como Grâ-Bretanha Hoje, foi publicado no dia 2 de Fevereiro de 1940. Era particularmente dirigido 
para leitores portugueses, incluindo matéria sobre a Aliança escrita por Edgar Prestage, a Royal Air Force e 
sobre religião na Grâ Bretanha. É de realçar que, até final da Guerra, os números seguintes eram 
essencialmente traduções do original para português do Brasil.  
Foram organizadas exibições de variados filmes realizados para o British Council para serem vistos por 
audiências não britânicas, tais como British Harvest, Island People (1941), London (1942), Lowland Village 
(1942), Country Town (1943), entre outros sobre lazer, o exército, as cidades e o campo inglês, a arquitectura, 
indústria, comércio, Serviços Públicos, desporto e sobre a história da língua inglesa. 418  O objectio era 
promover a nação britânica, cujo modo de vida parecia relativamente imune às provações da Guerra, realçando 
o acesso generalizado dos cidadãos britânicos aos cuidados de saúde, condições laborais, liberdade de 
expressão. A Guerra nunca era mencionada e a imagem da nação tornava-se intemporal. Por outro lado, os 
filmes eram geralmente coloridos e comentados em português. Esta particularidade era eficaz no que diz 
respeito à promoção da imagem da nação britânica, especialmente num país em que a taxa de alfabetização era 
ainda muito baixa. Os tópicos também não colidiam com os interesses do Governo português, uma vez que 
este igualmente se ocupava de promover uma imagem da nação portuguesa, renascida a partir de 1933, 
consciente da sua importância histórica, com fortes ligações ao valor da terra, povoada de gentes saudáveis e 
imune aos efeitos de uma Guerra em que oficialmente não tomava parte. 
Em 1939, o Professor Charles K. Webster (1886-1961), da Universidade de Londres, fez uma palestra 
sobre "Princípios e Métodos de Política Externa Britânica durante os Séculos XIX e XX" e outra sobre 
Portugal e Inglaterra durante a primeira metade do século 20, na Faculdade de Letras; Phillip Guedalla (1889-
1944), membro do conselho inicial do British Council, discursou na Sociedade de Geografia sobre 'Wellington 
e Portugal'; George West, Hon. Neil Hogg e de Winton falaram sobre "Shakespeare e Henrique V a propósito 
de Rivals (Sheridan), Man and Superman (Shaw) e Henry V (Shakespeare), levados a cena pela companhia Old 
Vic de Londres (em que participaram os actores Anthony Quayle e Alec Guiness) no Teatro Nacional Almeida 
Garrett. Esta companhia encontrava-se  numa tournée de três meses pelo sul da Europa e Egipto, patrocinada 
pelo British Council. Lisboa era a primeira paragem.  O Presidente Carmona e do Ministro da Educação 
assistiram ao terceiro espectáculo e a presença destas personalidades foi realçada pelo Diário de Lisboa como  
‘uma manifestação de interesse pelo teatro, infelizmente, tão negligenciado pelos nossos poderes públicos’. O 
mesmo diário referiu igualmente que, pelo menos, o segundo espectáculo tinha sido essencialmente visto pelo 
público britânico. 419  Diversas personalidades convidadas trabalhavam ou já tinham trabalhado nos meios 
diplomáticos britânicos (por exemplo, Webster, Guedalla ou Hogg), facto que facilitava não só o convite como 
a deslocação e apresentação a diversas audiências. Eram individualidades com experiência que ia para além 
daquela meramente artística ou académica. 
A apresentação de espectáculos, conferências e literatura britânica foi acolhida favoravelmente por parte do 
meio artístico português que viu nestas inicativas uma forma de enriquecimento do panorama artístico 
português, essencialmente alimentado pelos modelos franceses que dispunham de fraca ou quase nula 
competição. 420  
É de salientar que o Premio Camões (20.000$00), o galardão bianual mais importante atribuído pelo 
Secretariado de Propaganda Nacional a um autor estrangeiro que escrevesse sobre Portugal foi atribuído por 
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duas vezes a dois autores ingleses. Em 1939, foi oferecido a John Gibbons por I Gathered no Moss; e em 1943 
a Elaine Sanceau com o seu  Portugal in the Quest of Prester John. 
As palestras organizadas focavam algumas vezes temas com potenciais implicações políticas, mas que, à 
luz de um tácito não comprometimento abertamente político, era tratados sob o ponto de vista histórico e 
académico. Contudo, eram eventos que facilitavam a promoção das ideias e ideais dos Aliados. Em 1940, o 
SPN pagou à Sociedade para trazer o historiador britânico Sir E. Denison Ross (1871-1940) para duas 
palestras em Lisboa e Porto sobre as viagens portuguesas na Abissínia. Este tópico tinha fortes repercussões 
políticas dado o curso das circunstâncias estratégico-políticas. Sir Ross era Director do British Information 
Bureau para o Extremo Oriente, com um conhecimento linguístico profundo em línguas orientais. Conforme 
Sir Stephen Gaselee, antigo Embaixador do Reino Unido em Portugal e Conselheiro Diplomático  no 
Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros, afirmou: “The last thing we want to do is to create the impression that 
we think we have losts of things to teach to the Portuguese but that they have nothing worth while to offer us 
in return’.421  No início de 1940, O British Council patrocinou igualmente a viagem de Lord Harlech, antigo 
Ministro para as Colónias, que, acompanhado por George West, deu uma série de palestras destinadas a 
lisongear as posições colonialistas inglesas. Oportunamente, confidenciou a jornalistas portuguesas que o 
colonialism português era ‘exemplar’ em muitos aspectos e que os impérios britânico e português estavam 
intimamente ligados por interesses comuns.422  
Por ocasião da inauguração da Exposição do Mundo Português, a 23 de Junho de 1940, o Duque de Kent 
veio em representação da coroa britânica. Além de encontros com o Cardeal Cerejeira, o Duque de Kent 
entregou a Salazar as insignias de Cavaleiro da Grande Cruz da Ordem de São Miguel e São Jorge. O 
Presidente Marechal Carmona também não foi esquecido, tendo recebido uma fotografia assinado do Rei 
britânico. 
O Duque visitou igualmente o British Council em Lisboa, tendo sido recebido por um coro de alunas que 
cantaram o God Save the Queen, antes de conversar com os professores. Integrado no plano geral das 
Comemorações dos Centenários, realizaram-se uma série de congressos sobre História Portuguesa a que 
genericamente se chamaram Congresso do Mundo Português, que decorreu entre Julho e Novembro, em 
Lisboa, Porto e Coimbra e  que contou com a presença de cerca de 121 historiadores estrangeiros: sete vinham 
do Reino Unido. Relativamente à Exposição do Mundo Português, a mesma mereceu cobertura por parte da 
imprensa inglesa. Enquanto que o The Times referiu a relevância psicológica deste evento para os Portugueses, 
o Anglo-Portuguese News publicava uma edição especial sobre as colónias portuguesas.  
Em 1939, o Anglo-Portuguese News era propriedade do Major CR Wakeham, correspondente para o The 
Times. Era essencialmente um jornal escrito em língua inglesa, dirigido apenas para a comunidade inglesa 
residene em Portugal. A tiragem não ultrapassava os mil exemplares e mantinha-se bastante distante da vida 
portuguesa.A partir de 1939, o British Council viu nesta publicação uma oportunidade para reforçar a 
propaganda. Assim,  reforçando o valor do subsídio dado desde 1938, esta publicação que, entretanto passou a 
ser propriedade da empresa que detinha o Jornal do Comércio, melhorou a qualidade do papel utilizado e o 
número de páginas aumentou, sendo metade escrita em inglês e metade em português. Em 1943, a tiragem 
ascendia os 2.300 exemplares. Embora o subsídio tivesse aumentado significativamente, a questão 
fundamental é que o jornal era publicado, não obstante eventuais prejuízos, porque este reforçava a promoção 
da ideia de liberdade de imprensa britânica. 
Decorrido um ano sobre a Exposição do Mundo Português e como prova do fortalecimento das relações 
bilaterais, Salazar recebeu, em cerimónia própria na Sala do Senado da Universidade de Coimbra, o 
Doutoramento Honoris Causa em Leis atribuída pela Universidade de Oxford, a 19 de Abril de 1941. Thomas 
Higham, William Entwissete e John Weaver estiveram presentes em representação da Universidade britânica, 
tendo Higham tecido o elogio latino de Salazar. 
 
Conclusões 
 
Em 1939, o The Glasgow Herald Newspaper publicou um artigo entitulado “Britain in Portugal”, 
referindo-se ao estabelecimento do british Council em Portugal. Em 1943, o The Anglo-Portuguese News 
publicou “The Work of the British Council in Portugal”.423 Pelo meio desenrolava-se uma Guerra Mundial, 
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com implicações políticas, sociais, económicas e culturais. Deste modo, comparar os dois artigos é uma tarefa 
interessante, comparando objectivos propostos e publicitados e resultados alcançados e publicitados.  
Em 1939, o artigo não deixava dúvidas que a abertura e planeamento de actividades do British Council 
seguia uma rivalidade (“keen rivalry”) amigável, no sentido em que os Institutos alemão e italiano, presentes 
no território nacional há mais tempo, gozavam de apoio do Governo português. As actividades 
desencadeavam-se: a um pianista italiano, sucedia-se uma palestra de um historiador inglês e depois de uma 
palestra proferida por um cientista alemão, apresentava-se um coro inglês. A missão era, antes de mais, realçar 
a percepção da nação britânica como uma nação de valores, de um certo modo de viver e pensar. Neste 
propósito havia terreno a desbravar, “on which there can be no turning back, but only advance. Its fruition will 
still demand a two-way traffic, a Methuen Treaty of the mind”. É interessante o facto de a ênfase ser colocada 
na necessidade de mudança da maneira de pensar, na contribuição da mudança de espírito. Partindo uma vez 
mais de alianças e tratados históricos, o problema era reinventá-los. Sendo que a política cultural do Estado 
Novo era a Política de Espírito, as duas linguagens enunciadas combinavam, parecendo que uma ia ao 
encontro da necessidade da outra.  
Em 1943, o trabalho do British Council estava dividido por Lisboa, Coimbra e Porto e incluía o ensino da 
língua inglesa, a promoção de livros, música, filmes, exposições de arte, publicações regulares de anuários, 
revistas médicas e o convite a vários especialistas. Se o trabalho desenvolvido pelo British Council não serviu 
para aproximar particularmente a comunidade britânica residente em Portugal dos portugueses, este trabalho 
serviu o propósito de ambos os governos. Os números estatísticos de alunos e bolseiros e a abertura do novo 
Centro no Porto em 1943 demonstram o crescente interesse pela língua inglesa, numa altura de Guerra. Além 
do mais, sob o ponto de vista político português, a cooperação existente entre o British Council e as 
instituições governamentais reforçavam a posição oficial de neutralidade que era preciso publicitar, ao mesmo 
tempo que se asseguravam outras formas de cooperação com as outras potências beligerantes. Sob o ponto de 
vista cultural, o mais importante para a análise deste artigo, é de realçar que a cooperação cultural permitiu 
difundir uma certa imagem de diversidade multicultural. O reino Unido surgia como uma nação que auxiliava 
Portugal a suprir necessidades sociais e culturais, como por exemplo, na formação de funcionários em 
determinadas áreas do saber. Para o público português, esta colaboração permitiu abrir horizontes e 
perspectivas novas, em particular num ambiente em que a informação era fortemente controlada. Não obstante 
este facto, a designação “grande público” não implica necessariamente sempre o grande público devido a 
significativas taxas de analfabetismo. Contudo, as trocas culturais resultam inevitavelmente num 
enriquecimento do panorama cultural.   
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Culture and propaganda in World War II: 
Fascist Italy and the Balkans 
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1 . Origins and development of the Italian propaganda abroad 
 
 
Propaganda as a means to strengthen the political influence of a country abroad has been used extensively 
during the 20th century by all the major powers, including of course the dictatorships, which refined it in order 
to cement the home consensus. At the end of WWI, with the birth of new nations heirs of the desappeared 
Central Powers and of the Russian Empire, a competition among the great European powers winners of the 
war started, in order to gain a hegemonic role in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Even before the war, since the last years of the 19th century, the Italian government had activated a series of 
cultural institutions abroad, especially in areas considered strategic for the affirmation of the Italian political 
and economic influence. Hence, the first Italian schools abroad were created, both in North Africa and in the 
Balkans, as well as the Dante Alighieri Society, founded in Rome in 1889 and aiming at spreading the Italian 
culture abroad. During WWI, the structure of the Italian propaganda machine had been properly tried and 
tested in an anti-Habsburg perspective, and the rhetoric of the war for the liberation of the oppressed peoples 
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire had been used with both hands, especially in the final phase of the conflict. 
But it was the Fascist regime to develop a more complex and extensive network of propaganda abroad, 
particularly in the 1930s, under inspiration of the achievements made in this field by Nazi Germany, with 
which a real race started, in order to earn the favor of the composite galaxy of Central and Eastern Europe’s 
extreme right wing. In effect, during the interwar period, all the European powers continued to look at this 
area, considered crucial for the geo-political balance of the continent: from the economic point of view, these 
countries were of strategic importance as suppliers of foodstuffs and raw materials, and this is why Nazi 
Germany had launched since the mid-1930s a winning strategy of economic and financial penetration, aspiring 
to create a large economic area under German control from the Baltic to the Black Sea424. 
In March 1933 the Third Reich created the Ministry of Popular Education and Propaganda, which unified 
the organization of culture and propaganda into a single administrative structure425. Following this example, 
Mussolini decided to provide his press office with an authonomous section specifically devoted to propaganda, 
gradually transforming it into an undersecretary for press and propaganda and, from June 1935, into the 
Ministry of Press and Propaganda, headed by his talented son-in-law Galeazzo Ciano426. Within this ministry, 
which in 1937 changed its name once again in Ministry of Popular Culture, a General Directorate for 
Propaganda operated, with the specific task of organizing the Fascist propaganda abroad427. 
 
 
2 . The Italian propaganda in the face of war 
 
It was therefore with this political and cultural propaganda apparatus that the Fascist regime appeared at the 
beginning of the 1940s on the theater of war, taking care, even during the conflict, of the systematic 
organization of propaganda activities abroad. With the entry of Italy into WWII, on the 10th of June 1940, the 
General Directorate for Propaganda of the Ministry of Popular Culture was reshaped, with a partition 
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according to the competencies into four major geographical areas, one of them specifically dedicated to the 
Danubian and Balkan countries428. From archival documents, it appears that the Italian propaganda activity 
was concentrated in the areas considered strategical for Italy, especially the Balkans, aiming at the “setting off 
of the military effort of Italy” and at the “dissemination of the principles, the legal system and the 
achievements of the Regime, documenting the wonderful results in every field and fighting the subtle and 
insidious Communist propaganda”429. It was the invasion of Yugoslavia in April 1941 and the subsequent 
division of the kingdom between Italy, Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria, to transform the Italian propaganda 
activity into an element of primary importance in the flanking of the occupation policy. Italy proceeded to the 
annexation of a part of Slovenia, called the “province of Ljubljana”, and of the central part of Dalmatia, 
created a governorate of Montenegro, under Italian occupation, and unified Kosovo to Albania, in turn part of 
the Italian empire. Croatia became a nominally independent kingdom, entrusted to a member of the House of 
Savoy, Aimone of Aosta, who assumed the evocative name of Tomislav II, in fact never setting his foot in the 
country, controlled by the Ustaša militias of Ante Pavelić, which implemented a real ethnic cleansing of Serbs 
and Jews. 
Since the beginning, the Italian propaganda effort was focused on the province of Ljubljana, attempting a 
“pacification” and “cultural assimilation” of the Slovenes. Governmental guidelines emphasized the need to 
present the human face of Fascist Italy, and to highlight the difference between the violent and racist German 
policies and Italian paternalism. Italy, once again, was posing as a worthy heir of the Roman Empire, which 
aimed at the integration of the annexed peoples with the intent to civilize them, not through repression, but 
through the Latin humanitas430. Galeazzo Ciano, appointed minister of Foreign Affairs in 1936 by Mussolini, 
explained that the Italian policy towards Slovenes and Croats, “Catholic Slavs”, would have to be inclusive 
and not exclusive, so as to be more acceptable. According to Ciano, “our liberal treatment, compared with the 
German inhuman one”, would attract the sympathies of the Croats and Slovenes, as opposed to the German-
controlled part of Slovenia, where “the darkest abuses” were recorded431. The goal was to gradually make the 
Slovenes Fascist and Italian, taking more time, and using more flexible methods than the Germans. The idea 
was to compensate, through a more benevolent attitude towards the Slavs, the Italian subalternity in the 
Balkans, particularly after the Greek offensive, when the Italian army had to be rescued by the Wehrmacht. In 
effect, also in Slovenia the tracing of the border line had been decided by Hitler: according to the diary of 
general Cavallero – chief of staff of the Italian army -, Mussolini himself had stated that “after the break-up of 
Yugoslavia we found in our arms half of a province and, we must add, the poorest half”, pointing out: “the 
Germans have communicated us a border: we could not but take note”432. 
On the 18th of April 1941, the day immediately following the Yugoslav capitulation in the face of Axis 
forces, a course of action on the side of cultural propaganda to be developed between Slovenians and Croatians 
was prepared, pivoting on the common Catholic and “Latin” matrix of Italian, Slovenian and Croatian cultures. 
Under this program, the propaganda in Slovenia and Croatia would have firstly to “prove the existence during 
the time of real currents of sympathy and mutual understanding” between Italy and these countries, pointing 
out, through publications especially distributed by the Italian cultural institutions, “as the Slovenian and 
Croatian literatures and cultures – since Humanism - have found their origin and basis essentially in Italian 
literature and culture”. On the historical side, then, the Italian propaganda organs would have to exalt “the 
common destiny for whole centuries between Slovenia, Croatia and the Veneto slaves of the same imperialist 
policy of Austria, the commonality of religion that completely separated these populations from the Orthodox 
world where the other Slav peoples lived, and finally the commonality of ideals [... between] Italy, Croatia and 
Slovenia during the 19th century”, considering as examples historical phases such as the Napoleonic Wars, the 
Risorgimento and personalities such as Giuseppe Mazzini433. 
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These guidelines were based on a dichotomous view of Eastern Europe, where a kind of clash of 
civilizations was read between “Western” peoples, heirs of the civilizing influence of the Latin and Catholic 
Rome, and “Eastern” peoples, linked to the chaotic and barbaric Asiatic world. Within this interpretative 
framework, therefore, the recommendation was to highlight the contrast between Catholic and “Latin” 
Slovenians and Croatians on the one hand, and Orthodox “Byzantine” Serbs on the other. In a note of the 
General Directorate for Propaganda we read that “Croatia has always been the exponent of Western 
civilization to the south-eastern Europe in contrast to the Serbian world that has always represented, in that 
region, the restless and unstable Balkan Slavism”; that Belgrade had historically exercised a “negative 
influence”, because, “attracting the Croatian civilization in the orbit of Balkan Slavism [had] pushed it away 
from the West”; that, ultimately, “Italy, in the period of Serbian prevalence, [had] close relations with the 
Croatian nation - country of European civilization - and [had] worked for its independence”434. 
Cornerstones of Italian propaganda among Slovenes and Croats were the cultural institutes of Ljubljana 
and Zagreb. In the intentions of the representative of the Ministry of Popular Culture at the High 
Commissioner of the Province of Ljubljana, the Institute of Culture of that city would have to play an “intense 
language and hence national propaganda”, since the province, “despite its annexation to Italy, [would be] for a 
long time an autonomous cultural and linguistic entity, that only by means of an intelligent and active 
propaganda [could be], if not absorbed, at least culturally framed within the state”435. 
For its work, the Institute of Culture of Ljubljana could avail itself of the cooperation of many scholars and 
academics, particularly Slavists, ready to make available their knowledge and their network of personal 
relationships in order to “Italianize” the Slovenes. In return, the Fascist regime did not fail to gratify their 
valuable work with promotions and prestigious positions. Francesco Semi, full professor of Latin letters at the 
Teachers’ Training School of Venice considered for example appropriate to advise the minister of Popular 
Culture Alessandro Pavolini, as a “connoisseur of the Slovenian cultural problems”, a “plan for the cultural 
organization, based on historically appreciable bases, of the Slovenia annexed to the Kingdom of Italy”. The 
Venetian professor suggested to prepare a plan shaped on a “cultural paternalism” towards the Slovenes, which 
was to be based both on the shared Roman Catholic roots and the “natural” civilizing mission historically 
accomplished by Italy towards that geographical area. Despite the diversity that exists between Italians and 
Slovenes on the linguistic level, the fact remained that the Slovenian civilization had “character and tendencies 
through and through streched towards Rome”436. Distinguished Italian Slavists and academics were actively 
involved in organizations such as the “Commission for the revision of the books to be used in the schools of 
the Province of Ljubljana”, activated by order of the High Commissioner in August 1941 and headed by 
Giovanni Maver, one of the founders of Slavic studies in Italy437. According to Elio Migliorini, one of the 
leaders of the new discipline of geopolitics, the annexation of the Province of Ljubljana was the logical 
consequence of a geographical reality in which the Slovene lands naturally tended to gravitate towards Italy, to 
which they were tied “by multiple bonds”. As for the Savoy and the Switzarland’s Grisons, in effect, even in 
the case of Slovenia “there [was] beyond the watershed an area that gravitat[ed] towards Italy rather than 
towards the neighboring regions”438. 
The High Commissioner for the province of Ljubljana, in accordance with the directives issued by the 
government, initially implemented a moderate and “paternalistic” policy. Although devoided of Italian 
nationality, the Slovenes were to enjoy the rights that the regime granted Italians, in order to persuade them 
that the Italian “civilization” was still better than both the old feudalism of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and 
the more recent regime of oppression exercised by the Serbs by means of the Yugoslav state. Particular 
attention was paid to the field of culture and education, from school to university, carefully selecting the 
Slovenian teaching staff, who, formed in large part at the times of the former Empire, watched the Italians with 
hostility. In November 1941, the command of the 11th Army Corps denounced that Slovene teachers, “fervent 
propagandists”, used the old pre-occupation textbooks as an instrument of anti-Italian propaganda, inviting to 
examine them more carefully. In September 1942, General Mario Robotti, commander of the 11 th Army Corps, 
stated flatly that “our enemy is constituted by the intelligentsia of Ljubljana”. The Italian occupiers could, 
however, be supported by a minority group of Slovenian intellectuals of the capital, most of them openly 
Fascist and collaborationist, belonging to the traditionalist and anti-communist clerical right439. 
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3. From assimilation to repression 
 
The failure of the attempts of denationalization and Italianisation and the inadequacy of the Italian 
propaganda apparatus, along with the intensification of the armed partisan resistance against the Italian troops, 
marked a change of strategy. General Robotti identified in the attack of the Axis forces on the Soviet Union in 
June 1941 (the “Operation Barbarossa”) a watershed in the revival of the communist Slovenian clandestine 
movement, which joined the internationalist solidarity with Soviet Russia, pan-Slav feelings and Slovenian 
anti-Italian and anti-German nationalism440. With the so-called “Spring Plan”, the Italian army began to 
develop an offensive line towards all forms of resistance, deporting tens of thousands of Slovenes in 
concentration camps established for that purpose; in addition, between January and February 1942 the entire 
city of Ljubljana was fenced with barbed wire and the movements of Slovenes were prohibited, with a strict 
application of the martial law441. Meeting in July 1942 the Italian military leaders, Mussolini had clearly 
explained what was to be the line to follow for the future: 
 
I think it’s better to pass from a nice to a strong manner rather than being forced backwards. [...] I do not fear 
words. I am convinced that the terror of the partisans must be answered with iron and fire. The cliché that depicts 
Italians as sentimental unable to be tough when needed must stop. This tradition of grace and excessive tenderness 
should be ended. 
 
As for the University of Ljubljana, in addition, Mussolini considered it simply an anti-Italian “hotbed”, 
finally contemplating the possibility of a “transfer of masses of population”442. Communicating to the Ministry 
of the Interior its “program of activities”, the High Commissioner for the province of Ljubljana Grazioli had 
suggested the beginning of a “‘very tough’ course of conduct in respect of the Slovenes, until tangible and 
proven manifestations of repentance, and a very hard course even after”. The university students were 
particularly affected, considered by then lost in favor of the anti-Fascist resistance: the number of registered 
students was reduced to less than a third, taxes were doubled, to discourage new enrollments, and “almost all 
the students” had been interned. In essence, the university would have to “scrape out a living”, “looking 
forward to definitely resolving the issue, once achieved the victory, when it will be possible to determine 
which ‘Italian function’ it will be able to conduct in the Balkans”443. 
In Croatia, the Italian propaganda had to face a difficult situation: nominally placed under Italian influence, 
but in fact controlled by the Ustaša, Croatia was gradually included in the German sphere of influence. On the 
Italian side, an intense propaganda was activated, based on the known patterns levering on the common 
cultural and religious roots, especially through the Italian Cultural Institute in Zagreb, which during 1941 had 
opened new sections in the major cities of the “Independent State of Croatia” as Karlovac, Sarajevo, Banja 
Luka, Osijek and Dubrovnik444. The director of the Institute of Zagreb, after the partition of Yugoslavia, took 
immediately care to ask the General Directorate for Propaganda of the Ministry of Popular Culture for 
publications to be distributed in that country “on the achievements of the Regime and on the Fascist state’s 
organization”445 . In September 1941 an Italian delegation appointed by the minister for Popular Culture 
Pavolini along with some representatives of the German Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Propaganda 
discussed in Berlin to agree on a common policy in regard to the propaganda in Croatia, with the intention to 
arrive at “a position of perfect equality with the Germans”446. 
In fact in Croatia from the beginning a competition between Italy and Germany took place for the 
affirmation of their own areas of influence, with the belief, on the Italian side, that an objective inferiority in 
terms of economic penetration and military power, could be overcome through an effective work of cultural 
propaganda. This in turn would have to be based on the idea that “the tendency of the Croats to approach the 
Italian literature considered as an alive and active expression of our country’s spiritual values” had always 
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been present in the “cultural aspirations of the Croatian people”, even when “the political relations between 
Italy and the former Kingdom of Yugoslavia appeared difficult”447. 
Croatia constituted in German plans a key factor for the establishment of a Donauraum, that is a political, 
economic and cultural area, dominated by Nazi Germany, projected towards the southeast and connected with 
a Mitteleuropa hegemonized by the Third Reich. Even the German propaganda, similarly to the Italian one, 
was based primarily on dichotomous schemes, in which the Croatian “civilization” was opposed to the Serbian 
“barbarism”. However, for obvious reasons, the Germans were not so much interested in specific elements of 
Croatian culture and religion – as already mentioned, Latinity and Catholicism were factors of simbolical 
proximity to Rome, the capital of the Fascist empire - but to a generic role of defense of Western civilization 
that the Croatian people was supposed to have played over the centuries in the Balkan world. In this 
framework, the Croatian “diversity”, within the wider category of south-eastern Slavs, was attributed to an 
alleged racial superiority: as Hiler himself had stated, “the Croats are very concerned not to be considered 
Slavs” and “the fact that they speak a Slavic language would be just an accident”448. 
 
 
4. Failure of Italian power policy in the Balkans 
 
The Italian occupation policy in Croatia on the other hand had generated frictions with the interests of 
Ustaša nationalism: in August 1941 the military occupation of the demilitarized zone of Dalmatia, 
Herzegovina, Bosnian Krajina, Lika and Kordun had fueled a pre-existing anti-Italian feeling. At the same 
time, the Italian occupation authorities showed themselves frequently deaf to the messages that the propaganda 
was trying to convey with respect to the spiritual commonality between Italians and Croats, relocating the 
latter in the vague and disqualifying category of “Slav” peoples. According to the prefect of Rijeka Temistocle 
Testa, the Croatian people “every day [was] increasingly proving to be what it [had] always been, that is an 
inferior race which should be treated as such and not as an equal”449. To complicate matters, there were the 
relationships that the Italian authorities entertained simultaneously with the Croatian Ustaša and the Serb 
Chetniks, both virulently anticommunist, but in turn hostile to each other. Moreover, as the Italian troops 
engaged in the Balkans were diverted towards North Africa to face the Allied advance near the end of 1942, 
the occupying forces of the royal army had to rely increasingly on the Chetniks, as the Croats tended rather 
towards the Germans, openly adverse to the Chetnik bands. In July 1943, a document of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs stated that the Serbs, “as Serbs and not as Yugoslavs, tend to the Danube, not to the Adriatic, 
and so it is much more convenient for us to cultivate the Serbs and keep alive the contrast between them and 
the Croats, because as long as they are divided and enemies we will always have a Danube mass to 
counterbalance and prevent the ambitions and the threat of the Croatian Adriatic mass”450. 
In Montenegro, the Italians managed to keep some control of the territory, at the price of continuous 
clashes with the partisans. According to the Commissioner’s civil governorship, a program of propaganda was 
necessary in order to conquer to the Italian cause at least a part of the local educated class. It was therefore to 
flank a more overtly political propaganda with “a slow, methodical and cautious action” of spreading Italian 
“cultural” books and magazines 451 . The main initiative in the field of Italian cultural propaganda in 
Montenegro was launched in coincidence with the flare of partisan warfare in the spring of 1943, led by Tito. 
In April of that year in effect the publication of Durmitor, a monthly magazine of culture, began. Its name 
referred to the “highest mountain of this country [...], chosen as the symbol of the activity of the spirit”, which, 
among other things, was also the area where the partisans had shifted their operations centre452. The aim of the 
magazine, published in the Serbian language, except a few articles in Italian, would be to approach the 
intellectual elite of that Balkan country: “although with ultimately political purposes” the magazine was meant 
“to avoid even in the frontispiece any even distant allusion of purely political kind”, to prove “that our main 
purpose is the interchange between the Italian and the Montenegrin cultures”453. 
                                                          
447 Report by Benedetti on the development of book propaganda in Croatia, Zagreb, 7th November 1941, ibid. 
448 A. Hitler, Conversazioni segrete ordinate e annotate da Martin Bormann, Napoli, 1954, p. 103. 
449 Cit. in T. Sala, Fascisti e nazisti nell’Europa sudorientale. Il caso croato (1941-1943), in E. Collotti – T. Sala, Le 
potenze dell’Asse e la Jugoslavia. Saggi e documenti 1941/1943, Feltrinelli, Milano, 1974, p. 69. 
450 Cit. in D. Rodogno, Il nuovo ordine mediterraneo. Le politiche di occupazione dell’Italia fascista in Europa (1940-
1943), preface by P. Burrin, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino, 2003, p. 385. See also ivi, pp. 372-386. 
451 Rulli to the Ministry of Popular Culture, Cetinje, 6th December 1941, Acs, Mcp, Dgp, b. 151, f. Pubblicazioni Cettigne, 
1941-42. 
452 See J. Pirjevec, Il giorno di San Vito. Jugoslavia 1918-1992. Storia di una tragedia, Nuova Eri, Torino, 1993, p. 177. 
453 Note for the general director (draft), Rome, 23rd January 1943, Acs, Mcp, Dgp, b. 151, f. Propaganda italiana nel 
Montenegro, 1941-42; “Presentazione” by the direction, Durmitor, April 1943, pp. 1-2, ibid. 
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Also in Bosnia, which was part of Greater Croatia, a similar initiative was inaugurated, with the publication 
of a new bilingual edition of the already existing weekly Rinascita (Preporod)454. As reported by the Italian 
consul in Sarajevo, the magazine would have to serve “the spread not only of our language and literature”, but 
also “the Italian cultural, social and political principles” which had to “face at this time the fierce competition 
of their German confreres”455. 
In Greece, Bulgaria and Albania, the Italian propaganda was marked by a lack of organicity and collided 
with a shortage of funds, difficulties of organization, subordination to the Nazi ally/rival or massive illiteracy 
of the population. In these countries, however, cultural initiatives were initiated, from courses of Italian to 
magazine publishing: in particular, the bilingual magazine Albania was published in the homonym country 
since 1940 - the year after the Italian occupation -, which the minister Pavolini qualified of “great interest”, 
being “more necessary than ever to illustrate and make widely known the many problems related to the union” 
of the two countries456. The progressive weakening of the Italian positions in the Balkans during 1943, due to 
both intensification of partisan warfare, and to the transfer of men on other fronts, and finally to the 
strengthening of the German political and military control over the whole region, would lead to the consequent 
rapid disappearance of the entire propaganda network built by Fascist Italy before and during the war in those 
countries. The general of Carabinieri Giuseppe Pièche, sent by the high command and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs with the task of information and coordination of the anti-communist action in the Balkans, had traced 
in May 1943 a gloomy but true picture of the relations of power between Italians and Germans in the Balkans: 
 
The Germans control by now Zagreb and the most important centres not occupied by the partisans. Army, police, 
post, telegraph, telephones, railways, public order, everything is now controlled by the Germans who act as if they 
were in their own home without even consulting, in most cases, the Croatian or the Italian authorities457. 
 
In effect, the occupation policy of Fascist Italy in the Balkans was from the beginning subject to the one 
imposed by the Nazi ally/rival, and was able at most to try to carve out, until it had been possible, some spaces 
of autonomy. In turn, the Italian propaganda system was destined to develop in these confined spaces, 
crumbling then immediately as soon as the Italian military control failed. As for the effect that the Italian 
propaganda really had on the local populations, the existing documentation makes it impossible to give definite 
answers, but it seems likely the hypothesis that it could actually reach limited social groups. Numerous factors, 
first among them – as already mentioned - high rate of illiteracy, indifference or outright hostility towards both 
Italians and Fascists, prevented a massive penetration and a successful reception of the Italian propaganda. 
This could be welcomed in the form of cultural propaganda only in the pro-Italian or openly pro-Fascist 
milieus, which went increasingly thinner as the instability of Italian positions worsened, and German 
hegemony vice versa prevailed. Attempting to play the card of the Italian diversity compared to the Germans 
turned out in the long run not credible, after that – facing the mounting offensive of resistance - the Italian 
occupation authorities implemented repressive policies that do not vary much from Nazis’ ones458. The myth 
of the superiority of the two thousand years Roman civilization, as well as that of the “good Italian”, widely 
used by the propaganda, actually proved to be nothing more than ideal constructions, although the dynamics of 
repression were caused more by the Italian weakness in the face of the hostility of the occupied populations 
than by the overconfidence in a racial supremacy prevailing in the German army459. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
454 In English: Rebirth. 
455 Paolo Alberto Rossi to the Italian Legation in Zagreb, Sarajevo, 27th April 1943, Acs, Mcp, Dgp, b. 147, f. Propaganda 
italiana a Serajevo, 1941-42. 
456 Benini to Pavolini, Rome, 12th January 1940; Pavolini to Benini, Rome, 27th January 1940, Acs, Mcp, Gab., b. 109, f. 
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457 Cit. in T. Sala, Fascisti e nazisti, cit., p. 75. 
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459 E. Collotti, Sulla politica di repressione italiana nei Balcani, in L. Paggi (ed.), La memoria del nazismo nell’Europa di 
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Photojournalism and propaganda in the Spanish Civil War 
An overview 
 
José Luís Santos, 
CEIS20 - UC 
 
 
1. Photojournalism rises 
 
Since the beginning of the era that man created images to show and describe war. Since ancient times, 
war was a theme that penetrated his experience and interest, which became an inseparable factor from his 
culture. Already in the prehistoric time, men painted scenes of combat with other tribes with rudimentary 
tools as their weapons. The phenomenon of collective persuasion is therefore inherent to all human 
societies. 
After the arrival of photography, the war was never the same again. With the emergence of newspapers 
with printed images, the reader was driven into "a closer world, more real, but sometimes more cruel."460 
Public opinion was no longer monopolized by the written word 461 . From here onwards, war and 
photography started to be two inseparable elements. The picture was regarded as a proof ", or “witness " 
deeply attached to the notion of truth, that gave it the credibility as a "mirror of reality", which turned it 
into a powerful propaganda weapon. Early on, political power was interested in exploiting the 
photography´s potential as a vehicle for propaganda. At a time when most people were illiterate, the picture 
quickly took a central role, given the easy perception of the message to spread, as if photography would be 
journalisms "bible of the poor". It was in this period that the world of the media started developing and 
press registered a boom in its expansion towards a public who was interested in the event shappening 
around them, wanting to assist as if they were part of the plot. 
 
 
2. A difficult cohabitation 
 
Europe was in this period in deep convulsions. After the 20s, marked by a good understanding between 
the two Iberian states, from 1931 onwards the relations between Portugal and the Second Spanish Republic 
started to become incompatible, taking into account the root divisions that opposed the two countries. 
Europe became an arena for political ideologies that propagandized a “New Man”. These antagonisms led 
to several upheavals in a space to small for the coexistence of  such great contrasts. The Iberian Peninsula 
was a reflection of that reality. 
In February 1936, after the Popular Front´s victory in the spanish elections, Salazar saw the survival of 
the “Estado Novo” at risk, which he powered by himself. Avoiding Madrids interference in its internal 
affairs, something that already happened before, Salazar bet all in supporting a coup perpetrated by right-
wing spanish forces. On the 18th of July, started the rebellion in the country's main military quarters. The 
plan was to activate a military revolt that would extend through the whole country, failed in the major 
cities, starting the belligerence. 
  The conflict was treated as an internal matter because the Spanish government’s fate depended on its 
development. Salazar supported the nationalist cause and gave some facilities that were essential in the 
early days of the war, thus contributing to the strengthening of the fascist hordes. He instructed the former 
Trade minister, Sebastião Ramirez, to oversee the operations in support of the uprising and took concrete 
steps to facilitate the maximum transit of war material from the Portuguese capital to the nationalist zone. 
The Portuguese government also provided part of the fuel for the air bridge operation to transport the 
Moroccan troops to the peninsula, besides making an intermediary between U.S. suppliers and the military 
rebels.  
The Portuguese dictator gave also diplomatic cover to the revolutionary movement in the Western 
democracies in order to prevent the bailing the democratically elected government, and also undertakes a 
propaganda campaign in the portuguese media. It is in this context that, along with writing, photography 
played a central role in the field of informative wars 
 
                                                          
460  Sousa, Jorge Pedro, Uma História Crítica do Fotojornalismo Ocidental. Chapecó; Florianópolis: Argos, Letras 
Contemporâneas, 2004, p. 40. 
461 Idem. 
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3. Camera goes to war 
 
We are in the fervor of the '30s, considered the golden age of foreign correspondents. There wasn’t 
other war in the last century that has provoked such intense emotion and flagrante partiality and 
commitment. The Spanish cause went beyond its borders and was seen and felt by many to be the cause of 
all people. It was named thes " Holy War " and "cruzade" or, on the other hand, as "the defense of 
freedom" or " the proletarian paradise". Those who went there, knew they would fight for ideals. They 
were combating, writing and taking pictures with the same passion and commitment of those who give 
their best, sometimes life itself for a traditionalist Spain, or by whom attempted to stop the advance of 
fascism and wanted to save a more just and equalitarian model of society. It is not a surprise that a national 
war, which actually had a wide international significance regarding the delicate situation of the time, 
awakened the attention of the international press. It is more than valid to emphasize Hugh 
Thomas´statement, that "since the end of July 1936, and for two and a half years, it was common to find in 
the south of the Pyrenees the worlds greatest journalists." 
The technical and socio-cultural development of war photography was produced in the Spanish Civil 
War."462 In fact, in this new media world, information and propaganda are two fields that will interweave 
continuously. The ambition is not limited to inform about the facts, but also invests in inculcation in the 
public minds. The photographer gradually noted the significance and amplitude of his work. He started to 
know that there was a mass of readers who longed for the publication of his pictures. Some images that will 
excite them and make them feel as if they were present in the scenes printed on the pages they read. Hence 
this is the first war to be extensively photographed and will also serve as a testing laboratory not only in the 
military but also in the journalistic area for the looming World War II.  
It is here that the “visual communication of events”463 was born. Furio Colombo notes that this conflict 
opens a "new and never before experienced relationship with the tragedy" 464 , a relationship which 
emphasizes the emotional component, measured by feelings of participation, passion or compassion, under 
a sense of unity between the author and the event. It is based, in turn, on the notion of a technical 
standpoint (which also includes the aesthetic vision), a concept that unites also the author and his 
equipment and is expressed through the framing, the contrast and the selection of "decisive moment" and a 
"good" ocasion 465 . Furthermore, the author notes that "the beauty and perfection of picture framing 
correspond to the horror, the pain, terror and death"466, thus inaugurating the so-called "era of mass visual 
communication" 467 , which he classifies as "a powerful new field of interest, emotion, anger and 
exaltation."468 
Therefore, the war turns something visible. The event is experienced twice in two separate universes, 
the precise moment that captures the events and when they are communicated to the readers. "From this 
moment onwards, the world lives and suffers, waits, enjoys, fights and dies in public. Now, the word 
“public” indicates a bleak and fascinating right to see everything, amazing as it is.469 
The reality will be experienced emotionally or passionately at different angles by those participating in 
the war effort or by those using it as informative propagandistic purpose. It starts to be necessary to 
distinguish between the photographic reportage of war, between the photographic informative value and, 
on the other hand, the ideological propaganda argument. 
Each photographer choosed a point of view, which, led to the adoption of self-censorship as a result of 
commitment to the cause and consequent attitude towards the world, making their "touch of copyright". 
This commitment has shaped the photojournalistic production of the war, implying, for example, the failure 
to omit atrocities committed through the field in which they where engaged. The old aesthetic professional 
vision gives the place to an ethical participative and solidary vision, announcing the birth of a new era of 
photographic communication marked by excitement, elation and militancy of the photographer.470 
                                                          
462 Santiago, Miguel Angel, Fotoperiodismo y Guerra Civil,  congresso La República y la Guerra Civil. Setenta años 
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470 Mondéjar, Publio López, Historia de la Fotografia en España. Barcelona, Lunwerg Editores, 2003. 
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In the extreme circumstances of war "the artist loses its personal and subjective character to be 
converted into something collective, supportive and objective."471 Publio Lopez Mondejar points out that 
"the photographer is the artist of disciplinary freedom, a freedom subject to objective requirements, higher 
than their individual will. Its function is to serve the common cause, the collective task of defeating the 
enemy, as previous phase to the new situation of social justice and freedom that is pursued."472 Based on 
these assumptions, the artist, by being aware of the conjuncture that surrounds him, detaches himself from 
its asocial and individualistic position to operate in the service of large political propagandistic 
organizations responsible for broadcasting images. The imperative was not only to inform, but to win the 
war. Information and propaganda started to be mixed. 
On both sides of the barricades, the newspapers played a central role in the war effort. Their front pages 
where pamphlets, in spite of most of its contents, as well as the arrangement pursued the purpose, through 
its aesthetics and efficiency, of launching agitation propaganda. Soon, they would adopted the formula of 
the political posters. In Spain, the first pages as La Vanguardia or ABC Madrid473, with a photography 
filling the front page together with a short title with impact and an explanatory background, are classic 
examples of posters. These two newspapers were competing in 1936 in illustrative presentation and stood 
out through the spectacularity of their pictures of the conflict. In Portugal, newspapers like Diário de 
Notícias, O Século, Diário de Lisboa, and others, invested in the image as a vehicle of propaganda that 
suited the regime. Following these assumptions, the Secretariat of National Propaganda (SPN ), under the 
command of António Ferro, prepared and programmed the Portuguese journalists work during the war. It 
was urgent to give international credibility to “alzamiento" at the same time as they alerted for the eventual 
triumph of international Communism and the resulting access of Bolsheviks into Western Europe.  For 
internal political propaganda, the already moribund ghost “Spanish danger". It was praised the “Franco 
crusades”, while the "Marxist barbarism" was demonized.  
Over three dozen Portuguese reporters were in Spain at that time, particularly in the period between the 
unfolding of the uprising, in July 1936, until December of that year, when the positions in Madrid war front 
stabilized and it was understood that the victory wasn´t yet in the hands of the nationalists. Among them 
there were photographers like Deniz Salgado, Afonso Pereira de Carvalho, Salazar Dinis, Teodoro Medel 
de Aquino, Firmino Marques da Costa, Ferreira da Cunha, and when the journalists, themselves, also used 
the camera, seeking to sustain their words by captured images.  
Faced with the help of the Portuguese government, the rebel fraction corresponded with all the support 
in order to facilitate the work of Portuguese information professionals. Luis Bolín, responsible for foreign 
journalists in the fascist territory, was quite permissive, helping them numerous times, both in free access 
to the territory as well with the logistics of insuring the press coverage of the conflict. 
 The August 8, Felix Correia, Diário de Lisboa’s correspondent, was the first journalist to interview 
General Franco, getting a world scoop. It is notorious that the Portuguese press got help, observing the 
completely different treatment Bolin gave to the other foreign press. Correspondents like Edmund Taylor, 
head of the European Delegation of the Chicago Daily Tribune, Bertrand de Jouvenal from Paris Soir, 
Webb Miller from United Press, Arthur Koestler and Dennis Weaver, both from News Chronicle were 
among those who were imprisoned and threatened with execution by Franco´s press directors strict 
prescriptions, becoming famous among journalists abroad by saying "You journalists, deserve something 
worse than the shooting. " 
 
 
4.The in Republican Spanish press 
 
The Spanish Republican press facilitated more the work of foreign correspondents. They needed to 
show the world that they have been victims of lawlessness hoping to have the support of other democratic 
states in addition to collecting for itself the sympathy of public opinion to their cause. Anyhow, it was a 
conflict caused by an attempted coup that failed and degenerated into a spiral of violence throughout a 
country that was the target of the most flagrant violations of international law.  
The two newspapers in the Republican field that focused the most on images, the ABC of Madrid and 
La Vanguardia , Barcelona, presented in the initial period of the war a very distant reality shown by the 
Portuguese press, as was the case of the Diário de Lisboa and O Século . Photography, despite being seen 
as an irrefutable proof of reality, will in fact be a powerful way to show an angle that does not always 
reflect the veracity of the facts. 
 
                                                          
471 Excerto de um folheto intitulado “Función social del cartel publicitário”, published em 1937. 
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4.1 . The reliability of peace and order 
 
The photojournalistic coverage of ABC took his first steps on July 28. On the first page, with the title 
“The struggle in the Guadarrama mountains”474, is published a picture by of Alfonso Sánchez Portela 
showing the "guerrilla troops advancing in the slopes of the Alto de Léon”475, with a dozen soldiers to 
invest quickly against the enemy positions. It will be the first of a series of images whose content is 
substantiated in the reliability of the attack and continued advance of government forces. The fourth page is 
occupied by two pictures of the progress of loyal troops. In one, attributed to photographer Alfonso, a 
group of soldiers, “Guardia de Assalto” and Popular Front militia display the captured guns from the 
nationalists in front of Somossierra476. This photography ends in a rather strong symbolism. It is a clear 
collusion of forces between the various groups ranging composing the popular army, in a spirit of solidarity 
and unity towards a common cause, the return of Spain to the regime democratically elected by the people. 
This joining of forces will be, according to Republican propaganda, the key to military success against 
insurgents, and that union will be critical to the strength. 
 The July 24, La Vanguardia publishes the first moments of war that broke out in the Catalan capital 
through the eyes of Sagarra477. The images define the people as the main character of the events. There are 
elements of the Popular Front united with the police forces throughout the streets of the city, after defeating 
the enemy or actively participating in the fight, after taking the positions of the rebels in Catalunya Square 
or responding to the first wounded. The pictures show shows the conquered key points as well as the seized 
material. The military sector is also present, so that, to spread, like the Madrid daily, the idea of dialogue 
and concertation between the people and the army. 
The allure of successful operations is a call for general mobilization. The national goal is channeled into 
the war effort and each one will have the time to give its input. Peasants, workers and other citizens are led 
to join the Republican ranks, thus giving the example for those who are still undecided. Under the title 
“Towards a new Spain”, a peasant, symbol of rural workers, came to Madrid to fight with his brothers the 
enemies of the republican regime.478  Alfonso capted the worker with a hammer and sickle showing the 
communist symbol, representing the alliance between the workers proletariat and the peasants, calling for a 
new union, now to face the common enemy. It’s important to highlight the example of ABC’s own 
reporters taking up arms, replacing some times the pen by the sword. 
Military operations are resumed to "enemy's cleaning"479 and "beat one of the last strongholds on the 
fronts"480 to a faceless enemy only known to be on  the progress of Republican troops. That progress was 
permanent, "victorious"481 or "triumphant"482, causing the stampede of the nationalist forces, thanks often 
to artillery support, which "contributes to an effective way to remove the traitors." 483  The good 
performance of forces prevents the recording of casualties in their ranks. Piortiz photographed nurses who 
“remained idle during the day.”484 
The political class is present in the fight. Several ministers visited the frontlines, and were warmly 
greeted by combatants without feeling the different hierarchy. Largo Caballero, Minister of State, appears 
in a photo that became iconic, along with a group of militiamen, effusive with his presence in the Alto do 
Léon.485 Durruti, leader of the anarchist movement, gives the example on the frontline, with a shotgun in 
hand with his comrades beside the column with his name.486 
During the initial period of war, there was a conveyed idea, based on minimizing the gravity of the 
situation, showing it with a set of images which suggest calm, serenity and order in the Republican 
territory. It shows peace reigning in the capital and in the surrounds. Madrid continues to be a city that does 
not abdicate his vivacious spirit and the crops in the fields grow mostly in normality.  
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4.2. In Defense of Culture 
 
Since elections, the Republican discourse appealed and recognized the importance of the defense and 
enhancement of Culture since the election, praising his struggle for obtaining values such as Freedom, 
Justice and Equality. With the outbreak of war, one of the strengths of their propaganda or counter-
advertising against the accused of promoting the barbaric destruction of historical, cultural and artistic 
heritage, focused on self-reference while preserving agent, or even rescue of cultural heritage. In order to 
reflect responsibility, maturity of the democratic order and statesmanship, although the government 
confiscated wealthy families palaces of the National Front, soon the priority given to the preservation of 
property and its fillings from revolutionaries rambling fury, as succeeded with some churches around the 
country. 
 
 
5. The commitment of the Portuguese correspondents 
 
The war printed a very fast pace and Portuguese readers and spanish living near the border, yearned for 
news and pictures of the conflict. The best photo coverage was given by Diário de Lisboa. The August 28, 
publishes a full-page article with "images of pain and glory of the bloody struggle that rages in the 
neighboring country."487 Also the same page of the edition of the penultimate day of the month is entirely 
occupied by photographs of the Civil War488. There is in this edition a photo of a military column that runs 
to the front of Zaragoza "amid the acclamations of the crowd," 489  thus indicating the support of the 
insurgents already had. The September 18, highlights a sequence of images with various aspects of the 
fighting fronts, from the bombing of Talavera de la Reina to S. Sebastian, passed by the damage inflicted 
by the Nationalist aviation in Malaga, as well as the movement in the north, the Basque Country and 
Andalusia. Was thus shown the national scene. 
 
 
5.1 Religious war and Marxist barbarism 
 
Since the beginning of the war, there was the concern to justify the coup in order to give credibility to 
the insurrectionary movement that would, ideally, seize power and, therefore be, legitimized by 
governments and public opinion not only internally but especially wide internationally. One of the fronts of 
attack of the information wars in support of Francos cause focused on discredit of the democratically 
elected government by the people, and by the creation of the need for an urgent response to change the 
course of that choice, which was considered wrong. Republican institutions are shown to be unable to 
maintain public order and the required levels of security and stability necessary for the normal functioning 
of a nation. There is an association between chaos and entities linked to the government, labeled from the 
beginning of the conflict as impotent, or even conniving instigator of the chaos. The feeling of insecurity is 
pervasive, leading the reader in the imperative urgency of a radical change of the control of a country 
without a leash. 
One of the flags of nationalist propaganda, copied to exhaustion by the Portuguese press, was to pass 
the idea that Western Christianity was in danger to before the Bolshevik Satanism. And, if in this sense, the 
images of the destruction of temples and religious symbols correspond to the materialization of this fear, it 
was based on a reading taken a little less than incontestable under which arrived in Spain an atheist boost 
coming from Moscow and Marxists are, by their nature, enemies of the Christian faith. As the latter tend to 
be incompatible with the field of sacred, feel imbued with the task of annihilating. Churches, symbol of the 
Christian presence and affirmation, are usually the target of his advances, gesture soon becomes associate 
an act of desperation, anticipatory of defeat, to the extent that translate a final and ultimate act of revenge, 
typical of those having to flee from the enemy, does not without first annihilating some of their most 
intimate symbols, those of a religious nature. 
The images of the first destroyed churches were published in the first days of war, when the photos 
were broadcast of what's left of many490, of the state that was the chapel of the Virgen Macarena, "both the 
devotion of the Andalusian"491 and "looks bleak"492 of the church of San Roque. Here are references to a 
                                                          
487 Diário de Lisboa, 28/08/1936, see annex 7. 
488 Diário de Lisboa, 28/08/1936. 
489 Diário de Lisboa, 28/08/1936. 
490 O Século, 30/07/1936. 
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similar fate in the Somossierra493, Niebla (Andalusia)494, Santa Marina, Seville495 and Torrejon496. Not even 
the convent of San Francisco, in Betanzos, near Corunna, who was considered a national monument, 
escaped to the "fire launched by the Communists."497 
In parallel, they are also looking forward their disdain for heritage of the Church, as an image denote 
surgically chosen for publication that shows a baby Jesus that Marxists put as a police flagman at the 
crossing of two roads498. 
The picture with high emotional impact is reflected by the publication of an image of a pain family, 
living moments of anguish, a feeling that is present in the mother’s expression. The subtitle wanted to take 
dividends from the visual power of the illustration, describing it as a moment captured after the liberation 
of the eldest son by nationalist forces, and after the father had been shot the day before by the communists. 
This strong dramatic component picture was monetized to finalize the legend, to assert itself, that "it is 
always like that everywhere"499, noting that only in that locality “the communists killed 110 people!"500. 
Regarding this troubled conjuncture, as outlined in the portraits by the fascists, the national army 
emerged as the necessary strength, liberating the heavy yoke to whom Spanish people were submitted. The 
campaign of demonization of the marxists, shows them with the desire of destruction, written down in their 
genetic code, being an activity inherent to their politics. The message is clear: the Red Terror is installed in 
Spain. The “Marxist hordes" are accused of perpetrating the worst atrocities exceeding morally acceptable 
limits. Images, moreover, would try to prove so. 
 
 
5.2.Badajoz, censorship of a massacre  
 
The August 15 1936, the national troops conquer Badajoz. The biggest photographic report would be 
published in the next day in O Século. On the first page, outstands the photo of "Marxist prisoners in the 
camps by the rebellious troops.501" The commander of the operational forces, Coronel Yague, appears in 
this edition, read a copy of the newspaper itself, a clear gesture of complicity with the portuguese media. 
Are mentioned the reactions of the population to the troops entered the city through the harnessing of 
white flags in the windows, but there are no inhabitants. The soldiers of the Tercio give a serene pose, with 
military equipment captured. There is calm and tranquility in a city that lived an antagonistic episode that is 
tried to be presented. While foreign newspapers were aware of the horrors that occurred in the city, the 
portuguese press omit it. Mário Neves, Diário de Lisboa journalist, would have his work entirely censored. 
Ferreira da Cunha, Diário de Notícia’s photographer, also self censored his work, excusing himself from 
capture the abandoned bodies in the city, wich were photographed by other reporters, choosing to show the 
border post, the bullring and the refugees in Elvas. 
 At a time of multiple efforts to build trust in the rebel movement in public opinion, they tried to hide 
the scale of the massacre after the taking of the city, by devaluation of the pictures of fighters killed in 
combat and other later shot, getting voted to silence the file. At the end of the section for the Badajoz 
conquest in O Século, some file contains photographs that contain militiamen killed, some of them we can 
assume that have been victims of capital punishment right there at that moment. In one of them, is more 
than a dozen corpses in a courtyard, indicating the atrocities committed by the victorious army502. 
The horrors perpetrated by nationalist forces in Badajoz were silenced. The pictures give an idea of a 
clean war, where order reigns and the enemy surrenders, believing in the benevolence and mercy of 
Franco’s supporters, creating an illusory perception of reality to the newspapers reader. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
492 Diário de Lisboa, 12/08/1936. 
493 Diário de Lisboa, 16/08/1936. 
494 Diário de Lisboa, 21/08/1936. 
495 Diário de Lisboa, 25/08/1936. 
496 O Século, 12/11/1936. 
497 O Século, 12/08/1936. 
498 Diário de Lisboa, 25/09/1936. 
499 O Século, 21/09/1936. See annex 9. 
500 O Século, 21/09/1936. 
501 O Século, 16/08/1936, see annex 10. 
502 O Século’s photographic archives, cote SEC/AG/01-041/1067K, SEC/AG/01-041/1068K, SEC/AG/01- 041/1069K, 
SEC/AG/01-041/1070K. Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo. See annex 11. 
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6. Road to the victory, in Madrid 
    
With the approach of the nationalist forces, in late October 1936, the Republican press accepted the 
inevitability to give notice that the enemy would soon be at the gates of the capital and that the agenda 
would be to resist. Therefore it was essential to create an environment between Madrid’s population, of 
willingness to sacrifice. There was an immediate need to boost the morale of the troops and the population 
and to prepare them for the approaching painful struggle. Among multiple calls to resistance, "No 
passarán!", ABC publishes first pages with photo montages of an amazing spectacularity.503 
The Government of Burgos, certain of the victory of his troops en route to the capital, easy access to the 
front until the moment when, after the failed attempt to take Madrid in November 1936, the positions of the 
belligerents stabilize. It marks the return home of most of the reporters. Deniz Salgado, "Photographer of 
kings and king of photographers" as it was dubbed by the newspaper for which he worked, was the best 
portuguese professional image in the civil war504. He, and Firmino da Costa Marques, the Diário de 
Notícias photographer, were publicly honored on 29th November by their photojournalistic coverage of the 
war, a clear evidence as not only journalists, but also the portuguese photojournalists would be recognized 
by its war effort in the cause of Franco. 
The period in which the propaganda was more active in both sides slow down from here. However, 
other episodes of relief would be targeted by the info wars, like Alcazar of Toledo, the bombing of 
Guernica that the Portuguese press attributes to the "reds", the advances and setbacks in the battles of 
Guadalajara, Jarama and Terruel. In late January 1939 falls Barcelona, and La Vanguardia passes into 
nationalists hands. The March 28th, Madrid succumbs as the republican ABC. In these editions, in tune 
with the Portuguese newspapers, get on the first page of the 29th the photo of Franco, the winner. The war 
ended. 
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The illustrated paper bullets in World War I 
 
Noémia Malva Novais, 
IHC – FCSH – UNL 
CEIS20 – UC 
 
 
From the title «The illustrated paper bullets in World War I » I will address, as briefly as is required the 
main publications of war propaganda in the Portuguese language from 1914 to 1918. 
This is a time when, in fact, two wars unfolded: one of armies and civilians smitten by the battles and the other 
of offices. A war cabinet which is, as in 1914, writes the Austrian journalist and writer Karl Kraus, «as deadly 
as the grenades». 
«[...] A war of war cabinet  and sovereigns, propagandists and idealists, full of ambitions and ideals and 
political authorities, which determine the future of empires, nations and peoples, in such forceful ways as [the 
armies] in the field battle» (Gilbert, 2007:13). This says Martin Gilbert. In a  simpler form: a war of paper 
bullets, since it is fought through the press. 
Let’s see: The governments of the war, both the Allies, as in the central empires, learn to use the media to their 
advantage, transform newspaper organs of information on objects of propaganda, limiting free speech through 
censorship and controlling published content through propaganda, producing texts and images themselves, 
distributed through the offices created under the Ministries of War or news agencies of each state. 
Thus, returning to the place of utopia, the liberal idea that all citizens can communicate their thoughts in 
the press, or by any other means, without reliance on censorship. In this period of the war, the state regulates, 
with the force of law, the exercise of this right, by limiting the freedom of expression through censorship and 
punishing newspapers and journalists by alleged or actual abuse. 
This is how the press will play, during the war and worldwide, an active role in the building up of public 
opinion. Portugal is no exception to this rule, but , between us, the press assumes greater importance from the 
commissioning of the war cabinet created by Norton de Matos under the Ministry of War. This cabinet has two 
areas: the military-technical one and propaganda. The area of propaganda, which is of interest here, together 
with the work of the Photographic Service of the CEP, ensures disclosure by the press of the message that the 
government aims to convey to the Portuguese. 
It's called war propaganda, implemented in order to secure the support of public opinion to the Allied cause in 
the war, which has , in Portugal , as in other countries within the conflict,  a powerful asset : the illustrated 
press. As Portugal, despite being a small country and having come to war only in 1917, also has its illustrated 
periodicals, highlighting the Ilustração Portuguesa, newspaper supplement of O Século newspaper, which as is 
well known, account with photos of Joshua Benoliel; and Portugal na Guerra, illustrated quarterly magazine , 
created in 1917 , and directed from Paris by Augusto Pina; and even O Espelho, that, though not being 
Portuguese, is produced in Portuguese, in London, and for Portugal and Brazil. Among us there were also 
therefore, readers for the illustrated press which, during the war, became the most sought after by all. 
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The Ilustração Portuguesa is known, has been studied , so I have decided to study the magazine Portugal 
na Guerra and the newspaper O Espelho. 
 
Portugal na Guerra , illustrated magazine of war propaganda 
 
The Portugal na Guerra began to be published on June 1, 1917, in Paris , under the direction of Augusto 
Pina. Its tabloid format, is printed on newsprint, simultaneously in English and French, and is distributed in 
France, Portugal and Brazil, with the aim of documenting the war effort of Portugal and maintaining high 
national spirit. These were lofty goals which did not have time to bear fruit, as, after the first seven numbers, 
the magazine Portugal na Guerra was suspended by Sidónio Pais, in December 1917. 
But while it is broadcast irregularly , although it bore in the header the intention of being fortnightly, had the 
work of journalists , writers and well-known artists, such as Mayer Garção and Alfredo Mesquita , as well as 
photos of Arnaldo Garcez - the CEP photographer that photographing the war in Flanders, or the war that the 
Portuguese ministry of war wanted to show, half a year of war in the trenches of Flanders, portraits of 
personalities allied friends of Portugal, presidents, kings , prime-ministers and chief ministers of the allied 
countries, diplomats and republican governors’ visits to France. 
I think that the magazine Portugal na Guerra makes probably more for the image of Portugal to the allies than 
three years of diplomatic negotiations. 
 
O Espelho, illustrated newspaper of war propaganda 
 
O Espelho, whose  number one is published in September 1914, in London, is one of the illustrated 
newspapers of war propaganda produced under the War Propaganda Bureau, directly under the War Office. O 
Espelho, like other titles, mirrors the historic The Illustrated London News in order to promote the cause of the 
allies and blame the central empires - the enemy - in Portugal and Brazil. 
However, as a consequence of being published in Portuguese there were those who have considered it a 
Portuguese newspaper. And yet, as during the war, it assumes itself like a newspaper in Brazil, there are also 
those who have considered it Brazilian. Moreover, it is for this reason that the registration of O Espelho at the 
British Library Newspapers, in London, indicates the Brazilian origin of the newspaper. 
But, after consulting the full collection O Espelho and having analyzed the editorial published in the end of the 
war, and having observed the evolution of the newspaper after the war, I confirmed the English origin of the O 
Espelho, as well as its place of yield, in other words, the Section of Portugal and South America in the War 
Propaganda Bureau, in London. 
O Espelh fully complies with the mechanics of British propaganda strategy. That is, it omits the English origin 
and indicates the origin in the country which it wants to persuade and convince about the cause of the Allies. 
This is intended to secure the support of Portuguese speakers in Portugal and in Brazil, to the cause of the 
Allies, presenting it as a national cause against a common enemy. This is how the British lead neutral countries 
to war. It is the strategy they use in Brazil and, more intensely, in the U.S., whose entry into the armed conflict 
turns out to be decisive for the Allied victory in this war. 
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Conclusion 
 
Therefore, war propaganda manipulates the audience of newspapers and magazines, persuading them and 
convincing them of the benefits of their countries’ participation in the war. And as propaganda based on use of 
the image, the illustrated press is a prime means of persuasion, no wonder the states in confrontation produce 
newspapers and magazines of propaganda, simulating its origin in certain countries. It is this way on the two 
sides of the war, but it is in England that this expedient is mostly used. Indeed, it is in England that the war 
propaganda is further developed during the World War I. 
In Portugal , although the press is not as powerful as the British, French , German or American press, and 
despite the propaganda machine assembled by Norton de Matos not being as evolved or having as numerous 
means as the propaganda of the major belligerent states , the truth is that the press, in general, and the 
illustrated press, in particular, is, during World War I, a powerful weapon, either in the battle that rages 
between interventionists and anti - interventionists or in the act of persuading and convincing the Portuguese 
public of the allied cause in the war. 
Now, how do you persuade and convince the public or even family members of soldiers who leave for the 
battlefields of Flanders, sometimes returning mutilated, lifeless , or simply do not return? Creating a heroic 
image of war. Selecting images that help maintain the motivation of the troops on the battlefield and create a 
public opinion favorable to the interventionists ideas and entirely blame the enemy, without showing how the 
war is bloody, so as not to arise these feelings among anti - interventionist people. 
It is , therefore, that , despite all we know that war rips off wombs, mutilates , destroys , kills , this war is not 
what we see when we look from a distance through reports, chronicles, photos, engravings, drawings... 
published in media, especially in illustrated newspapers and magazines of war propaganda. It is this 
embellished reality on the pages of newspapers and magazines that gives authenticity to a statement during 
World War I, in 1917, by U.S. Senator Hiram Warren Johnson which is as follows: «The first casualty when 
war comes is truth». 
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The cruel campaign of pro-German press against 
Romanones’s Government in 1915-1917 
 
Maria Àngels Carles-Pomar, 
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Spain had known the propaganda’s power at the end of nineteen century when the American journalist, and 
owner of a Press Trust, William Randolph Hearst, through media manipulation, broke the Spanish-American 
war, to achieve benefits for his commercial and political interests. In 1914, when war broke in Europe, Spain 
remained outside, but the spectre of the war intervention was real during Romanones’s Government (1915-
1917. “The Good Press” under Germany control, launched a campaign of harassment and vilification against 
Romanones. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Spain was neutral during I World War, but the Spanish society was fractured between Anglophiles and 
Germanophiles, the supporters of the war participation and the neutral. Even the Royal family was divided. 
The Queen Victoria Eugenia de Battenberg, Queen’s Victoria granddaughter, was in favour of the Allies, 
meanwhile the Queen Mother Maria Cristina of Habsburgo, Kaiser’s niece, was remained in favour of the 
Central Empires. The fracture was increasing during the first two years of conflict. When European war was 
broke, the Spanish Prime Minister was the Galician politician, from Conservative Party, Eduardo Dato. He was 
able to maintain the Spanish neutrality by applying of what technically it was a cover dictatorship; not calling 
the Parliament and governing by decree. Dato’s Government failed at the end of 1915 and the King Alfonso 
XIII immediately appointed Romanones, from Liberal Party, as a new Prime Minister on December 9.  
 
The Prime Minister Romanones 
 
Romanones remained at power until 19 April 1917, a long period crucial to understanding the crisis of the 
Restoration and the subsequent settlement and where the war and the impact on civilians Spanish are noted so 
very special. On 16 March 1916, the King signed a decree dissolving the Parliament. The Liberal Party 
leadership was dispersed and Romanones thought it would be within reach of his hand. Romanones nominated 
Santiago Alba, the bastion of the Castilian agrarian interests and the most important cacique (local ruler) of 
Valladolid, as a Government Minister. One of the objectives of Romanones was finish with the Catalan Lliga 
Regionalista led by Francesc Cambo, and Romanones had believed than Santiago Alba was the key to obtain 
his purpose. Alba, with the same aim, formed an electoral coalition “El Pacto de la Castellana” with liberals, 
republicans, and federals, for April 9 voting. It was a literal war declaration for Catalan nationalists. 505 
Romanones also promised to end the crisis by stimulating the economy in order to meet shortages, rising 
prices, inflation and unemployment by creating high expectations among the population. Obviously he could 
not fulfil his promise. In contrast, during 1916 and especially in 1917, changes in the economy because of the 
war were so fast and furious that it was impossible to take them, causing the deepest crisis was still without a 
vision possible output. The changes were not only economic, the social and ideological were especially crucial 
to start the beginning of the end of the political canovist system.506  
We can distinguish two types of policies in Romanones’s Government: internal and external. About the 
first one there are three determinant agents, workers, bourgeoisie, and Army. The Germany submarine attacks 
towards to merchant Spanish vessels was determinant in Romanones’s international policy, and will be the key 
for the difficult decision to maintain the Spanish neutrality. Both policies can’t be separated because the 
actions of one affect the other immediately. Romanones not only interested in the internal matter but also for 
the international. Never until then had been so ready to go to war. Romanones continued preaching neutrality, 
but their personal preferences to intervene on the side of the Allies were increasingly.  
                                                          
505 Enric UCELAY-DA CAL, El imperialismo catalán. Prat de la Riba, Cambó, D’Ors y la conquista moral de España. 
Barcelona: Edhasa, 203, pp. 725-726. 
506 In reference of Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, six terms Spanish Prime Minister between 1874-1897. He was a principal 
author of the Spanish Constitution of 1876. 
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Internal Policy 
 
The working class was whom more suffered the difficult than the European war situation comported. It was 
a paradox, but labour troubles were decreasing during the war. These years are not so conflictive; in any case 
the conflicts will come after 1918 with the fall on demand and the excess of manpower in factories.507 The 
most important riots during the conflagration were about livelihoods crises, not by the labour unrest. Factory 
workers had seen their wages increased due to the increase of production and the substantial profits. 
Meanwhile the situation of agrarian workers was the opposite. Most of them migrate to cities thanks of the 
labour demand, good salaries and living conditions. Some products increase their exportation and helps to 
develop industrial sectors, but it was not the same for the agrarian goods.  
The dynamic commercial and industrial bourgeoisie was looked down by Restoration policy rules, which 
basically were nothing more than a coalition between the Crown, the Army and the financial oligarchies and 
landlords of Andalusia and the centre of the Peninsula. The war became an opportunity for an unexpected 
economic prosperity and quick industrialisation. The great beneficiary was the Catalan bourgeoisie than who 
took advantage on profits of the business war. His economic power was increasing and the same time was 
trusting on obtaining his autonomy from Spain. The Catalan textile factories were working without stop to 
provide goods, first to countries involved in war, and then to markets forgotten by belligerent countries. The 
major problem was the difficult to export and the difficult to get raw material. Alfonso Sala, Deputy for 
Terrassa (one of the more important wool textile industry cities in Spain) did a lot of actions to get profit for 
his town, increasing the entry of raw material, improving the commercial transport and getting important 
orders from the belligerant countries. In 1916, through a French parlamentaries, Sala had the job of suppling 
clothes and blankets for French Army. The order was distribuited among all textile factories in Terrassa.508   
The textile industry was not the only one to profit from the situation. There are also other Catalan industrial 
sectors were favoured by the lack of foreign imports. Without having competition, could work to supply the 
domestic market, being a potent stimulus for the production. In these industries we find the real service 
companies such as electrical, engineering, or metallurgy. The same phenomenon was seen in other industrial 
areas, as was the case of steel and shipping companies in the Basque Country and Santander or Asturias 
mining industry. The conflicts were among the most advanced industries and modern capitalism than 
demanded dynamic with agrarian sectors in Castile and Andalusia, two different views of the industrial and 
capital world. The shift system was a hindrance party, in which the chiefs and the clienteles had a primary role 
and nothing could be changed, neither in the political nor the economic.509   
It was precisely this bourgeoisie, which put the Government between the devil and the deep blue sea. 
Romanones’s leadership was in danger despite being the Prime Minister. The strong man of the match was 
Alba who had the desire to replace Romanones and become party leader and his successor in the government. 
But Alba's ambitions clashed head-on with Cambó, who wanted the destruction of the parties turn in order to 
modernize the country and consolidate the hegemony of Catalan capitalism in Spain. Cambó was a stumbling 
block for Alba, but the Catalan politician came out stronger after the April elections, with sufficient support 
and confidence to undertake an offensive against the ruling oligarchies in Madrid.510  
The political skills of Cambó, before and after the elections, went thrown directly into a great adventure, 
the moral conquest of Spain. Looking elections La Lliga had published the manifesto for “Catalonia and Great 
Spain”.511 At the opening up of new Parliament, Cambó presented an amendment to Crown Message. In his 
memoirs said that there were expectations and "meant that all attention was concentrated on the action we 
should take in the political debate".512 Cambó landed in Madrid with all the artillery to take the project 
forward. Alba held the portfolio of Finance after the election. He presented a program for 10 years, claiming to 
reduce the deficit that meant keeping the campaign in Morocco introducing a new tax in order to collect the 
benefits of trade and industry. The benefits of agriculture were left unscathed. This was an outrage because the 
landed oligarchy did not look affected. Cambó formed a coalition of economic groups, becoming the leader of 
the industrial interests.513  
Refuted one by one the points presented in the Alba’s program, Cambó dominate the situation very soon. 
The duel that kept both political session of the Parliament highlighted the conflict of interest between the old 
                                                          
507 Eduardo CALLEJA GONZÁLEZ, La razón de la fuerza. Orden público, subversión y violencia política en la España de 
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509 Francisco J. ROMERO SALVADÓ. España 1914-1918. Barcelona, Crítica, 2002, pp. 50-53. 
510 Francisco J. ROMERO SALVADÓ. España ..., p. 53. 
511 Enric UCELAY-DA CAL, El imperialismo…, p.726. 
512 Francesc CAMBÓ, Memòries (1876-1936), 2a. ed., Barcelona, Editorial Alpha, 1981, vol. I, p. 235. 
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agrarian oligarchy and the modern industrial bourgeoisie. Cambó was a great speaker. The suspicions aroused 
the political ascent of Alba shining among Parliament’s members, this situation played for Cambó. Romanones 
saw as his leadership within the party endangered for the benefit of Alba. Romanones seeing Alba defending 
fiercely his project said: 
 
 Glad of the energy and skill with which the regional minority annulled his efforts and was lowering his 
claims and prestige.514  
 
Basically, he knew if Alba could approved the project, he will became the man who have saved the 
economy and finances of the country, leaving Romanones in the second term and would be forced to give way 
to the party leadership.515  
The Army also suffered the consequences of war. In late 1916 officials Infantry from Barcelona began to 
organize in a Juntas de Defensa. The Infantry there was more discomfort felt discriminated against compared 
to other Army Corps. The evolution of the policy had accentuated the split in the organization of the State. On 
one side the King and his armies and the other the Government and other political institutions. The King was 
the backbone that gave primacy to the Army, which was gaining weight in the preservation of the social and 
political order while representing a guarantee of the unity of the State. The impact of the war helped to 
accelerate the disintegration of the canovist system.516 
 
 
International Policy 
 
Germany launched an underwater campaign to torpedo vessels. Spain, despite its neutrality, also severely 
affected. The torpedoes at Allied ships had been criticized, especially when the German submarine U-20 sank 
the Lusitania, a luxury liner killed on 7 May 1915 off the coast of Ireland, causing great international 
condemnation. It was a passenger ship journey to New York. Among the 1,200 dead, the American engineer 
Frederick Stark Pearson, founder of the Barcelona Traction, Light & Power, "La Canadenca". In 1916 some 
German submarines got some supplies in Spanish waters by the Majorcan Juan March's small boat, but without 
touching port. On June 21, the submarine U-35, based in Pula, Istria, and commanded by Vice Admiral Lothar 
von Arnauld de la Pirie, arrived in Cartagena. This submarine was suspected of being responsible for several 
attacks on Allied convoys that sailed the Mediterranean.517 The official version was carrying a letter for the 
King, was twenty-four hours in port and set sail.518 The newspapers, depending on the trend, condemned the 
facts or treated like a heroic feat, such as El Correo Español  
 
In Cartagena was to be. There, where the Roman effort, representing civilization and culture for centuries, 
today represents the German effort.519  
 
From here, the German submarines attacks were increasingly common. 
Romanones’s domestic policy, with important issues such as the need for military reform, or the crisis of 
livelihood, was eclipsed by the Government foreign policy. Spanish neutrality was in danger, especially during 
1916 to the extent that Spain was in the doorway of the war. Then, the word "neutrality" tantamount to 
patriotism, to Spanishness, and was in the basic roots of the Germanophile vocabulary. Romanones could not 
disguise the practice of international politics increasingly favourable to the Allies, though officially the country 
had not changed its policy towards intervention. On 9 March 1916, Germany declared war on Portugal. It was 
important to put something in the Iberian Peninsula in the crosshairs of both the Central Powers and the Allies. 
Romanones was no active intervention in the conflict, but instead, it was for ”benevolent neutrality" with the 
Allies, particularly France and Britain. So Romanones had to have a display of his diplomatic trustworthy and 
sheltered from the press, the public opinion and especially the control of Parliament. To achieve its objective, 
Romanones named the Canary Fernando León y Castillo, Marquis of the Muni, in front of the Spanish legation 
in Paris. The diplomat had an impossible mission: to change the international status of Tangier in favour for 
the Spanish sovereignty. Tangier was a key element in the control of the Mediterranean and for the pacification 
of the Spanish protectorate of Morocco.520 Obviously France was unwilling to yield to the Spanish claims, and 
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Great Britain was no also excited by the idea. Alfonso XIII recognized that Poincare had asked that Tangier 
should be in Spanish zone, however when asked to monarch about Portuguese colonies, he replied:  
 
I exposed to the Emperor of Germany my refusal to cooperate in their projects on the Portuguese 
colonies.521 
 
Romanones sought public support for its foreign policy. Antonio Maura was still the most respected right 
wing politician in the country and his opinion was very valuable. On September 4, Maura met the King and 
Romanones to work together in a speech that Maura had to pronounce in Berlanga:  
 
Mr Maura's speech fell like a bomb, and the passions been unleashed such as had never been known before. 
Especially among Germanophiles, they say, nothing less than Maura and Lerroux will walk hand-in-
hand.522  
 
In contrast to the Maura's approach to Romanones caused indifference, or was not very well received in 
diplomatic circles, because it was interpreted as blackmail to the Allied powers of Spain.523 
 
Press campaign against Romanones 
 
The Central Powers were not so passive in his response. From September it launched a campaign of 
harassment and vilification against Romanones. The Germans exercised considerable control of the Spanish 
media coming from the right. It was the time than Spain was closer to entering in European War. The 
international policy was decisive for his Government, the continuous attacks of German submarines to the 
Spanish merchant vessels, which caused great economic losers and prevented adequate supplies for the 
population, will also have very soon its repercussions in the internal policy. Because of the war, the changes in 
the economy were so fast and furious than it was impossible to take them. The economic changes, and lack of 
staples, were the cause of the deep crisis. Spain was still without the vision of a possible solution, but his 
public opinion was divided in supporters and opponents of the intervention were initiating his particular war in 
the press. The price of the paper was increasing; its high cost had made impossible the maintenance of certain 
publications. This it was the opportunity of Germany than begun to buy as much periodicals as he could to take 
under his control maintaining public opinion favourable to their cause. From the monarchic ABC, through the 
carlist El Correo Español, the catholic El Debate, but even of the anarchist CNT Solidaridad Obrera, or the 
republican left-wing Nueva España, among others, received large sums of money from Germans, and they 
were held by Germanophiles or they were directly owned by Germans. In 1916, Germany spent 500,000 
pesetas in the handling and control of the Spanish press. At the end of the war Germans and Austrians 
controlled more than 500 periodical titles in Spain. 524  The press had already started their offensive in 
September 1916 and was "amplified" it in December while the Germans increased the surveillance and spying. 
Romanones was the target of Teutonic fury, accused of smuggling day after another, speculation and 
incompatibility of office with private business. The apocalyptic visions of some newspapers inside the German 
orbit were devastating. 
We can find an example of what Romero Salvadó said in the Carlist journalist Domingo Cirici. Cirici in El 
Correo Catalan, and since 1916 also in the Catholic newspaper El Debate, had always been faithful to his 
cause, but within the courtesy parameters and without losing the humour sense that made him popular. When 
war begun, he wrote a fiction: The secret of Lord Kitchener. European war fantasy, where he make fun about 
Allies, specially the British.525 The book was a bestseller, becoming two editions of 18,000 copies between the 
two, and translated into German and Swedish.526.  
On 12 December the Central Powers proposed the peace with conditions. This proposal was not accepted. 
The Spanish society was totally polarized and tensions between Romanones and Germanophiles were high 
voltage. The press had already started their offensive in September was "amplified" while the Germans 
increased the surveillance and spying. Germany had an extensive network of spies. The submarine attacks 
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were intensified since January, firing torpedoes that any vessel, allied or neutral, it goes to a harbour ally. The 
incident led the United States to break diplomatic relations with Germany. Romanones would have done the 
same as the U.S. government, if public opinion had not been so divided.527 Romanones was regarded as the 
main enemy in Spain by Germany. He was the target of Teutonic fury, accused of smuggling day after another, 
speculation and incompatibility of office with private business. The apocalyptic visions of some newspapers 
were devastating. For example, an article signed by Julio Perez published in La Nación on 26 January, entitled:  
 
Is it lawful for a company be interested in contraband of war and play at the same time president of the 
board of a neutral country?528  
 
The situation had reached a point of no return. Romanones made a proposal to the Entente, via Paris, to 
join the war in exchange for compensation. The idea excited the Foreign Office, but still, seriously appreciated 
the advantage of Spain's entry would bring at the Allies.529 In the secret memo from the Office of Foreign War 
Office, the report is headlined with the following statement:  
 
So far as the Foreign Office are concerned the entrance of Spain into the war on the side of the Allies could 
certainly not be regarded as an unmixed blessing.530  
 
But nonetheless, it could be beneficial: Spain was a Catholic country and this could mean the acceptance of 
the position of the Allies by other Catholic countries, especially in Latin America, Germany had a good share 
of the Spanish market, its demise could be used for British business expansion, and as had happened with 
Portugal, Spain might seize German ships anchored in Spanish ports.  
In return, Spain demanded compensation for his intervention, in fact there were three: Tangier, Gibraltar 
and “free hand in Portugal”. The Foreign Office said, respect Tangiers, it was against their interests annoy 
France, and even if he agreed to the change of status, something unlikely. Accepting the proposal would 
threaten France, as Spain had no ability to control or develop Tangier, Gibraltar was a sacred issue by the 
British. Spain offered Ceuta in exchange for Gibraltar. The mountains surrounded Ceuta belonging to the 
international zone of Tangier, this could lead to problems with France, problems than Britain wanted to avoid. 
The exchange of places poses no benefit to Britain, Spain had aspirations of Portugal, according to the Foreign 
Office, it would possibly than Spain did not wanted to annex Portugal, but maintain a state of superiority in the 
country. This went against British interests, as was Portugal's oldest Ally, on the other hand the ups and downs 
of the Portuguese Republican politics had become a headache for England, and was unwilling than 
complication them with the Spanish intervention. Also, another problem was added, Spain had not explicit 
need a loan or special financial conditions to go to war. It happened with the other Allies, and Spain did not 
seem to be the exception that proves the rule. None of the Spanish proposals were of Great Britain’s interest. 
The bottom line of the report was that the Foreign Office was more concerned that Spain will continue to be 
neutral.531   
Throughout 1916 the Chief of British Military Legation at Madrid, Jocelyn Grant, had contacts with 
officers and artillery members of Estado Mayor. Do not know if it was the same person that March 25, 1917 
had a conversation with General Primo de Rivera in Cadiz. The document does not specify the pile name of the 
general, but probably was Miguel Primo de Rivera, because was appointed military governor of Cadiz since 
1915. The Foreign Office secret report refers to this conversation. Primo de Rivera was willing to give up 
Ceuta and even Tangier to give in exchange for the recovery of Gibraltar to Spain. Spain was not Africa, 
however, does Gibraltar was Spanish territory. According to Primo, The Catholic Queen Isabella had 
pronounced the following sentence:  
 
We must occupy the lands of the Mediterranean without losing Gibraltar.532 
 
The memorandum was accompanied with a series of reports. Including a joint note of the General Staff of 
the War Admiralty on the value of Spain as an Ally. It is a complete inventory of the state of the Army, the 
number of his troops, weapons, ships, ammunition ... The conclusions are hard and said than Spain had an 
army obsolete, comparable to Romania. However, he had two advantages over Romania, which borders the 
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threshold were not any enemy country, and it was good in case to have to instruct the troops to go fight in 
France, because it would displaces place them, and the other was that it had direct access to land in France and 
would not require ships to cash transfers. Spain could have 200,000 men from military service, over 140,000 
more between 22 and 34 year old. The Army had 300,000 active over 180,000 men in reserve. Guns were 
inadequate and out-dated, with the aggravating circumstance that Spain did not have the technical capacity to 
manufacture the necessary weapons, ships were old, had 30 years, but could be useful and can be availed of for 
listen merchant vessels in an attempt to avoid the attacks of German submarines, is to shield.  
 
The advantage was that Spain had the largest number of men available, at least he could have 500,000 men 
in that an instruction should be minimal. It would be troops standing to reinforce the trenches in France. It also 
had other advantages as naval ports, Balearic and Canary Islands.533 With Spanish participation, Great Britain 
would get control of the Strait of Gibraltar, then neutral, the Moroccan coast, and Spanish and Portuguese 
troops could go to France by land, always cheaper than the alternative of moving by boat and because of the 
attacks of the German submarine had become a dangerous practice. In favour of the intervention was also 
necessary to consider the mineral wealth of Spain. But in contrast, there were also disadvantages: the 
submarines could increase attacks. While Spain remained neutral, the Germans could not attack the ships that 
sailed its waters, if it entered the war itself. Should protect ports to test submarine networks, and the coast of 
Spain was very extensive. Spain had good things that might take, but it should not spend too much time before 
it could see the benefits. In summary disadvantages were greater than benefits.534  
 
There are more reports of the Foreign Office also evaluates potential profits for England hypothetical 
participation of Spain in the side of the Allies. For example, in case of appropriation, as had been done in 
Portugal a year earlier, calculated the tonnage of ships Germans and Austrians were in Spanish ports. The 
Foreign Office also wrote a detailed report on the mineral resources, pyrite, copper, iron ... and their industries. 
These stood in the city of Bilbao, as the main producer of steel and steel plate that was exported to France, 
Barcelona and textile producer, and the production of small arms.535 
 
While the Foreign Office diplomacy and assessed whether or not the entry of Spain into the war, the United 
States added to the Allies in April. That changed things, and the Foreign Office before the entry of the 
Americans decided to study better the proposed participation of Spain. On April 6, the Foreign Office decided 
that given the three interim reports, the issue of exchange of Gibraltar for Ceuta had to be studied, in reference 
to iron and other minerals Spanish property was not worth talking about it more given the difficulties with 
transport.536 Romanones wanted to make public the abandonment the Spanish neutrality, but before he met 
with Mr Vaugham, British ambassador in Madrid. Romanones was convinced it was time to stop being neutral, 
which had the support of the King, even though it had been difficult for the pro-German influence around was 
great. He added that if Britain did not accept his proposal was ready to resign. Vaugham also reported to 
Romanones that he had met with the French ambassador to ask the support of the media and influence in 
public opinion by step that Spain would give, the decision was very thoughtful, and postponed opposition from 
members of his own Cabinet, but it was already solve. Vaugham was supposed than Romanones did not have 
the population support, and all depended on the attitude of the Army. Everything seemed to suspect that the 
military felt more sympathy for the Germans. The British ambassador asked the Foreign Office if Britain 
wished to encourage the abandonment the Spanish neutrality or not. In any case, asked a common position 
between the French and British embassies and instructions for urgent actions.537  
The press campaign against Romanones was devastating. His active participation with the Allies did not 
have the success he expected. The entry of the United States in the fight was an offense. Some leading articles 
in La Correspondencia Militar, put in evidence that the military were not willing to fight on the same side than 
had humbled Spain in 1898. 538  It was a paradox, but the press in favour of the intervention harmed 
Romanones's interests because socialists, with Pablo Iglesias ahead, were campaigning for the abandonment of 
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neutrality. However, the news arriving from Russia were troubling and political elites blamed on the Allies. 
The campaign of attacks by German submarines was a leech on the Spanish economy and reaching the highest 
point when the San Fulgencio, carrying a cargo of coal was torpedoed and sinking.  
Regarding domestic politics, Alba lost the battle. The failure of his project, and especially the campaign 
against Romanones putting the blame on him and who make responsible for the turmoil that existed in 
Morocco, so unfair as Cambo, he had left the government in a precarious position on 9th January 1917 when 
Romanones put his resignation to the King.539 He renewed trust in him, but the parliamentary collapse and 
closing of the Parliament on February 26, the government made impossible. The King commissioned García 
Prieto the formation of a new government. Romanones resigned on April 19 1917. On day 21 the Madrid's 
newspaper La Acción, published a cartoon, in colour, which saw the count of Romanones pierced by a sword, 
which was read in the hand wielding the "press" and "neutral" on the blade.540 This will put an end to the cruel 
campaign of pro-German press with the aim of overthrowing Romanones.  
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On May 31st, 1939 the German media announced, through a torrent of articles, pictures, newsreel footage 
and radio broadcasts, the triumphal return to Germany of the military contingent sent covertly by Adolf Hitler 
to aid General Francisco Franco’s Nationalist forces during the Spanish Civil War: the Legion Condor. The 
German legionnaires, tanned by the Spanish sun, sporting colourful new military decorations and wearing the 
khaki uniforms of Franco’s Nationalist forces, were treated as stars in a week of receptions, parades and 
speeches which one legionnaire described as “overwhelming.”541 From May 31st until June 6th, after which the 
Legion was disbanded and its members sent back into the regular military, the German media featured 
numerous images of legionnaires signing autographs, receiving honours, or marching in parades in which they 
were, as one newspaper put it, “showered with flowers, cigarettes and refreshments.”542 This notoriety, and 
indeed the week of festivities as a whole, though, vast and choreographed as it was even considering the 
frequency of military-themed celebrations in early 1939, has not traditionally been a moment of particular 
consequence to scholars of Nazi propaganda. When it is mentioned, this event and its accompanying 
propaganda have been largely folded into wider works documenting the Legion Condor’s history as a unit, 
such as by Stephanie Schüler-Springorum; German media reportage on the Spanish Civil War by historians 
including Peter Monteath, Joachim-Schmitt Sasse and Conrad Kent; or else the rise in military themed 
propaganda leading up to the Second World War, most notably by Jutta Sywottek.543 
More surprising, though, is that despite the honours, praise and pageantry which celebrated the victory and 
achievements of the “Spanienkämpfer,” as the legionnaires were known, these men have never been studied in 
any significant way as part of Nazi Germany’s hero culture. More specifically, the idealistic war hero figure 
created in this propaganda has not, to date, been included in the evolutionary narrative of such figures in 
German propaganda of the Nazi period established by scholars including René Schilling and Sabine 
Behrenbeck.544 To these historians, among the few to have studied this evolution in any depth, National 
Socialism did not, in fact, create any new war heroes; rather, and particularly after the commencement of the 
Second World War, Nazi propagandists recycled those of previous periods of German history, most notably 
the First World War.545 According to this argument, since the Legion Condor does not appear in either authors’ 
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work and since the unit’s most significant and celebrated contingent had been its aviators, the ideal warrior 
represented in the Spanienkämpfer-propaganda would simply be a re-visitation and resurrection of the great air 
aces of the First World War. The latter, in other words, were the true war heroes of National Socialist 
Germany, who on this occasion were merely dressed in the khaki uniform of Nationalist Spain, emphasizing 
the same, traditional, virtues of the German warrior hero. This paper will argue, conversely, that the 
Spanienkämpfer hero figure represented a distinct break with the hero culture hitherto existent in Nazi 
Germany, and that the return of the Legion Condor in May-June 1939, before the beginning of the Second 
World War, was thus a moment of significance in the development of the German war hero in propaganda.  
On the surface, at least, it is understandable how this event could be seen as an unremarkable example of 
the traditional retrospective interpretation of war hero development, and consequently why it has received so 
little scholarly attention. More than one scholar, for example, in documenting the Legion Condor propaganda 
campaign has noted the presence of “classic military” themes and motifs in the representations of the 
legionnaires which harkened back to earlier hero literature and images. 546 Moreover, upon inspection the 
Legion Condor propaganda is indeed permeated with references to, and comparisons with, the legendary air 
aces of the First World War, most notably Manfred von Richthofen (the famous “Red Baron”), Oswald 
Boelcke and Max Immelmann. In his official greeting to the Legion in Hamburg on May 31st, for example, 
Hermann Göring, commander of the Luftwaffe (Air Force) and himself a famous air ace, noted that “the spirit 
of Richthofen, Boelke and Immelmann lives once more [in the Luftwaffe], as it did in the glorious aerial fight 
of the World War.”547 Likewise, authors of subsequent memoirs and testimonial volumes from the war such as 
Wulf Bley and Hermann von Kohl frequently compared the fighting in Spain with that of “France between 
Arras and Douai in 1915.”548 
To conclude, however, that the Spanienkämpfer hero figure built up and heralded by the press following 
the Legion Condor’s return was simply a revisited Red Baron or Boelcke is to neglect its novelty and to 
mistake those previous heroes’ contribution to its alteration of the heroic ideal. To begin, and to be clear, the 
men of the Legion Condor were hardly Nazism’s first or only heroes. Indeed, as René Schilling has noted, the 
Third Reich was a “renaissance of national heroism.”549 As Jay W. Baird and Sabine Behrenbeck have both 
capably documented, the party had constructed a mythology of heroes around which a significant portion of 
Nazi pageantry, memorialisation and ideology was centered. These “heroes” were the martyrs of the Nazi 
movement, those who had died in the failed 1923 Munich Putsch or during the party’s bid for electoral success 
in the early 1930s.550 While the Nazis framed their sacrifice as having been in the service of the movement, in 
its “war” against enemies characterized as essentially non-German, i.e. chaotic parliamentary democracy, 
Jewry, and Bolshevism, it was inescapable that their heroic character had been fundamentally domestic: as 
political heroes fighting not in the military or in a formal clash of arms, but as members of the party and its 
affiliate organizations.551 As a result, and because, importantly, Nazism lacked any equivalent military heroes 
in its own day upon which to rebuild the new German Wehrmacht (Armed Forces) and fighting spirit, as 
documented by René Schilling, Nazi propagandists reached outside of their own movement for this aspect of 
its hero cannon.552 Without military war heroes of its own, that is to say an idealized military figure whose 
heroism had been garnered fighting for, and against the enemies of, the movement, propagandists turned to the 
heroes of Germany’s past to serve in this role as an ersatz war hero; embodying the virtues and character 
which the party wished for its soldiers to emulate and venerate.553 As such, as of May 30th 1939, the Nazi hero-
cult was thus composed of two separate war “hero-types”: the political hero of the movement, and the military 
war hero of the past. The fundamental characteristic of both of these types being their ultimate sacrifice for the 
fatherland, has led scholars including Jay W. Baird to note that the Nazi hero-cult “was tied more to death than 
to life, more to destruction than to victory.”554 The following day, with the return of the Legion Condor, 
propagandists were able to unmask a new, living, war hero in whom the various heroic attributes of both 
previous hero-types could combine to form a true “National Socialist war hero.” 
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From the moment the ships ferrying them home came into sight, it was clear that the regime wished the 
German legionnaires to be portrayed as wholly National Socialist in character and identity. The following 
week of festivities which occurred in Hamburg, Döberitz (the Legion’s nominal base) and Berlin, would be a 
Nazi celebration par excellence: seas of swastika banners, forests of arms raised in the Hitlergruβ (Nazi 
salute), and the customary martial pomp of Nazi pageantry. Likewise, the controlled media of the press, film, 
and radio were all called into service to emphasize the National Socialist nature of the returning 
Spanienkämpfer. The pages of the Völkischer Beobachter, the Nazi party’s main printed mouthpiece, for 
example, and likewise other newspapers including the Frankfurter Zeitung or Freiburger Zeitung as well as 
magazines published by the military’s various branches like Der Adler and Die Wehrmacht, all hailed the 
Legion Condor as the embodiment of the new German Wehrmacht, as the “soldiers of the Führer.”555 The 
many speeches delivered during the week reinforced this theme with words almost dripping with sycophancy. 
In Hamburg on May 31st, for example, after a welcome delivered by Hermann Göring “in the name of the 
Führer,” the Legion’s last commanding officer, Freiherr Wolfram von Richthofen proclaimed that the Legion 
would gladly step back into the firing line if they could “only look into the eyes of the Führer.”556 Hitler 
himself would cement this personal link in his speech during the festivities in Berlin on June 6th, calling the 
legionnaires “the brave executors of my mission.”557 In short, as the Frankfurter Zeitung proclaimed, “at a 
stroke, the name of the Legion Condor [had] become a byword for the German soldier.”558 The homecoming of 
the Legion had served for propagandists as an opportunity not only to personify Germany’s redeemed military 
might, but the character of this new military: one built upon National Socialist foundations and personal 
loyalty to the Führer. 
In addition, the figure of the Spanienkämpfer also served as a vehicle by which to characterize the Spanish 
Civil War along the lines desired by party ideologues and propagandists. As Peter Monteath and Jutta 
Sywottek have argued, that conflict represented the climax of Nazi anti-Bolshevik invective in the 1930s.559 
Specifically, as outlined by party ideologue Alfred Rosenberg at a conference of regional propaganda leaders 
on April 24th, 1939, post-war propaganda had to emphasize the leading nature of Germany in a new Europe 
threatened by the menace of Bolshevism, and that consequently propagandists “must distinguish between 
questions that only concern the German people, and those that involve the rest of the world.”560 An analysis of 
the propaganda devoted to the Legion Condor, as Germany’s official (though hitherto covert) contribution to 
the Spanish Civil War, shows that this theme of international ideological struggle, rather than the domestic 
fight which had occupied the party’s early martyrs during the 1920s and early 30s, was communicated through 
the medium of the legionnaires and their experience. 
From his earliest public references which hinted at their existence, Hitler had endeavoured to connect the 
German legionnaires to the rescue of the civilized world from “Bolshevism’s annihilation of European 
culture.” 561  Indeed, internal records from relevant propaganda agencies reveal that this theme had been 
deliberately planned well in advance to be a central propaganda component of the welcoming festivities and 
propaganda campaign for the Legion, with writers and veterans being instructed that the role of the 
legionnaires in Spain had to be framed in light of that country’s historic liberation from Bolshevik barbarity.562 
In subsequent propaganda, the message was correspondingly clear that the legionnaires had fought “for the 
goals of their Führer in foreign lands,” against, as one article put it, “cruelty, organized brutality and fanatical 
destructive anger.”563 The campaign’s perhaps most illuminative example of this theme came in the form of a 
documentary film by the famous director Karl Ritter entitled Im Kampf Gegen den Weltfeind. Deutsche 
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Freiwilligen in Spanien (In Combat Against the Enemy of the World: German Volunteers in Spain).564 More 
than simply a recurrence of a well-worn premise of Nazi ideology, then, the legionnaires’ attachment to this 
theme represents a new phase in hero propaganda. The new idealized hero brought the Nazi fight against the 
Weltfeind onto the international stage, something the martyrs of the movement had not done, nor the heroes of 
the Great War, since according to well known party dogma it was the agents of the Weltfeind which had 
“stabbed Germany the back” at home and not at the front. This new military hero embodied by the 
Spanienkämpfer both represented, as the “executors” of Hitler’s will, the fruit of Germany’s political 
“uprising” against Bolshevism, and its future role as a nation which could, and would, aid in effecting the same 
“uprising” in other nations.565 
Moreover, the heroic Spanienkämpfer also introduced another new attribute into the person of the Nazi war 
hero: that of the comrade in arms to Germany’s fascist allies. Although anti-Bolshevism had been a central 
element within German propaganda all throughout the Spanish Civil War, the conclusion of the “Pact of Steel” 
with Benito Mussolini’s fascist Italy, in May 1939, introduced the need, as Hitler would himself say, for a 
“practical demonstration of weltanschaulich solidarity.” 566  While the notion of “Kamaradschaft” 
(camaraderie), had always served as a central component of Nazism’s hero-figure as they appeared in 
propaganda, a fact well documented by historians of German hero culture, this international 
Waffenbrüderschaft (brotherhood in arms) had not hitherto been a component in the propaganda of either the 
party’s or the First World War’s principle heroes. The records of the Wehrmacht Propaganda Department 
(WPr.) reveal that this cooperative element was just as central to the fore planning of the Legion Condor 
festivities as its anti-Bolshevik message.567 Accordingly, Hitler’s speeches, as well as subsequent propaganda 
testimonials, articles and films like In Kampf gegen den Weltfeind  ̧all noted and highlighted the legionnaire’s 
kinship in spirit and action with his Spanish and Italian comrades, all of whom stood “shoulder to shoulder” 
against the Bolshevik tide. 568  The cover of Der Adler’s special edition on June 13th  best captures this 
sentiment, depicting in vibrant colour German, Spanish and Italian soldiers, all dressed in the khaki uniforms 
of Franco’s nationalists, marching together in perfect step with their respective national flags held aloft in 
solidarity. 569  Spanish and Italian dignitaries, likewise, could be seen at all the week’s major events in 
Hamburg, Döberitz and Berlin, a fact well publicized by the press.570 In short, this infusion of an international 
element into the character and celebration of the Spanienkämpfer both served a political purpose and aided in 
the creation of a Nazi soldier-hero which could better reflect Germany’s new leading role in Europe’s now 
seemingly increasing fascist community. 
How propagandists reconciled this new internationalist Nazi hero with those which had come before, 
namely First World War heroes like von Richthofen and Boelke, was the last, and perhaps most significant, 
aspect of the Legion Condor propaganda which demonstrates its importance to the development of the war 
hero ideal in Nazi propaganda. First, the legionnaire did not erase the benefit for propagandists of glorifying 
historical German heroes. The arrival of a new, more propagandistically viable war hero figure, however, 
meant that the figurative torch could be passed to the next generation, signifying National Socialism’s 
redemption of Germany’s victorious military heritage. In an article in the Völkischer Beobachter, prolific 
propaganda writer Karl Georg von Stackelberg wrote that while attending the festivities in Hamburg, he had 
spoken with an old, grizzled veteran of the former conflict who “stretched out the arms of the resurrected, 
strong and faithful Germany to the Spanienkämpfer. Coming home in 1918, the man said, warriors like himself 
had been  
“beaten and mocked for our dedication and our willingness to sacrifice. Now our sons are coming home (…) 
[and] given the reception and honour which I and millions of my comrades hoped for in vain.”571  
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From this article, and others like it in the Beobachter and other media, emerges a message that the victory of 
the legionnaires, and their triumphal return, not only served to reverse “the sad ending of 1918,” but to usher in 
a new chapter in German military history.572 This sentiment was perhaps best captured by contemporary 
Wilfred von Oven, who wrote:  
“[t]he Germans, who as the losers of 1914-1918 had been treated for so long as pariahs, wanted something 
of which to be proud again. They could be now. And we were their object.”573  
As Stephanie Schüler-Springorum has characterized, the victory of the Legion Condor in Spain was, in effect, 
the first “German victory of the century,” and consequently propagandists choreographed its homecoming to 
represent a mix of the traditional pageantry of Germany’s returning heroes, with that of National Socialism.574 
Legionnaires including Hermann von Kohl, for example, wrote later of the Legion’s much publicized march 
along Berlin’s traditional triumphal route: through the historic Brandenburg Gate and along the city’s main 
east-west axis. “[F]or the first time in sixty-eight years,” he wrote, “victory-crowned German troops are 
marching through this traditional victory portal of the Reich.”575 
This conspicuous connection of Germany’s past with its new future, rather than just a means by which to 
resurrect the ghosts of the Great War, as René Schilling’s interpretation would suggest, served to fulfill the 
unfinished heroism of those previous heroes; accomplishing what they had failed to do, and receiving the 
thanks they deserved.576 As living, victorious, embodiments of Nazi ideology and government policy, the 
legionnaires had not destroyed the war heroes of the last generation, but rather taken away the necessity for 
their existence as part of a bifurcated hero-cult and destroyed the precondition of death for inclusion in 
Nazism’s idealized hero cannon.  In short, the Spanienkämpfer represented the soldier-hero Nazism had craved 
but had hitherto been unable to claim: a idealized hero figure who exemplified both life and victory for 
National Socialism. As such, the orchestrated and much publicized meeting which took place on the dock in 
Hamburg on May 31st 1939 between the old fighter-ace and party leader Hermann Göring and the Legion’s last 
commanding officer Wolfram von Richthofen, signified the passing of one era of war hero propaganda, 
personified by the former, to a new one, personified by the latter.577  
The only problem with this new hero-type was that it embodied Nazi ideology of the 1930s too well. As 
Max Domarus has pointed out, though anti-Bolshevism had been the focal point of Spanish Civil War 
propaganda in Germany, Hitler’s final address to the homecoming legionnaires in Berlin on June 6 th, which 
marked the conclusion of the week’s festivities, marked his first public shift in priority away from attacks on 
Bolshevism and towards the “international plutocracies,” which had “fanned the flame of revolution there.”578 
This process began even before the Legion Condor campaign had begun in earnest, the German press being 
instructed on May 31st, for example, to withhold any further attacks directed at the U.S.S.R..579  Guidelines 
issued to propagandists in August, moreover, ordered the media to stress the new Russo-German Non-
Aggression Pact, to use the word “Russian” rather than “Soviet Union,” as well as to avoid “any discussion of 
worldview matters.”580 As a result, and furthermore with the commencement of hostilities against the Western 
powers in September, propaganda materials about the Legion like Karl Ritter’s feature film-successor to Im 
Kampf gegen den Weltfeind, were shelved as the propagandistic benefit and viability of the new anti-Bolshevik 
hero-type embodied by the Legion declined.581 During the summer of 1939, as memoirs and literature about 
the Legion Condor continued to be published in Germany, and which continued to emphasize the 
Spanienkämpfer’s fight against the “reds,” popular media began to increase their content devoted to First 
World War heroes such as the Red Baron and Oswald Boelcke, who had fought against Germany’s now 
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renewed chief-enemies, as seen in magazines like Der Adler and Die Wehrmacht.582  This is not to say, 
however, that the Legion Condor’s anti-Bolshevik crusader model of hero propaganda was simply forgotten; 
rather it was simply pigeonholed for future use. 
That future use came with the official renewal of German-Soviet hostility in June 1941, with the German 
invasion of the latter. Once again, propagandists had use of heroic figures which emphasized Germany’s role 
as the conqueror of Bolshevism and liberator of the people. As German forces began their invasion, for 
example, German magazine editors were instructed in their weekly newsletter from the Reich Ministry for 
Public Enlightenment and Propaganda (RMVP) to formulate their articles along the lines of “the anti-
Bolshevist magazine material that we used up until 1939, contrasting the Soviet system with the new 
Germany.” Likewise, “just as the Germans have gotten rid of exploiters in their own country, they will be sure 
that social justice prevails in the former Soviet Union.” 583 A redoubling of propaganda efforts following 
Joseph Goebbels’s call for “total war” in February 1943 and the Wehrmacht’s disastrous defeat at Stalingrad, 
saw the renewal of the same fear propaganda of Bolshevik incursion into Europe as that which had defined the 
legionnaire’s mission in the Spanish Civil War.584 Guidelines for a new anti-Bolshevik propaganda campaign 
issued by the Propaganda Ministry Main Office on the 20th of February 1943 instructed the German media to 
stress that Germany was fighting “a defensive war for the life and freedom of the German people, and 
ultimately for the other peoples of Europe as well.” 585 Though the German legionnaire of 1939 was not 
resurrected in this propaganda campaign, his mission in Spain as a European saviour figure was used as a case 
study in later guidelines for anti-Bolshevik propaganda, both regarding the latter’s barbarity and, more 
importantly, its vincibility.586  
 
In conclusion, though its actual duration in the direct spotlight of the National Socialist propaganda 
machine was relatively brief, the triumphal return of the Legion Condor to Germany in May-June 1939, is of 
significance in that it served to create a new hero-type in the heroic culture of Nazi Germany. Up to that point, 
propagandists had been forced to create and foster a dualistic-hero cannon which was divided according to 
propagandistic need: comprised of the political martyrs of the movement and the fallen heroes of Prusso-
German past, mainly of the First World War. With its homecoming, the Spanienkämpfer hero-figure erased the 
need for this duality in the Nazi hero-cult, fulfilling both roles and thereby beginning a new era in German 
propaganda. The legionnaire both reflected and fulfilled the virtues and heroic sacrifice represented by the 
heroes of the first war, as well as the ideological purity and motivation embodied by the domestic political 
heroes of the movement. More importantly, though, this figure brought National Socialism’s fight against 
Bolshevism onto the international stage alongside his fascist brothers of Spain and Italy, thereby also 
representing Germany’s new role as a senior partner in Europe’s seemingly growing network of fascist and far-
right nations. Lastly, the heroic model developed by propagandists in 1939 to personify these themes would 
later be resurrected, once German and Soviet hostility was renewed. As such, the figure of the Spanienkämpfer 
challenges the traditional interpretation of German war hero development: that of simply pouring new wine 
into old wineskins. Instead, the Legion Condor’s return and popularization demonstrates a significant point of 
discontinuance before the Second World War, in which Nazi Germany created its own, distinctly Nazi hero-
type. Simply put, the Legion Condor represented the Third Reich’s first, true, war heroes. 
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Images 
 
 
Cover, Berliner Illustrirte Zeitung. Nr. 22 (1, June, 1939) 
 
Images of the legionnaires in Hamburg, 31 May 1939. Völkischer      Beobachter Nr. 151 (31 May, 1939). 
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The front page of the Völkischer Beobachter on May 31st. Völkischer Beobachter Nr. 151 (31 May, 1939). 
 
Cover, Der Adler. Sonderheft. Nr. 9, (13 June, 1939) 
 
The festivities in Berlin on June 6th, 1939. Note the association of the Legion with the Brandenburg Gate and the 
historic Unter den Linden in these photographs. Der Adler, Sonderheft. Nr. 9, (13 June, 1939). 
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Background 
 
Researching demographic losses of the former Yugoslavia in the Second World War has remained one of 
the most controversial topics in the modern history of the Balkans. There are a myriad of problems to take into 
consideration, including political ones. 
 
Primarily, the number of victims has been manipulated since 1942 when the Communist propaganda 
exaggerated the number, trying to motivate larger number of people to join their forces and to demonize the 
enemy. The starting point was the existence of the labour camp Jasenovac in the Independent State of Croatia, 
founded in the summer of 1941, and where, according to the Communist brochure published in late 1942, 
300,000 prisoners were murdered by the end of that year.587 The Communist Party of Yugoslavia had no 
access to the camp and its documentation, and the estimation of the victims’ number was based purely on 
witnesses’ testimonials. 
Manipulating the number of Jasenovac victims continued after the end of the Second World War and it 
served as the most important part of exaggerating the number of the war victims in general. On 26th of May 
1945 the Communist leader Josip Broz Tito suggested that 1,685,000 people were killed during the Second 
World War in Yugoslavia588. However, it is not clear how he could possibly know that as a fact since there was 
no population census held after 1931 and the last battle of the Second World War in Yugoslavia took place on 
27th or 28th May 1945 in the Bosnian town of Odžak589. Nevertheless, Tito again expressed his views on the 
war losses in July 1945 when, while he was delivering his speech in Bela Crkva, he stated that “during the four 
years we have lost one million and seven hundred thousand of our citizens”.590 
 
However, Tito’s statement needed scientific confirmation, but the prominent demographer and Professor 
Dolfe Vogelnik and his assistant Alojz Debevec refused this assignment since  population census was not held 
and instead, they decided to pass it on to Vladeta Vučković, at that time a math student who was working at 
the Bureau of Statistics in Belgrade. He was given two weeks to calculate the total figure of all victims with 
the instruction that the number “must be impressive, but scientifically-statistically based”.591 
Furthermore, as Vučković emphasised,  
 
“either out of ignorance or in order to deceive, the people of the regime turned demographic losses into 
actual victims, which were according to all scientifically funded investigations something more than a 
million.”592  
 
What is more, that number of one million people was supposed to include also those killed by the 
Communist forces.593 Nevertheless, the number of over 1,700,000 war victims was presented by the Yugoslav 
representative Edvard Kardelj at the Paris Peace Conference in 1946 and it remained the official one till the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s.  
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However, based on the number of Yugoslav war victims of one million, provided by the USA government 
in 1954 594 , Germany refused to pay reparations for 1,700,000 alleged victims. Therefore, the Yugoslav 
authorities were forced to conduct a new research in order to provide more accurate data. The list of victims 
was finally completed in 1964, but the result was “disappointing” since the total number was indeed 
approximately one million, including 597,323 victims of the so-called “fascist terror”. According to the same 
list, approximately 60,000 people died or were killed in the Croatian camps Jasenovac and Stara Gradiška, 
where, as the Yugoslav authorities claimed, at least 700,000 people were murdered. 
 
 
Table 1: War losses in Yugoslavia (1941-1945), according to the research in 1964595 
 
Republic / Region Lost lives  Victims according to nationality Lost lives 
Croatia 194,749  Serbs 346,740 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 177,045  Croatians 83,257 
Serbia, proper 97,728  Jews 45,000 
Vojvodina 41,370  Slovenes 42,027 
Slovenia 40,791  Muslims 32,300 
Macedonia 19,076  Montenegro's 16,276 
Montenegro 16,903  Macedonians 6,724 
Kosovo 7,927  Albanians 3,241 
Unknown 1,744  Others 4,526 
Yugoslavia 597,323  Unknown 16,202 
 
 
The first, but unofficial excavations in the Jasenovac area were conducted by the municipal committee of 
former members of Yugoslav Army from Bosanska Dubica in 1961 on the location called Gradina, near 
Jasenovac. They found three mass graves and identified 17 human skulls in one of them, but failed to specify 
the exact number of bones found in the other two. However, based on this finding, they enumerated 120 other 
undiscovered graves and concluded that number of victims in Gradina only should be 350,800.596  
Official forensic investigations, conducted in 1964 in Jasenovac, were supposed to prove huge numbers of 
Jasenovac victims, and Yugoslav war victims in general, but were interrupted since, after investigating 130 
locations, only seven mass graves which held a total of 284 victim remains had been found. However, it is 
important to emphasise that the report, signed by Dr Alojz Šercelj, stated that  
 
“a large amount of objects shows that the victims were brought directly to the bridge where the executions 
took place and they were not previously being held in the camp. On this he is particularly keen to indicate 
the presence of knives, rings, coins, etc.”597  
 
Therefore, the remains found did not belong to the prisoners from Jasenovac, but probably refugees, 
possibly Croatians who, in fear for their lives, fled the country in May 1945, but were surrendered to the 
Yugoslav Army by the Allies. The available data and the testimonials encouraged the on-going debate among 
Croatian historians that this camp continued to exist after the end of the Second World War and it could be a 
place where communist executions of Croatian POWs took place in 1945 and later. Documents found in the 
State Archive in Sisak and used for the first time in the forthcoming article Post-war POWs camp 
Jasenovac598, prove beyond any doubt that this camp was indeed operational between 1945 and 1948. 
 
The research results in 1964 were shocking and the list was declared top secret. It remained unknown to the 
public until 1989 when it was mentioned for the first time in the magazine Danas. The authors of the published 
article emphasised that,  
 
“the first phase of compiling the list was done in October and November 1964 together with the 
preliminary collection of data at the republic level. A real panic occurred when this data was put together in 
the federal commission in Belgrade. The witnesses of those happenings claim that the reactions basically 
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came down to the following phrase: ‘Impossible!’ The lists therefore were returned to the republic 
commissions and from there to the local level. Here and there minor corrections took place, but the general 
picture could not be changed. It was considered that the error in the compilation of data occurred due to the 
migration of the population and perishing of whole families and smaller villages in the mountainous 
regions. This could count for 25 to 30 per cent. It was the opinion that the listing was mistaken mostly on 
individual nationalities, primarily Serbs, Croatians and Muslims. On the other hand, Slovenes, 
Macedonians, and even Montenegrins data was very much correct”.599 
 
The first population census after the end of war was held in 1948 and, according to the results, the 
Yugoslav population had increased two million compared to the census conducted in 1931. Since there was no 
census in 1941 or 1945, the results of demographic research, including those published by Bogoljub Kočović 
(1985) and Vladimir Žerjavić (1989), were inconclusive and incomplete. Moreover, there were several 
problems related to the census conducted in 1931 that made further research even more difficult. Inhabitants 
were grouped by their first language and religion instead of nationality, and republican borders were different 
from those established after the Second World War. 
Kočović and Žerjavić both concluded that the number of war victims was approximately one million, as 
Vladeta Vučković and the USA government estimated. Also, they suggested that approximately 80,000 people 
were killed in Jasenovac. 600  However, the major flaw in their research was the fact that it was purely 
estimation and they did not conduct in-depth research in the archives. Therefore, the results failed to reveal 
more information about the composition of victims or circumstances of death. Kočović emphasised that  
 
“many [Serbs] in their anti-Croatianism search for spiritual food for their viewpoints. There is a deeply-
rooted opinion, I would say a myth, that at least one million, if not more, Serbs were killed [...], that the 
Serbs were practically the only ones who suffered real losses”.601 
 
Previous research and its gaps 
 
Without comprehensive research, which is crucial for unmasking Communist manipulations and 
propaganda, it is not possible to determine the number of war and post-war victims in former Yugoslavia as 
well as the extent of war and post-war crimes or to identify the perpetrators and organizers of these crimes. 
Although that was not possible until 1990 along with democratic changes in Central and Eastern Europe, today 
the major obstacle presents unavailability of the documents kept in unknown locations, private collections and 
in the Military Archive in Belgrade, Serbia, where thousands of the documents of the Yugoslav Army have 
been held. However, the majority of archival documents in Croatia and Slovenia are available to researchers 
despite the fact they are often unsorted or heavily damaged, and they provide a solid ground for a further 
research and more reliable research results.  
 
Between 1944 and 1964 three Yugoslav commissions produced lists of war victims. Upon the AVNOJ’s602 
decision from November of 1943, The State Commission for Determination of Crimes Committed by 
Occupiers and their Collaborators was formed, but it was selective and it focused only on investigating the 
crimes committed by the opposite side. The first official victims' list was prepared in 1946 by the Commission 
for War Damage. An unofficial research was also conducted by SUBNOR603 in 1950 and it resulted with 
159,193 war victims in Croatia. However, the collected data relied mostly on testimonials only, particularly 
those given by the victims’ relatives.  
The third commission was the one which conducted the research in 1964. According to available 
documents in the Croatian archives, created by these commissions, it is obvious that the researchers did not 
include archival documents or even provided the list of source(s) for each victim. Therefore, that serious error 
undermines reliability of these data and opens more space for further manipulation. Although they are an 
absolutely necessary and valuable part of researching demographic losses in former Yugoslavia in the Second 
World War, they should be used with caution compared to other sources. 
 
Although the Yugoslav authorities prepared several official victims lists in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, 
many other unofficial lists were prepared by other organizations, controlled by the Communist regime, 
                                                          
599 Željko Krušelj, Đuro Zagorac, Sporna knjiga mrtvih. Aktualne kontroverze u istraživanju broja poginulih i umrlih 
Jugoslavena naprosto tjeraju na analizu zbivanja oko popisa iz 1964. godine, Danas, No. 405, Zagreb, 21 November 1989. 
600  For further reading, see  Bogoljub Kočović, Sahrana jednog mita. Žrtve Drugog svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji, 
Otkrovenje, Beograd, 2005, and Vladimir Žerjavić, Opsesije i megalomanije oko Jasenovca i Bleiburga. 
601 Anto Knežević, An Analysis of Serbian Propaganda, Zagreb, 1992, available at http://www.hic.hr/books/analysis/part-
03.htm 
602 Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia. 
603 Association of the Second World War veterans, former members of the Yugoslav Army. 
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particularly by the Yugoslav secret police UDB-a and its‘ forerunner OZN-a. My previous research in the state 
archives in Split and Sisak demonstrated that the local authorities also prepared additional lists of the missing, 
dead and living “enemies” for every village and town in the late 1940s. Even though the lists are incomplete, 
they demonstrate without a doubt that the Yugoslav government knew the approximate number of all war 
victims. Moreover, the sources indicate, that occasionally victims of communist repressions were presented to 
the public as victims killed by the German, Italian or Croatian Army. Lists of living “enemies”, including 
entire families, were also produced. These people were deprived of their political and civil rights, and often 
their property was confiscated or later nationalised.   
Several parts of the counties of Splitsko-dalmatinska and Dubrovačko-neretvanska in Croatia, are quite 
unique examples since they are the only areas in Croatia identified so far where Yugoslav National Police604 
conducted separate research in the late 1940s. The members of the police prepared a report for every village 
and town in that area which included a historical overview between the First World War and the end of the 
Second World War with the lists of the Communists, members of the Croatian Army and others. The original 
documents have been kept in the State Archive in Split and they seem to be complete. It is possible that similar 
research was conducted in other areas of Croatia and Yugoslavia, but the documents have not been discovered 
yet. Therefore, these documents that have been neglected by the previous researchers represent an extremely 
rare source which should be thoroughly analysed and compared to other available archival collections. 
 
On 8 October 1991, the same day that the Croatian parliament cut all remaining ties with Yugoslavia, the 
Commission for the Identification of War and Post-War Victims was founded. The law defined war victims as 
people killed between 6 April 1941 and 9 May 1945. Post-war victims were those killed after that date.605 The 
Commission began its work on 11 February 1992 and submitted the report in October 1999 stating that it had 
collected 88,800 testimonials, recorded the names of 153,700 victims in Croatia, 99,228 in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and 8,487 in other republics. The commission identified approximately 700 mass graves in 
Croatia, including 106 in the City of Zagreb and Zagreb County, as well as 90 mass graves in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and 200 in Slovenia.606 The Commission did not have the time to finish its work as its activities 
were terminated from 28 May 2002. However, the Commission adopted the same methodology as previous 
commissions and, as a result, the flaws were identical. Once again archival collections, especially those in 
regional archives and museums, were ignored. 
Earlier that year, the Croatian Institute of History asked the Croatian Ministry of Science and Technology 
to fund a research project on “Croatian human losses in the Second World War and the post-war period”, with 
the aim of calculating the real demographic losses of the Second World War in Croatia. At the same time, 
another project on  “The Victims of the Second World War, post-war period and the Homeland war”, (also 
funded by the Ministry of Science), was organised at the Institute ‘Ivo Pilar’ and led by Josip Kolanović, the 
Director of the Croatian State Archives. Although in both cases research was conducted by professional 
historians, the results, that are supposed to be published on web site http://zrtve.com.hr/, are still unknown to 
the public and, therefore, it is impossible to evaluate them critically.   
 
In conclusion, the majority of the victim lists prepared so far were based on testimonials, which is why the 
results were not only unreliable, but also sometimes contradictory to other sources which again leads to new 
manipulations and on-going disputes in the Croatian society.  
 
 
Researching the town of dugopolje 
 
The research project “The Victims of Dugopolje”, conducted in 2010 and 2011 by Dr Josip Dukić, 
professor at the University of Split, and myself, was the first in depth research carried out on a particular 
village, town or region in Croatia which included all available sources, including archival documents.607 The 
book was published in June 2011 under the title “Dugopoljski žrtvoslov” and it resulted with the complete list 
of war and post-war victims. Moreover, identifying all the victims by their names and other personal data, 
stating the time, place and circumstances of their death as well as comparing all sources and including one or 
more footnotes for each victim, meant that all collected data can be verified by future researchers or the public 
                                                          
604 Croatian: Narodna milicija (NM). 
605  The full text of this law is available at 
http://cadial.hidra.hr/searchdoc.php?query=Zakon+o+radu+&searchText=on&searchTitle=on&filteracttype=all&filtere
uchapter=all&filterfields=all&resultlimitnum=10&resultdetails=basic&lang=hr&action=search&showeurovoc=on&filt
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606 Report on the Work of the Commission for the Identification of War and Post-War Victims, Croatian State Parliament, 
Class: 023/03/99-03/20, Number: 63-99-968, Zagreb, 15 October 1999. 
607 Blanka Matković, Josip Dukić, Dugopoljski žrtvoslov, Općina Dugopolje, Dugopolje, 2011. 
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and cannot be manipulated. Therefore, a thorough research of a specific area proved that micro-analysis is the 
best way of establishing the correct number of war and post-war victims beyond any doubt.  
 
This approach has already shown its benefits particularly in the case of Jasenovac. According to the latest 
data of the Memorial Site Jasenovac (March 2013), 83,145 people lost their lives in that camp.608 The experts 
 
 “have used hundreds of sources (books, documents, photographs, and statements given by relatives and 
friends of the Jasenovac victims, field research and photographs of monuments to the victims of Fascist 
terrorism), of which 169 are mentioned in abbreviation in the List’ and they ‘have made critical 
comparisons of data for each individual and thus compiled a list of the men, women and children who died 
in Jasenovac Concentration Camp”.609  
 
One of the inhabitants from Dugopolje, mentioned on the Memorial Site Jasenovac list, is Cvijeta 
Sladojević, a woman allegedly born in Dugopolje in 1902. However, after reviewing all the documents related 
to that town, no record of her was found. Moreover, among the victims or people who lived in Dugopolje at 
that time, there were no people with that surname. Among Dugopolje victims only two women whose first 
name was Cvijeta were found. The first one was Cvijeta Balić, born in 1880, who was murdered by the Italian 
army and the Chetniks in October 1942.610 The other one was Cvijeta Vukasović, born in 1881, who died of 
hunger in the spring of 1943.611 It is possible that the data provided by the Memorial Site Jasenovac, which in 
this case is based on the research conducted in 1964, is inaccurate, and that this person was not actually from 
Dugopolje at all.  
The second example is even more extreme. Andrija Rogošić, born in 1918, a man who was allegedly killed 
in Jasenovac in 1945, was, according to the document signed by a Yugoslav court official in 1957, actually 
arrested by Germans in Zagreb in 1943 and his fate remains unknown.612 Therefore, it is incomprehensible that 
the Memorial Site Jasenovac failed to check the information published almost two years before the updated list 
appeared on the website, despite the fact that the experts stated that they “have used hundreds of sources” and 
“have made critical comparisons of data for each individual”. 
The claim that Andrija Rogošić was murdered in Jasenovac is based on the research “Projekt Dotrščina” 
conducted by the Croatian Archives between 1980 and 1985.613 The aim of the research was to identify the 
victims who lived in the area of Zagreb by their names and surnames. According to the former director of the 
Croatian State Archives, all relevant archival material from the Croatian Archives was analysed, as well as 
material stored in other institutions in Zagreb and Belgrade, and data published in the media at that time.614 
However, although the researchers analysed over 7,000 boxes of archival material, again they completely 
ignored archival material in the regional archives and museums, including the State Archive in Split where the 
document from 1957 was found. 
 
Researching the Dugopolje case resulted in more unexpected outcomes. Despite the Yugoslav official 
number of 207 war victims, among whom 132 were civilians, in the small town of only approximately 2500 
inhabitants, not a single paper or a book was published about that place between 1945 and 2011. The fact that 
personal details, such as year of birth or year of death, were inaccurately stated in the case of 96 people proves 
that the list prepared by the Yugoslav authorities was superficial and it probably relied on testimonials of 
surviving member of their families or comrades.615 Also, one of the ‘civilian victims’ was not a war victim at 
all. According to the documents of the hospital in Split, a 90-year old male died there of skull injury even 
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612 HR DAST 553. Narodni odbor općine Solin, svež. 28, br. 2164/57, S-32/57. Matković, Dukić, Dugopoljski žrtvoslov, 
pp. 102-103. 
613 HR HDA. Projekt Dotrščina, ZM103/12-Z-2902.          
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arhiv, Zagreb, No. 39 (1996), pp. 157-174. 
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though in the official Yugoslav documents his name was listed as a person killed by German grenade.616 
Another “civilian victim” was actually a member of the Croatian Army captured and killed by the communists 
in the winter of 1944/1945.617 Two people who were listed as the members of the Yugoslav army in the official 
list were actually civilians killed by the Italian and the German army.618 On the other hand, three “civilian 
victims” were actually killed as members of the Yugoslav Army.619 
However, the most striking detail was the fact that the authors managed to upgrade the existing list with the 
names of seventeen members of the Communist forces and 51 civilians whose names were not included in the 
official list published in former Yugoslavia. Only one of the members of the Yugoslav army who was killed 
was a former Croatian soldier, who was later forcibly mobilised620, while among another sixteen there were 
several prominent Communists and the information surrounding the circumstances of their deaths was already 
published in Yugoslav books. Therefore, it remains unknown why these people were excluded from the 
official Yugoslav list of war victims. Among civilians, not included in the official list, were those who died of 
hunger or in bombings, but also those who were killed by the members of the Italian, German or Croatian 
Army. It is unknown why the names of these people were forgotten for so many years even though the 
information regarding their deaths was available to the Yugoslav authorities. 
 
After upgrading the list in 2011, it consisted of a total of 445 names, including 131 people murdered by the 
communists. Among them there were approximately 30 civilians, counting three women and two Catholic 
priests, both murdered in 1942. The majority of these people (96) were killed in 1944 and 1945, while at least 
30 people were actually murdered after the end of the Second World War (between 7th May 1945 and 1948).621 
164 people were killed by other armies who operated in the same area between 1941 and 1945 (Germans, 
Italians, Chetniks and the Croatian Army), This number includes the victims of the two worst atrocities 
committed in Dugopolje by Italians and Chetniks in October 1942 (34 victims), and Germans in September 
1943 (40 victims), and represents almost half of all inhabitants killed by other military units.  
 
Given the fact that 219 inhabitants of Dugopolje lost their lives in 1944 and 1945 all together, which 
represents 49.2 % of all war and post-war victims in that town, the number of those murdered by the 
communist at the same time - almost half - is even more striking. At the same time, the case of Dugopolje 
proves that research of demographic losses in Croatia should especially focus on the last two years of the 
Second World War when the number of victims was the greatest, but due to a very chaotic situation it was 
even easier to manipulate victims’ names and numbers.  
 
 
Manipulating the number of war victims’ number after the disintegration of Yugoslavia 
 
Finally, an inaccurate number of the Yugoslav victims killed during the Second World War was used as 
one of the tools of Serbian propaganda during the Croatian War of Independence (1990-1995) when according 
to a Croatian demographer Dražen Živić over 22,000 people were killed622.  
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The topic drew lots of attention in the late 1980s not only because of the previously mentioned article 
published in the magazine Danas, but also because of the book “Wilderness of Historical reality” published by 
the Croatian historian and first president Franjo Tuđman. The author, among other topics, also analysed the 
creation of the Jasenovac myth which served as a foundation of the thesis of the genocidal nature of Croats, 
and he demonstrated how the number of victims of Jasenovac increased “slowly, but surely”. According to 
Anto Knežević, the author of the book “An Analysis of Serbian Propaganda” published in 1992,  
 
“it is significant that the polemics about Tudjman’s book coincided at the time when Croatia was seeking 
international recognition of its independence” 
 
 in the early 1990s, approximately at the same time when an article ‘Minority Serbs in Croatia Fear New 
Genocide: Yugoslavia: Re-emergence of checkerboard shield associated with fascists of World War II adds to 
anxiety in troubled republic”, written by Carol J. Williams, was published in Los Angeles Times.623 Knežević 
emphasised that  
 
“the attacks are an expression of those international forces which strove to postpone the international 
recognition of Croatia. These attacks have been carried out by non-historians”  
 
and concluded that  
 
“Tudjman systematically and with thorough documentation demolishes the myth of the collective guilt of 
any people, and of the Croats in particular. Making use of scholarly facts, he questions almost every 
foundation of the anti-Croatian propaganda that has gone on for many years. These are the main reasons for 
the attacks on Wilderness.”624 
 
The number of war victims, especially those who died in Jasenovac, has continued to serve as an important 
part of anti-Croatian propaganda after the end of the war in 1995. Serbian web site www.krajinaforce.com 
commented on the opening of a new memorial in Jasenovac in 2006 stating that “massive Croatian Holocaust 
Revision” was “encouraged” and that director of the Simon Wiesenthal Center’s Israel office, Efraim Zuroff,  
 
“seemed to accept the scandalous reduction of a number of the people murdered in Jasenovac death camp 
complex, leaving an overall impression that Croatia is making steps in the right direction after all”.625  
 
The same year Jasenovac Research Institute (JRI), based in New York, published the book “Jasenovac and 
the Holocaust in Yugoslavia” edited by Barry M. Lituchy. A year earlier the same organisation established the 
monument for the victims of Jasenovac in New York’s Holocaust Memorial Park which suggested that 
“hundreds of thousands of Serbs, Jews and Roma” were killed on that location during the Second World War’. 
On JRI's website, Lituchy claims that “estimates of the total numbers of men, women and children killed range 
from 300,000 to 700,000” but “despite the scale of the crimes committed there, most of the world has never 
heard of Jasenovac”.626 Furthermore, JRI representatives emphasise that in October 1991  
 
“during the withdrawal the Croatian Army placed explosives to blew up the bridge on the Sava River which 
connected the two parts of the Memorial Park; they also blew up the graves, destroyed the Museum 
artefacts and stole the Museum equipment”,  
 
and, “due to the courage and enthusiasm of individuals who worked at the Memorial Park, some historical 
materials and objects were saved”.627 However, according to the Memorial Site Jasenovac information,  
 
“the building of the Memorial Museum was prepared for evacuation, but before its contents could be 
moved to an area outside the war zone, Jasenovac and the Memorial Site were occupied on 8 October 1991. 
The museum inventory was transferred to Bosanska Dubica and from there, to Banja Luka. Until May 
1995, Jasenovac Memorial Site was inaccessible to museum staff and conservationists.  
In a report by an observation mission of the European Community published in May 1994, an inspection of 
the condition of cultural monuments and museums in the occupied part of the Republic of Croatia revealed 
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that the Memorial Museum was completely empty and that there was no information on the whereabouts of 
the Jasenovac Memorial Museum inventory, but that the memorial area and memorial itself had not been 
damaged... 
Representatives of the Republic of Croatia’s Ministry of Culture’s State Administration for the Protection 
of Cultural and Natural Heritage visited Jasenovac Memorial Site on May 17 1995 and confirmed that the 
entire museum inventory was missing and that the buildings of the Memorial Museum and Memorial Site 
had been devastated.”628  
 
The political manipulation and the flaws in previous research have obviously had a tremendous impact, 
even on the generations born after the end of the Second World War. Today, due to the reluctance to deal with 
the Communist past and, incomplete de-communisation of Croatian society, this topic in Croatia is still a 
matter not only of political and scholarly debates, but also of everyday life. Moreover, questioning total 
demographic losses and investigating communist crimes, which represents a crucial part of any serious 
research of the Communist post-war propaganda as well, is often seen as “historical revisionism”, particularly 
by the former Croatian president Stjepan Mesić who compared it with “celebrating Fascism” and emphasised it 
might actually prevent Croatia from joining the EU.629 Mesić ignored that in 2011 the Croatian Parliament 
itself had adopted the European Day of Remembrance of Victims of All Totalitarian and Authoritarian 
Regimes, commemorated on 23 August. Since this day also refers to victims of communist crimes, therefore, 
they should also be investigated impartially and objectively. 
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Introduction 
 
Historiography studies men along time. History tries to understand comprehensively the evolution of men 
along time. For studious men, history has, as a main tool, several forms of sources. Not all of these sources 
have to be in writing form: images, as well, can be used as sources for studying history. But, even those, are 
somewhat dependent of a writing narrative. As Fernando Pessoa, one of the most important thinkers of 
twentieth century, has said, what we see is a narrative elaborated in the brain (Fernando Pessoa, 2006: 56). So 
indeed, all history sources are dependent of the writing narrative that is elaborated in the historian brains. 
This introduction is important because we are dealing with the influence of politic vision and ideological 
propaganda in the contemporary historiography understanding of First Portuguese Republic belligerency in 
World War One. What we will try to point out is the influence of the political and propagandistic discourse of 
war mongers and anti-war activists in the historiography comprehensively understanding of First Portuguese 
Republic belligerency in World War One. 
So, this conference will deal with historiographic discourses (arguments) on First Portuguese Republic 
belligerency in World War One. The first discourse accepts the main arguments of belligerents’ republicans for 
participating in First World War. The other discourse refuses the belligerent view with the opposition epochal 
arguments to the Portuguese interventionism. They, indeed, follow the political and ideological debate that 
started with the Great War, in 1914. And this happens because the main guidelines of political and 
ideologically contemporary debate are an heritage of Portuguese political and ideological thinking that can 
trace its origins to the Liberal Revolution of 1820 and cross the ideological political dispute of the First 
Portuguese Republic. 
This text will be organized in three chapters. The first will present the historiography that battled for the 
radical republican belligerent perspective. The second will deal with the historiography that interpret the 
intervention as an error motivated by political party interests. The third chapter will relate the propaganda 
battle of “guerristas” (war mongers) and “antiguerristas” (anti-belligerents proponents) with the contemporary 
history and will try to insert both debates in a ampler ideological debate that cross the history of Portugal since 
the Liberal Revolution.    
 
   
1) The Belligerent Perspective 
 
Intervention in World War One was an imposed necessity related with the modernization of Portuguese 
society and economic infrastructure. This is the main argument of the Portuguese favourable belligerent´s 
historiographical perspective. The Republic was a modernization project of democratization and citizenship 
socialization of the Portuguese “Ancien Régime” that Constitutional Monarchy has perpetuated against the real 
ideals of 1820 Liberal Revolution.  
Intervention in World War One would robust the Anglo-Portuguese alliance and would integrate the 
Portuguese Republic sovereignty in the international system. A solid relation with Great-Britain and a closer 
relationship with France would assure the independence of Portugal and the preservation of its colonial 
patrimony and would allow the resolution of its internal dilemmas, mainly, the political, cultural and economic 
modernization, in its own terms, of the Portuguese Republic. 
As the historian Vitorino Magalhães Godinho has said, speaking by the pen of one of the main ideological 
proponents of belligerency, João Chagas, Portuguese Ambassador in France between 1912 and 1917, on one 
side, were the “liberal ideas”, on the other side, were the “reactionaries’ ideas”, against “all programs of 
human emancipation”, on one side were the Teutonic Empires, on the other, liberal France and Great-Britain, 
“the democratic Europe” against the “feudal and apostolic Europe”, forcing Portugal to intervene, in the name 
of modernization, in the European war, as a basis for its own politic and social modernization (Vitorino 
Magalhães Godinho, 2004: 107-108).   
In the same vein, Luís Alves Fraga says that the main aim of the belligerency republican politics was to 
transform Portugal from one internationally peripheral nation to a central one, from a nation that was subject of 
foreign interests to another that was an actor of himself in international terms, in parity with the European 
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Great Powers (Luís Alves Fraga, 2010: 18-22). The democratic republican belligerency politics were, in his 
historian view, a national emancipation politic, the vector that imposed to Portugal the active intervention in 
the main theatre of World War one, France. 
Both historians optics echoes the intense words of João Chagas, expressed in his diary, at the announcement of 
the declaration of war, in Paris, in 1914: 
 
“This moment give to it (Portugal) the unique opportunity of acquiring personality. (...). Portugal has to 
assume, without tergiversation´s, the role of England’s ally, giving the little that can be given, but giving it, and 
don´t waiting that she demands it or takes it by her own hands. (...). For the first time in the history of ours 
oldest alliance, we would give something, and don´t ask for her support” (João Chagas,s/d, I: 132). 
 
João Chagas said it, in a more polite way, in one propaganda book released in 1915, with an appeal to 
Portugal intervention in World War One: in that book, João Chagas battle for belligerency in the name of 
democratic ideals embodied by the Entente, against the “feudal and apostolic” Europe, represented by the 
Central Powers. Given the Anglo-Alliance, Portugal has, necessarily, to break relations with Germany and 
Austria and became, accordingly with is own history, a belligerent on the side of the Entente (João Chagas, 
1915, 11 e 14).  
Later, with the effective belligerency, the same arguments will be put to use by other republican 
intellectuals, in a propagandistic effort to strength the moral of the population and its support to the war 
(Ribeiro de Meneses, 2000: 93-94). 
This was the ideological basic arguments for the republican belligerency activists and this is the basic 
interpretation argument for understanding comprehensively the politics of belligerency from part of the 
contemporary Portuguese Historiography. They, indeed, only replicate older ideological republican arguments. 
 
 
2) The Anti-Belligerent Perspective                       
 
Republican revolution was a tragedy for Portuguese twentieth century, in political, social and economic 
terms, annihilating the possibility of a democratic development based on the political evolution of the 
Constitutional Monarchy (Rui Ramos, 2004: 27-28). It is in this framework that modern historiography must 
understand comprehensively the Portuguese belligerency on World War One. The belligerency was a party 
politics aimed at preserving the dominance of the “Partido Republicano Português” (Portuguese Republican 
Party) own political power. It was, not a national intervention in the World War, but a belligerency moved by 
egoistic party interests, with the goal of imprisoning Great-Britain and the oldest alliance in the defence of the 
Portuguese radical republican sieged regime.  
Given to the tense relation, political and diplomatic, between Great-Britain and republican Portugal, with 
several diplomatic clashes in Africa and about several aspects of internal Portuguese politics, the republican 
governments have adopted an international posture much more British friendly with the aim of assuring her 
support in case of necessity. It was a clearly “bandwagoning” movement. The war intensified this movement 
and the international political posture of the Portuguese Republican Party and his allies. Intervening in the War 
was central to robust the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, and in the process, to assure, for the republicans and the 
Portuguese Republic, a closer and friendly relationship with the old ally: in a good definition, the historian Rui 
Ramos defines this international politics as “aggressive gluing” to Great Britain (Rui Ramos, 2008: 79-94).  
But the war for the Portuguese Republican Party was also a strategy to robust the siege republican regime 
in Portugal. A “national war” in support of the old ally was what was needed to assure the cohesion of the 
Portuguese people around the republican regime. Belligerency was synonymous of regime stabilization (Vasco 
Pulido Valente, 1997: 81-87). So, belligerency policy would serve the Portuguese Republican Party, not the 
nation as a whole, indeed, the nation as a whole was thrown to a war that meant nothing to them. It was a self-
interest political goal that forced belligerency. The pro-Britain posture and the national war were instruments 
of regime stabilization and of internal political dominance by the Portuguese Republican Political Party. 
As an echo, the words of one of the most important Portuguese writers of the twentieth century, Aquilino 
Ribeiro, written against the ideas of João Chagas, expresses this sentiment: 
 
“Declare war, throwing thousands of poor devils to hell, sucked the nation exhausting fertility, what is that if 
there are three grails to conquest: glorify the name of Portugal, shove the leopard sovereignty, and pay our 
tribute to civilization.” (Aquilino Ribeiro, s/d: 68).  
 
It was, in the end, self interest, which was, indeed, treason to republican ideals, not national interest, what 
moved the Portuguese Republican Party to belligerency in World War One. This is what Rocha Martins, a 
conservative republican journalist and historian said in those days: 
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“Indeed, the party (Portuguese Republican Party) has thrown himself, in heart and mind, in the belligerent 
champ (…) in the way of solidification the Republic, and for others, of fortified the army organization (…) 
intending the consolidation of the Republic, if its flag flied on the side of the allies (…).” (Rocha Martins, s/d: 
103-104).  
 
3) Propagandistic Discourse and Historiography Debate 
 
Understanding comprehensively the historiography paradigm on the Portuguese belligerency in World 
War One cannot be read as a simple matter of different historical interpretations based on different reading of 
the sources, or as a historiographic debate around the Portuguese participation in the First World War in itself. 
This is not a mere historiography question or interpellation, if such thing exists. 
The Portuguese historiographical debate and the different historiography paradigms on Portugal belligerency 
in World War One are rooted on the historical perspective that each historian have of the First Portuguese 
Republic and, more relevant, in what it signifies for the history of Portugal, as a whole. And beyond that, and 
above all that, is the contemporary ideological vision that today influences the historical reading of Portugal 
intervention in World War One. Indeed, the debate of 1914-1916 about the belligerency continues today, in 
historiography, in a direct ideological link between politicians and intellectuals of the First Portuguese 
Republic and contemporary historians and other literates.     
Beyond the ample and solid historiography apparatus that all these historians evidence and their 
unequivocal capacity of produce very good historical narrative lays an ideological perspective that gets a good 
deal of arguments from the propaganda ideological machinery of both political and ideological sides of the 
Portuguese First Republic.    
Both historiography paradigms are based on the same facts, the “aggressive gluing” of First Portuguese 
Republic governments to the alliance with Great Britain and the sieged situation of the regime, with a strong 
conservative opposition to its existence and a profound divided republican champ, as a basis for explaining the 
politics of actively intervention of part of the republican spectrum in the Great War by Portugal. Indeed, both 
historiography paradigms also accepted the idea that the belligerency was viewed by the radical republicans as 
the solution for the Republic dilemmas, internal and external.  
 
The difference lays in the perspective on how these facts are interpreted.  
On one side, the belligerency was the solution for stabilizing a modern political, social and economically 
regime and assuring an effective modernization of Portugal, according with the evolution of industrialized 
Europe. This was the real meaning of the Revolution of October 1910 and this was what was searched with the 
intervention of Portugal in World War One. The Republic was the embodiment of modern Portugal, and if it 
was necessary to confront all the old country and the majority of it, to change it, so what? Modernity was the 
best justification to impose to an archaic country the violence of transformation, internally and externally, 
going to the Great War. 
On the other side, the radical republican belligerency was also imposed by the necessity to stabilize the 
menaced regime, internally and externally, and to assure the predominance and the hegemony of the radical 
republican Portuguese Republican Party in power and his ideologically view of radical transformation of 
Portugal, of course, not only in behalf of the Portugueses, but also in behalf of themselves. The Republic was 
the embodiment of a revolutionary archaic regime, dreaming with the French eighteen century revolution, like 
the “Jacobins” (as conservative republican,630 monarchic or catholic opposition, also cognomen the members 
of the Portuguese Republican Party and other radical republicans), forcing a “republican radical dictatorship”, 
that in the name of modernization were imposing its absolute power to Portugal (Vasco Pulido Valente, 1997: 
35-38; Rui Ramos, 2004: 28-29). And, in some aspects this was true; given the ability of the Portuguese 
Republican Party in manipulate the electoral census mechanism in behalf of wining always the elections (only 
once did this not happen). Intervention in World War One was one of the strategies to assure the perdurability 
of the radical republican regime.  
It is the way in which we look the facts that produce the difference of interpretation. And this is ideological 
and circumscribed by the way as we looked to the October 1910 revolution and what it signifies in the 
contemporary history of Portugal.  
Republican radicalism was a cut in the evolution of the liberal regime, institutionalized in the second half 
or the nineteen century, and explains the incapacity of Portugal´s adaption to the democratic evolution of 
western Europe along the twentieth century, and represent the basis for the long duration of the “Estado Novo” 
dictatorship regime, that sequentially produced a III Republic with a clear leftist spirit´s constitutionally 
                                                          
630 See, for example, the utilization of the Jacobin word in the correspondence of M. Teixeira Gomes, (s/d): 47, 
117.  
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program, that today is reflected in the difficulties of our capitalist modernization (an example of this view 
could be extracted from Rui Ramos, 2004).    
The October 1910 revolution was made by a political vanguard searching to transform an archaic political, 
social and economically, and cultural country in a effective European modern nation, that was stopped by the 
fierce resistance of the conservative Portuguese world in a long fighting against modernity that was prolonged 
by the “Estado Novo” dictatorship. The III Republic (indeed, as many put it, the II Republic, as the “Estado 
Novo” was an interregnum) reopen the prospects of modernization, with the participation of the citizens, a true 
social, economical, cultural and politically modernity, similar to what would happen in Europe since the 
beginning of the twentieth century.  
  These are the views that explain why the World War One debate between belligerents and anti-
belligerents proponents is still open. More than a debate on the reasons of Portuguese belligerency is a 
discussion on the identity of contemporary Portugal and on the ways for its future. Like Antonio Elorza said 
about “July 36” in Spain, that is “demasiado cerca”, “too close”, the First Portuguese Republic, indeed, is also 
“too close” to contemporary times to be read without the passion that moves the man politically: the First 
Portuguese Republic is not something of the past, instead, it deals with the present history of the III Republic 
(or II Republic) and its immediate future. 
 
 
Conclusion      
 
Intervention in World War One was an imposed necessity related with the modernization of Portuguese 
society and economic infrastructure. This is the main argument of the Portuguese favourable belligerent 
historiographical´s perspective. The Republic was a modernization project of democratization and citizenship 
socialization of the Portuguese “Ancien Régime” that Constitutional Monarchy has perpetuated against the real 
ideals of 1820 Liberal Revolution.  
The belligerency was a party politics aimed to preserve the dominance of the “Partido Republicano 
Português” (Portuguese Republican Party) own political power. It was, not a national intervention in the World 
War, but a belligerency moved by egoistic party interests, with the goal of imprisonment Great-Britain and the 
oldest alliance in the defence of the Portuguese radical republican siege regime.  
The difference between these two perspectives results from dissident interpretations about the facts involved.  
For one side, the belligerency was the solution for stabilize a modern political, social and economically regime 
and assured an effective modernization of Portugal, accordingly with the evolution of industrialized Europe. 
This was the really meaning of the Revolution of October 1910 and this was what was searching with the 
intervention of Portugal in World War one. 
 For the another side, the radical republican belligerency was also imposed by the necessity to stabilize the 
threatened regime, internally and externally, and to assure the predominance and the hegemony of the radical 
republican Portuguese Republican Party in power and his ideologically view of radical transformation of 
Portugal, of course, not only in behalf of the Portuguese’s, but also in behalf of themselves.  
Is the way as it is looked the facts that produces the difference of interpretation. And this is ideologically and is 
circumscribed by the way as we looked to the October 1910 revolution and what it signifies in the 
contemporary history of Portugal.  
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Introduction 
 
This paper will demonstrate that both the cartography and the German School of Geopolitics became 
respectively a propaganda weapon and an instrument in the service of the Third Reich. Although, the 
(suggestive) cartography was used by Adolf Hitler’s government, it was one of its less known means. There 
was never the preoccupation for creating a central institution to cartographic propaganda. But this did not 
avoid the utilization of maps making use of the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, the publication of the German 
School of Geopolitics, and of Völkisch groups, inclusively without any kind of attention and rigor in the choice 
of theories and/or terminology. 
 
 
1.The appearance of the suggestive maps in the sequence of the Treaty of Versailles (1919) 
 
The unsatisfaction with the impositions of the Treaty of Versailles, in whose negotiations Germany was not 
authorized to participate, was a general sensation of the German society, capable of join all the German-
speaking people (Murphy 1997, 46). The majority of Germans defended that the territories of the Sudetenland, 
Austria, Memel, Alsace-Lorraine and parts of Poland, which were lost as a result of the territorial impositions 
of this Treaty, belong to the German national territory.  
Developing a Groβdeutschland [Great Germany] with the unification of the all German-speaking people in 
one state, in the name of the self-determination, was the main goal of two groups at that period: Völkisch, 
considered by Herb (1997, 2) as “activists advocating the supremacy of Germans”631, and the geographers 
(and, later, also the geopoliticians), such as Albrecht Penck that developed the notion of the German people 
and cultural soil, describing the German national identity in what respects to cultural landscape. A new 
Germany would retain the German Empire, Austria and parts of Czechoslovakia.   
 Both of them realized that the key to their revisionist aspirations was the maps, where they could clarify 
the image of the German self-determination with scientific respectability. Thus, the maps were in the service of 
this national cause, being a successful way of propaganda even during the Weimar Republic, and depending 
more of private initiatives and voluntary subordination than of the governmental activities. 
 
 
1.1.Arnold Ziegfeld as the master of the suggestive cartography 
 
Although the first demand for a greater involvement in cartographic propaganda came in the beginning of 
the 1920s with Joseph März, which defended maps as the most effective mean of propaganda (because they are 
easily remembered: few words were sufficient to convey the message), it was with Arnold Hillen Ziegfeld that 
the suggestive cartography was truly developed.  
Ziegfeld was an early member of Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei [National Socialist 
German Worker’s Party] (NSDAP), a founding member of the Deutscher Klub632 in Berlin, and also affiliated 
with the Deutscher Schutzbund, where he established a specialized suggestive mapping office. In 1927, he had 
an article published in the periodical Volk und Reich, in which he argued that suggestive maps should be 
dissociated from the established cartography in general and proposed the creation of a new discipline, 
Kartographik. 
For Ziegfeld was essential the development of the suggestive maps without any kind of restrictions 
imposed by scientific maps. Because both are ruled by different laws: on the one hand cartography is a science 
and a technique committed to the graphic representation of the surface of the earth with naturalism and 
truthfulness, on the other suggestive cartography is a political weapon and an educational instrument as result 
                                                          
631  The first Völkisch groups appeared in the late of the nineteenth century: the Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland and 
the Alldeutscher Verband. 
632  A Völkisch group. 
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of the combination between the acuteness of the phrased idea, the clarity of the corresponding image and the 
psychological effect produced.    
But back to the beginning, Ziegfeld came to Berlin in 1923 for working at the Vowinckel Verlag, the 
publishing house of Kurt Vowinckel, which was responsible, together with Karl Haushofer (1869-1946), for 
the creation of the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik [Journal of Geopolitics] in 1924. Vowinckel was a professed 
National Socialist, being interested in the use of suggestive maps in its publications (mainly related with 
Geopolitik [Geopolitics]). 
Nevertheless, in 1924, Vowinckel put in contact Ziegfeld and Karl von Loesch, the head of the Deutscher 
Schutzbund. Quickly, Ziegfeld became the director of this publishing house, establishing an office for the 
production of the suggestive maps. In 1928, economical constraints and personal differences led Ziegfeld to 
leave this work, but he continued the publication of his maps through Edwin Runge Verlag, his own publishing 
house, became freelance of at the same time of Volk und Reich, a journal published in cooperation with 
Deutscher Schutzbund. By 1930, he worked full-time at Volk und Reich, heading the suggestive cartography 
office that he had established there. Being a member of the editorial board of this publication, he was also 
involved in other firm’s publications. 
Indeed, Ziegfeld became famous as a master of suggestive mapping633. His maps were used by various 
institutions, such as the Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland, Vowinckel Verlag, Verlag Grenze und 
Ausland, and Wirtschatftspolitische Geselschaft.  
In spite of that, Haushofer was considered the founder of suggestive cartography, and not Ziegfeld. But the 
only responsibility of Haushofer in the greater importance given to these maps was related with its use in his 
works of Geopolitik, as a way of illustrating its ideas.  
 
 
1.1.1. The success of the suggestive cartography during the Weimar Republic 
 
Since the end of 1920s to the beginning of 1930s, the suggestive cartography had a great success being 
promoted by private initiatives: in public lecture, in newspapers and in many books. The atlases devoted only 
to this cartography genre appeared in 1927 with Ziegfeld and Braun, and in 1929 with Schmidt and Haack. 
These maps were characterized by a simplistic design and a minimum of information visible: they were drawn 
in black and white, or with a few select colors (principally red), omitted legends and scale bars, chose dynamic 
symbols (using arrows for example) and bold shading. This allowed to produce very inexpensively and easily 
reproduced in different sizes and various contexts. They were more dynamic and persuasive.  
Thus, the Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland decided to replace its “scientific” atlas of the distribution 
of Germans in border regions and abroad by a collection of black-and-white suggestive maps of Friedrich 
Lange, an associate judge of a regional court, published as Volksdeutsche Kartenskizzen. It was a project 
started in 1928. In 1937, this atlas was in the fourth edition, being reproduced through the masses and used in 
education in order to demonstrate the position of the “German fatherland” and make the German youth 
understand the future tasks of the German people (Herb, 1997, 91). They were easily drawn in the blackboard 
and in notebooks, and memorized. This was also why they were included in the demand, of a proponent of 
Geopolitik, to introduce geopolitical knowledge in primary schools.  
 
 
1.2.The birth of the German School of Geopolitics and its “relation” with this kind of maps 
 
According to Karl Haushofer634, the mentor of the Geopolitics as science, it was the inability of the 
politicians and of the general public to understand the importance of geographical factors, which contributed to 
the way that World War I ended and, consequently, to the Diktat of Versailles. Maps were considered an 
instrument of the political education defended by geopoliticians, especially because they allow noting the 
relationship between the geographical and political factors (Herb, 1997, 77).   
In 1922, in an article published in the journal Grenzenboten, Haushofer defended that maps should also 
become a tool of politics and, following the foreign examples (such as the British, the French and the Polish), 
the Germans needed to concentrate only on the essential issues in maps, abandoning the excessive 
                                                          
633  The increasing of the production and dissemination of Ziegfeld’s suggestive maps was a result of his association with 
influential activists in the Deutscher Schutzbund, Deutscher Klub, and Volk und Reich, such as the case of Max Hildebert 
Boehm, Karl von Loesch, and Hermann Ullmann. His participation on book projects with Friedrich Heiss and Karl von 
Loesch put him into contact with geographers - such as Albrecht Haushofer (son of Karl Haushofer), Walter Geisler, 
Albrecht Penck, Waldemar Wucher, Robert Sieger and Fritz Jäger -, historians and researchers – such as Gustav Aubin, 
Erich Maschke, Manfred Laubert, and Martin Spahn.  
634  Haushofer had liaisons with Völkisch groups. In 1923, for example, he became the Bavarian president of the Verein für 
das Deutschtum im Ausland. Cfr. Michel Korinman, Quand l’ Allemagne pensait le monde (Paris: Fayard), 290. 
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perfectionism and love of detail. It did not mean to do cartographic lies, unnecessary and unacceptable, but to 
select the facts and emphasize what was central, suppressing what was extraordinary or insignificant. This was 
how to make suggestive maps. In this sense, the German maps would be powerful instruments of education 
and conviction of the German people (Herb, 1997, 81).   
The German School of Geopolitics, also known as the School of Munich, was founded in 1924 with the 
birth of the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, which oriented its preoccupations to the recovery of Germany and its 
consequent transformation into a great power (Correia, 2004, 143). Its theoretical corpus was based on the 
thoughts of Rudolf Kjéllen (1864-1922), the creator of Geopolitics’ concept, and Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904). 
The publication, having as editor Kurt Vowinckel, was destined to masses and had a monthly edition. In what 
respects to the initial group of Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, it was constituted by Vowinckel, Haushofer, Erich 
Obst, Otto Maul, Hermann Lautensach and Fritz Hesse. However, the only names that always remained in the 
publication, until 1944, were Vowinckel and Haushofer (Silva, 2003, 2-9). 
In essence, Haushofer popularized the suggestive maps by integrating them into Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, 
encouraging its use and development through the publication. As a result, it became the main forum for the 
discussion of the issues related to these maps in Weimar Republic and, therefore, they were mostly known as 
“geopolitical maps”. Although Völkisch groups tried to use other terms such as “volkspolitische Karte”, the 
association of the maps with Geopolitics proved to be more effective. It gave them “the aura of respectability 
by making them part of a quasi-scientific discipline”. Thus, “geopolitische Karte” was to representations with 
a psychological effect, while “volkspolitische Karte” respected all maps which addressed political aspects of 
the German Volk independently of being persuasive or not (Herb 1997, 81-82). 
 
 
2. The cartography as propaganda during the Third Reich 
 
For Herb (1997, 151) the success of propaganda was a result of the combination of the themes of traditional 
German nationalism with the NSDAP ideological motifs. Before the control of the different forms of mass 
communications by the Propaganda Ministry, it was Völkisch that dominated the print media, film and radio.  
So, when Adolf Hitler (1889-1945) came to power in 1933, there was a well-established network for the 
production of suggestive maps, centered in Völkisch groups that were responsible by the popularization of 
maps, using them in a variety of mass media.  
 
 
2.1. From the inexistent cartographic propaganda institution with Arnold Ziegfeld… 
 
On 3 April 1933, three weeks after the foundation of the Propaganda Ministry, Ziegfeld proposed, 
inclusively, the creation of a center for political cartography to this Ministry. The goal consisted in the 
standardization of regulation and in the providing of assistance for map production not only by various 
government authorities, but also to cooperate with private interest groups and press.   
      
He also tried to get the support of the Zentralinstitut für Erziehung und Unterricht, where he participated 
with a conference about the role of suggestive maps for propaganda and education, submitting a petition in 
1934. After the outbreak of World War II in 1939, Ziegfeld voluntarily offered his services as a specialist in 
modern political cartography to the Propaganda Ministry.  
At the end of 1939, he became a censor for maps, in the German press, in the Propaganda Ministry, being 
transferred in January 1940 to the foreign propaganda office of the Ministry, where he was responsible for the 
organization of a map service destined to the foreign press and involved in the production of the periodical 
Signal635.  
Between 1940 and 1941, Ziegfeld was involved in a propaganda unit and from the autumn of 1941 to the 
summer of 1942 he participated in the direction of the propaganda against England. On 31 July 1942, he 
presented his resignation in order to devote himself to his publishing house.  
In spite of the Ziegfeld’s expertise offer of to the Propaganda Ministry, the Ministry did not centralized 
cartographic propaganda. Several suggestive cartographers made maps for NSDAP’s publications, such as 
Karl Springenschmid (with a map series entitled “Deutschland kämpft für Europa!” [“German fights for 
Europe!”]) in 1937, Ziegfeld (with an oversized map supplement about the extension of German settlement 
and culture beyond the existing political boundaries) in 1938, Friedrich Lange and Karl Loesch (with some 
figures for the number of Germans in different regions, excluding the German-speaking Jews), in a sporadic 
collaboration, with the exception of Ziegfeld in the conditions above mentioned.  
                                                          
635  A magazine of the German Wehrmacht published from 1940 to 1945, destined to the exterior.  
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2.2…. To the Volk und Reich as instrument of German Foreign Propaganda with Friedrich Heiss 
 
Only one institution established a close cooperation with Third Reich: the Stiftung Volk und Reich, which 
became famous still in the Weimar Republic with its journal Volk und Reich and its monographs series serving 
as “an inconspicuous medium for the dissemination of official propaganda” (Herb, 1997, 161).  
In 1933, Friedrich Heiss, the director of Volk und Reich, suggested making this publication into an 
instrument of German foreign propaganda; and he was well succeeded because it would receive support from 
the Foreign Office and prepare the entire propagandistic literature for the attack on Poland, in cooperation with 
the press office of the German Foreign Office. This resulted in the publication of an issue, in August 1939, 
entitled Krieg wegen Polen?[War because of Poland?], in different languages (English, French, Polish and 
German), containing some black and white maps and one colored suggestive map, promising to be an 
introductory issue to the subject of Poland and escape from foreign censors.  Additionally, the publication also 
prepared some maps for propaganda materials to be used by the German Library of Information in the USA, in 
order to possibly convince it to remain neutral.  
After being succeeded in the establishment of a working relationship with the Foreign Office, Heiss also 
tried to exercise complete control over the activities of Volk und Reich. Thus, he dismissed Ziegfeld, on 12 
August 1933, the responsible for the establishment of the suggestive cartography office and for the expansion 
of the activities of the foundation.  
The case came to court and Ziegfeld complained in a letter written to the Foreign Office that Heiss tried to 
make his contributions to Volk und Reich insignificant from the beginning. This ended with a financial 
settlement and the promise that Ziegfeld’s name would be mentioned if his maps were used in Volk und Reich. 
But what is fact is that the suggestive cartographic office was established and it was associated with Volk und 
Reich and not with Ziegfeld. In practice, when Ziegfeld’s maps were used, his full name did not appear. The 
maps contained Ziegfeld’s symbol, but he was never referred for being the creator of the suggestive 
cartography (and in this journal).  
Beyond the close connections with the Foreign Office, Volk und Reich worked also with Völkisch and 
NSDAP, preparing suggestive maps for the Hitler Youth and for several exhibitions. Additionally, there were 
also two new institutes, which became involved in map propaganda: the Publikationsstelie Berlin (Puste) and 
the Institute für Allgemeine Wehrlehre at the University of Berlin. In what respects to the Puste, it worked in 
the production of suggestive maps as a result of its scientific expertise. On the initiative of Albert Brackmann, 
the director of the Prussian State Archives, it was founded in 1932 as a central information office for 
coordinating and controlling the German research on the East and responding to the Polish and Czech 
scientific propaganda. Puste was also affiliated with Nord- und Ostdeutsche Forchungsgemeinschaft. Both 
were closely associated with the Ministry of the Interior, having the same goal as the Stiftung für deutsche 
Volks- und Kulturbodenforschung, which was to supply scientific material for political purposes, such as 
supporting with drafts for several historical maps to the 1938 party convention.  
The Institute für Allgemeine Wehrlehre had as director Oskar Ritter von Niedermayer, a German 
geographer and a former employee of the Reich swehrministerium. Beyond being responsible for organizing 
production and finalizing maps, it had also the task of producing a book on the map exhibit of the 1938 party 
convention, destined to political education. But, to avoid the foreign criticism, Niedermayer asked all scientific 
collaborators, including the Puste, to reanalyze the maps of the exhibit and make sure that they only contained 
scientific material.  
 
 
2.3. The instrumentalization of the German School of Geopolitics 
 
In the period between 1933 and 1936 the German School of Geopolitics was used as an instrument of 
propaganda, being under the pressure of the Propaganda Ministry of Joseph Goebbels (1897-1945) (Almeida 
1990, 123). The Geopolitics, which since 1924 was assumed as a practice science and the geographic 
conscience of the state, served the designs of the NSDAP policies. The influence of Alfred Rosenberg (1893-
1946), in the development of the racist and Aryan doctrine of the Third Reich, had also consequences in the 
geopolitical thought of the School of Munich. 
Since March 1934, Rudolf Hess (1894-1987) assigned three functions to Arbeitgemeinschaft für 
Geopolitik, according with the theory of Blut und Boden [blood and soil]: the constitution of a state science in 
what respects to the spatial policy; the German mass education in conformity with the principles of the 
National Socialism; and the collaboration with the Propaganda Ministry and, consequently, the work to the 
prestige of Reich in the exterior.  
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Thus, it was justified the necessity of association of the German School of Geopolitics with the technology 
in the 1930s, being frequently the use of the mass media, but principally the cartography would have an 
essential role in the dissemination and enforcement of the German Geopolitics to all population’s layers.  
For helping in the divulgation and diffusion of this became National Socialist Geopolitics, in 1934, Rupert 
von Schumacher, an Austrian, gave the first steps in the development of the theoretical principles in the design 
of suggestive maps636. He defended that the general public needed highly simplified maps to better understand 
them; for clarifying its argument he presented a comparison between a scientific map (of complex 
comprehension) and a popular map (easily comprehensible). The popular version did not have legends, but 
employed pictorial symbols to identify the main ideas.  
 
 
 
 
Schumacher’s comparison between a scientific (above) and a popular geopolitical map (under) (1934) (Herb 1997, 155) 
 
The ideas of Schumacher were well received by other cartographers. However, its general impact was 
limited. He was a professed National Socialist and worked for some NSDAP organizations, but neither the 
government nor its party took up his theoretical principles. With exception to the review conducted, in 1938 
                                                          
636  Although, he never drew his own maps (he was a jurist), which were designed by two cartographers: Guido Gebhardt 
and G. Jedermann. Cfr. Guntram Herb, Under the Map of Germany.Nationalism and Propaganda 1918-1945, (London: 
Routledge, 1997), 154. 
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and 1939, by the Ministry of Education to the primary school atlases, which resulted in a recommendation of 
following the catalog of suggestive symbols developed in 1935 by Schumacher; especially as a result of the 
misuse of arrows in the atlases.  
In the case of the NSDAP publications, and with exception to the maps developed by the masters of 
suggestive cartography, the design was less sophisticated, violated many rules of suggestive cartography 
theory that seemed to be forgotten, such as the case of the Schumacher’s ideas, and the terminology was 
unreflectively used (Herb 1997, 158).  
 
 
2.3.1. The South Tyrol as a common subject of Hitler’s prohibition: in Karl Haushofer’s book (1939) 
and in a suggestive map (1938) 
 
On 25 October 1936, it was signed a settlement between Germany and Italy, establishing a cooperation 
between both states in what respects to the Spanish question (the Spanish Civil War approached the two) e to 
the Danubian area. In November, in a speech in Milan, Benito Mussolini (1883-1945) referred that the 
approach of the two states originated the creation of the axis Rome-Berlin, an axis of peace and collaboration 
with which all the European states could join.  
Also during the year of 1937, many German rulers visited Italy; on 16 November 1937 Italy joined the anti-
Comintern Pact concluded with Germany and Japan; and on 22 May 1939, Germany and Italy signed the Pact 
of Steel, from which it detaches the third article, stipulating that if one of the parts goes to war, the other 
should go immediately also to war, as ally and supporting in all the ways: in land, sea and air (Milza 2007, 194 
and 215). 
In this sense, in June 1939, Hitler prohibited the second edition of Haushofer’s book Grenzen in ihrer 
geographischen und politischen Bedeutung, in which was discussed the question of the German people in the 
South Tyrol, a region that was attached in 1919 to Italy, the main ally of the Third Reich. Albrecht Haushofer, 
the son of Haushofer, referred in July of the same year that any opposition to the situation of the South Tyrol 
caused the anger of Hitler. This was the only region of Europe in which a border revision, according with the 
nationalities principles, would not be mentioned (Defarges 2003, 81; Korinman 1990, 294). 
However, the problem was repeated, but with a suggestive map and, in April 1938, Hitler ordered the 
withdrawal and destruction of a map of German national territory and culture in the publication Der 
Schulungsbrief637. This map showed the German ethnic areas in South Tyrol, a territory of Italy, something 
that Hitler renounced after his meetings with Mussolini begun in 1936. But, at least one copy arrived in 
Switzerland and, as a consequence, with the goal of avoiding future episodes, the Propaganda Ministry issued 
a directive that was disseminated together with the Deutsche Kartographische  Gesellschaft. It established that 
South Tyrol could not be represented as German on maps, neither its name could be mentioned in publications. 
Obviously, this problem had the opposition of Völkisch and caused confusion about what should constitute 
German territory given the absence of guidelines.  
Thus, in the summer of 1938, different institutions took some initiatives to clarify this. For example, the 
Puste contacted the Ministry of the Interior and requested the confiscation of three ethnographic wall maps that 
were using in schools. The Education Ministry and the Propaganda Ministry accepted the request, agreed with 
it and ordered the elimination of these maps.  
With the goal of establishing a preventative censorship process, it was organized meetings at the 
Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (Vomi) on the production of maps of the German national territory. And, 
consequently, a decree was agreed upon, stipulating that every map respecting the political aspects of the 
German nation had to be submitted to the Vomi. 
In spite of that, the regulation process was never formally established. In October 1938, at the second 
meeting of the Deutsche Kartographische Gesellschaft, it was referred that there was neither unified approach 
to regulation nor cooperation among the government institutions. There was also a lack of guidelines. Vomi’s 
participants did know who could establish these rules, but they considered that Alfred Rosenberg could clarify 
this situation futurely. The fact is that cartographic regulation during the Third Reich was plenty of conflict, 
contradiction and confusion: “maps were used at home and abroad, for education, propaganda, and reference, 
by the party, the government and private interest groups” (Herb, 1997, 169).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
637  A publication of the NSDAP.  
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3. Maps as an element of war justification in World War II 
 
If in the beginning maps had as main goal the demonstration of territorial losses and the expression of 
specific territorial demands, the later versions would be focused on the military threats to the German space 
and in the demand of public support for World War II. Therefore, with the war, the German military also 
produced films in which were employed cartographic sequences (“moving maps”, as considered by Hans 
Speier), in order to demonstrate the advances of the German armies, such as Der Feldzug in Polen [The 
Campaign in Poland] (1939) and Sieg im Westen [Victory in West] (1941). In spite of that, it has to be 
mentioned that these movies were made by professional film ateliers and no credit was given to suggestive 
cartographers (Herb, 1997, 176).  
 
3.1. The voluntary submission of Geographers to the political needs of Third Reich… 
 
Neither the government nor the NSDAP were interested in the creation of a central cartographic 
propaganda institution. They preferred to cooperate with the established cartographers and institutions of 
suggestive cartography and did not take an active role in the creation of a coordinated approach. It happened 
because when the NSDAP came to power, the geographers adopted racial terminology and concepts, following 
a voluntary submission to the political needs of the Third Reich. In this sense, previous suggestive cartographic 
activities continued with a renewed sense of pride in being German. However, this did not prevent the 
emergence of new forms of cartographic propaganda, involving emotive images and public displays (the 
Deutsches Ausland-Institut in Stuttgart attempted to become the main institution involving in the supply of 
materials for exhibitions and political education, especially after 1933). Frequently, the goal was to appeal to 
the primal instinct, suggest the necessity of struggling for survival: “Germany was in danger of being mutilated 
or killed by her enemies” (Herb, 1997, 173) and it had no choice but to counterattack as fast as possible.  
 
 
 
  A Schumacher’s map (1934): Germany threatened all sides by countries neighbors’ airplanes  
(Silva 2003, 13) 
 
During the war period, there was a decline in importance of the propaganda mapping in Germany, although 
it continued until the end of Third Reich. One of the main characteristics of propaganda (inclusively the one 
made through maps) was that it needed to be flexible to adjust to changing military conditions. With the loss at 
Stalingrad (1943), propaganda “returned” to the mythical and irrational elements of NSDAP doctrine, being 
difficult to represent it cartographically.  
 
 
3.2. … But the creation of a pre-publication censorship of maps by the Propaganda Ministry 
 
In 1941, the publication of some maps with incorrect political boundaries led the Propaganda Ministry to 
create a mechanism for preventing future occurrences. So, since then, all the cartographic representations had 
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to be submitted to the Propaganda Ministry, but it did not mean that other institutions left to be involved with 
contradictory regulations. For example, between the Propaganda Ministry and the Ministry of Interior had 
different conceptions about the color that should be used to represent Germany.  
In this sense, Herb (1997, 171) defended that the enforcement of a unified message in maps during the 
Third Reich seemed to be difficult (if not impossible), given the conflicts, the contradictions and the confusion 
existent between the various organizations involved in the production of suggestive maps.  
In 1943, there were also problems after the officially complaint presented by Hungary and Bulgaria, related 
with the map "Der deutschen Osten", published in the journal Das Reich of 11 July 1943, in which the German 
political boundaries were incorrect. Because of that, it was initiated a pre-publication censorship of maps in 
magazines and newspapers by the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Interior, the Reichsamt für Landsaufnahme, 
the Propaganda Ministry, the German High Command and the Ministry of the East. Thus, the publishers were 
advised to present its maps to the four institutions via messengers in order to expedite the process.  
Another resolution of 26 August 1943, established that all maps with political, historical, and economic 
topics (related with the German Empire, the General government, and civil administrations areas) in 
publications had to be submitted to the Propaganda Ministry and the Reichsamt für Landsaufnahme. Maps 
related with areas abroad had to be submitted also to the Foreign Office and maps related with occupied 
territories in the East to the Ministry of the East.  
 
 
3.3. After being a mechanism of war promotion…The extinction of the German School of Geopolitics 
 
Between 1936 and 1945, the German School of Geopolitics was totally subjected to the policy of the Third 
Reich, becoming an instrument of the war effort. According with the settlement of 10 December 1936, 
Geopolitics started to be considered as a science of territorial and racial basis, essential to the development of 
people and states. Thus, Geopolitics was converted in the official political science of the Third Reich, having a 
political and a strategic orientation to the international scene.   
In what respects to the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, and with the beginning of World War II, there was a 
decrease in the number of pages from year to year: from 562 pages in 1942, to 347 pages in 1943. To work 
more or less independent and provide reasons for Hitler’s achievements became an insuperable difficulty. 
Since 1942, and progressively, Haushofer's contributions decreased. The chronicles disappeared from the 
journal and his works were like a catalog of keywords, a heap of titles and names, and a serie of dates.  
In 1943, the "literary" articles of Haushofer were related with the relations between Geopolitics and 
Religion, Geopolitics and Medicine, Geopolitics and Ethnology. It was also verified the merger of Zeitschrift 
für Geopolitik with Schule der Freiheit, anti-Semitic and anti-Soviet, which allowed the publication of a larger 
volume, intended for a wider audience of readers.  
Finally, on 2 September 1944, as director of Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, Haushofer received the order to 
cease its publication. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
After the rise of Hitler to power in 1933, and with Germany in its hands, the Third Reich transformed 
everything into an instrument of its power 638 . Both suggestive cartography and the German School of 
Geopolitics adapted and were adapted to the principles of the new German government. They respected to the 
relations between space, power and the German-speaking people.  
As Doods (2007, 115-116, 120-121) referred “at times of war and international discord”, the interest in 
maps is greatest, principally when national survival is at stake and it is necessary to explain and justify the 
threats that are facing citizens. The geographers and cartographers were frequently employed by government 
to produce maps for the political leaders. Because of that “maps as images of political space are never neutral 
or transparent representations”, especially at these times of war, international discord and in the presence of 
propaganda. Monmonier considered “A good propagandist knows how to shape opinion by manipulating 
maps”, justifying the idea, which it is possible to lie with maps639; although, in a trial-and-error approach as the 
one followed by suggestive cartography (more developed in practice than in theory).  
In the end, both suggestive cartography and the School of Munich were damned to the disappearance 
especially after the German loss of Stalingrad (1943), in the sequence of the failure of Operation Barbarossa 
                                                          
638 And when something (or someone) did not become an instrument of power, it was condemned in some way to the 
disappearance, prison or death. 
639 Even in peacetime it is possible to lie with maps, suppressing “truth to help the user see what needs to be 
seen”. Cfr. Mark Monmonier, How to Lie with Maps, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991), 25. 
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(1941). An operation with which Haushofer always disagreed, considering that Germany should be an ally 
with USSR that occupies the Heartland640 in the vision of Halford Mackinder (1861-1947). Following this, 
Germany would be a strong power in Europe and, perhaps, the course of the World War II had been another. 
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One of the events that marked the end of the twentieth century was, without a doubt, the collapse of the 
socialist system and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. An inexorable consequence that we all witnessed 
was the abandonment of ideological principles, the rupture of the traditional system of references and their 
symbolic foundations, and the calling into question of common perceptions of the country’s drive and 
historical memory. There was an unavoidable process of “rewriting the past” 641  in the Soviet historical 
narrative faced with revelations of new facts, and formerly blank pages were filled subjects forbidden until 
then.  
Confronted with this “…disaggregation... of the usual forms of life and collective memory...” (Hösle e 
Nora, 2003), it would be normal to think that the images of events, national myths, leading historical figures 
and leaders registered in the memories of people born and trained in the Soviet Union were confirmed and this 
created tensions or even significant changes. In fact, the interpretation of the past in the post-Soviet period was 
always linked to criticism of the communist regime with a clear marginalization of all ideological aspects, 
including all the attendant political symbols and traditions. However, public opinion studies conducted in post-
Soviet Russia (Gudkov, 2005; Levada, 2012) and inquiries among immigrants born and trained in the former 
Soviet Union and presently living in Portugal (Mirotshnik, 2012) show an amazing strength and persuasion of 
memory of the Patriotic War,, a high persistence of its emotional impact and power of attraction of the 
unshakable belief in the absolute victory of the Soviet Union as part of the core identity of the people. 
One can therefore safely consider that the phenomenon of war has been the target of a confabulation 
process, and that the deformation and mythologizing policies carried out by the Soviet government during its 
term and the persistence of this image in the memory of former Soviet citizens of different generations may be 
considered persuasive evidence of the success of propaganda produced by the communist regime. Soviet 
propaganda was a system that exerted an influence on the consciousness of the community, making use of 
strategic variables and techniques in many social areas such as literature, music, film, art, etc., which, 
paraphrasing Lotman, "... do not enter into any such mechanical details, but [function] as organs of an 
organism" (1996, p. 31). In this system the teaching, particularly the teaching of history, which has always 
been used as a political instrument, played a key role – serving as a link of continuity between generations of 
Soviet citizens to assimilate these beliefs, so that the convictions and their country’s historical-cultural 
traditions be held as high national values. In this process, the officially authorized and socially valid 
knowledge contained in textbooks played a decisive role. 
Given the previous statement, it is proposed in this paper to analyze key strategies and propaganda 
techniques involved in building the image of World War II in the USSR History Manual officially used in the 
years 1970-80, and to decode the messages conveyed in the textbook, their underlying and understood aspects 
and perspectives and the ideas that were promoted or rejected. 
 
Framework for the analysis of history textbook 
 
The memory of war, and especially of a victorious war, has always played an important role in the 
foundation and evolution of all nations. In a country like the Soviet Union, where political power has 
permanently had a prominent role in the world’s opinion and on the chosen model of socioeconomic 
development, the interest in preserving the memory of the war was strongly related to the understanding of its 
ideological potential.. The image of the War was part of the War – it was a “battlefield" with a function that 
can be considered of high importance: projecting an image of themselves and others to serve as the basis for 
the construction of collective memory and national identity of several generations of Soviet citizens. So, 
working with the image of the war over the years of Soviet dominion has become one of the main directions of 
political propaganda in social institutions acting upon the entire population, particularly the younger 
generations. 
                                                          
641 A very common process used by the Soviets is what Burke calls "syndrome Soviet Encyclopedia," referring to the fact 
that it has undergone revisions whenever the political course changed in the Soviet Union (Burke, 1992). 
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To provide theoretical elements for our reflection, we used the History Manual as a repository of meanings 
that must be decoded, and we have elected the theory of symbolic culture from Geertz (1973) which addresses 
the relationship between past and present under the perspective of attribution of meanings in the cultural 
process as it takes place over time. In this view, collective memory is seen as the memory formed by all kinds 
of “textual resources," in particular historical narratives, considered the cultural tools that promote collective 
remembering while their own properties develop this process. Wertsch (2002), one of the authors of this 
perspective, analyzing different historical narratives, has identified an abstract property and generalized forms 
that constitute the foundation, the standard, of various narratives. This pattern, which the author calls 
"Schematic Narrative Template," in accordance with a cultural framework, can be revealed to be a model to 
build primary plot lines for significant historical events, and thus end up being responsible for forming the 
collective memory and consequently by certain characteristics the collective identity of a population. 
Garagozov (2002), developing Wertsch's theory, adds that schematic narrative templates are used as the basis 
for historical narratives and are inserted into collective memory through the education system, mainly in 
history lessons and particularly when they attempt to be very faithful to history and to official discourse. So the 
mere facts of history configured according to the model of the narrative can gain in strength with increased 
effect and a regulator structuring of the students' perceptions about history and its events, about “us" and 
others, as well as about the current reality and future. 
The central hypothesis of this work and the argumentation that supports it is identifiable in the text of the 
History Manual. Our aim was to adapt the facts of collective experience to a particular model that produces 
and reproduces a model of collective memory of war, supported by the implementation of various propaganda 
strategies and propaganda classic techniques as well as rules that are inherent, particularly the image of the 
enemy, myths, language and counterpropaganda, which will be further discussed and explained.. 
 
Method and sample textbook 
 
This work is based on analysis of the text of the History Manual used in the Soviet Union, more 
specifically the role the textbook plays in portraying World War II. Our study was performed according to two 
approaches to textual analysis: the first focuses on the study of historical narrative, and the second deals with 
the interpretation of language.642 The main goal of narrative analysis is to describe the main features of "Image 
of War" as produced by the History Manual and the assumptions which underlie it. 
The research was guided by the following questions: 
- How does it portray the war, what was the role of the Soviet Union and what kind of approach was used 
to create the "Image of War"? 
- What are the fundamental ideas and messages conveyed in the Manual and how were the main battlefields 
portrayed? 
- What strategies and techniques have been used to introduce these ideas and messages to students? 
The language analysis was guided by the following question: 
 - What is the function of the words and expressions used by the authors in different situations and events 
described in the Manual? 
For the purpose of this study a specific portion of the textbook was chosen which cover the historical 
period between 1939 and 1977, in other words, the years before, during and after the war, ending with the 
"golden years" of Soviet socialism. This book, because of the centralized nature of the education system of the 
Soviet Union, was widely used and its use was compulsory in its time, i.e. this History Manual was officially 
adopted and applied uniformly across the country. 
 
 
Authors 
 
Main    Title 
 
Publishing     House 
Total number 
of pages 
Year of 
publication 
Number of copies 
published 
 
Furaev,V. (ed.) 
Modern 
History, 10th 
year 
 
M: 
Procveschenie 
      
   272 
 
 1978 
 9ª Ed. 
 
   2.700.000 
Tab.1. Book under review 
 
Considering the central theme which is examined in the present work, it is significant to note that the 
relationship between political propaganda and textbooks, which is established through the communication 
process of historical information, cannot be examined separately from the economic, social, political and 
cultural surroundings. In all political systems, textbooks depend on the particular circumstances in which they 
are produced and used. In the case of the Soviet Union, a totalitarian country, the issue of context becomes 
                                                          
642 Inspired by Foster and Nicholls (2004). 
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even more pertinent. The selected Manual was edited during a period of moderate policy of the Soviet state, 
subsequently called the “stagnation,“ with a predominant climate of deep political apathy that along with the 
removal of the glorious days of the war, leaving room for national heroism and the victorious spirit associated 
with the principal achievements – the October Revolution and victory in World War II. With the increased 
difficulties of every kind – economic, political, moral and so on – the government and the Communist Party 
sought a way out of the impasse in order to strengthen the work of political propaganda. A high emphasis was 
then placed on the need to form a new Soviet citizen, which resulted in the formulation by the XXVI Congress 
of the CPSU in 1976 of a program of “communist education” in which the main part was assigned to the 
schools and their ability to inculcate a Marxist-Leninist vision and an unshakable certitude in the ultimate 
victory of communism. 
 
Analysis and Discussion 
 
Although the Manual developed a traditional informative approach to World War II, explaining the 
reasons, describing the main forces involved, the role and interest of each one, and depicting the military 
conduct and its consequences. We will investigate what might be behind this packaging of historical facts, 
present it in a rigorous way, explain it, understand it, illustrate it and discuss what purposes, strategies and 
propaganda techniques underlie the narrative contained in the text. 
At first glance the reader of the Manual is placed before the portrait of a classic conflict between two 
clearly distinct worlds, where the offender is well established, comes from overseas, beyond borders, and this 
enemy is perfectly known and identified. This circumstance reveals a symmetrical order, which allows the 
Manual authors to situate (therefore distinguish) the events and characters in two opposite poles – we (the 
good) and others (the evil).643  
The objectives of each one are determined, their requirements are explicit; their identities are revealed and 
the outcome of military conflict is predictable, almost sure. From these assumptions the course of war events is 
presented, in our view, following a model of specific narrative that works as a sort of co-author who organizes 
in advance what students should understand, making clear or transparent what could pass unnoticed (Wertsch, 
2002). We have called this model “War of the Soviet Union Against Foreign Enemies" and we introduce it to 
you, together with quotes from the Manual that support our assertions. The narrative model of the textbook 
consists of three stages: 
1. The initial situation;  
2. Enemies attack the USSR; War begins;  
3. The USSR wins the war and saves the world. 
 
1. Initial Situation 
 
The book begins by presenting, as was the tradition in Soviet times, all regions of the world, but showing a 
very bleak picture of the pre-war period, focusing on a celebration of brute strength and lack of principles in 
the capitalist countries dominated by fascism: 
 
“[…] The fascist countries aspired... to destroy... USSR, prepare and trigger a world war to assert their dominance 
in the world” (p. 3). 
 
Through various ways of addressing the reader, the Manual authors use different strategies to identify the 
various characters about whom the text speaks. The text does not spare the adjectives when referring to the 
moral decay that had reached the fascist countries and their capitalist leaders – the images and pessimistic 
visions that incited a number of negative emotions and seemed to drive the world in that time to a very 
worrying situation. Among the negative emotions found in the book associated with that pre-war moment, the 
predominant feeling is a mixture of sadness and anger. We assume that this effect could be due to the nature of 
the event – a war and the use of violent methods, but we can find also underlying desires or/and feelings of 
justice and revenge: 
 
“[...] The barbarians... fascist aggressors mistreated brutally civilians, they burned cities and have destroyed 
villages and they used poison gas...” (p. 7) 
 
It was surprising to find that the Manual does not make a separation between peace time (natural and 
expected) and war, making instead a traditional distinction between three possible situations: peace, war and 
                                                          
643  This structure had certainly accustomed students to interpretations based on binary reasoning itself: truth versus 
falsehood, socialism versus capitalism. 
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post-war. The image the student gets is that the chance of a peace situation is drastically reduced, that 
opportunity is even eliminated and the feeling prevailing in the mind is a sense of constant threat. From the 
first pages in the Manual, the idea of the hostile environment and of being surrounded by enemies appear as 
constants of national existence and the central feature that always determines the uniqueness of the history of 
the USSR.644 However, these factors probably do not produce in readers any fear or insecurity because they 
think that the Soviet regime will not only defend "our interests," but also sustain "our hope":  
1) The Soviet Union is a "fortress,” driven by the principle of upholding world peace and by the concern 
for collective security, and able to take down enemies; 
2) The enemies are identified, located and addressed in an armed conflict that is legitimate and morally fair.  
The review of the book's narrative allows us to see that its subject is the Soviet Union, always present in 
the entire text, the supreme collective personage, persevering and progressing. It is quite evident that the 
purpose of the Manual’s authors is to produce representations of a practically perfect society, free from 
contradictions and serious internal problems, endeavoring to convey the idea of how the USSR is peaceful and 
ready to selflessly help others and the weakest: “[...] Multilateral and disinterested aid... friendship... offered by the 
USSR [...]” (p. 68). 
 
This idealization of the Soviet Union allows us to recognize, in its various manifestations, the structures of 
a “mythological machine"645 that produced many founding myths in the ideological and political fields and 
exerted a great influence on the formation of the core identity and consciousness of citizens of the Soviet 
Union (Günther, Hansgen, 2006). One of the Soviet citizen’s dearest myths – created, nurtured and instilled 
throughout the permanence of the system – is the myth of the greatness of the nation. This greatness should be 
the main source of Soviet pride and justification for all the sacrifices they were required to perform by the 
Soviet Union if they wanted to preserve in the hierarchy of nations a suitable place for the country that 
prevailed in the Socialist Revolution and won World War II. 
In first part the Manual text highlights one aspect of this other myth – the moral qualities of the Soviet 
Union. The idea here was not only to magnify the image of the USSR, an assisting brotherly country which 
provided excellent support to others, but also and mainly to serve as background cloth to start building the 
image of the enemy. The complex semantic enemy here establishes a functional connection with the social 
perception of “us,” represented by the power and features of the man included in "us.” In other words, this link 
highlights those social norms and values that underlie the establishment and management of the social system 
as a whole, indicated directly or indirectly, and featuring symbolic representations of the past and future, 
resources, partners and other elements of the framework of social reality. As Bauman writes: 
 
“[... ] The opposition between friends and enemies separates truth from falsehood, good from evil, beauty 
from ugliness.... right from wrong [....]. It makes the world readable and thus, instructive” (Bauman, 2007, 
p. 65). 
 
It is recognized by the investigations of political propaganda among the participants of political struggle, 
that there is a necessity to have and create enemies (Girardet, 1987; Günter, 2006). The creation of the image 
of the enemy in the Manual has its own story that changes according to the events: at the beginning when it 
introduces the fascist enemy, he is an opponent that is the personification of extremely negative principles of 
an enemy of the Soviet people646 and of the entire world’s progressive community, that he is a bad enemy 
endowed with characteristics opposite to human nature. In general, the text of the Manual shows a concern 
with language that matches the contextual characteristics in which it is applied, turning the narrative into a 
"war of symbols” (Tchskhotine, 1967). When it comes to the enemies and their doings, the language, which 
prioritizes the health climate, appears full of epithets such as "cruel," "barbaric," and “thugs.” 
The message which the Manual’s authors communicate at the end of this first narrative part, is very 
explicit: the Soviet Union is the only country able to catch and destroy the enemy, because of its socialist 
nature. This approach not only brings the student to a War ending that is predictable but also pretends to 
establish a belief in the strength and power of the socialist model. 
 
2. Enemies attack the USSR, War begins 
 
In the very first Manual pages it states that the Soviet Union was attacked by a fascist enemy and forced to 
fight this total threat because: 
                                                          
644 These factors also always served as the foundation for a high production of armaments and as an explanation and 
justification of the economic backwardness in relation to the West, especially in the production of consumer goods. 
645 The expression is from F. Jesi (1977). 
646 According to Kolonitskii (2003), the first mentions of the term enemy of the people had emerged in 1917, during the 
October Revolution, as the expression itself dates back to the French Revolution. 
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“[... ] The fascists sought the elimination of the Soviet state, the capture of its riches, the transformation of the 
Soviet people into slaves of the capitalist and landlord Germans” (p. 21). 
 
From here, the book History on examination begins the narrative of a story about victory, bringing out 
another aspect of the myth of the greatness of the Soviet nation – its military power. The war of the USSR 
against fascism is presented as a series of victories that led to the inevitable loss of the fascist enemy in Europe 
and worldwide.647 Military defeats are described as “almost victories” or, only “forgotten.” It is relevant in this 
respect that the war report starts with the victory of the Red Army near Moscow in December 1941, omitting 
thereby the events of the first months of the war, during which the troops of the enemy reached Moscow. 
However, the Soviet Union appears in the book always sure and certain of the superiority of their political 
principles, their ethical and social organization and the attitudes that were propagated: “[...] [The USSR] 
convinced the world of the great strength and vitality of the socialist system” (p. 39). 
 
In this section of the narrative, among the plentitude of personages comes a new group of “allies” 
consisting of the U.S. and Great Britain, with which the USSR signed an agreement for assistance. However, it 
is clear the effort to demonstrate that they never behaved like friends, and were just concerned with defending 
their own interests, wishing the end of communism in the USSR and its dependence of the West. The Allies 
are always heavily criticized in this part of the Manual, especially for their alleged lack of character and their 
true intentions: 
 
“[... ] Churchill ordered the British military commanders to collect German weapons, and, if necessary, 
redistribute them to the German soldiers to turn against USSR” (p. 35). 
 
To give credibility to the facts and show students that it is a discourse of truth, the Manual authors resort to 
comparison of information provided by the Manual to that provided by the enemies or simply by "malicious" 
people. Using the classical rules of counter-propaganda (Domenach, 1975),9 for example, they respond with 
facts648 to insinuations from those who doubt that the USSR felt forced to sign the military agreement with the 
Allies. The story continues by stating that when Hitler started the war, the USSR faced the enemy counting on 
the cooperation of Western powers, though the sacrifices of the USSR were paid with ingratitude – sometimes 
constantly betrayed, sometimes failing in their role as allies and delaying the opening the second European 
front, and even when they were giving some help, their support had no decisive importance, and was an 
attempt to further deprive the Soviet Union of the legitimate fruits of victory. These ideas are mentioned in an 
evident way in the narrative of the Manual with a clear purpose to win the approval of the students and ensure 
that they get the message of the true winner of the War: 
 
“[…] The supply of weapons and military supplies by allies of the Soviet Union were performed 
irregularly, with frequent interruptions, and in the first year of the war, had no practical significance to the 
Soviet Union”(p. 23); 
 
“[…] The USSR strictly honored its alliance commitments. But the United States and Britain have gravely 
violated [them]” (p. 25). 
 
To create the illusion of unanimity on this allies theme, so delicate but essential to the proclamation of the 
USSR as the only winner in the War (that will appear briefly in the pages of the book), illustrations were used 
that help create this impression in the minds of students.649  One of these is an illustration titled “Collecting 
signatures for a petition to the US government for the immediate opening of the second front.” It shows a 
group of workers, men and women, collecting signatures, with the backdrop of a poster “Open the western 
front NOW!” and this acts as a testimony to confirm the argument of the authors of the Manual. Apparently 
this is done in order to demonstrate the ubiquity of the supporters of the USSR – it explores the image to “get 
the message that we are there and we are stronger” (Domenach, 1975, p. 91) and that is accepted by readers. 
In this part of the narrative begins to emerge another enemy of the Soviet Union: American imperialism. In 
the text of the Manual there is now an increase in the pace and intensity of the propaganda that aims to show 
the true intentions: 
 
                                                          
647 This manual reveals an appreciation strategy of the national role in the war, similar to the American history books: 
according to Foster, Nicholls (2004), in them the "battles and key events of World War II are portrayed under an 
American perspective; the central focus is given to the victories and achievements.” While "[...] the details of the 
British and Soviet contributions are limited" (p. 60). 
648 The fact is what really happened; it has only a logical value – what is true. 
649 According to Pingel (1999), the illustrations may be more persistent than the text itself. 
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“[…]If we see that Germany is winning we should help Russia and if Russia is winning, we should help 
Germany and so let them kill as many as possible” (Citing the future American President Truman, p. 22)650 
 
“[…] The U.S.A. [...] sought to establish the undivided supremacy in the Pacific” (p. 4). 
 
The authors of the textbook did not lose any opportunity to transmit negative messages about the United 
States, specifically related to the attack on the U.S. base at Pearl Harbor by the Imperial Japanese Navy. Some 
compassion is shown for the victims: 
 
“[…] The Supreme Command of the U.S. armed forces was not prepared for the attack of the aggressor... 
This has been costly for the US armed fleet... The U.S. position was weakened in the Pacific” (p. 23). 
 
Insistence on the unattractive role of Americans is not accidental; in order to assign them the blame for the 
Cold War, which determined the political climate in the world in the 1970s, when the History Manual under 
consideration was used in schools, it was confirmed this way, once again, with undoubted facts – the atomic 
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki: 
 
“[... ] This inhumane act aimed at long-range policy goals: to intimidate all nations of the world and force 
them to bow their heads before the power of the United States. The U.S. imperialists hoped to establish 
their dominance in the world” (p. 38). 
 
A meaning was assigned to this event by textbook authors, as was expected: the U.S. was showing its 
power and asserting its hegemony in the world at the end of the War. 
 
3. The USSR won the War and saved the world 
 
Although the operating history includes a section entitled “Victory of the Soviet people and other lovers of 
freedom over the fascist aggressors,” the emphasis is placed on the success of the Soviet Union and not on 
other people. The end of the war in Europe is presented in terms of the unstoppable advance of the Red Army 
beyond the borders of the USSR; this progress began in Stalingrad and would end only, of course, in Berlin. It 
is against this backdrop of... 
 
“[... ] Complete liberation of Soviet soil from Nazi invaders” (p. 32). 
 
that is mentioned the opening of the Second Front of the allies when... 
 
“[... ] The Allied expeditionary force under the command of General Eisenhower landed in northern France 
and began moving eastward” (p. 32). 
 
The last phase of the war is the subject of comprehensive coverage on the part of the Manual. Actions of 
the Red Army dominate the narrative: countries and cities of Europe being subdued by Soviet Union troops, 
sometimes with the support of their own populations, led by their respective communist parties and the 
liberation of Europe from fascists. However, that was not the only front where the army acted. The book’s 
authors underlined the fact that the USSR entered into war with Japan, northeast of China and North Korea just 
after the rescue of Europe, fulfilling the commitments it had assumed with its allies. The idea is to show 
students the decisive role of Soviet troops on all fronts. These battles consequently pointed out its contribution 
to the final result of the War: “[... ] The fate of the Japanese aggressors was not decided by explosions of nuclear 
bombs, but by the actions of the Soviet Armed Forces” (p. 38). 
 
Thus, the end of World War II is described as a matter of Soviet responsibility. These descriptions are 
confirmed with numbers of losses of the enemy, which gives clear credibility and illustrates the merits of the 
Soviets in the War – one reason why the West had to thank them, and to be clear no doubt that the defeat of 
Nazi Germany was due to the victories of the Red Army:  
 
“[...] The Soviet military during the war destroyed 507 German divisions and 100 divisions of its satellites. 
The Allies defeated no more than 176 divisions [...] Germany lost 10 million people [...]49 divisions and 27 
brigades of the army were defeated and captured” (p. 38). 
 
                                                          
650 Here's another example of using the rules of counterpropaganda - to ridicule the target, attributing to him words that 
make him look ridiculous (Domenach, 1975). 
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Victory in the World War is a logical interaction with the greatness myth of the Soviet nation and its 
ideological assumptions: the assertion of military strength and the ability to overcome the enemy demonstrated 
during the War are justified by the authors using the exceptionality of the first world socialist country, while 
reconfirming this exceptionality651 with the deeds of the Soviet people during the war. It is quite evident that 
the history of the Soviet Union’s victory over fascist Germany, as told and repeated in the Manual, affirms and 
embodies the myth of the great victory in World War II. According to Hosler, the young Soviet educated class 
adopts this spirit and gradually becomes committed to this brilliant myth (Hosler, 2005). 
The central importance assigned to the great USSR victory in the war, in our view, was aimed at the 
realization of many ideas addressed to students: on one hand, an obvious and expected glorification of heroism 
and sacrifice of the Soviet people; on the other hand, the symbolism of victory was intended to offset the 
failures of the system, passing the message to the reader of how petty and insignificant were the difficulties 
really faced by the country in many areas, compared with the great victories in the recent past. It also seems 
pretty clear that the Soviet Union’s victory described in the Manual is not intended to show only the defeat of 
the fascist enemy, but also to provide "arguments" to bring down the image of the West as a development 
model to be emulated and to prove the certainty of the predictions of Marxist theory which assumed the end of 
the capitalist world: “[…] The events [...] strongly confirm that capitalism is a society without future” (p. 177). 
 
The model for the future was destined to be occupied by the great socialist experiment – the Soviet Union - 
which was invigorated by its victories in war. The promotion of the idea of the USSR as the model for the rest 
of the world has become one of the main messages of the Manual. The intention seems to have been to 
establish in the minds of students a picture of a model society in war and in the postwar period as well : “[...] 
The central people driving force …” (p. 24). 
 
However, the context of geopolitical change, with the elimination of the invading enemy and the 
establishing of peace, did not remove the external threat or a “siege mentality evoked in the text of the 
Manual.652 The external danger is now identified in this book with the threat posed by the United States, “[... ] 
The main economic, political and military strength of imperialism” (p. 124). 
 
This changes the understanding of the enemy as well. If at the beginning of this book the enemy is 
understood as a community of people who are morally bad, the set of particularities of postwar American 
enemy – violence, betrayal, conspiracy – leads readers to believe in the existence of an "objective enemy" 
(Mamatova, 1990). The U.S. is identified as an objective danger to the Soviet state, regardless of the subjective 
intentions, plans and actions of the enemy. The idea of the American enemy here reaches its highest point; it is 
presented as a prerequisite of political consciousness and is stated as a condition for new forms of political 
consolidation of the progressive forces led by the USSR, as well as being included in the typical Cold War 
models. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Our analysis has found various evidence that the Soviet power made use of major instruments of 
propaganda. Despite the documentary appearance of War images, the text essentially distinguishes two groups 
of propagandist strategies: first, different techniques are aimed at raising the image of the USSR in every way, 
but particularly as the winner of World War II. The attitudes towards the world, its principles and values, the 
"real images" of military victories, open the prospect of a hero-liberator country. The second group of 
strategies is directed at students. The reader is opened to the possibility of acceding to that history and 
accepting it as only truth – his history. Both groups of strategies attempt to get the War history to resemble a 
narration of facts presented with objectivity and rigor so that the production of this knowledge could not be 
questioned by the student. Instead, proceeding in this way, it establishes an alignment (Cerri, 2002) of the 
readers with the historical events and characters, turning them all into "us," but also making it possible for 
them to join against the "other." 
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Propaganda, violência simbólica e controle social durante a 
Guerra Fria: a Ditadura Civil-Militar e a educação superior no 
Brasil (1964-1988) 
 
Jaime Valim Mansan,653 
PUCRS e UCM 
 
Esta reflexão trata de um modo de controle social aplicado sobre um segmento social específico em um 
duplo contexto de guerra. Mais especificamente, aborda a propaganda como modo de controle do campo da 
educação superior utilizado no Brasil entre 1964 e 1988. Nesse período, o país foi profundamente afetado pelo 
clima de polarização ideológica criado pela Guerra Fria, tornando-se um alvo preferencial das políticas 
exteriores estadunidenses para a América Latina. No plano interno, profundamente influenciado pela referida 
polarização no contexto internacional, o país viveu aquilo que o grupo no poder, com o intuito de criar uma 
aparência de democracia e legitimidade para aquele regime ditatorial, definia como “guerra interna”.  
A pesquisa de doutorado que fundamenta esta comunicação trata de cinco diferentes modos de controle 
social: vigilância, punição, normatização, formação de intelectuais e, é claro, propaganda. Tais modos são 
analisados em suas ações sobre o campo da educação superior durante o regime ditatorial instaurado no Brasil 
em 1964.654 Como se trata de uma pesquisa em desenvolvimento, as considerações aqui apresentadas possuem, 
consequentemente, um cunho predominantemente exploratório.  
 
1. A Ditadura Civil-Militar: “guerra interna” e Guerra Fria no Brasil 
 
Como mencionado, o contexto da Guerra Fria implicou em um crescente intervencionismo estadunidense 
na América Latina, sobretudo após a Revolução Cubana. O Brasil, por suas dimensões continentais, constituiu 
uma das prioridades da política exterior estadunidense na região. Em função disso, os EUA financiaram, no 
início dos anos 1960, caríssimas campanhas de propaganda golpista contra o governo João Goulart, 
promovidas por grupos como o Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais (IPES) e o Instituto Brasileiro de Ação 
Democrática (IBAD) (Dreifuss, 2006). O medo de um Brasil socialista também levou-os a apoiar o movimento 
civil-militar responsável pelo golpe de Estado de abril de 1964. Navios de guerra estadunidenses estavam 
localizados na costa nordeste do Brasil, prontos para o ataque, caso houvesse resistência (Fico, 2008). 
Com o sucesso do movimento golpista, foi instaurado no país um regime ditatorial que, liderado pelas 
Forças Armadas e com decisiva participação civil, vigorou até 1988. Embora o país já contasse com um 
presidente civil desde 1985, a mudança de regime político efetivou-se verdadeiramente em 1988, através da 
promulgação, em 5 de outubro daquele ano, da Constituição atual (Lemos, 2011).  
À semelhança do que ocorreu em outros países latino-americanos nesse período, como Argentina, Uruguai 
e Chile, e possuindo também vários pontos em comum com os regimes salazarista e franquista, a chamada 
Ditadura Civil-Militar foi um regime de exceção, calcado em violência, arbítrio e medo.655 Desde o golpe de 
1964, foi gradativamente sendo configurado no Brasil um sistema de controle social (Cohen; Scull, 1983) 
muito peculiar, cuja marca maior foi a ocultação das práticas violentas, nas quais baseava-se o regime, por 
meio de ações de propaganda que buscavam caracterizar o país como “democrático”, “forte”, “um país que vai 
pra frente”. O grupo no poder pautava-se pela ideia de que o país enfrentava uma “guerra interna” e seguia 
nesse sentido as diretrizes da Escola Superior de Guerra, núcleo ideológico do regime (EMFA/ESG/DE, 1975). 
O “inimigo interno” era definido através da difusa e convenientemente flexível noção de “subversão”, apoiada 
sobretudo em normas arbitrariamente impostas pelo próprio regime (como os chamados “atos institucionais”). 
Isso permitia um controle dinâmico da sociedade, que era constantemente vigiada: toda oposição não 
                                                          
653  Doutorando em História na Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul, bolsista CNPq/Ministério da Ciência, 
Tecnologia e Inovação, Brasil. Doutorado sanduíche na Universidad Complutense de Madrid, bolsista PDSE/CAPES/ 
Ministério da Educação, Brasil. Membro do Grupo Internacional de Pesquisa IBEROAMÉRICA-20 – Violência e 
sociedade no espaço ibero-americano no século XX.  
654  Projeto “O controle do campo da educação superior no Brasil da Ditadura Civil-Militar (1964-1988)”, CNPq/PUCRS, 
2011-2015.  
655  A historiografia sobre o regime de 1964 é notoriamente ampla. Como referência, algumas sínteses, com diferentes 
enfoques, podem ser conferidas em Alves (1985), Fico (2001), Mendonça & Fontes (1988) e Skidmore (2000). 
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consentida, ao constituir-se como tal, automaticamente passava a ser perseguida e punida de modo brutal; a par 
disso, buscando ocultar a ilegitimidade de origem (Aróstegui, 2012) daquele regime, tais violências eram 
apresentadas à sociedade como “combate à subversão”.  
 
2. Propaganda, violência simbólica e controle social 
 
É notória a polissemia das noções de propaganda e publicidade. No Brasil, muitas vezes os dois termos são 
usados de modo ambivalente. Daí o surgimento de expressões como “publicidade política” ou “propaganda 
comercial”. Contudo, nota-se uma tendência em associar publicidade a objetivos comerciais e propaganda a 
objetivos ideológicos, políticos ou religiosos. Para os fins desta pesquisa, em consonância com tal perspectiva, 
propaganda fará referência às estratégias  comunicacionais implementadas por determinado emissor individual 
ou coletivo para a disseminação de um conjunto de ideias, de cunho predominantemente ideológico, político 
ou religioso, visando a um público-alvo específico ou difuso.656  
A propaganda é um dos mais eficazes meios de violência simbólica, via de regra tanto mais eficaz quanto 
menos evidente. Embora em tempos de guerra certas formas de propaganda assumam-se claramente como tais 
(cartazes, panfletos etc.), há também formas de propaganda de guerra, como a chamada “guerra psicológica”, 
cuja eficácia reside sobretudo na capacidade de dissimular-se. 657  De todo modo, independentemente de 
assumir-se ou não como propaganda, trata-se de uma forma de violência simbólica, ou seja, de impor 
determinados valores e ideias, recobrindo com uma aparente e ilusória naturalidade o “puro arbítrio cultural”, 
como observa Mendonça (1996, p. 2). Daí que o caráter simbolicamente violento resida no conteúdo, não no 
meio.658 
Desse modo, compreende-se porque a propaganda é concebida como um elemento essencial dos modernos 
sistemas de controle social, tanto em regimes democráticos quanto – e sobremaneira – em regimes de 
exceção.659 Outro conceito marcado por forte polissemia, a acepção de controle social aqui utilizada possui 
importantes paralelos com a ideia gramsciana de “relação de unidade-distinção” entre “coerção” e “consenso” 
(Gramsci, 2007, p. 39). Como observou Aróstegui (2012, p. 46), essa nova concepção dos processos de 
controle social, que confere igual importância aos mecanismos de coerção e de coesão social, tornou-se 
predominante após a Segunda Guerra Mundial, como tentativa de compreender as “nuevas formas de barbarie 
aparecidas y culminadas en el propio conflicto”. Segundo essa perspectiva, controle social compreende o 
conjunto dos processos que Gramsci denominava de “dominação” e de “direção”, através dos quais busca-se 
estabelecer ou preservar determinada ordem social, marcada pela “supremacia” de um determinado grupo. 
Processo no qual, como dito, a propaganda cumpre um papel fundamental. 
 
3. A propaganda feita pelo regime 
 
Quando se fala em propaganda durante a ditadura de 1964, normalmente pensa-se na AERP. A Assessoria 
Especial de Relações Públicas, de fato, teve um papel decisivo naquele contexto.660 Entretanto, optei por 
analisar aqui outro órgão de propaganda daquele regime, tão importante quanto a AERP: a Agência Nacional.  
Em 1945, através do Decreto-Lei nº 7.582, de 25 de maio, foi extinto o Departamento de Imprensa e 
Propaganda (DIP) e criado, em seu lugar, o Departamento Nacional de Informações (DNI), subordinado ao 
Ministério da Justiça e Negócios Interiores. Um dos órgãos componentes do DNI era a Agência Nacional, à 
qual competia, conforme Art. 14 da citada norma, fazer a “distribuição de noticiário e serviço fotográfico, em 
caráter meramente informativo, à imprensa da Capital e dos Estados”. Embora o referido decreto-lei seja a 
primeira referência à Agência Nacional em textos normativos, observe-se que aquele trabalho já era realizado 
pelo menos desde 1934, no âmbito do Departamento de Propaganda e Difusão Cultural, criado naquele ano e 
substituído pelo DIP em dezembro de 1939.  
A menção no decreto-lei ao “caráter meramente informativo” do material distribuído pela Agência 
Nacional indicava uma clara intenção de diferenciar-se do antigo DIP, principal órgão de propaganda e censura 
                                                          
656  Dentre a ampla bibliografia específica, ver Jowett & O’Donnell (1999), Sant’Anna (2001) e García Uceda (1995). 
657  Sobre a chamada “guerra psicológica”, ver EMFA/ESG/DE (1975) e Caparelli (1986, p. 23-28). 
658  De tal ponto de vista, supera-se a aparente incompatibilidade entre a crítica de Bourdieu (1992) ao caráter socialmente 
reprodutivista da escola e o evidente potencial emancipatório de tal instituição. Sobre o conceito de violência simbólica, 
ver, dentre outros, Bourdieu (2004; 2006). 
659  Sobre os estudos de controle social e questões correlatas, ver Cohen & Scull (1983) e Garland (1993). Para uma discussão 
mais voltada para o caso do Brasil, ver Alvarez (2004).  
660  Sobre a AERP, ver Fico (1997). 
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da ditadura do Estado Novo e, consequentemente, um dos mais visados alvos das críticas àquele regime no 
pós-1945.661  
O DNI foi extinto em 1946, mas a agência foi mantida, agora subordinada diretamente ao Ministério da 
Justiça, conforme definido pelo Decreto-Lei nº 9.788, de 06/09/1946. Tal norma estabelecia que a agência 
deveria ter “uma função meramente informativa das atividades nacionais em todos os setores” (Art. 3º), que 
seria de sua competência “ministrar ao público, aos particulares, às associações e à imprensa toda sorte de 
informações sobre assuntos de interesse da nação, ligados à sua vida econômica, industrial, agrícola, social, 
cultural e artística” (Art. 3º), ficando incumbida ainda “de manter o jornal cinematográfico de caráter noticioso 
e o boletim informativo radiofônico de irradiação para todo o país” (Art. 4º).  
De modo análogo ao que aconteceu com os DOPS (Departamentos/Delegacias de Ordem Política e Social), 
em 1964 a Agência Nacional foi assimilada pelo novo regime, que a integrou no sistema de controle social que 
constituiu para sustentar-se. Logo após o golpe, a agência já tinha larga experiência na área, com hábitos e 
padrões de ação consolidados. Em 1979, a Agência Nacional passou a ser chamada Empresa Brasileira de 
Notícias, no âmbito do processo de dissimulação das atividades de controle social posto em prática naquele 
contexto de transição dirigida.  
Analisarei três tipos diferentes de materiais de propaganda produzidos pela agência após 1964: (1) boletins 
diários enviados à imprensa; (2) textos do programa radiofônico A Voz do Brasil; (3) cinejornais e “filmetes 
institucionais”.  
 
3.1. Boletins diários 
 
Os “boletins diários” que a Agência Nacional distribuía à imprensa consistiam de  grossos compêndios de 
informações, compilados pelo Serviço de Documentação da agência. A dimensão de cada boletim variava 
bastante, alguns apresentando pouco mais de trinta páginas e outros quase oitenta. Iniciava por uma lista de 
“fatos de interesse jornalístico” previstos para os dias seguintes: pronunciamentos de figuras de proa do 
regime, exposições, conferências, solenidades e outros eventos, juntamente com uma seleção de “fatos 
históricos”, efemérides como nascimento ou falecimento de ‘figuras ilustres’, batalhas etc., em geral 
relacionadas com os períodos colonial e imperial da história do Brasil. A seguir, encaminhava os “noticiários”, 
resumos das principais atividades realizadas na data pela Presidência da República, pelos ministérios civis e 
militares e, eventualmente, também por outros órgãos públicos, que podiam variar do Supremo Tribunal 
Federal à Rede Ferroviária Federal. Apresentava ainda “notícias culturais” (como lançamento de livros), 
“notícias do exterior” (como conferência da UNESCO sobre cursos de línguas), dentre outras.  
A questão, contudo, não era a forma, mas sim o conteúdo veiculado. Vejamos um exemplo: em 
16/06/1964, na seção “Notícias do IAPB”, a agência informava sobre a atuação de Wilson Ferreira como 
interventor no Instituto de Aposentadoria e Pensões dos Bancários (IAPB).662 É interessante observar que, 
embora de modo sutil, a agência referendava a intervenção ditatorial em órgãos como o IAPB: segundo o 
noticiário, o interventor teria “mais uma vez alertado para o difícil trabalho de reestruturação e reorganização 
do serviço, visando a volta definitiva do instituto às suas funções específicas, que é [sic] servir aos bancários” 
(Brasil/AN/SI, 1964). Ficava subentendido que o IAPB havia sido afastado de suas “funções específicas”, o 
que vincula-se com um argumento que, embora falso, foi amplamente utilizado no pós-golpe para tentar 
justificar as ações violentas e antidemocráticas do novo regime. Trata-se da então recorrente afirmação de que 
a administração pública no Brasil estaria dominada por “esquerdistas” e “corruptos”, e que as ações da 
“Revolução” teriam o objetivo de devolver tais órgãos à “normalidade”.663  
Outro importante aspecto da propaganda realizada pelos boletins diários à imprensa era a divulgação de 
notícias favoráveis ao regime, com o intuito de angariar apoios sociais para o mesmo e de justificar as políticas 
públicas adotadas. Em relação à educação superior, era muito comum a divulgação de notícias sobre 
investimentos na área. Assim, por exemplo, em 04/12/1969 a agência informava que a Universidade Federal de 
Viçosa/MG iria dispor, dentro de poucos meses, de uma biblioteca “líder na América Latina em assuntos de 
Agronomia e Veterinária”, conquista que seria alcançada através da “inclusão de tal iniciativa no 
financiamento do Programa MEC-BID [Banco Interamericano de Desenvolvimento]” (Brasil/AN/SI, 1969).664  
 
 
                                                          
661  Sobre a propaganda durante o Estado Novo, ver Capelato (1999). 
662  Sobre o IAPB, ver Oliveira (1999).  
663  Tratava-se de fato de um dos principais argumentos utilizados pelos golpistas em suas tentativas de autojustificação, como 
é possível verificar, por exemplo, no texto de abertura do primeiro ato institucional, de 9 de abril de 1964. 
664  Sobre a atuação do BID e de órgãos análogos após 1964 no Brasil, ver Minto (2006, p. 94-98). 
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3.2. A Voz do Brasil 
 
O rádio foi um dos principais veículos de propaganda da ditadura que vigorou no Brasil de 1937 a 1945 e 
que, à semelhança do regime salazarista, também denominou-se Estado Novo. A Hora do Brasil foi crucial 
nesse sentido. Pouco depois de eleito e buscando diferenciar-se de Vargas (de quem havia sido importante 
colaborador durante o Estado Novo), o general Dutra determinou mudanças em A Hora do Brasil, inclusive no 
nome, que virou A Voz do Brasil (Perosa, 1995, p. 57). Daquele momento até hoje, o programa atravessou 
diversos regimes políticos. A partir de 1964, foi utilizado para propaganda do regime ditatorial, mesmo depois 
de 1970, quando a televisão já alcançava mais de 40% das residências urbanas (Skidmore, 2000, p. 222). Nas 
áreas rurais do país, onde o rádio continuou a ser, ao longo dos anos 1970 e 1980, o principal (e muitas vezes 
único) meio de comunicação disponível, a importância da propaganda radiofônica foi ainda maior. 
Em A Voz do Brasil de 30/08/1966, informava-se que Moniz de Aragão, então ministro da Educação, iria 
visitar Goiânia no dia seguinte, a fim de “inaugurar diversas obras na Universidade Federal de Goiás” e de 
“receber o título de ‘Doutor Honoris Causa’ na Faculdade de Direito” (Brasil/AN, 1966b). Isso ilustra dois 
aspectos marcantes da propaganda feita por aquele regime:  
(a) a divulgação de exemplos do “desenvolvimento” que o regime supostamente trouxera ao país, através 
da veiculação de imagens e informações sobre investimentos, obras etc. “Segurança” e “desenvolvimento” 
eram os dois pilares doutrinários daquela ditadura. Toda a retórica adotada após o golpe de 1964 na tentativa 
de criar uma aparência de legitimidade para aquele regime ilegítimo estava calcada nesses dois elementos, 
sendo fundamental entender o sentido que tinham naquele contexto. “Segurança” dizia respeito à eliminação 
não apenas de qualquer ideologia ou movimento contrário ao capitalismo, mas também de toda e qualquer 
forma de oposição àquele regime. “Desenvolvimento” fazia referência a uma forma específica de 
desenvolvimento capitalista, marcado por crescimento econômico nacional dependente, abertura irrestrita ao 
capital estrangeiro e vertiginosa concentração de renda (Fernandes, 1975, p. 26). A adoção de tal modelo de 
desenvolvimento, tão celebrado pelos organismos de propaganda naquele período, foi uma das principais 
causas dos altos índices de desigualdade social ainda hoje existentes no país. 
(b) a divulgação de concessões de honrarias a figuras de proa do regime. Os títulos de doutor Honoris 
Causa foram bastante distribuídos naquela época. Vários presidentes e ministros foram assim homenageados 
por universidades de todo o país. Para a instituição de educação superior e seus dirigentes, poderiam concorrer 
como eventuais causas a busca por alguma simpatia de membros do governo com vistas a futuros benefícios, o 
alinhamento ideológico dos dirigentes universitários com o regime, dentre outros. Para o homenageado, havia 
um óbvio interesse no ganho simbólico que aquela distinção representava em alguns meios sociais. Para o 
regime, aquele reconhecimento artificial, forjado através de uma lógica viciada de prêmios e distinções onde o 
que contava era quase sempre o vínculo político e quase nunca o mérito acadêmico, era uma forma de fazer 
com que representantes do grupo no poder parecessem ter um reconhecimento efetivo por parte de 
determinados segmentos sociais. Em jogo estava, também nesses casos, a tentativa de construir uma aparência 
de legitimidade para um regime marcado pela ilegitimidade desde suas origens mais remotas, anteriores ao 
próprio golpe. 
No programa de 01/10/1968, A Voz do Brasil noticiava a assinatura do projeto da Lei de Reforma 
Universitária, em reunião de Costa e Silva com as principais lideranças da ARENA (Aliança Renovadora 
Nacional).665 O programa radiofônico, dentre outros aspectos, destacou da seguinte maneira as declarações do 
senador Petrônio Portella, uma das principais figuras do partido:  
 
O senador Petrônio Portella, a seguir, afirmou que ‘se alguém quiser encontrar a posição exata do Presidente 
da República diante dos problemas da mocidade, basta ir ao Palácio do Planalto, onde irá encontrá-lo lutando, 
estudando, trabalhando, abrindo campo, para que a juventude tenha um legado que não seja igual àquele que 
recebeu’. Finalizou dizendo que ‘o Presidente Costa e Silva deu provas concretas de que o diálogo que deseja 
manter é o da ação, o do trabalho e não o das promessas e dos acenos demagógicos’ (Brasil/AN, 1968). 
 
Fica evidente a tentativa de diferenciar a reforma universitária que o regime ditatorial então estava 
implementando daquela que vinha propondo o governo Goulart no pré-golpe. O programa de rádio ajudava a 
disseminar, assim, uma de tantas versões do mito da “Revolução Democrática”: contra “promessas” e “acenos 
demagógicos”, lideranças ‘estudiosas’, ‘trabalhadoras’, preocupadas com os “problemas da mocidade”. 
 
 
                                                          
665  “Lei de Reforma Universitária” é o nome pelo qual ficou conhecida a Lei nº 5.540, de 28/11/1968, que reorganizou o 
campo da educação superior no Brasil de acordo com as diretrizes e interesses do regime ditatorial de 1964. Conferir, a 
título de exemplo, Cunha (2007). A ARENA era o partido governista, criado em fins de 1965 após a extinção de todos os 
partidos políticos decretada pelo Ato Institucional nº 2. A ARENA cumpria importante função na tentativa de estabelecer 
uma aparência democrática para a ditadura. Para mais detalhes, ver Alves (1989, p. 87-95). 
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3.3. Cinejornais e filmetes institucionais 
 
Os cinejornais eram noticiários produzidos para exibição no cinema antes da projeção dos filmes em cartaz. 
Ao longo de sua existência, a Agência Nacional produziu, no mínimo, 958 cinejornais (Brasil/MJ/AN, s/d). 
Em geral eram curtos, com pouco menos de dez minutos de duração.  
Do Cinejornal Atualidades, o nº 47 foi o primeiro a ser veiculado após o golpe de 1964. Nele eram 
promovidos os valores do novo regime e exaltadas algumas figuras de proa do movimento golpista, sobretudo 
Castello Branco. Em um dos blocos, era noticiada a “posse dos novos ministros de Estado, constituindo-se 
assim o novo governo nascido da Revolução de Abril”. Sobravam elogios para o novo gabinete, “composto das 
figuras mais representativas dos meios técnicos, culturais e administrativos do país”. A “ordem inicial do chefe 
da Nação” a seus ministros era clara: “trabalhar intensamente na obra de reconstrução nacional”. Ao senador 
Milton Campos, que assumia a pasta da Justiça, caberia, segundo o cinejornal, “a tarefa de recompor e 
fortalecer as instituições políticas e democráticas do Brasil”. O mesmo cinejornal noticiava ainda, em outro 
bloco, a posse da nova direção da Agência Nacional, ocasião em que o general Otávio Alves Velho, que então 
assumia como diretor da agência, declarava “os seus propósitos de modernizar o órgão oficial de informações, 
tornando-o mais apto ainda para cumprir suas importantes atribuições nos setores da cultura, da difusão interna 
e externa” (Brasil/AN, 1964). 
Já o Cinejornal Informativo nº 29, de 1966, tratou exclusivamente da ida de Castello Branco à Santa Maria, 
no Rio Grande do Sul, onde o ditador, dentre outras atividades, recebeu o título de Doutor Honoris Causa das 
mãos do Reitor José Mariano da Rocha e proferiu a aula inaugural da Universidade Federal daquela cidade. 
Posteriormente, com a presença do governador do estado e autoridades locais, foi feito um “imponente desfile 
militar em homenagem ao Presidente da República”, ocasião em que “a população de Santa Maria” teria 
vivido, segundo aquele cinejornal, “um dia alegre e festivo, exteriorizando seu júbilo nas manifestações de 
apreço e simpatia que tributa ao presidente Castello Branco” (Brasil/AN, 1966a). Lembremos aqui dos 
comentários anteriores, quando da análise de A voz do Brasil, a respeito da exaltação de figuras de proa do 
regime e da divulgação de solenidades e premiações, como as concessões de títulos de Doutor Honoris Causa. 
Os “filmetes institucionais” eram ainda mais curtos que os cinejornais, com duração de um a dois minutos. 
Foram elaborados pela agência entre 1964 e 1979 para serem veiculados na televisão, embora uma parte deles 
tenha sido utilizada também em montagens para o cinema (Privatti, 2009). Adotavam um formato semelhante 
ao de comerciais publicitários televisivos, com hábil utilização de imagens e fundos musicais. Geralmente, 
orientando a interpretação do material audiovisual apresentado, concluíam com uma ou duas frases de impacto, 
pronunciadas por um narrador de voz grave e destacada.  
Vários filmetes tratavam da já mencionada relação entre “segurança” e “desenvolvimento”. Em 1972, um 
deles destacava a importância da construção da ponte Rio-Niterói, que estava “sendo construída no atual 
governo, saltando os 13 quilômetros e 900 metros” da Baía da Guanabara e sendo “realizada dentro da mais 
alta técnica especializada” (Brasil/AN, 1972). Em 1976, outro tratava da importância da “segurança” para o 
“desenvolvimento nacional” e argumentava que o investimento do Brasil em gastos militares seria pequeno se 
comparado com outros países, inclusive porque, segundo a peça de propaganda, “o que se gasta com as Forças 
Armadas significa segurança e também ajuda no desenvolvimento nacional” (Brasil/AN, 1976b).  Em um 
terceiro, de 1970, às linhas principais da bandeira nacional eram mescladas imagens associadas àquelas 
diretrizes ideológicas: produção de automóveis, militares marchando, cirurgiões, paraquedistas, grandes 
construções, navios de guerras etc. (Brasil/AN, 1970a). Um quarto filmete, também de 1970, adotava padrão 
semelhante de seleção de imagens e música de andamento acelerado (Brasil/AN, 1970b). Um fundo musical 
diferente, de andamento mais lento, acompanhava a frase final: “desenvolvimento e segurança: bem estar da 
coletividade”. Aquele contraste musical era fundamental, pois despertava a atenção do espectador, criando 
uma tensão que era musicalmente resolvida ao final do filmete, junto a imagens de casais sorridentes em 
pedalinhos, de crianças brincando ou da bandeira nacional. Som, imagem e narração final reforçavam-se 
mutuamente. 
A música era, de fato, um elemento importante dos filmetes. O Hino Nacional e o Hino da Independência 
obviamente tinham espaço privilegiado, mas nada que se comparasse à canção “Marcas do que se foi”, de 
Roberto Pera e Flecha, na gravação da banda Os Incríveis: “Este ano / quero paz no meu coração / quem quiser 
ter um amigo / que me dê a mão. // O tempo passa / e com ele caminhamos todos juntos, sem parar / nossos 
passos pelo chão vão ficar. // Marcas do que se foi / sonhos que vamos ter / como todo dia nasce / novo em 
cada amanhecer”. Ao final, como de costume, fechavam os filmetes um dos bordões da agência, como “a paz 
se faz com quem ama o mesmo chão”.666  
                                                          
666  Exemplo: Brasil/AN (1976a). Fico (1997) analisa amplamente o papel central que o otimismo cumpria na propaganda do 
regime. 
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Alguns filmetes eram dedicados a temas bastante caros ao regime: unidade nacional, patriotismo, civismo 
etc.667 Outros tratavam de assuntos de caráter utilitário, como a importância de cuidar dos documentos pessoais 
e registrar os filhos668, ou de hábitos de higiene, neste caso geralmente através de um conhecido desenho 
animado com o personagem Sujismundo e outros da série, como Sujismundinho e Dr. Prevenildo.669 Se, por 
um lado, tais filmetes possuíam efetivamente um caráter informacional importante para a sociedade, também 
ajudavam a disfarçar o caráter propagandístico das outras peças, reforçando seu potencial para a violência 
simbólica. 
Havia também uma série de filmetes dedicados especificamente à educação superior. Alguns faziam a 
propaganda do desenvolvimento nacional naquela área, nas linhas do que já foi comentado. Outros eram 
direcionados aos estudantes, e buscavam induzi-los à apatia política incentivando justamente sua mobilização. 
A estratégia era inteligente: tratava-se de mobilizá-los, sim, mas a padrões de comportamento favoráveis ao 
regime, fazendo da política um tabu. Buscavam, assim, convencer os estudantes da suposta importância de 
atividades como o Projeto Rondon, “uma experiência incrível”, segundo um dos filmetes. Os professores 
também eram convocados a participar. Em um dos filmetes, um professor participante do projeto afirmava: 
“acompanhar estes jovens nos campos avançados é uma tarefa gratificante”. E pedia: “eu faço um apelo aos 
colegas professores para que esclareçam aos universitários o significado deste projeto e a importância de 
participar” (Brasil/AN, 1976c). 
Em outro filmete, com um animado samba de fundo, eram exibidas cenas de jovens universitários 
caminhando e conversando, animados e sorridentes. Depois, cena idêntica com adolescentes, e por fim com 
crianças pequenas, na faixa dos sete anos, todos com uniformes escolares. De fundo, ao final, ouvia-se a voz 
grave do narrador: “O Brasil tem mais de 50 milhões de jovens com menos de 20 anos. O Brasil conta com 
milhões de estudantes. Acredita neles. E precisa deles” (Brasil/AN, 1978a). Em outro filmete do mesmo ano, a 
ideia central era a mesma, resumida na frase final: “um país de jovens precisa contar com eles” (Brasil/AN, 
1978b). 
 
4. A propaganda feita para o regime 
 
Além da propaganda feita pelo regime, havia aquela feita para o regime. Pra ser mais exato, tratava-se de 
efeitos de propaganda de certos discursos veiculados em meios de comunicação “de massas” 670 , como 
programas televisivos, jornais e revistas, assim como em meios circunscritos ao campo da educação superior, 
como panfletos e pequenos periódicos estudantis (que não serão analisados aqui por questões de espaço). Tais 
discursos apresentavam-se como a opinião de grupos específicos, supostamente apolíticos e sem vínculos com 
o regime, o que incrementava significativamente seu potencial para a violência simbólica. 
Desse tipo de propaganda feita de modo parcialmente espontâneo671 por grupos e empresas da sociedade 
civil para o regime, optei por buscar exemplos: (1) na grande imprensa; (2) em programas televisivos. 
 
4.1. Grande imprensa 
 
Algumas matérias do Jornal do Brasil (JB) contribuíram com essa forma de propaganda do regime, a qual, 
com raras e importantes exceções, foi realizada com frequência pela grande imprensa.672 No emblemático 
editorial do JB de 01/04/1964, o apoio ao golpe era total. Jango, segundo o texto, teria dirigido-se “a 
                                                          
667  Exemplo: Brasil/AN (1977c). 
668  Exemplo: Brasil/AN (1977b). 
669  Exemplo: Brasil/AN (1977a). 
670  Compartilho aqui das críticas propostas por John Thompson (1995, p. 287) em relação à noção de “comunicação de 
massas”. 
671  Parcialmente espontâneo porque o contexto impunha uma série de restrições e expectativas. Assim, a análise da 
colaboração com o regime por parte de certas empresas de comunicação deve levar em consideração não apenas eventuais 
congruências ideológicas, mas também as diferentes estratégias de mercado adotadas por tais empresas em um contexto 
político de exceção. Obviamente, essa ressalva não implica em considerar que tais empresas foram coagidas à colaboração, 
o que constituiria um erro crasso. 
672  O jornal Última Hora foi uma dessas raras exceções. Sua história é bastante conhecida: fundado em 1951 por Samuel 
Wainer, esteve desde o princípio fortemente vinculado com o trabalhismo. Após o golpe de 1964, sofreu sérios ataques por 
parte de partidários do novo regime, e Wainer teve seus direitos políticos cassados. Mesmo assim, o jornal conseguiu 
manter-se até 1971. Neste estudo, utilizo Última Hora como uma espécie de contraponto na análise da propaganda do 
regime realizada pela grande imprensa. Isso, obviamente, sem nunca deixar de ter em conta as diversas formas de pressão 
sofridas por aquele periódico após abril de 1964, da censura à autocensura. APESP/UH (s/d). 
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subalternos extremados, em reunião política, em linguagem e pregação subversivas, em tom degradante” e, por 
isso, teria perdido “o direito de ser chamado de Presidente da República”. Goulart não mais mereceria, assim, 
“a lealdade dos verdadeiros brasileiros”, que estariam “restabelecendo a legalidade democrática”, “expurgada 
do objetivo de comunização do Brasil”. Consideravam que “o reformismo do Sr. João Goulart”, ou seja, seu 
apelo às Reformas de Base, fosse “comunização disfarçada em reformismo” (Fora da lei, 1964). 
Na mesma linha, em matéria de capa de 01/07/1968, o JB afirmava que diversos órgãos estudantis, como 
“as extintas UNE e UME” e vários diretórios acadêmicos, teriam realizado uma “reunião secreta” para 
organizar formas de pressionar o governo a “soltar os presos”, “acabar com a repressão policial e com a 
censura artística” e “reabrir o Restaurante do Calabouço”. Informava ainda da prisão de dezenas de estudantes 
em Porto Alegre, do apoio do padre d. Helder Câmara aos estudantes em Recife e que, em São Paulo, 
estudantes estariam planejando voltar às ruas para protestar “contra a prisão de seus colegas”, “dispostos a 
prender policiais para trocá-los pelos estudantes detidos” (MEC-USAID, 1968). 
A revista Veja, criada em 1968 pelo grupo Abril, também deu sua contribuição à manutenção daquela 
ordem social, disseminando alguns dos principais valores do regime. No trecho seguinte, é possível ver como 
são mobilizadas as noções de subversão, esquerdismo e guerra interna, fundamentais para a desqualificação 
de qualquer forma de oposição ao regime: 
 
Dois temas preferidos dos universitários esquerdistas cariocas - o Vietnam e as guerrilhas - estão sendo 
debatidos esta semana na Praia Vermelha, a poucos metros das faculdades da Universidade Federal do Rio 
de Janeiro. Mas desta vez não há perigo de intervenção da DOPS: a reunião é na Escola de Comando do 
Estado-Maior do Exército, onde delegados de dezoito países participam da VIII Conferência dos Exércitos 
Americanos. Sobre o Vietnam fala o General William Westmoreland, 54 anos, ex-comandante das tropas 
dos Estados Unidos em Saigon. Sobre guerrilhas falará, por exemplo, o representante do Exército da 
Bolívia - que combateu e matou Che Guevara. A conferência de Westmoreland e o depoimento boliviano 
sobre guerrilhas são encarados apenas como “troca de experiências militares”. O tema central da 
Conferência será a defesa do continente e a contribuição dos exércitos para o desenvolvimento nacional. A 
tese do Brasil afirma que a segurança da América depende do desenvolvimento econômico, político e social 
de cada país. (...) Toda a teoria da Escola Superior de Guerra, do Brasil, baseou-se, nos últimos vinte anos, 
na hipótese de uma terceira guerra mundial. Os armamentos, dentro dessa teoria, supunham a guerra 
externa. Agora, os militares estão mais preocupados com eventuais inimigos internos (Os exércitos, 1968, 
grifos meus). 
 
 
Nesse trecho, também são mobilizadas as noções de segurança e desenvolvimento, pilares ideológicos 
daquele regime, conforme comentado anteriormente.  
Em outra passagem da mesma edição de Veja, a noção de esquerdismo é novamente mobilizada, desta vez 
para criticar estudantes cariocas que teriam se desentendido com um de seus professores, em um episódio que 
gerou na ocasião uma certa polêmica nos meios de comunicação (Novo terror, 1968, grifos meus).673 Em parte 
através das palavras do intelectual católico ultraconservador Gustavo Corção, Veja assumiu a defesa do 
professor e destilou crítica feroz aos estudantes “de esquerda” que estariam praticando “terrorismo cultural” na 
universidade. Alunos que, segundo a fala tomada de empréstimo de outro professor, seriam ‘indisciplinados’ e 
estariam deixando de assistir as aulas para “discutir política”, algo altamente “subversivo” naquele contexto. 
Conjuntamente, Veja fazia coro com outros veículos de comunicação, que acusavam a diretora daquele 
instituto de conivência com os “estudantes de esquerda”. 
 
 
4.2. Programas televisivos 
 
A televisão também cumpria função fundamental na disseminação dos principais valores do regime. 
Analisarei duas importantes redes televisivas da época: Tupi e Globo.  
Na Tupi, duas das manchetes do Edição Extra (EE) de 06/04/1964 são emblemáticas da adesão do 
programa ao movimento golpista: “Considera-se certa a eleição [sic] do general Castello Branco para a 
Presidência da República” e “Maurício Loureiro Gama salienta, na sua crônica política de hoje: ‘depois de 
uma fortaleza vermelha, só mesmo um Castelo Branco: presidente ideal para passar a limpo o Brasil’” (TV 
Tupi, 1964a). Em 09/04/1964, o EE afirmava: “o famigerado ISEB, que era um curso comunista de extensão 
universitária, vai ser extinto, segundo  informa o Diário da Noite (...)” (TV Tupi, 1964c).674 Em 07/08/1964, 
informava o noticiário da Tupi sobre a decisão de Castello “em prosseguir nas reformas, democraticamente e 
sem demagogias”, e que a “concentração de críticas contra o governo” seria parte “de um esquema de grupos 
                                                          
673  Sobre a polêmica, ver, a título de exemplo: Filosofia (1968). 
674  Sobre o Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros, ver Toledo (1997). 
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interessados em que as principais reformas democráticas não sejam realizadas” (TV Tupi, 1964b). Já em 
27/02/1969, na seção Ponto final, de Maurício Loureiro Gama, afirmava-se que os cinejornais iriam ser 
“obrigados a apresentar também assuntos de interesse educativo, nos termos do sábio, oportuníssimo decreto 
assinado pelo Presidente da República”, e louvava a iniciativa de impor aos meios de comunicação “mais 
espaço dedicado a elevar os níveis moral, cívico e cultural do povo” (TV Tupi, 1969). 
A vaga e flexível noção de “povo” também serviu por diversas vezes à propaganda realizada pela Globo 
para o regime. Tomemos aqui um exemplo bastante representativo. Trata-se do programa O Povo e o 
Presidente, criado em 1982 na Rede Globo, em horário nobre (aos domingos, após o programa Fantástico), 
com a participação do então presidente, o general Figueiredo, convidado pessoalmente por Roberto Marinho. 
No programa nº 25, veiculado em 23/01/1983, o ditador era questionado por um suposto ouvinte quanto à 
pequena oferta de vagas para cursos como Engenharia ou Medicina no turno da noite, inviabilizando a 
participação de trabalhadores que desejassem aprofundar seus estudos. Figueiredo, contradizendo o suposto 
ouvinte, afirmou que existia no país “um número considerável de cursos de ensino superior em horários 
vespertinos ou noturnos”. Na área de Engenharia, segundo o general, já haveria “cerca de 40 cursos 
vespertinos e noturnos e a tendência verificada, nos últimos anos, é de uma ampliação na proporção de cursos 
oferecidos à tarde e à noite”, resultando em “um maior número de opções para aqueles que, além de trabalhar, 
desejam cursar estudos de nível superior” (Brasil/PR/GC/SID/CD, 1983, p. 38). O que não estava sendo dito é 
que a referida ampliação da oferta de cursos havia ocorrido majoritariamente através do crescimento da 
educação privada, o que, na prática, continuava a inviabilizar, para muitos trabalhadores, a frequência ao 
curso.675 A narrativa dinâmica da televisão, contudo, induz a maioria dos espectadores a uma interpretação 
pouco ou nada crítica do conteúdo veiculado. Fundamentalmente, o que deveria ficar daquela passagem do 
programa da rede Globo, para muitas pessoas, eram ideias do tipo “só não estuda quem não quer”. 
Cumulativamente, tais ideias acabam sendo assimiladas pelo senso comum e reproduzidas através de diversas 
formas, inclusive por meio de chavões e ditados como o referido, executando uma função de sedimentação 
ideológica da mais alta importância para a manutenção de uma determinada ordem social. 
 
5. Funções de controle da propaganda sobre a educação superior 
 
Finalmente, apresentarei algumas considerações de caráter exploratório a respeito daquelas que entendo 
serem as principais funções de controle exercidas pela propaganda sobre a  educação superior naquele 
contexto.  
A primeira função que abordarei é a face mais visível da questão: a propaganda como instrumento de 
formação de consensos favoráveis. Em relação a esse aspecto, a propaganda atuava em duas frentes: no reforço 
de afinidades pré-existentes com o regime e na constituição de novas afinidades.  
O termo “manipulação” parece-me adequado, mas penso que deva ser utilizado e interpretado com 
cuidado. De fato tratava-se de manipular, através de associações, ênfases e omissões. Muitas pessoas eram 
levadas, por certas ações de propaganda, a acreditar que aquela ditadura era uma democracia, que o golpe de 
Estado dado em 1964 (caracterizado como “revolução democrática”) salvara o país do “comunismo”, e assim 
por diante.  
Tratava-se, portanto, de clara manipulação. Porém, é preciso cautela no uso desse termo. Em primeiro 
lugar, para que o poder do sistema de controle não seja superestimado. A propaganda era um forte instrumento 
de controle, mas também tinha suas limitações. Em segundo lugar, para que não sejam isentados de 
responsabilidade os muitos indivíduos e grupos que, mesmo conscientes das violências e abusos de toda ordem 
sobre os quais aquele regime fora constituído e se mantinha, ainda assim emprestaram seu apoio ativo, fato 
decisivo para o sucesso e longa duração daquela ditadura.  
A questão obviamente é delicada. Aqui interessa apenas destacar que, como em casos análogos, a 
propaganda valia-se de certas ideias, arraigadas no senso comum, na ideologia dominante e em certos 
imaginários, para alcançar seus objetivos de controle social.  
Outra importante função da propaganda era ajudar na disseminação da ideia de subversão, principal 
fundamento teórico daquele sistema de controle social. A veiculação dessa noção no rádio, na televisão, no 
cinema, em jornais e revistas constituía, assim, uma das mais importantes formas de propaganda do regime. 
Apoiava-se naquela ideia todo o amplo e permanente esforço no sentido da criação de uma aparência de 
legitimidade para aquele regime, marcado pela ilegitimidade de origem característica das ditaduras (Aróstegui, 
2012). À noção de “subversão” recorria-se constantemente. O “subversivo” seria, assim, o “inimigo interno” 
contra o qual as “forças democráticas” do país lutavam, travando aquela sangrenta “guerra interna”.  
Curiosa inversão, na qual intitulavam-se “democratas” os subversivos que haviam em 1964 ignorado a 
                                                          
675  Ver, a esse respeito, Minto (2006, p. 87-138; 180-181). Ele indica que, no período 1960-1980, enquanto o ensino superior 
público teve um aumento de 36,99% no número de instituições, no setor privado esse aumento correspondeu a 498,25%, e 
que, também naquele período, enquanto no setor público o número de matrículas aumentou 848,15%, no privado aumentou 
2.043,66%. 
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Magna Carta vigente e deposto um presidente democraticamente eleito, ao mesmo tempo em que tentavam 
justificar, como suposta “luta contra a subversão”, as violências e arbítrios praticados pelo regime ditatorial 
por eles imposto à maior parte da sociedade brasileira. 
Como acredito ter sido evidenciado ao longo deste texto, a propaganda cumpria um papel central nesse 
processo de manipulação, fundamental para a manutenção daquela ordem social injusta e fortemente 
excludente. As permanências daquele regime, claramente perceptíveis nos dias atuais em diversos âmbitos da 
sociedade brasileira, são indicativas da força daquele modo de controle social. Daí a importância dos estudos 
históricos sobre o tema, bem como da ampla divulgação de seus resultados em linguagem clara e acessível, 
para que as pessoas, na medida do possível, estejam preparadas para identificar estratégias sutis de controle, 
análogas àquelas aqui abordadas, e possam, assim, atuar de modo consciente e participativo na consolidação da 
democracia e na construção de uma sociedade mais justa. 
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From the maintenance of perpetual peace, of Kantian rationality, to the current “smartpower”, defended by 
the American administration, through the principle of subsidiarity within the European Union, it is imposed to 
the governance of the people, understood as a state’s administration or government, a diversification of forms 
and representations, contextualized in temporally and spatially complex studies. The strategic question 
represented by the evolution of public spending, in specific sectors such as Health and Education, rather than 
in Defense, tend to be understood as an evolutionary trend of the indicators of human development. 676. 
 
In the educational context, contingencies do not allow that the analyses of public action 
be merely circumscribed to the observation of laws and of the social and economical structures, since the 
analysis of transformations is structured in a long duration, in culture and on mentalities.  
 
Observing the efforts of instruction through “…the society’s sensibility and accountability (…) and, 
(…) by the involvement of the local living forces. The governmentalisation of the process gave way 
to a heavy mesh of organs, hierarchically and administratively integrated – from parishes, involving 
municipalities, civilian governments, district boards, inspection, central government. The vision of 
instructional matters (…) has reinforced the organicity and has originated a solution open to 
external mediation, whose regulation was simultaneously a factor of order and evolution...”.677 
 
This study aims to determine the level of intervention, in the domain of the shared competences of 
committees or Juntas.  
In the eighteenth century, the archival records of the Three States Junta (1755), whose activity was 
extinguished by charter, in 1813, reveal assets, forms of collection, levy, and confiscation.  
The various business of the Algarve (kingdom), whose customs authorities of Portimão, Lagos and Faro, 
rich in fishing, were registered in the letters of the governor e captain of the Algarve678.  
The chronological section, corresponding to the period of the liberal fights, in which the army of D. Pedro 
IV was besieged in Oporto by the army of D. Miguel, shows the establishment of a governing junta, the 
Provisional Junta of Oporto (1828-1833), which gives an account of the insurgency regime being favorable to 
regional autonomy. 
The information concerning the Provisional Government Juntas (1808) 679  and the conferences of the 
Revision of the Bills Junta (1823-1824), from the first national liberalism, were recently inventoried680.  
The minutes of the School Junta of Olhão, already analyzed, as well as the ones from the municipalities of 
Tavira and Faro, show formal structures, in the context of the provision of educational public policy.  
Citing the report of the Faro district inspector, Francisco Augusto de Quintanilha e Mendonça, dated 
December 1st of 1890 : 
 
“… the attention of our statesmen (…) has neglected (…) the truly important fulfillment of the 
desideratum of those who believe in the seed that instruction and public education can give to the 
nation, dedicated servers,  freedom, conscious sectarians and not frenzied, to religion proselytes of 
                                                          
676 O Marquês de Olhão na Obra de Alberto Iria. Atas do Congresso Histórico OLHÃO, O ALGARVE & PORTUGAL no 
tempo das Invasões Francesas, 14-16 Nov.2008.  Município de Olhão Edition. 
677 This comunication is part of the work developed by Unidade de Investigação e Desenvolvimento em Educação e 
Formação, scientific guidance of Professor Doutor Justino de Magalhães- Atlas – Repertório dos Municípios na Educação e 
na Cultura em Portugal (1820-1986), PTDC/CPE-PEC/116938/1010.  
678 Torre do Tombo - Ministério do Reino maço 607- 1761-1761; maço 608 – 1762-1766 maço 609 – 1774-1775. 
679 Torre do Tombo - Ministério do Reino – maço 593 
680 Lisboa, 1999, coordination Maria do Carmo Jasmim Dias. Farinha Paulo Tremoceiro, Teresa Revés Jorge. Secretaria de 
Estado dos Negócios do Reino Ministério do Reino – Inventário. Publicação do Instituto dos Arquivos Nacionais/Torre do 
Tombo. Direcção de Serviços de Arquivística IANT/TT. 
 203 
living belief without fanaticism: because true religion cannot exist that faces ignorance as an 
indispensable mean to achieve the salvation of the soul (…). Finally, I shall mention that the most 
remarkable abuses committed by the administrative Corporations of this circumscription, arise from 
the almost total indifference to everything that is relevant to these matters of instruction…”681  
 
 
The School Juntas, obey to three separate periods, the first is situated towards the end of the nineteenth 
century (1881-1892), the following in the first half of the twentieth century (Decree n.º 5787 and 16024, 10 th of 
May of 1919 and 13th of October of 1928). 
In the thirties, the report of Faro’s civil governor notes the problematic of Work, before the political 
situation and the doctrinal Propaganda. Centralized power, dissipated by the inauguration of Houses of the 
People and the institution of syndicates in nationalist activities, gives rise to the improvement of schools 
through local desires. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 681 Torre do Tombo. Handwritten report on deposit inscribed in the volume 379, do Ministério da Instrução Pública, Maço 
3, Case 4. 
 204 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Second World War 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 205 
Tourism in Portugal at the beginning of the Second World War 
 – an innocent oasis in Europe, or the achievements 
 of disguised propaganda 
 
 
 
Cândida Cadavez, 
Escola Superior de Hotelaria e Turismo do Estoril 
 
 
Whenever I refer to the subject of propaganda, I associate it to the p
olitical education of the Portuguese people. The main purposes of pr
opaganda are the following: firstly to inform, and secondly to educa
te in political terms. 
Salazar, 1943: 195 
 
Introduction 
This article discusses the importance of tourism-based representations as an effective vehicle of hidden pro
paganda for strengthening and validating the Estado Novo dictatorship in Portugal, particularly within the cont
ext of the outbreak of the Second World War. As more and more areas fell under the auspices of the official bu
reau of propaganda, it proves worthwhile to acknowledge how tourism narratives became relevant tools for dis
seminating the features of the new political regime. In fact, these seemed particularly effective devices for disp
laying the new “Nation” both to nationals and to foreign guests. The former group were to recognize the uniqu
eness and singularity of Portugal through the display of allegedly national icons, while the latter group was inv
ited to recognize and advocate the neutrality confirmed by Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, the ruling president, in
 September 1939. 
 
 
Propaganda and the Portuguese Context 
 
The Sociedade de Propaganda de Portugal was established in the final years of the monarchy, in 1906, by 
a charter that stressed the need for a well organized system of national propaganda able to pursue the activities 
appropriate to promoting the country. This official document highlighted the patriotic drivers of propaganda an
d indicated ways in which these would serve to attract national and foreign guests to visit and get acquainted w
ith Portugal. In keeping with this motivation, tourism was identified as one way to accomplish this goal, while 
the need for an inventory of monuments, the importance of creating more itineraries, the relevance and purpose
 of participating in exhibitions and fairs, alongside the importance of holding tourism conferences and studies 
were all mentioned (vd. Sociedade de Propaganda de Portugal, s/d). 
Nevertheless, the ideological context that followed the 1926 National Revolution, which ended the military
 dictatorship that had taken over after the declaration of the Republic in 1910, enabled the implementation of S
alazar’s nationalist oriented political regime that demanded a far more formal and state-dependent sort of prop
agandistic strategies within the framework of its broadly dictatorial approach. As such, 1933, the year when se
veral iconic moments legitimised the new political paradigm, including a new political constitution and the sett
ing up of a new political police entity, also proved the occasion for launching the Secretariado da Propaganda
 Nacional/SPN (the Bureau for National Propaganda). Decree number 23:054, dated 25th September 1933, exp
lained the need for this department, perceived as a humble Portuguese version of the ministries of propaganda 
already existing in other countries at the time and stated that such a bureau had to be effective enough to rally t
he Portuguese population around the moral creeds deemed to henceforth constitute the values of the “Nation”. 
This same decree highlighted an apparently urgent need to organize and monitor Portuguese internal and exter
nal propaganda, as was ongoing in other European regimes and correspondingly clarifying that the new secreta
riat would be divided up between national and international departments. Such a strategy represented a clear in
dication as to the importance attributed to foreign audiences within the scope of ideologically validating the Es
tado Novo, therewith providing an obvious clue as to the significance that would therefore be assigned to the to
urism industry. The same decree furthermore informed how public festivities and national and international ex
hibitions would be organized and staged as acknowledged and valuable means of both education and propagan
da.  
Between 1933 and 1949 the national bureaus of propaganda in Portugal would be managed by António Fer
ro, the journalist and writer who had “interviewed” Salazar in 1932. Apparently only after strong insistence fro
m Ferro did Salazar acknowledge the need for this new institution that ended up boosting the relationships bet
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ween the politician and the population. Ferro became a vital figure in designing and promoting the new Portug
uese “Nation” as was to a great extent involved in pretty much all of the events incorporating the newly hatche
d political paradigm, which also included his concern with the representations drafted for the purposes of touri
sm. He undertook intense and assertive initiatives that would end up shaping and impacting on different sector
s of the Estado Novo. Popular culture, art and tourism were some of his favourite areas and he explored them 
widely throughout those sixteen years, in which Salazar trusted him to prepare and exhibit the authorized repre
sentations of the “Nation”, both to domestic and international publics. 
 
 
Salazar on propaganda 
 
In 1911, Salazar had already stated that the “motherland should be the root of life (...). We should go back t
o the traditional values, which are the basis of civilization: Nation, Family, Authority, Hierarchy and above all,
 God” (Trabulo, 2008: 27), thereby already announcing the foundations of the ideology that would come to sha
pe the Estado Novo in later decades. In fact, these would be the core elements of the propagandistic narratives 
set out to describe and validate the new political regime. They made up the essence of the frequently reproduce
d narratives of the “Nation” imagined by Salazar and designed by Ferro, and especially at a time when Europe 
was plunged into severe conflict, i.e. in the latter half of the 1930s. 
However, the five “interviews” Salazar gave to António Ferro in 1932 probably represent the first and one 
of the foremost assertive propagandistic devices of the Estado Novo. Their undeniable value results from the fa
ct that those dialogues, whose official motivation was to introduce the new political leader to the “Nation”, stat
ed Salazar’s opinions about the most important issues to be achieved through the still young political paradigm
, such as the regime’s validity and his legitimacy for leading it. 
In 1933, these five “interviews” were published in book format, with readers clarified of its purposes from t
he outset through the preface written by Salazar himself. The first thirty three pages of the book provided the s
cope for the politician to explain that those “interviews” should “correct wrong interpretations, improve the qu
ality of the picture, replace incorrect notions of a man and his work” (Salazar, 2007 [1935]: ix). This preface w
ould basically enable Salazar to call the attention of readers to what he considered the most important informat
ion provided by the book, guiding them down very obvious propagandistic paths and framing the reading of th
e actual “interviews”. 
Out of the several subjects discussed by Salazar over the five “interviews”, he referred to one particular issue, 
which would be frequently recalled in by the representations of the “Nation” that simultaneously held both ide
ological and tourism purposes. In fact, a propos his alleged meanderings with Ferro, Salazar mentioned one of 
the narratives that would become more recurrently deployed as a means to portray the uniqueness of Portugal i
n his elaboration of the differences between the authentic and essential countryside versus the falsity and inacc
uracy of the cities (vd. Salazar, 2007 [1935]: xx). 
Propaganda was the main subject of several official discourses issued by Salazar. In particular, we may refe
r to the speech he delivered on the opening of first bureau for national propaganda, the SPN, on 26th October 1
933. He took the occasion to clearly explain how the regime made sense of propaganda, illustrating his beliefs 
when mentioning the need to reveal the truth and help everyone in “looking beyond whatever can be seen from
 the window of their bedroom” (Salazar, 1961 [1935]: 263). “National Propaganda”, the speech delivered by S
alazar on that occasion, was broadcast on the national radio station and published in the newspapers, with the o
pening of the bureau justified as a need for new political paths. Propaganda, he added, should not only be reco
gnised as a tool beneficial to the good government of the “Nation” but should also specifically reflect the Portu
guese reality (vd. Salazar, 1961 [1935]: 259-268). The ruler took the opportunity to comment on the need for t
he production of valid documents about the history of Portugal and its national monuments, while also announ
cing that the national borders and public life were open to everyone, while simultaneously stressing the kindne
ss of traditional Portuguese hospitality (Salazar, 1961 [1935]: 265). In a formal meeting with the National Unio
n, in February 1940, Salazar stated his belief that the sort of education provided by propaganda would allow th
e population to identify with all the developments undertaken by the new regime, thereby ending any feelings 
of ingratitude (vd. Salazar, 1943; 195-197). 
 
 
Tourism as a vehicle of propaganda  
 
Assessing how the propagandistic mechanisms were managed by the Estado Novo regime proves particular
ly interesting especially when considering how other countries were either at war or going through severe confl
ict, as happened for example with the beginning of the Spanish civil war in 1936 and the world conflict trigger
ed in 1939. The serious political and social problems spreading throughout Europe in the late 1930s seem to ha
ve fostered new inspiration among those in charge of creating and promoting the core of the so called “new Na
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tion”. While on the one hand the Salazar regime feared that similar winds of controversy might damage the cal
m and peace they were frequently mentioning to refer to the new state of affairs in Portugal, on the other hand, 
those same problems happening just on the other side of the border somehow allowed Portuguese propaganda t
o emphasize a supposed national distinctiveness. 
The “Nation” was officially portrayed as a unique geography, different to all other countries and, as Antóni
o Ferro uttered, while battles were going on Portugal should implement the necessary infrastructures so as to pr
epare itself in such a way that the rest of the world would come to identify the country as the much longed for 
peaceful oasis amidst the tormented and devastated Europe (vd. Ferro, 1949: 62). Portugal should be identified
 by everyone as “the ideal model of tourism and becoming the nursing home for a suffering, tired and sick Eur
ope” (Ferro, 1949: 54). 
The possibility of linking tourism and propaganda had previously been lengthily discussed at several offici
al meetings. The National Union, the only “non-political party” allowed in Portugal and whose purpose was to 
support Estado Novo, met for the first time in a congress held in 1934 and convened with the objective of payi
ng tribute to the deeds accomplished by Salazar’s regime. Considering the importance of the event, it is particu
larly relevant to acknowledge that some of the papers presented argued that tourism was a nationalist activity i
n the sense that it was the perfect arena to recall, exhibit and praise the traditional and authentic representations
 of the Portuguese “Nation” (Silva, 1935: 55, Torres, 1935: 93). Tourism was declared as a legitimate vehicle f
or evoking the material and moral assets of the “Nation” and to raise awareness over the past, present and futur
e of Portugal (vd. Torres, 1935: 71). Only countries like Portugal that were not plunged in war would have the 
opportunity to develop their tourism industries, which should try as much as possible to captivate foreign visito
rs who would later be able to spread the word about the particularities of the Estado Novo (vd. Ferreira, 1935: 
347). The delegates to this congress also agreed that Portugal could increase its tourism skills by paying attenti
on to that then being done by Spain and Italy, for example (vd. Torres, 1935: 111). 
Two years later, in 1936, another meeting took place in Lisbon with its major purpose being to give the flo
or to the professionals involved in the tourism business. The First National Congress of Tourism was widely co
vered by the media and officially supported by the regime, as would be expected. During the four-day gatherin
g seventy nine delegates discussed specific destinations and plans for developing the industry, and praised the 
way Salazar was protecting the “Nation”, thus allowing tourism to expand (Fonseca, 1936: 61, Guimarãis, 193
6: 46). In most speeches, tourism was presented as a vital mechanism for exhibiting the new “Nation” and as a 
mirror to the blossoming of Salazar’s Portugal, a country that honoured its heroic past through displays in mus
eums and monuments (vd. Guimarãis, 1936: 48-49). The specific propaganda requested by tourism (vd. Santos
, 1936: 1, Sousa, 1936: 4) and the labelling of Portugal as a shelter for Europe (Santos, 1936: 4) were recurrent
 subjects, as was the importance of perfectly welcoming and hosting foreign visitors (vd. Spratley, 1936: 5). 
A 1939 decreed stated that tourism would be a new competence of the SPN bureau for national propaganda
. The reason for this was probably still some months away, the Portuguese World Exhibition, which would tak
e place between June and December 1940 in Lisbon. However, ever since the opening of that bureau, António 
Ferro had always been very much involved in all sorts of tourism related activities, which he considered as the 
ideal stage for exhibiting popular culture as understood by the Estado Novo. The bureau director was an enthus
iast of all sorts of activities involving foreign contacts and considered tourism as a field worthy of investment. 
Hence, this follower of Salazar’s ideology maintained that “the international reputation of a nation results, in m
any aspects, from the way it organizes its tourism activity” (Ferro, 1949: 35). 
 
The hidden propaganda in two different tourism representations: tourism for nationals and tourism for 
foreigners 
 
As happened in ideological paradigms similar to that implemented by Salazar in Portugal throughout a sign
ificant proportion of the last century, popular culture would feed most of the representations of the “Nations”, 
as it was officially believed that this group of society stood out as the most authentic core of an ancient country
 protected from evil by brave leaders, as supposedly was the case with the Portuguese council president. Theref
ore, the virtues of this segment of the population were very often extolled in narratives that exhibited it as a reli
gious, loyal and hard-working people. 
In 1938 the SPN published a set of seven posters, A Lição de Salazar (Salazar’s Lesson) due to celebrate th
e tenth anniversary of Salazar’s first serious involvement with Portuguese politics and exalt the benefits broug
ht to the “Nation” by Salazar’s dedicated input. Deus, Pátria, Família (God, Motherland, Family), maybe the b
est known poster in this collection, is a clear reflection of the regime’s preferences by featuring a spotless mod
est rural household, in which religious and national icons were also on display. 
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Image 1 - Salazar’s Lesson, 1938 
 
This would also be the pattern followed when coming up with tourism representations. The exhibitions and 
re-enactments of iconic moments and characters in a history deemed brave and heroic were designed to suppor
t the unique “Nation” concept and constituted another subject shared by authorized representations of Portugal,
 even when the goal was promoting the country’s tourism sector. 
The sharing of these two main thematic areas would then be carefully negotiated by Ferro throughout his pr
opaganda campaigns so that Salazar’s ideological purposes might be spread to both nationals and foreigners an
d the political goals achieved. 
In the 1930s, Portugal was clearly divided into two different tourism destinations, which also corresponded 
to two obvious ways for conveying the propagandistic patterns of Estado Novo in a disguised, but effective fas
hion. 
On the one hand, there was the national target. The authorized tourism stories due to be told this particular 
group suggested humble practices and insisted on representations of popular culture and of historical themes, t
hus reminding us of Salazar’s Lesson. Actually, as illustrated by the following examples, rather similar images
 would be deployed a couple of years later in a document also prepared by Ferro’s SPN, Cartilha da Hospedag
em Portuguesa (Booklet of Portuguese Hospitality).  
 
     
Image 2 – Booklet of Portuguese Hospitality, 1941 
This booklet explained how Portuguese tourism authorities were to go about preparing the hosting infrastru
ctures designed to accommodate national tourists outside urban areas. Augusto Pinto was the author of the writ
ten guidelines with Emério Nunes, the picture editor. The final result was an easy to understand and follow doc
ument that insisted on this type of lodging sticking to the trends of a supposedly authentic national simplicity a
nd avoiding chic patterns unsuitable to the surrounding locations. 
The plan to set up the Pousadas which represented an important facet to the whole entire 1940 Double Co
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mmemorations of the “Nation” programme also referred to the need to retain a rural imagery. The Pousadas w
ere lodging houses located outside the cities and thus instructed to obey non-urban trends in terms of both their
 decoration and their gastronomy. There is a general belief that the Pousadas somehow resulted from copying t
he Spanish paradores. However, they had already long since been proposed as a response to the need to provid
e a so-called traditionally Portuguese sort of accommodation for tourists travelling around the country on more
 modest means. We would here identify the following interesting coincidence: in the very same year that the S
panish civil war broke out, which drove fears in the Portuguese regime over its stability getting threatened by s
uch close conflicts, also proved the date when the Fundação Nacional para a Alegria no Trabalho / FNAT (Na
tional Foundation for Joy at Work) was established. This was a poorer and less ambitious version of similar or
ganizations then existing in Italy and Germany, and whose main purpose was to enable the regimes to organize
 and structure the free time of workers. A 1936 decree implemented FNAT based on an officially announced n
eed to care for the physical and psychological wellbeing of the poorest social classes, otherwise unable to affor
d proper leisure or education. For several decades FNAT would serve as another surreptitious but effective pro
pagandistic tool for spreading new Portuguese values. Excursions and tours would be carefully prepared so the
 participants might have the opportunity to get acquainted with meaningful locations within the particular ideol
ogical frame of Estado Novo. Thus, visitors would preferably travel to iconic Guimarães (a symbol of the birth
place of the Portuguese national identity), Alcobaça (intimately linked with the founding of the Portuguese mo
narchy and the place where Afonso Henriques was proclaimed King), or Batalha (a monastery built to comme
morate the victory of the Portuguese over the Castilians at the Battle of Aljubarrota in 1385). Other favourite a
ctivities run by FNAT included visits to public exhibitions of popular culture artefacts or practices, which mig
ht consist of visiting a museum or attending a musical parade. 
As mentioned above, these three examples of tourism-oriented representations mostly targeted the Portugue
se tourism market and were designed to result in an effective strategy to spread, repeat and validate ideological
 lessons that would remind nationals of the characteristics that featured this old new “Nation”. 
The international market was also a preferential target of the Portuguese propaganda through naive tourism 
stories, probably as a consequence of the statement of neutrality announced to the world by Salazar in Septemb
er 1939 and due to the strategic and political interests prevailing. To attract foreign empathy to his political par
adigm, Salazar authorized the creation of a completely different kind of tourism that not only nurtured but also 
boosted behavioural and social practices incomparable to those forced upon the national population. That micr
o tourism destination was labelled as Costa do Sol (Sunny Coast would be the international brand used) and co
mprised the coastal area between São Julião da Barra and Guincho, just outside Lisbon itself. Fausto de Figueir
edo had identified that region several years earlier but only under Salazar’s regime did it become the internatio
nal resort Figueiredo had dreamed of, particularly in the region that included São Pedro do Estoril, São João do
 Estoril and Santo António do Estoril. 
 
 
 
Image 3 – Sunny Coast, 1930s 
Instead of extolling and promoting humbleness and modest attitudes and practices, Costa do Sol’s imagery 
was luxurious and sophisticated so that the task of attracting foreign markets would be easier. Those travellers,
 fleeing from conflicts and wars, such as the Spanish civil war and the Second World War, would be hosted in 
an ambience that allowed them to carry on the social routines of the high societies they had been forced to leav
e behind. The schedule awaiting these travellers was busy and included parties, movies, parades and open-air a
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ctivities. The accesses there had been improved tremendously so the poorest and most degraded areas located a
 little further from the coast would not be identified by those touring either onboard the comfortable Sud-Expre
ss train that travelled from Paris to Santo António do Estoril, or along a recently constructed coastal road whic
h linked Lisbon to this Costa do Sol. The accommodation catering for these foreigners differed from the faciliti
es dedicated to national tourists. In fact, palace hotels and similar chic lodging houses hosted not only these tra
vellers, but also refugees and spies. 
It seems clear that there was a very valid motivation for the Estado Novo regime to accept and authorize all
 the differences happening in Costa do Sol. This exception does suggest that allowing such diverse patterns of 
behaviour was probably a propagandistic strategy of Estado Novo and reflected its neutrality towards the confli
cts then ongoing around the world. Costa do Sol was sought out by travellers and refugees from the most differ
ent national and social backgrounds, who arrived seeking the promised peace and tranquillity that distinguishe
d the “Nation” sheltered from danger and riots by Salazar. Here, they were able to continue a social routine si
milar to that otherwise shattered by the war and witness the tolerance and neutrality promoted by the Portugues
e regime. On the other hand, this different imagery would be observed from afar by nationals, who were thus ta
ught to consider these as behaviours not suitable for adoption. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article argues that the tourism narratives of the early years of the Estado Novo, i.e. during the Spanish 
civil war and the Second World War, were compounded by references similar to those put forward by the regi
me’s ideological propaganda. The lessons dedicated to Portuguese travellers would repeat the same iconic stori
es based on a popular culture deemed authentic and on the history of the “Nation”. This continuous echo of the
 same national representation left hardly any void space for wondering or creativity, which ended up forcing th
e population to accept the official validations created as a means of self-authorization by the regime and thereb
y imposing this belief in a coherent national unity. 
However, in contrast, foreign visitors were allowed to pursue distinct practices and enjoy less regulated soc
ial routines thereby inviting them to believe in the much heralded tolerance and neutrality of Portugal. 
Tourism is usually associated with the idea of relaxed ambiences, where light, unimportant activities are en
gaged in. As such, tourists easily accept what they observe and experience during their leisure time. Therefore,
 conveying propagandistic messages through tourism representations would seem a particularly cunning strateg
y for imposing ideologies in a very veiled way. People would easily accept these lessons without a great deal o
f questioning. Portuguese targets would acknowledge a father-like protector and understand the need to remain
 united against foreign dangers as well as the non-approved attitudes of peoples at war and without modest patt
erns of behaviour. Thus, the conflicts overhanging other nationalities worked as a natural boost for national co
hesion. 
In one of his speeches, Salazar stated that propaganda was a means of political education, whose purpose w
as to inform and to educate (vd. Salazar, 1943: 195). Tourism was the ideal arena to attain this objective. Withi
n this framework, Salazar and Ferro proved easily able negotiate just what to show and what to hide with censo
rship, a tremendous effective tool deployed by propaganda to play this game of hide and seek within an activit
y otherwise not especially linked with serious information. The already mentioned 1933 decree founding the S
PN was very clear when it mentioned the urge to stop spreading any information that might result in the upsetti
ng of ideas that would corrupt national unity or its defined interests. Tourism was, and still is, acknowledged a
s an activity exhibiting simple and natural realities and able to promote peace. 
Curiously enough, in 1944, when the Bureau for National Propaganda changed its title, the word “propagan
da” was replaced by the expression “information, popular culture and tourism”. With the long period of conflic
t drawing to a close, retaining “propaganda” in an official title would have represented some sort of embarrass
ment to the regime. Thus, the Portuguese solution became renaming the entity which continued with just the sa
me sort of propagandistic activity as before. To achieve that purpose, “propaganda” was replaced by “informat
ion, popular culture and tourism”, i.e. the vehicles that had always been applied by the propaganda mechanism
s of the Estado Novo regime. And tourism was certainly one of these, and especially where there were wars goi
ng on. 
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For years fascism attacked democracy by pointing its divisions and ineffectiveness out as the cause of the 
deep crisis suffered by the European societies. All over the continent fascist leaderships promised immediate 
and radical responses to overcome such a difficult moment, so people would have to leave the “empty talk” of 
past times by taking initiative with its bare hands. It was crucial to make it look the only possible way, for this 
reason propagandistic efforts tried to turn fascism into a dogma of faith which put down roots inside men’s 
internal drives, fears, apprehensions, social and cultural dynamics to be then codified and projected on 
reality.682 In that sense, fascist movements carried out from its very birth a sublimation of action, placed as the 
key moral code of the movement, the paradigmatic expression of the fascist man, and the best way to feel the 
fascist experience itself.683 In spite of some mutual differences, fascisms –rose themselves up from war, 
violence, and trauma– and armies –with their complex cultures of war [Weltanschauungskrieg, in nazi terms]– 
come to terms in this respect throughout Europe, as we can see in the Spanish case during the Civil War or in 
the German one during the campaign of annexations and the World War itself. They both were infused by a 
similar culture and marked by an almost analogous perception of reality: the respect for military values, the 
fear to the revolutionary threat, the scorn of democracy, the nationalist spirit, or the longing for order and 
hierarchy were their common worries.684 At the same time, they both saw the other as the perfect partner to be 
more powerful and influential, to get acceptance and legitimacy, and to carry out their own designs.  
 
Fascism found in war the way –if not the only, of course the best one– to get its two main projects: the 
forging of the national community [Volksgemeinschaft] by getting the necessary fascistization of society 
through that effort and the achievement of the New Order thanks to the warlike state of exception 
[Ausnahmezustand]. In an unprecedented way military and politics were fused together by fascism, they both 
encouraged each other. From the fascist point of view when soldiers made war they were making politics 
because they were providing the highest service to their community, and in this trance they were writing 
history by hand. It happened in such a way that they lived a fascist experience through the combat one, 
something inevitable because of the fascist atmosphere of mobilization where continuous fascists discourses 
identified the opponent as the enemy of Fascism, that is to say, European civilization. So, combatants were 
posed and considered by fascism at the vanguard of their national communities, they were the bearers of truth 
and justice, new Prometheus who went to save the civilization in an annihilation war. Obviously this mythical-
poetic codification of the conflict and the soldier’s place in history made easier his task of death and 
destruction. To keep alive this understanding of reality was not an easy task, for this reason the Wehrmacht 
and the German Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda spared no effort to maintain and reinforce 
it. With “an endless stream of leaflets, brochures, speeches, radio talks, newspaper articles, and all other forms 
of propaganda directed at the troops throughout the war” they both tried to manage combatants’ perceptions 
fulfilling the role of spaces for the codification of their sentiments and appealing to cultural formulas familiar 
to them.685  
The fact is that something changed at Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union, in spite of the ideological 
terrain had been prepared long time ago. Talking about the war, fascist language had always been pompous, 
                                                          
682  Klaus THEWELEIT: Male Fantasies. Volume 1: Women, Floods, Bodies, History, Minneapolis, University of 
Minnesota Press, 2007 [1977], and Male Fantasies. Volume 2 Male Bodies: Psychoanalyzing the White Terror, 
Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1989 [1978]. 
683 In the end the very concept of “movement” [Bewegung, in German, or movimiento, in Spanish], used by fascists to refer 
to their own political organization, reflects the will of accomplishing permanent dynamism, mobilization, and action. 
684 Ferran GALLEGO: El evangelio fascista. La formación de la cultura política del franquismo (1930-1950), Barcelona, 
Crítica, 2014 [in press]; Javier RODRIGO: Cruzada, Paz, Memoria: la Guerra Civil en sus relatos, Granada, Comares, 
2013, pp. 9-52, and Omer BARTOV: Hitler’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich, New York, Oxford 
University Press, 1992, pp. 127-138. 
685 BARTOV: op. cit., p. 120. 
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but this time German fascism went for broke. As Hitler stated the very 22nd June: “At this moment a march is 
taking place that, for its extent, compares with the greatest the world has ever seen. I have decided again today 
to place the fate and future of the Reich and our people in the hands of our soldiers. May God aid us, especially 
in this fight”.686 In fact, some months ago he had pointed his generals out that this struggle was “one of 
ideologies and racial differences and will have to be conducted with unprecedented, unmerciful and 
unrelenting harshness”.687 At the same time as the war in the Ostfront was on it had to imply the conquest of 
the long-awaited Lebensraum and the construction of a German empire over there, so fascist leadership 
ordered and waited the cooperation of all German and Axis forces to get it.688 This results in increasingly 
demanding expectations: immediate execution of communist political commissars; cooperation in anti-partisan 
operations where the line between combatant and civilian was completely blurred; or collaboration in massive 
executions of Jewish populations.689 For this reason the fascist propagandistic machinery began to work in full 
performance to justify in the home front what was going on in Russia, and to give ideological and moral 
support to the soldiers, who would make politics through war and violence from now on.  
Without a doubt one of the key propagandistic efforts was the “Europe’s Crusade against Bolshevism” 
[Kreuzzug gegen den Bolschewismus], a campaign which not only looked for enlistments in the fishing 
grounds of European fascism, but also the improvement of Germany’s image all over the continent –most of it 
occupied by German forces–, and the legitimation of its war. Anyhow they wanted to show themselves 
fighting on behalf of a common civilization, but nothing further from reality: it was a German war conducted 
to get the Germany’s supremacy over the continent. Last but not least, German propagandists wanted to bring 
Germans back a self-satisfied image about themselves by showing the sympathies and admiration of European 
peoples because of its consciousness, bravery, sacrifices, and leadership. For this reason the foreign volunteers 
fitted in the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS occupied so many pages in very famous military magazines of this 
time as Signal, distributed through all Europe, where we can see from the recruitment processes to the combats 
and daily routine in the Ostfront.  
 
                       
We can see here the Spanish volunteers in Signal. A soldier with the Spanish uniform before leaving Spain bound 
for Germany (left) and another one reading the Hoja de Campaña in the Ostfront (right).690 
 
Likewise the syncretic and generic way in which the European question and national-socialist Europeanism 
was posed by German propaganda enabled the confluence of numerous fascist individuals from all over 
Europe around “the Crusade against Bolshevism”, each one of them with their own perceptions and projects 
                                                          
686 Quoted by Alan CLARK: Barbarossa. The Russian-German Conflict, 1941-1945, New York, William Morrow, 1985 
[1965], p. 44. 
687 Quoted by Stephen G. FRITZ: Frontsoldaten: the German Soldier in World War II, Lexington, The University Press of 
Kentucky, 1997 [1995], p. 199. 
688 Xosé Manoel NÚÑEZ SEIXAS: Imperios de muerte. La guerra germano-soviética 1941-1945, Madrid, Alianza, 2007, 
pp. 40-54. 
689 Before the beginning of German’s invasion the soldiers received a kind of memorandum called “Guidelines for the 
Conduct of the Troops in Russia” [Richtlinien für das Verhalten der Truppe in Russland], delivered by the Wehrmacht’s 
High Command (OKW), where the “Judeo-Boshevism” was pointed as the nemesis of German Volk and the ultimate 
cause why Germany is waging war”. Quoted by Jürgen FÖRSTER: “The Wehrmacht and the War of Extermination 
Against the Soviet Union”, in Michael MARRUS: The Nazi Holocaust. Part 3 The “Final Solution”: The 
Implementation of Mas Murder, Westpoint, Meckler Press, 1989, p. 500. 
690 Signal, 16 (August, 1941) and 6 (March, 1942). 
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for the New Order. This synthetic and open way of doing and posing things was a distinguish feature of fascist 
political culture, and a key point for understanding its exits throughout the “European civil war”:  691 
 
“From very different points of view each national or local fascism could imagine what was going to be its 
specific function inside the New Order, and they developed their own interpretations on the nazi-fascist 
Europeanism and its favourite geopolitical concepts, as Lebensraum or great co-prosperity spaces, 
adapting them to its own particular and immediate goals”.692 
 
It was what made possible the involvement of 47,000 Spanish volunteers in the Ostfront along with 
thousands of French, Walloon, Flemish, Dutch, Croat or Nordic youngsters.693 The truth is that the German’s 
invasion of the Soviet Union raised a wave of excitement among the anti-communist European public opinion. 
In fact, many enthusiasts and supporters of the German cause, up to now contained by some national-socialist 
ideas, began to look at Hitler in a similar way that the one posed by German propaganda: a natural leader 
sanctified by God’s will who enjoyed a privileged relationship with history. We can see to what extent was 
similar the Spanish volunteers view on Hitler’s leading figure to the German one through the Hoja de 
Campaña: 
 
“[…] the man who has known to build [edificar] with his political and strategic genius the so high and 
victorious fatherland of the Great Reich. […] victorious conductor of the National-Socialist Army […] the 
gigantic work and the stunning string of victories gotten in all directions under the leadership of the Great 
Führer.”694 
 
Almost two years before we can observe the similar projection of Hitler’s image among the German troops 
through the most important circular issued by the Wehrmacht, Mitteilungen für die Truppe: 
 
“His genius, in which the whole strength of Germandom is embodied with ancient powers [mit Urgewalt 
verkorpert], has animated the souls of 80,000,000 Germans, has filled them with strength and will, with the 
storm and stress [Sturm and Drang] of a renewed young people; and, himself the first soldier of Germany, 
he has entered the name of the German soldier into the book of immortality.”695 
 
Therefore Hitler appears as “The Giver”, the “Homo Faber” in his greatest expression, that one who 
collaborates in the improvement of matter and the opening of a new time while at the same time secures 
perfection for himself.696 In some sense, as Hitler, fascist propagandistic efforts had the mission of forging a 
new man, that one able to sacrifice himself to his Führer and his people by giving him the chance to share in 
Hitler “genius” and “ancient powers”, and finally to feel the sublime and divine through the linguistic and 
discursive dramatization of history. From my point of view, what made possible the confluence among fascists 
from all over Europe beyond their obvious differences was a kind of shared combative Christianity and a 
liminal view of their time, and more precisely this war.697 More of them were looking for their own catharsis 
and the redemption of the world through purifying violence. These are some of the guiding principles and 
thematic focus that we find in the Hoja de Campaña, the Spanish Blue Division’s official organ, which was 
among these key spaces in the indoctrination and conduction of Germany’s –by extension Fascism’s– 
ideological war in the Ostfront. This kind of periodic publication is really common to all military units, even 
further if possible for collectives as the Spanish one fighting under a different military discipline in a war 
which was not open up by their country.698 In this case the publication turn into a kind of catalyst and encoder 
                                                          
691 The concept has been taken from Enzo TRAVERSO: A feu et à sang: De la guerre civile européene 1914-1945, Paris, 
Stock, 2007. 
692 See Xosé Manoel NÚÑEZ SEIXAS: “La ‘Cruzada europea contra el bolchevismo’: Mito y realidad”, Cuadernos de 
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694 “En el cumpleaños de Adolfo Hitler”, Hoja de Campaña, 24 (April, 20th 1942), p. 1. 
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698 The Spanish volunteers were made up of the Wehrmacht as the 250. Einheit spanischer Freiwilliger (250th Division of 
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of soldier experiences, a unifying force and a producer of community feeling, and last but not least a projector 
which would reflect the ideological-military targets. Here we can see different headlines of military periodicals 
by European volunteers units: 
 
 
The Legion of French volunteers (Légion des Volontaires Français, LVF) published its own twice monthly organ 
between 1942 and 1944, Le Combattant Européen [The European Combatant]. 
 
 
This was the headline of the SS Volunteer Legion Flandern’s official organ, published from 1940 and directed by 
Ward Hermans, De SS Man [The SS Man]. 
 
 
That’s the Spanish Hoja de Campaña headline, the weekly newspaper of the Blue Division from 1941 to 1944. 
 
We have to take into account that the Hoja de Campaña was never an independent organ, but was 
subjected to German funding and, hence, to Berlin political and military interests. In any way its beginning 
was really rudimentary, so much that it was one leaf [Hoja de Campaña means Campaign Leaf] written on 
both sides. The first twelve numbers limited themselves to copy and translate the German military circulars 
adding some little news about the very Blue Division and Spain.699 From this moment the periodical would 
grow and expand unstoppably turning itself into something essential and quotidian for the soldiers in the 
trenches, and many of them kept it with love during their stay in Russia or sent it home. According to Díaz de 
Villegas, Lieutenant-Colonel of Blue Division’s General Staff, by 1943 the Hoja de Campaña had a print run 
of 18.000 copies, one per each volunteer.700 Besides, by March of the same year it included eight pages and 
deal with so different questions as the hot sports news from Spain, the newsletter and index of the divisional 
library, the Spanish cultural life, the everyday progresses made by the fascist regime at home, the editorial, and 
some opinion articles. At the same time, it had some sections opened to combatants’ contributions where we 
find poetry; combat experiences or political reflections; a consolidated –and sometimes really clever– humour 
section; suggestions to improve hygiene and good shape in daily life, and effectiveness in combat; different 
competitions; German language lessons; photographic and journalist reports on different aspects about the 
Blue Division and its daily life in trenches; historical considerations on the Spanish history in an always 
palingenetic and teleological way; and, of course, the war news which lost its initial importance just as the 
Hoja de Campaña became established itself and things began to go badly for the Axis powers. It is not by 
chance that it coincided with the disaster of the VI Army and the Army Group South around Stalingrad.701 
Without a doubt, a thematic guideline in the Hoja de Campaña was the debate about the possible Spanish 
intervention in war on Axis side. It was an extremely important question for many fascist volunteers, 
especially those who were in the periodical’s editorial office. As I have tried to prove, fascism had a close 
relationship with war, because that is the ideal setting where reality shows itself in its purest form, that is to 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Spanish volunteers, popularly known as Blue Division [División Azul]). 
699 See Jorge M. REVERTE: “Noticias de la guerra”, in idem: La División Azul. Rusia, 1941-1944, Barcelona, RBA, 2011, 
pp. 217-223. 
700 José DÍAZ DE VILLEGAS: La División Azul en línea, Barcelona, Editorial Acervo, 2003 [1963], p. 210. 
701 We can see that in the only number published at January, 1943, where the only reference as to what was happening in 
Stalingrad is: “According to the German High Command we can sum up the last news: fruitless red attacks in the 
South; the same activity in Stalingrad with grave enemy losses.” Hoja de Campaña, 55 (January, 1943), p. 5. 
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say, clear-cut and understandable. That is for example what we can see in an historical article, which ennobled 
the national past by connecting its main landmarks through teleology. It resulted directly in the “Spanish 
Crusade” or “Liberation War” [Spanish Civil war in fascist discourse] and the Blue Division, a liminal 
moment in the Spanish history where all the eternal essences of the national genius came together: “the dawn 
of resurrection”. So, the war was seen as school for males, the only place where the genuine national 
community could be forged under the purest Spanish Geist. There, men could participate in an authentic 
exercise of democracy to decide their common destiny by taking arms. To devote oneself life was the best vow 
for fascism. In this way, talking about the Spanish Civil the author pointed out: “Finally, the hard plebiscite of 
arms had been announced and there each chest [cada pecho] was a ballot box [urna] and each blood was a 
vote, long live Spain”.702 Therefore, the fascist volunteer defended the need to go to war, because “‘The war 
has not ended’, said the Caudillo in the very moment of having Victory between his strong hands of 
soldier”.703 In this sense we can see how war is an essential need for fascism, and Spanish fascists needed it 
again to get over the social and political gap provoked by the civil war. By going to war fascism could keep 
and spread a total mobilization to forge the new Spain, and besides, by giving the Spaniards the same external 
enemy they would get the indivisible unity under the same spirit. For this reason, an editorial maintained:  
 
“We want a broadest implication which spread itself over all the fronts where we have powerful historical 
reasons to defend! Any movement from us won’t be nothing but continuity [continuidad]; continuity in the 
struggle; continuity in the ideas and emphatic strengthening of being and winning. As long as there was an 
arrow, the bow will be stretched with the ambitious will of forging an Empire.” 
 
Precisely, continuity was another axial idea in the Hoja de Campaña. From the Spanish fascist point of 
view their Civil War was fully in contact because of its causes, goals, and incentives to Germany’s one against 
Russia, all is part of “the great European battle against bolshevism”, “the enemy is the same which we brushed 
aside in Spain years before”. So this is not a German war but a European one, and the Spanish fascists ask for 
the continuity as a kind of palingenetic will to reconnect with the Spanish history and the path opened in 1936, 
as well as to deserve and take the right to be. In some way, this is about fascist “will to power” [Wille zur 
macht], because it needs war to make its Weltanschauung reality and to keep harmony. In the end it has to run 
away from itself to solve its contradictions, but during its necessary violent flight generates a bigger crisis. 
Consequently fascism cannot avoid war to fascistize community, to build the real national community [unidad 
de destino, in Spanish, or Volksgemeinschaft, in German]: 
 
“[…] the son who comes to relieve the father. This is continuity and not exhaustion. It would be rightful to 
grant the wishes from all the Spaniards. […] Continuity is our historical march through all the lands 
standing by our missionary and warring national community [unidad de destino]”.704 
 
We can see exactly this combative Christianity, so war was posed as the only possible way for authentic 
Spaniards. In fact it would explain what they were doing in Russia: 
 
“[…] the LOVE OF SPAIN […] is THE ONLY WAY in which we can trust. […] For love of Spain, only 
that way, we’ll achieve the so long-awaited, asked and recommended unity. 
Unity represents the rejection of little interests, partisan passions, old compromises, embarrassing ties 
coming from interest and convenience… 
[…] This goes farer, it goes to Spain where still remains mean-spirited people [mezquinos]. It goes to 
attract them to reason, because of the Fatherland [patria] which we yell from here not as trashy whiner 
orators [oradorcetes chillones], but as trustworthy daughters [hijos cumplidores] which follow their 
mission of love, this path which is the only possible one”.705 
 
In this sense, Spanish volunteers claimed for a place in the New European Order, and they justified their 
presence in Russia through the need of recovering the respect for Spain all over Europe. This is about re-
channelling national destiny: they were the heirs of the work pioneered by the Spanish people against 
bolshevism between 1936 and 1939, and the first ones –but not the last, they hoped– in taking up Spain’s 
projection over the continent again. The volunteers’ struggle in Russia only could be a new step to get “a 
greater Spain and a fairer Europe”, the motto of the Hoja de Campaña since its seventh number until the last 
                                                          
702 On the ideas of participation and democracy in fascism see David ALEGRE LORENZ: “La idea de participación y 
democracia en el fascismo. Materiales para una visión comparada y maximalista”, Col·loqui Identitats Feixistes. 
Feixistització i desfeixistització a Espanya, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2013. Available online: 
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703 “4 recuerdos históricos” [4 historical memories], Hoja de Campaña, 12 (Februar, 4th 1942). 
704 Hoja de campaña, 32 (June, 24th 1942). 
705 “El único camino”, in Hoja de campaña, 45 (October, 14th 1942), p. 5. 
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one in March, 18th 1944, and we come back to see again how war was the only setting where fascism can 
reach its summit:  
 
“From our sacrifices should remain –by its result– a never ending certainty. […] the idea of fighting in 
these latitudes for Gibraltar, Oran and Morocco doubles our combative bravery [coraje combativo]. So 
Russia finish, the Strait [el Estrecho, it refers to the Strait of Gibraltar] will start…”706 
 
Anyway, something interesting is the incessant and mutual contact between the Spanish volunteers in the 
Ostfront and their home front.707 This is really important because it contributed to make easier the adaptation 
of the Spaniards to such a harsh environment as the Russian one, really far away from their countries, getting 
nostalgia over by giving them a sense of community, showing the admiration and respect of their compatriots 
for their struggle, and defending their role as the vanguard of the New Order.708 At the same time, codified 
experiences coming from the Russian front contributed to reinforce fascist dynamics and politics in the home 
front and tried to make bearable the life of deprivations under the autarchy, so the Blue Division’s cause was 
spread in key moments through Spain as an example of sacrifice and application on behalf of the spirit. For 
example, in January, 15th 1942 the Propaganda Department of the Spanish fascist party printed and distributed 
a poster with a quote by Muñoz Grandes, the general of the Blue Division, in garages, factories, offices, 
institutions, professional training schools, and banks: «The enemy is hard, and the Russian winter is very hard 
too; but it doesn’t matter, my race [raza] is harder».709 
 
 
 
The conditions and requirements of modern total war led to never-before-seen cultural, social and 
political changes, sometimes structural ones.710 Propaganda had a lot to do with that, especially during the 
Second World War, and also with German war effort as one key resource in a coordinated mobilization. 
Precisely, in the Hoja de Campaña Blue Division’s soldiers found an horizontal meeting point where they 
could participate and feel themselves under the same conditions than their mates, giving room for a sense 
of belonging to a privileged front’s community or Frontsgemeinschaft. It was always a complicated task 
among the European volunteers, as we can see in the Spanish case where there were too many differences 
between the most radical fascist volunteers (the falangistas) and the professional military man, specially 
                                                          
706 “Por qué hemos venido… [Why have we come…]”, Hoja de Campaña, 7 (December, 7th 1941), pp. 1-2. 
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the sub-officers, besides the historical officers classism made things difficult too.711 Anyway the Hoja de 
Campaña contributed to soften –at least it tried to do so– differences turning itself into a key “transmission 
belt”, because it was the same for all the combatants, foot soldiers other, sub-officers, or officers. As it 
were, propaganda war would try to give “soldier males” an illusory sense of equality, because combat 
experience would transform them by giving a new conscience and identity [Weltanschauung]. Thus, we can 
observe it in the next excerpt: 
 
“Among us, soldiers, all seems to be clear and diaphanous. Our gaze does look neither towards right, nor 
towards left, but looks directly at the enemy. We do not make things halfway, as usual, […]. In front’s 
everyday life we have not made anything but distinguish between enemies and comrades. There is not 
place for halfway postures in our way of judging reality […]. 
You, the Spanish people, are different to us in many senses. This differences disappeared there, where only 
prevailed the essential, there, where we stand shoulder to shoulder in front of the enemy, there, where 
German and Spanish names have remained engraved on the crosses erected in the common cemeteries of 
the Wolchow and the Ilmen lake”.712 
 
Here we can see again how in a fascist war the fascist experience happens through the combat one, 
where the “soldier male” can easily apprehend reality. He necessarily acts promptly and radically, so the 
combat experience takes place in a psychosomatic way converting itself in an impulsive act of faith. 
Sometimes it brought the “soldier males” to sacrifice his life, but in the shared death with their comrades 
would born Frontsgemeinschaft. At the same time, European tombs would mark out the new borders of 
civilization and “reterritorialize” the elusive and vast Russian territory.713 The history which would give its 
meaning to the new European community was being forged there.  
 
 
 
This was the front page in the Hoja de Campaña last number. The Christian cross, symbol of the European civilization, 
appears as the only landmark in the devastating Russian immensity, and the irrefutable proof of European 
fascism’s collective endeavour in Russia.714 
 
Not wonder, one crucial aspect in the Hoja de Campaña was its continuous attempt to build up a 
performative paradigm of “soldier male” to induce and reinforce among the volunteers some kind of 
identity and different behaviour patterns, something that happened since its first number. The periodical 
editorial department reclaimed and reviewed the volunteer’s great deeds by presenting as archetypes of 
fearlessness and bravery, revealing the path to glory, and making it accessible for all the combatants. So, “it 
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is all men’s life what transforms itself, it is world’s painful soul what is going sterilizing itself by letting us 
catch sight of its future shape. […], it is going dissipating […] the legends that now men, purified by war’s 
fire, cannot believe”.715 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
715 Alvaro DE LA IGLESIA: “La leyenda partida” [The split legend], Hoja de Campaña, 13 (February, 4th 1942), p. 4. 
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The research of the Nazi perseverance during the final stage of the Second World War never fails to 
include an analysis of the regime’s propagandist efforts to encourage both the home front and the military to 
persist to the bitter end. In recent years, this research saw an intensification and reached a broad audience as 
well-known historians, such as Stephen Fritz (Endkampf, 2004), Richard Bessel (Germany 1945, 2010) and Ian 
Kershaw (The End, 2011), contributed to the debate. They tended to focus on nation-wide propaganda, most 
notably spread through newspapers and news-reels, which stressed the message of perseverance  (durchhalten) 
to be reached by an unshakable trust in the Führer, the promise of a collapse of the Allied alliance and the full-
scale deployment of ‘miracle weapons’, to name but some.  
Little attention, however, had been devoted to local propagandist initiatives to bolster the defence. This 
neglect is peculiar, especially considering the dissolving state of the Reich, which made the need for this kind 
of initiatives all the more necessary. By 1945, the war was no longer solely a struggle for existence of the 
Reich – as portrayed in the nation-wide propaganda – but rather a matter that affected one’s direct 
environment, reaching the homes and families of the majority of the Germans in the course of that year. 
Although this message did not fail to find its way to nation-wide propaganda as well, its emphasis remained on 
fighting a common cause. However, with many German areas becoming increasingly  isolated, it is hardly 
surprising that local bodies interchanged a considerable size of the nation-wide views in favour of a message 
that appealed more to a confined public originating from the district or town in question.    
So far, the course of these local efforts - often hardly venturing beyond the boundaries of their own 
communities – has not been closer examined, and this paper therefore strives to bring to light what line local 
propagandists chose to strengthen the will to continue fighting. Königsberg, the capital of East Prussia, will be 
used as a case study in this paper. Due to the cities’ designation as fortress (Festung) in January 1945 and its 
subsequent siege by Soviet troops for over two months, its garrison and its civilian population experienced a 
wide variety of propaganda in order to bolster their fighting spirit. As this research mainly consists of 
previously unused archival material from the Archiv Stadt Königsberg in Duisburg, as well as reports from the 
Militärarchiv and the Lastenausgleichsarchiv (both part of the Bundesarchiv), it will contribute to our 
understanding of propagandist measures during the last months of the Second World War.  
 
 
The difficulties of propaganda during the final stage of the war 
 
For the Nazi propagandist, many of the challenges during the final stage of the war were tangible ones. 
With the front closing in on Germany, Allied radio stations started operating on a wave-length that could be 
received by more and more Germans, while the ongoing bombing and paper scarcity were severely hampering 
radio transmission and reception and the distribution of newspapers.716 National radio could barely provide 
positive news, and could only sum up military defeats and news of terror-bombing; therefore, listeners had to 
do with the vocalised promise that Germany’s enemies were suffering equally. 717   It was the task of 
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propagandists to provide an explanation for the grave military situation, whilst instilling  a will among the 
population to keep on fighting. Propagandists had to fight an uphill battle. Growing parts of the German 
audience lost trust in the sincerity of the articles and speeches, eroding the very fundaments of the Nazi 
system. By early 1945, as propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels noted in his diary, ‘neither the Führer in 
person nor the National Socialist concept nor the National Socialist movement are immune from criticism’, a 
development referred to by the scholar Stephen Fritz as ‘a wholesale rejection of the social-revolutionary 
promise at the heart of the Nazi idea.718  
More so, many Germans were presented with a workable alternative, which above all appealed to the 
population living in the western part of the country: a Germany under new rule. For Nazi propagandists, 
relating to audiences that were already cautiously looking beyond the war and beyond National Socialism was 
near impossible. In the parts of west that were still in German hands, some newspapers even cautiously started 
referring to a post-war world, deliberately overlooking whether this was a world under Allied or Nazi rule.719  
Lastly, by the beginning of 1945 Germans could hardly be referred to as ‘one people’ anymore. When the first 
‘post-war newspaper’ appeared in Aachen, on 25 January 1945, the last stage of war was yet to begin for 
Königsberg. 720  
From November 1944 onwards Goebbels’ propaganda ministry chose an approach that pursued a ‘poetic 
truth’, which meant that the large blanks in the scanty information received by propagandist were to be filled 
by themselves, thus extrapolating to the point of mere guessing.721 The infamous radio-speech of Goebbels, 
‘Hannibal ante portas!’, which drew the historical parallel between Hannibal’s advance as far as Rome, from 
where the Roman victories began that led to the eventual destruction of Carthage, was considered as shameless 
by some of the more critical listeners.722 Recurrent, but also fairly ineffective, were the claims of a stiffened 
resistance and eagerly mobilizing communities. Since via informal channels audiences had some access to 
other information, which basically claimed the exact opposite, that smokescreen was easily pierced. The 
Panzerfaust (an anti-tank weapon) for example, was hailed in the Deutsche Wochenschau as a people’s 
weapon, of which the usage was ‘just as easy as it looks’.723 Nevertheless, on the walls in Königsberg could be 
read: ‘Panzerfaust and Panzerschreck, Volkssturm-man, throw away that scrap!’724 Similarly, commentaries 
were added to the well-known slogans of the regime. Under ‘Wheels role for victory’, was added: ‘Nazi-heads 
after the War.’ 725 Nevertheless, these kind of nation-wide slogans were still used on a large scale, and could be 
found on banners hanging throughout cities, or written on walls. They were perceived by growing parts of the 
population as empty slogans which lured them into fighting for a cause that they no longer considered theirs.726  
Consequently, propagandists were forced to look at alternatives to embrace a nation-wide course, which was 
backfiring. Similarly, the ‘poetic truth’ yielded little result and appeared to be disregarded by the population on 
a large scale. Local propagandists appear to have grasped this and responded by shifting the emphasis in the 
message that they had to convey. 
 
 
Losing faith in the Führer, gaining local heroes 
 
By 1945, not only the faith in the party started to crumble, for the first time people started openly ventilating 
criticism towards Hitler as well. 727  This was a tendency that could be found throughout Germany, and 
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Königsberg was no exception. ‘A tank is blocking the Pregel-bridge. The man is the top of it holding a flaming 
speech’, a doctor recalled. ‘And when something like “our beloved leader Adolf Hitler” penetrates my ears, I 
prefer to quickly disappear into a side street.’ 728 Hitler remained closely involved with the developments in 
Königsberg and throughout its two-month siege, as numerous reports of staff meetings show, he repeatedly 
highlighted the city’s importance and assured that weapons and ammunition would arrive to the city. 729 
Nevertheless, his ongoing attention to the city was completely ignored by local propagandists. The last time 
that Hitler dominantly featured in the papers of Königsberg was on 31 January in the newly founded 
newspaper ‘Die Festung Königsberg’, the ‘battle-paper for labourers, soldiers and men of the Volkssturm’. 
Large parts of his speech, commemorating the seizure of power in 1933 were published,730 but soon after that 
Hitler was ‘replaced’ by local characters.  
 These characters not only predated Nazism, but the unification of Germany as a whole. Goebbels’ 
propaganda had been clinging to the idea of a ‘Volksgemeinschaft’, a people’s community, but as Germany had 
been united for only 70 years, there were in fact few national heroes.731 Therefore, many of the role models 
that were chosen in 1945 to bolster the fighting spirit enjoyed only local popularity. In the first and only 
divisional newspaper of the 561st Volksgrenadierdivision, ‘Die Sturmglocke’, printed in ‘Festung 
Königsberg’, Hitler was not even mentioned once. On the other hand, to General Yorck, the Prussian hero of 
the wars of liberation of 1813, an entire article was devoted, including his picture and some quotes that were as 
appropriate in 1813 as they were in 1945. The impact of his (distilled) legacy is not to be underestimated, as in 
Königsberg military decisions were sometimes even judged through the eyes of Yorck, even when the 
resulting actions were contradictory to Hitler’s view.732 Another role model, by far the most famous son of the 
city, was the philosopher Immanuel Kant, whose legacy was reinterpreted to fit the propagandist aims of 1945. 
The Königsberger Allgemeine Zeitung went so far as to state that ‘Kant’s notion of the duty is embedded in 
each and every German soldier and German worker, even if he has never read a single line of Kant.’733 Along 
similar lines, Professor Baumgarten, deacon of the philosophic faculty of the Königsberg’s Albertina 
University broadcasted a message ‘in the memory of Kant’, condemning Churchill’s post-war ideas and 
rallying people to fight. 734  
 
More tangible and contemporary local role models were used as well. The best-known in Königsberg 
was Ernst Tiburzy, one of the four Volkssturm members ever to receive the Knight’s Cross, Germany’s highest 
award for valour. During a Soviet attack on the city on 2 February, Tiburzy  knocked out a tank with a 
Panzerfaust, although the Soviet advance towards the city continued. When one of his subordinates, a 
Zugführer, made efforts to retreat, Tiburzy shot him. Staying put despite being wounded, he knocked out four 
more tanks, after which the attack was called of. This limping man with one eye remaining, but still in action, 
was the epitome of a fight till the end;  this was exactly the kind of tangible example propagandists were 
looking for.735 On 5 February, he was set as an example by the local authorities, first and foremost by 
Kreisleiter Ernst Wagner, the leader of the Volkssturm in Königsberg. Wagner devoted a large part of a speech 
to him, while in that same speech Hitler was mentioned only in a clause. 736  
The ‘Volkssturm-man’ in itself was another tool that was favoured by Kreisleiter Wagner. All 
necessary virtues could be allocated to him, in Königsberg the emphasis lay on steadfastness and courage. 
Addressing the different Volkssturm units, Wagner avoided speaking about Germany, but focused exclusively 
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on the people of Königsberg. When he addressed Volkssturm units, his speeches were not stilted, and the times 
that he spoke of ‘us’ or ‘we’, he did not mean the German people, but rather the men in front of him.737 The 
army, which had the final responsibility in the city, hardly interfered with Wagner’s efforts. More so, the 
fortress commander, General Otto Lasch, co-signed a number of proclamations, not only out of military 
necessity, but to give a paper more standing as well.738 Despite that  Lasch was the most important man in the 
fortress, he was hardly used as an object of propaganda within the city. Although he came from East Prussia, 
his links with the city itself were marginal. Few people knew him prior to the siege, making him an unsuitable 
subject for local propaganda. Even after featuring prominently in Der Deutsche Wochenschau, side by side 
with Gauleiter Koch, his role within the local propaganda remained limited.739 
 
Losing sight of the greater good 
 
It is striking to see how little thought propagandists in Königsberg gave to the Reich, and all that it was 
supposed to encompass. No sustained attention was paid anymore to upholding morals and virtues that had 
been actively propagated in the years prior. Instead of focusing on greater ideas, people were asked to defend 
something considerably smaller: the bare existence of the city. This was in itself an all but an easy task. 
Königsberg  was one of the many German cities that had suffered heavily from Allied bombardments, and 
although its ruins featured repeatedly in national propaganda, most of its inhabitants, having lived in the city 
for their entire live, did not consider that praiseworthy at all, let alone worth defending. ‘There was a dull 
atmosphere of the downfall of the world’, the writer Rudolf Naujok recalled over a decade later. ‘The feeling 
of walking through a mortuary was impossible to get rid of.’740 From that mindset, which was common in 
Königsberg, it was hard to instil a mood of steadfastness. As the conservation of the city was thus hardly an 
issue anymore, the approach that propagandists took from the very beginning was to emphasize that everyone 
in the city was in the same boat. The fact that the city was surrounded and constantly shelled from late January 
onwards was not explained as negative, but as a test that separated weaklings from the strong-hearted. On 
posters spread throughout the city, it could be read that: ‘In the thunder of guns, the stout hearts prove 
themselves. There is no going back here.’ The encirclement would give birth to an ‘unconditional battle-
community’ which would be invincible. The conclusion of the posters linked the anticipated steadfast 
behaviour in Königsberg directly to the preservation of the rest of Germany. ‘That’s how we will do it. All of 
us together will hold Königsberg until the time that the Reich achieves victory over our mortal enemies.’ 741 A 
similar message could be found on specially designed Volkssturm posters. In Königsberg, these posters 
featured two men holding arms, while the silhouette of Königsberg’s castle could be seen in the background.  
Again, the focus lay on defending the city, rather than the Reich, despite the fact that the Volkssturm was on 
nation-wide effort.  In a number of speeches and proclamations this two-staged approach was used: by rallying 
people for the defence of their ‘Heimat’, a concept that was almost tangible, they were contributing to the more 
indefinable ‘Reich’ as well.  
 With communication getting harder, bringing across this theme was entrusted to a relatively newly 
deployed medium, the so-called Mundpropaganda, or ‘mouth-propaganda’. This type of propaganda had the 
purpose of spreading ‘positive’ rumours. In Königsberg a set of rumours was introduced in late February - 
early March. Again, no attention of these rumours was paid to the situation in the rest of Germany. By doing 
so, the population was left in the dark in respect to the gravity of the situation, for which there was indeed little 
encouraging to tell. Instead, the mouth-propaganda focused exclusively on matters that preoccupied the people 
in Königsberg. A post-war evaluation on the mood in the city, written by Walter Kemsies, an intelligence 
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officer that was present at the time, speaks about the introduction of a rumour telling that the Russian had been 
demoralised, having underestimated the strength of the garrison of Königsberg. Instead, the Russian troops in 
East Prussia gathered for an attack on the German troops surrounded in Courland grouping, further to the 
north, and therefore would have no troops left to attack Königsberg. Apparently, the fact that other parts of the 
German army were threatened was of no consideration for the propagandists, as long as the inhabitants of the 
city were eased. In other rumours, a similar pattern can be detected: all German military operations focused on 
Königsberg; encircled troops in Insterburg and Tilsit had linked up and were marching towards the city while 
some 500,000 men of the Wlassow Army had broken out from an area near Warsaw and were heading to 
Königsberg as well. Himmler was also gathering his Army, and approached the city via Danzig. On top of that, 
it was claimed that 500 Tiger tanks were already offloaded in the harbour of Pillau, and were shortly available 
to bolster the city’s defence as well.742 The reason to spread these rumours was to encourage the people in the 
city to stay calm, 743 most likely as a counterweight to the shock of what had happened in Metgethen. (see 
below) 
 
 
The use of atrocity propaganda and the role of the soldier 
 
Perhaps the most wide-spread theme within the propaganda during the final stage of the war were the 
atrocities. A special role was reserved for soldiers, as the majority of the population considered their views to 
be sincere. With the decreasing availability of news through ordinary channels, the soldier became one of the 
easiest available sources of information for the population, something that had not gone unnoticed by 
propagandists. On a national level one of the most famous German soldiers, Generalmajor Otto Ernst Remer, 
had held a radio speech focusing on Bolshevik atrocities, a broadcast that was reviewed positively by the 
majority of the population.744 In Königsberg too, soldiers were among the main contributors of the propaganda 
that focused on Soviet atrocities. Many of the soldiers that arrived in the city  had taken part in the recapture of 
Nemmersdorf in October 1944, the sight of the best-known Soviet atrocities thus far. They were actively 
involved in these propagandist efforts, and many of the articles concerning atrocities featured parts of soldiers’ 
first hand reports.  
Initially in Königsberg, the atrocity propaganda remained somewhat void and distant. When in the first 
week of the Soviet encirclement of Königsberg a pamphlet was circulated, encouraging its civilians people to 
‘hate and revenge’ the Soviet atrocities, some civilians were offended by the tone of the message, even though 
many of the refugees that were flooding into the city had experienced the Soviet wrath at first hand.745 
Nevertheless, in the earliest weeks of the siege, between 30 January and 20 February, relatively little attention 
was paid to the atrocities throughout the East Prussia.  
That lack of coverage changed virtually overnight, after German troops had managed to recapture one 
of the suburbs of the city, Metgethen, on 20 February. Many soldiers, especially of the 1st division, saw 
mutilated and raped corpses there, and their accounts were passed to the city. The Sicherheitsdienst prepared a 
‘photo report of the murdered and desecrated Germans by the Bolsheviks in Metgethen.’ 746 From then on, the 
massacre was given full attention in the city and posters appeared with ‘METGETHEN RACHE’ (Metgethen 
revenge), which depicted a Soviet skeleton, clinching a knife between his teeth, holding a barely dressed and 
emaciated woman, which he obviously had killed. In this effort soldiers took the lead, something that was 
clearly monitored, as ‘The grenadiers go past the corpses of the defiled and tortured women, and then go into 
battle.’747 What they saw did not fail to make an impact on the soldiers. ‘It was worse than Nemmersdorf, the 
attack had to succeed!’, a member of the 5th Panzer Division wrote down. ‘What the advancing soldiers saw, 
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surpassed by far the propaganda up till now,’ the evaluation of Walter Kemsies concluded. The population was 
not spared of gruesome details, but instead was presented with the situation in meticulous detail. Soldiers were 
writing ‘revenge for Metgethen’ on their vehicles, while banners with the same text were spread throughout 
the city.748  
Only when atrocities were discovered within ten kilometres of the city centre did the topic become a widely 
embraced theme for local propagandists. It shows that propagandists did not randomly repeat the message of 
‘hate and revenge’, as this could actually reduce its impact and credibility. Instead they only chose to act when 
an event occurred that could be featured by providing substantial evidence. The best known post-war account 
estimates the number of deaths found in Metgethen as high as 3,000, although no wartime source has remained 
with a number that comes even close to this.749 But even if the real number was lower, the shock that was 
caused as a result of it bolstered the fighting spirit in the entire region.750  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
So far, the propagandist efforts that rallied the German people to continue fighting in 1945 has merely been 
assessed on a nation-wide scale. Drawing conclusions from sources scattered throughout Germany can only 
lead to generalisations and does not allow a historian to look to the way propaganda influenced people on a 
more individual level. Focusing on one city, Königsberg, allows us to look at propagandists means and the 
impact of their message more carefully.  
This paper has sought to discern the course of the local efforts within the line that was prescribed by 
Goebbels’ ministry by using the city of Königsberg as a case study. Three developments distinguished 
themselves in the city. The Hitler-cult, which already started to show serious cracks, was interchanged for an 
emphasis on role-models, both historical and contemporary, originating from the area itself. This served the 
purpose that their legacies and actions were easier to relate to, making them more suitable for employment on 
a local scale. Secondly, the defence of the Reich as a whole was deemed unfit as a propagandist tool. Instead, 
what was being asked of people was considerably smaller and more straightforward: the mere defence of one’s 
city. Rather than defending the greater good, the salvation of Germany, people were asked to work towards a 
tangible goal. The way mouth-propaganda was employed within that approach, showed that there was an 
unmistakable tendency of creating a tunnel vision, as the citizens in Königsberg were completely left in the 
dark about the developments in other parts of Germany. Lastly, the atrocity propaganda seemed to have been 
used more cautious than often assumed. Although the message itself remained irreducibly gruesome, in 
Königsberg much thought was given to its timing and presentation. Only when demonstrable acts of atrocity 
had occurred, which was the case in Metgethen, was the topic considered suitable for full scale use.  
These developments suggest that local propagandists diverted from the line proposed by the propaganda 
ministry, and instead choose their own course, albeit still within the  
guidelines of the ministry. National propaganda was increasingly pushed to the background, and local concerns 
were given a higher priority. The obvious reason for this emphasis shift seems that by doing so, people were 
rallied to a cause they could more easily relate to. Therefore, this paper nuances the commonly held view of 
propaganda mainly as a means for the masses, but rather as a ‘personalised’ and versatile tool, capable of 
adapting to specific situations. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper will focus on the theme of propaganda regarding the phenomenon of the Great War. More 
specifically it will focus on the Portuguese belligerence and the way it was presented in three journals from the 
time of the First Republic. Those journals are the magazines Ilustração Portuguesa, Portugal na Guerra and A 
Guerra.  
The main goals will be to identify and analyze the kind of effort that was undertaken by the national 
political power concerning three specific aspects: firstly, in spreading out the importance of the Portuguese 
participation in the war in Europe (Ilustração Portuguesa); secondly, in terms of  propagating the ongoing 
effort of the Portuguese contingent already in France (Portugal na Guerra); and thirdly, regarding the post-war 
period, and the attempt to reach a catharsis of the physical and psychological traumas caused by taking part in 
the war (A Guerra). 
The first part of the paper will refer to some ways of using propaganda as a political instrument within 
Europe; there will also be a brief account on the evolution of the Portuguese belligerence. The core will be the 
analysis of the three chosen journals to find some of the key ideas and concepts in terms of belligerence and of 
the mechanisms then used for disseminating it. The last part will refer to the ideas and aspects which are 
common to the three journals. 
It is intended that this paper will contribute to a better understanding and knowledge of the way propaganda 
played its role at the time of the First Republic concerning the Portuguese participation in the Western front 
during the Great War. 
  
 
2. Propaganda as an instrument 
 
The means of propaganda used by the foreign press during the period of the Great War and that can be 
looked at as  both an inspiration and an influence to Portugal came from France, Great Britain and Germany. 
We will start by mentioning the case of propaganda in the French press after the year 1914, as that was the 
year of the Bureau de Presse’s foundation, and the beginning of the interference of censorship and control in 
all journals and other means of propaganda at national and international level. The sudden appearance of a 
controlling and repressive mechanism such as the Bureau de Presse led to the publishing on most journals of 
all types of imaginary stories and, on the other hand, of texts impregnated with patriotism and nationalistic 
fervor which can be referred to as somewhat excessive and not necessarily positive for the maintenance of 
those journals.  
Despite that close and constant control, the French press still went through much change and growth during 
the period of the Great War. Namely, there were journals which were then created with the unique objective of 
addressing the subject of war and the daily life in the battle front. There were two main advantages in those 
type of journals: firstly, they were an important means of keeping the general population informed about the 
conflict, and of confirming the support given to the Government and to the soldiers fighting at the front; 
secondly, this new, rising press became fundamental in terms of maintaining the high morale of the troops 
(Quintero, 1993: 220). 
In Great Britain, commercial propaganda was already being used during the first years of the 20th century. 
It is, therefore, not surprising that during the course of the four years the conflict lasted the British propaganda 
had shown to be  a lot more developed and effective than that of most European countries. However, this 
development and effectiveness might have been due to the fact that the public opinion was totally against the 
participation of Great Britain in the war. Also, and not of least importance, it may have had to do with the fact 
that  the only European country where, by the time the war started, conscription did not exist at all  (officially 
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instituted by the Law of Military Service on March 3.1916) was Great Britain and the British Army consisted 
only of volunteers.  
These two factors made it easy for the Government and for the Press controlling mechanisms - like the War 
Propaganda Bureau, whose main function was disseminating printed material in the neutral countries 
(Quintero, 1993: 221) – that, along with the previously numerous existing journals, magazines and political 
posters (Ventura, 2010: 521), there was the great need of getting support and incentive from the public opinion 
regarding the participation of Great Britain in the Great War. 
 
 “In terms of domestic – though not imperial – institutions, the British state in 1914 was perhaps the weakest in 
Europe. Concomitantly, no country boasted a civil society as strong and diverse. These contrasts gave to 
popular culture a critical role. It ensured that in wartime Britain propaganda from below would dominate the 
war of words and images. And it created a vocabulary of a simplicity and immediacy that made that 
propaganda effective.” (Winter, 1999: 330). 
 
Hence, a new type of pro-war propaganda appeared in most of the press trying to reach as many supporters 
as possible in terms of public opinion. Its core business was the European conflict and everything that could 
derive from it. Some magazines were then created with the only purpose of disseminating those pro-war ideals 
in other countries and were written in the language spoken in each of those countries. Great Britain was, 
undoubtedly, the country which possessed the most powerful propaganda machine at the time of the Great 
War. 
Despite that, Germany was most likely the country which had the best means of propaganda during the 
European conflict. It was mainly a type of counterpropaganda working as a call for German national awareness 
and based on two different organizations: a press department connected to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and 
a political section dependent of the Army Staff. 
In the Imperial Staff there was a political section in charge of war news (Deutsche Kriegsnachrichten), 
whose task was to raise the morale of the troops and of the civil population. This type of work might have been 
of great influence to the public opinion, as amongst the contributors of the press one could find many writers 
and teachers who tried to explain, in a way that was accessible to everyone, the reasons why the allies should 
be considered responsible for the start of the  war (Quintero, 1999: 212) 
In 1917, the Kriegpressamt or Press of War public service was created. This service depended on the 
German military command and included the tasks of censorship, and control of all national and international 
news. At a private level, there was the Wagner cultural committee. 
However, the structure failed internally. There was no coordination between the propaganda addressing the 
civil population and the propaganda addressing the troops and other countries. Each department carried out 
different politics regarding the use of propaganda. This was, probably, why of the 4,221 newspapers and 
magazines that existed in 1914, 900 disappeared during the following years of the conflict (Ventura, 2010: 522). 
As for Portugal, in 1914, similarly to other European countries, in the main cities (Lisbon and Porto) there 
were several newspapers which were accessible to the general population, and on all those publications war 
was the central issue. The main reason was, certainly, the fact that the Great War worked as the stage where 
parties disputed their political divergences from the time of the establishment of the Republic, in 1910. Thus, 
“the history of the Republic since 1914 is the history of the Great War”751  (Ramos, 1994). 
In terms of what was being published in Portugal and what kind of format was being used, the Portuguese 
publications followed the pattern and the tendencies of their foreign peers: image was a means to the great end 
of getting the attention of the major number of people possible. Meaning that photography, drawing, sketches, 
illustration or caricature became very powerful ways of conveying  political messages to the masses, even 
when censorship was an obstacle to overcome before publication. 
 
 
3. Portugal – proliferant ground for propaganda 
 
When the war started, the participation of Portugal became a nuclear issue nationwide. Despite the apparent 
national cohesion towards the subject, different approaches came out from within the Government itself 
regarding the actions to follow.  
It was definitely a divisive issue and those supporting the war had to really commit themselves in order to 
surpass British resistance and proclaim the importance of national sovereignty and of Portugal itself in the 
Iberian Peninsula. It was seen as necessary as Spain’s ambiguous position could lead Great Britain to accept 
the military interference of Spain in Portugal. However, due to the reluctancy of Great Britain in terms of 
Portugal’s participation in the conflict, it was difficult to politically maneuver the country towards the 
                                                          
751 Free translation: “a história da República desde 1914 é a história da Grande Guerra”.  
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necessity of a Portuguese military engagement in Europe. Especially once the military were the first to 
acknowledge the complete lack of preparation and means of the Army to accomplish such great a task. 
By the time Bernardino Machado was President, the nomination of Afonso Costa for Head of Government, 
in November 29, 1915, had one clear purpose: getting Portugal to participate in the war next to its traditional 
ally, Great Britain. The main worry was then to force the British to accept Portugal as their ally in the 
battlefield. Moreover, with the national-unity Government – the Sacred Union – supporting the participation of 
Portugal in the war, and despite the country’s complete indifference and repulsion towards the idea of Portugal 
taking part in it, the Portuguese Government got totally committed  to the mission of passing the idea of a 
jeopardized country in need of keeping its national unity above all things. 
From the time Portugal entered the war, the Portuguese Government decided to send special envoys to the 
fronts. It was then possible to have access not only to the news referring to the events in the front, but also to 
the daily life of the Portuguese soldiers, namely through the eyes of some reputable authors who were 
themselves in the ditches together with the CEP. 
We will now refer to the three publications which were chosen as examples of the use of means of 
propaganda of war in the Portuguese journals, before, during and after the Great War.  
 
 
The magazine Ilustração Portuguesa 
 
The magazine Ilustração Portuguesa was a weekly journal which was first published in November 9 1903 
by the Republican newspaper O Século. It had two series: the first had 119 numbers published; the second was 
a large-scale series of 947 numbers ranging from 1906 to 1924. The director of the second series was Carlos 
Malheiro Dias, and amongst his contributors were the journalists Alfredo Mesquita and Julio Dantas. When the 
director emigrated to Brazil, the Direction of the magazine was then handed to J. J. da Silva Graça, a journalist 
and also the owner of O Século.  Silva Graça directed the Ilustração Portuguesa until 1922. 
As from 1906, the magazine reduced its size (28cmx18cm) but doubled its number of pages, of which only 
50 percent were allotted to text. On its first three years, the Ilustração Portuguesa followed the French model 
of L’Illustration. The structure and design of the magazine which, at this point, were the result of the work of 
50 people, resulted then in 24.400 copies “Impressive number bearing in mind the chronic difficulties of the 
sector”752 (Costa, 2000). 
Photography became the preferred technique for creating images, turning all drawings into mere 
adornments of pages and covers, or reproductions of whatever was not possible to photograph. In 1915, 
photography itself was taking up 70% of the entire magazine. Besides the professional photographers, many 
amateur photographers participated in the magazine with their works on picturesque Portuguese landscapes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image, especially photography, was then looked at as a means of conveying the truth of all information and at 
the same time, was a sign of modern times, therefore becoming an essential component of most texts. Hence, 
the photographs of the Portuguese military in the war, played a great role in terms of bringing home the reality 
lived by those men. 
 
                                                          
752 Free translation: “Número impressionante tendo em conta as crónicas dificuldades do sector.” 
1-Front cover of 
Ilustração Portuguesa 
of 30th April 1917 
portraying Portuguese 
soldiers waiting to 
depart towards France 
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2-Front cover of Ilustração Portuguesa of 22th 
February 1917 portraying a loving farewell. 
Two of the most important men working for Ilustração Portuguesa were J. Benoliel (photographer) and 
António Ferro (writer). Benoliel, published his works between 1906 and 1918 and was one of the 
photographers with more works published in the magazine. António Ferro, on the other hand, helped the 
magazine become more competitive abroad.  
In spite of not being considered a magazine dedicated to political or social analysis or criticism, all the 
information on the Ilustração Portuguesa defended the position and opinions of the Government. Perhaps 
because that was the position of most writers, drawers and photographers, the magazine presented a type of 
propagandistic speech and image, which defended the forces of war and was extremely laudatory when 
referring to the Portuguese soldier. 
As the international community became more committed to the issue of war in Europe, (more) information 
regarding political and military issues gained crescent visibility in the magazine. Mostly information on the 
attacks suffered by the Portuguese and by the Allied Forces. 
 
From the moment of its landing in France, in 1917, the 
CEP experienced a number of casualties which helped to 
increase the conspiracy against the Democratic 
Government. Notwithstanding, the Ilustração Portuguesa 
displayed a type of speech showing solidarity towards the 
CEP and the participation of Portugal in the war. Benoliel 
was the author of the cover dated February 12 1917 and 
named it “a loving farewell” which shows one of the first 
boarding’s of the CEP to France. Though the magazine did 
not provide any information regarding the number of 
departing troops to France, the images of the battalions 
embarking in Vila Real, Porto, Braga, Mirandela or Régua, 
showed how extensive the Portuguese participation was 
and explained the spread of the so called Festas da Flor. 
These were a kind of festivity which raised funds all over 
the country in order to give them to the families of those 
who had died, were injured or made prisoners during the 
war. During the course of the four years of the conflict, and 
even during the Government of Sidónio Pais, the Ilustração 
Portuguesa always published important and real images of 
the Portuguese troops, both in the Western front and in the 
Colonies and kept those images apart from other general 
news on the conflict like the boarding of the troops, the 
Portuguese casualties, images of prisoners of war or even 
the return of the military contingent. 
 
In short, the magazine Ilustração Portuguesa offered its 
readers the conflict through the strength of its photographs. 
At the same time it highlighted the importance of the Great 
War in terms of enhancing the country itself and the 
soldiers who were fighting in the front against German 
oppression and for freedom, therefore, also trying to 
legitimize the issue of colonialism. 
 
 
 
Portugal na Guerra: revista quinzenal ilustrada 
 
Portugal na Guerra was a seven-issue only magazine, published during the year 1917, between June and 
December. The journal presented itself as a magazine for and about the men of CEP who fought in the Great 
War. It was published in France and its director was Augusto Pina. In the opening pages it can be read that the 
magazine had the "literary collaboration of the most remarkable Portuguese and foreign writers, letters of the 
leading Captains of the world, and the artistic collaboration of remarkable Portuguese artists". 
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3-Page with pictures depicting daily working 
life in the front. 
4-Front Cover depicting President of the 
Portuguese Republic decorating a soldier 
with the Cross of War  
Image occupied a large part of the magazine and much 
of its popularity was due to the photographs, illustration 
and even water-colours which Portugal na Guerra offered 
its readers. The photographers were Arnaldo Garcés, in 
France and Alfredo Lima, in Portugal.  
The structure of the magazine remained almost the 
same over the first five editions. The number of pages was 
sixteen and the cover always kept the green background 
and portraits of presidents or monarchs of the Allied States 
involved in the European conflict. The first article was 
invariably a biography and praise of character and deeds of 
those portrayed in the cover. 
José de Bragança, vice editor, signed the two following 
pages with texts of different kinds but that can be 
summarized in the expressions of patriotic fervour and 
acclaim of all those who shared and promoted the 
participation of Portugal in the European conflict. The first 
issue of the magazine announced the participation of the 
CEP in the war and paid tribute to such participation and to 
all the soldiers who took part in the conflict. The magazine 
Portugal na Guerra paid tribute to several associations, 
groups and even countries. It commended the Sacred 
Union, not as a union of parties, but as a national union; 
Regarding monetary aid it also praised the cooperation, of 
associations such as the Portuguese Women's Crusade 
(chaired by the wife of the President of the Republic), or the 
cooperation of individuals and institutions created in Brazil to help the Portuguese soldiers. On the third issue 
of the magazine, in a text titled “France and Portugal in civilization”, the magazine disseminated the idea of 
Portugal as a French ally and at the same time it criticized the Germans, highlighting the ancient times of 
Portuguese derring-do. 
 Along with short texts dedicated to Portugal, there was always the concern, over the seven issues of the 
magazine, to convey some political and military Portuguese and foreign biographies to the readers. Those 
biographies would always come along with photos and texts praising the artists' character and any actions 
taken on behalf of their homeland. 
There was another type of text found on the pages of Portugal na Guerra and also of highly propagandistic 
content - although at a first reading it might just seem a description of daily life in the trenches -, and those 
were the chronicles of daily campaign signed by Captain X. The man behind Captain X was the Portuguese 
writer André Brun, also a Captain in the front. André Brun also published some pages of his book Migalhas da 
Guerra in the magazine, with episodes from the life in the battlefront. Through Brun's texts, readers could 
sympathize with the setbacks experienced by soldiers, identify with them and above all, support them. 
It is worth mentioning the third issue of Portugal na Guerra, where the usual column addressing the 
readers, explained why the magazine had been suspended for 
some time, more precisely two months, and that it was due to 
financial constraints. However, what was more important about 
this column was that the accolades from France, regarding the 
magazine, have, despite the constraints, greatly helped the 
coming back of Portugal na Guerra. 
In addition to being a way to support the CEP and to 
promoting the participation of Portugal in the European conflict, 
the journal Portugal na Guerra, gradually became a way of 
promoting the Portuguese foreign policy, mainly in France. On 
some of its editions there were texts promoting the economic 
approach between Portugal and France. Thus, the magazine not 
only fostered the Portuguese external relations, but also valued 
the patriotic character internally.  
The role played by photographs and illustrations, which have 
always maintained their brilliant quality, must also be 
emphasized. Concerning the Portuguese section in the exhibition 
of the Allied Armies in France it is mentioned in the magazine 
that: 
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5-Front cover of one of p 7 “Muitas folhas the 
few issues of “A Guerra” dedicated to the 
British allies 
 
"The Portuguese room was much admired because we see in it, and by the direct evidence of the photographs, 
always precise, what is our effort in the current war. Several newspapers in Paris mentioned our curious and 
very complete section with praise. Another triumph from our military effort".753 
 
Regarding illustrations, a particular one by Augusto Pina must be highlighted. It was published in 
the first issue of the magazine, and it depicted a Portuguese flag-bearer. The cover of issue number three, with 
a three-colour illustration by Ferreira da Costa (enshrined artist in the Salon de Paris) is also worth 
mentioning, with the portrait of the Commander of the CEP, General Tamagnini.  
As for the photographs, they showed the reality experienced at the battlefront and the everyday life of the 
CEP. Photographs also had the dual function of not only displaying the faces of the main leaders and 
politicians from the Allied countries involved in the conflict, but also of showing a more human side of those 
men. Especially photos of Norton de Matos or Tamagnini together with their men; or the numerous photos of 
Bernardino Machado's visit to France; or even the cover of issue number six, featuring the President of the 
Portuguese Republic decorating a soldier with the Cross of War. 
Despite the few numbers published, Portugal na Guerra became, at that time, a reference in the 
international arena, not only in France but also in Brazil, having received a large number of positive reviews 
and incentives for its continuation. 
 
 
“Many Parisians and departmental sheets have referred to our publication with praise. 
And from the principal members of the Portuguese colony in Paris we have also 
received very kind words of much appreciation. Our publication obtained great success 
in distant colonies, for among the newspapers that have mentioned our magazine it is 
worth mentioning a sheet of Tonkim! The Brazilian press refers to us several times and 
we have seen transcriptions of articles from our magazine in the most read daily 
newspapers in Rio, São Paulo, Inas and Pará “754 
 
 
However, the last issue was published in December 1917, and there is no written record of the reasons why 
it happened. 
 
The magazine A Guerra 
 
A Guerra was the monthly magazine of the Liga dos 
Combatentes da Grande Guerra (LCGG) (League of the 
Combatants of the Great War) founded in 1923 and 
formalized by the Decree n.º 3888, of January 29, 1924. 
Before analyzing the magazine itself it is important to 
understand that the statutes of the LCGG referred the 
objectives of the league, stating, in paragraph 5 of article 2 
the main goal "of the country's propaganda abroad, using 
for this purpose, mainly, the exchange with similar existing 
associations of different foreign countries" 755 ; and in 
paragraph 2 of article 3 was "expressly forbidden for any 
associated 
to express 
its political 
or religious 
                                                          
753 Free translation: No. 6, p 14. “A sala portugueza foi muito admirada, porque nélla vêmos, e pela directa prova 
photographica, sempre axacta, qual é o nosso esforço na actual guerra. Varios jornaes de Paris referiram-se com elogio à 
nossa curiosa e bem completa secção. Mais um tryumpho do nosso esforço militar.”. 
754 Free translation: No. 7, parisienses e departamentaes se teem referido à nossa publicação com elogio. E dos principaes 
membros da colonia portuguesa em paris temos egualmente recebido palavras carinhosas de muito apreço. A nossa 
publicação obteve mesmo um grande sucesso em colonias distantes, porque entre os jornaes que à nossa revista se teem 
referido destacamos uma folha do Tonkim! A imprensa brasileira cita-nos amiudadas vezes e temos visto transcripções 
d’artigos da nossa revista nos quotidianos mais lidos do Rio, de São Paulo, de Inas e do Pará”. 
755  Free translation: “de propaganda do país no estrangeiro, servindo-se para este fim, principalmente, do intercâmbio com 
as associações congéneres existentes dos diferentes países estrangeiros”. 
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6- Front cover of the last issue of 
“A Guerra” in December 1931 
creed"756. When in January 1, 1926 the magazine A Guerra was published as an organ of the LCGG, these and 
other statutory purposes influenced its content. The magazine was published from January 1926 to December 
1931, with an interregnum of three months and a total of 72 numbers. 
The magazine lived up to the statutes of the league devoting most of its pages to matters relating to the 
problems of the combatants: several tributes to those who had fought for their country, often through poetry, 
photographs or other initiatives such as Iconography of war (article 3 and 5); debate for complaints and 
suggestions (No.3, p.18); and other reports on the initiatives of the League and the Comissão dos Padrões da 
Grande Guerra. The political non-partisan was always a concern in the pages of the magazine. In paragraph 5 
under the title "Mutilated victory" the Direction was clear about the issue: “to undeceive the adventurers and 
reassure over-cautious people, we declare that the League will, under the new Direction, remain indifferent to 
the fights of the parties"757. After the revolution of May 28, 1926 and in the first edition after an interregnum of 
three months (no. 8, p. 2), the new Direction reaffirms that "according to our Statute, this magazine and the 
League it represents, will not have a political idea or a religious creed. It will respect all the combatants' 
opinions or ideas, because the title of combatant is synonym for patriot and Portuguese hallmark"758. However, 
that concern did not prevent the fact that a few numbers later, the director of A Guerra, Sousa Carrusca, 
decided, in support of the May 28 Movement "to replace the partisan politics by national politics which wants 
to save the dead homeland," concluding that, "here we are, General, ready to follow you, decided to take up the 
Posts that you refer, to well serve our country"759. And in  December 1926 (No. 12, p. 1), the Board regretted 
"that the Statute of the League does not give us more freedom, to open our heart slowly and vent our soul in a 
shout of great sorrow for the terrible miseries that come dripping on our Homeland and our race!"760. 
The great sense embodied in the magazine A Guerra was not so much about the political issues that led to 
the Portuguese participation in the Great War, or the preoccupation with a possibly jeopardized national 
sovereignty, or even about the role of Portugal in the Peninsula. What was truly conveyed by the pages of A 
Guerra was the feeling of abandonment experienced by all of those who had had to fight in the Flanders and in 
Africa against their will. A sense of abandonment that existed among the combatants leading to various calls 
for a fight against the indifference felt and shown by many of the former combatants and by most public 
opinion regarding war effort. 
There was also a sense of loss of the entire “reconstruction” 
underway in Europe. For example in the first issue of the second 
year of publication, the Direction regrets "my Portugal of 
bitterness" referring to Portugal as a "Nation of the Earth stays 
behind, in this march in celebration, which wants to be 
stubbornly sad and shameful, a refusal which diminishes and 
weakens"761. (n.13, p.1).  
The effort made by the LCGG to change those feelings was 
enormous and it was visible on the pages of A Guerra, by the 
way it valued the Portuguese participation in the Great War. In 
fact, the magazine A Guerra can be considered as one of the 
vectors of the propaganda campaign of the Republic that 
according to Telo (2011, 152) started on early 1919 with a huge 
effort to present the Portuguese belligerence as a great deed, a 
victory that proved the 
sagacity and strategic vision 
of the Republican leaders, or 
rather the Republican war-
                                                          
756 Free translation “expressamente vedado a qualquer associado o manifestar, dentro da mesma, o seu credo político ou 
religioso”. 
757 Free translation: “para desenganar os aventureiros e tranquilizar as pessoas timoratas, declaramos desde já que a Liga se 
manterá, sob a nova Direção, absolutamente estranha às lutas dos partidos”. 
758 Free translation: “nos termos do nosso Estatuto, não terá esta revista, e liga que representa, uma ideia politica ou um 
credo religioso. Respeitará todas as opiniões ou ideias dos combatentes nela inscritos, porque título de combatente é 
sinónimo de patriota e apanágio de português”. 
759 Free translation: “substituir a política partidária pela política nacional alimentando a grande aspiração de salvar a Pátria 
moribunda” ; “aqui estamos, pois, meu general, prontos a segui-lo, decididos a ocupar os postos, que nos indicar, para 
bem servir a Pátria” 
760 Free translation: “que o Estatuto da Liga nos não dê mais liberdade, para franca e lealmente abrir o nosso coração e 
desabafar a nossa alma num grito de grande tristeza, pelas lancinantes misérias que escorrendo vêem sobre a Pátria nossa 
e nossa Raça!” 
761 Free translation: “Nação da terra fica para traz, nesta marcha em festa, teimando em ser triste e oprobriosa, numa recusa 
que sangra e que desdoura, que deminue e enfraquece”. 
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supporters.  
 
A Guerra followed the same pattern of the previous two magazines in the sense that its pages were also 
chosen to convey the idea of the participation of Portugal in the Great War as something to celebrate and 
praise.  Poetry, texts inflamed with patriotism, image and art, especially paintings and drawings were the tools 
used for that effect.  The death of former combatants was often the leitmotif for a certain relief of the soul by 
remembering those heroes and their sacrifices.  
In the magazine A Guerra the feeling of repulsion towards Portugal’s oldest ally – Great Britain – was also 
recurrent. Throughout the several issues published, the absence of references to the British allies could not be 
more evident, In spite of the fact that Britain was the country that equipped, armed, trained and tactically 
supervised the Portuguese Army and, side by side, received the impact of the German offensive of April 1918 
The exception made was a letter from Marshal Haig to the Portuguese Legion, in issues 23 and 25, November 
1927, published during the visit of the British Fleet to the Tejo River and almost entirely bilingual; and issue 
26, dedicated to Marshal Douglas Haig, at the time of his death. However, there were countless references of 
praise towards the French. One of the Officers of the Brigada do Minho, for example, wrote on April 1926, 
about his personal experience on 9 April 1918, that it had been "the great France, our spiritual mother, the 
motherland of our racial brothers ..."762(No. 4, p.15). 
A Guerra would end in December 1931 due to "several difficulties" but also "because we were ordered to 
stop" as the last editor, then director, Eduardo de Faria wrote763.  
 
 
4. Final remarks 
 
The magazines Ilustração Portuguesa, Portugal na Guerra and A Guerra were different publications, from 
different periods, designed for different types of readers but still, they can be said to have had some things in 
common. Regarding the Portuguese participation in the Great War the techniques used by all of them to 
disseminate ideals, namely, for advertising for a cause, can be considered to have been mostly the same. These 
techniques included the use of image, poetry and prose inflamed to the exaltation of sacrifice and heroic deeds 
by the Portuguese. The official photos of the main Commanders alongside portraits of many combatants, 
regardless of rank, gave a personal and human character to the reasons why Portugal had to endure so much 
effort in terms of taking part in the European conflict.  
The means of propaganda used by the three magazines were, in fact, efficiently used in terms of : 
disseminating the key idea of the need to safeguard the national sovereignty and the role of Portugal in the 
Iberian Peninsula; being a great help regarding the dissemination of the idea of the Allies accepting the 
national effort (France more than Britain, which supported and maintained that Portuguese effort) during the 
Portuguese participation in the war; and finally, in the postwar period, when conveying the idea of heroic effort 
and quality of the Portuguese participation in the Great War.  
Similarly to most countries at war, the three Portuguese magazines Ilustração Portuguesa, Portugal na 
Guerra and A Guerra were a means of propaganda of key ideas that materialized the political options which 
would mark the European countries during the next few decades and which would also lead to a war of even 
more dramatic proportions, lined up with the exponential weight that propaganda would have. 
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Musical propaganda of the Great War 
 
Eric Sauda, 
Sorbonne 
 
 
Introduction  
 
     The French musical propaganda during the Great War has been the subject of publications by eminent 
colleagues Jane Fulcher764 in the U.S. and Esteban Buch765 in France. Their articles address the issue of the 
implementation of an embargo on German music in France at the beginning of the Great War before a musical 
propaganda whose influence extends to the international level during the entire conflict. These writings 
highlight the actions of politicians and heads of musical institutions of the time and the results of their 
businesses. However, even if the ideological goals of each other are complex and differ between preservation 
of musical heritage and affirmation of a nationalist cultural policy, the findings of the two musicologists lead 
to the same result which is positive. Propaganda bears fruit in raising funds for the benefit of injured while 
convincing other nations to join the cause of France in the conflict. However, these studies are limited to the 
music industry "scholar" of this period, whose relations with the political gente are narrow especially since the 
« Dreyfus affair »766. The following article proposes to explore the topic by observing more closely the impact 
of the dual phenomenon (embargo/propaganda) on the entire French population (civilians and mobilized) 
compared to other genres : military music, religious and popular.  
 
 
The application of the embargo on German music and the organization of propaganda of French music. 
 
     A measure prohibiting the free movement of goods " embargo " is understandable because it is the setting 
of a stopcock. However how can we explain the same initiative about music, an intangible asset ? If the French 
political and musical authorities manage to exclude the German music from concert programs at the beginning 
of the conflict, how can they expel German music from French spirits ? Public lectures and articles in the press 
of great composers such as Camille Saint-Saëns and Vincent d’Indy put the German music in the dock. These 
actions explain, consider (its intrinsic elements : rhythms recalling the walk of military parades, invasive 
harmonies...) and even amalgamate the violence of some of the works of German repertoire at the vehemence 
of the enemy. Their arguments are likely to convince the intellectuals and the French bourgeoisie. The French 
lambda, however, does not attach much importance to this case and find the arguments that can feed its 
germanophobia in other priority reach. Denigrate the German music in the early twentieth century is a 
daunting task besause Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert, Wagner or Schuman had largely served the 
teaching of Western music. Not to mention their influence on the works of European composers. So it is the 
promotion of French music at the detriment of the German music that will establish the dual phenomenon : 
embargo/propaganda. At the front, the professional and amateur musicians mobilized do not ask the question : 
what sort of music should be played in priority ? Unlike what happens in Paris, french musician soldiers don’t 
select the sheet music available to them at the front. And more for many of them, the masters remain masters 
in the eyes of amateurs and professionals. According to their testimony, Lucien Durosoir and Maurice 
Maréchal (both members of the « Quartet Mangin767 ») play at the front, quartets of Beethoven768, François 
Gervais769 plays sonatas of Schubert and Georges Duhamel (the future academician) learns to play the flute 
with the cantatas Bach. The researches of Stephan Patin show how musicians and composers not mobilized 
                                                          
764 Jane F. Fulcher, Concert and political propaganda in France in the early twentieth century, Translated by Marie-Pierre 
Gaviano in Annals, History, Social Sciences. Indiana University, 55th year, N. 2, 2000. p. 389-413. 
765 Esteban Buch, « Les Allemands et les Boches : la musique allemande à Paris pendant la Première Guerre mondiale », 
in  Le Mouvement Social, 2004/3, p. 45-69. 
766 Gaetano Manfredonia, La chanson anarchiste en France des origines à 1914, l’Harmattan, 1997. 
767 "The Quartet Mangin" is the orchestra of the General Headquarters, the quartet created by General Mangin supporting 
initiatives concerts in front. Violinist Lucien Durosoir, violist André Caplet, cellist Maurice Maréchal Henri Lemoine 
and Henri Magne will turn piano quartet. 
768 Durosoir Lucien (1878-1955) violinist, performer and composer Maurice Maréchal (1892-1964), a concert cellist, both 
friends and fellow composer André Caplet who lead during the war the famous quartet Mangin. Deux musiciens dans 
la Grande Guerre, Lucien Durosoir et Maurice Maréchal, Paris, Tallandier éditeur, 2005. 
769 François Gervais (1885-1956), cello concertist, soloist of the Concerts Lamoureux, a friend of Maurice Maréchal. 
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can’t fault their colleagues committed to the front who play German music770. It seems legitimate to all allow 
these brave soldiers who defend the homeland, some ethical or political exemptions. While in the civil, 
musicians and composers are struggling to reveal to the public any defects of German music and make every 
effort to prevent its spread on French soil, musicians mobilized do not feel concerned or by almost debate. 
     To better understand how the propaganda of French music will supplant aspired blockade on German 
music, we now observe the works composed in the civil and those created at the front. Thus we will be able to 
obtain a significant reflection of the importance of these occasional works in this propaganda. As a reminder, 
the declaration of war had led to an immediate closure of theaters and concert halls, which was lifted after the 
Battle of the Marne in November 1914. From this date are organized by the Parisian orchestras, charity 
concerts for the benefit of soldiers (in the civil and rural hospitals) as well as tours abroad to promote French 
music and invite other nations to join the French army in the conflict. 
 
 
The circumstances works created in the civil 
 
     First, we can not ignore the musical compositions created by the composers or not mobilized musicians. 
They are interpreted far from the front to civilians and wounded soldiers. The proceeds are donated to the 
victims or sometimes participate in financing the war effort. However, participation in charity concerts and 
solidarity gives many composers the opportunity to play their music and the French school as a whole benefits 
from the exclusion of German music. "National mornings" founded by « l’Œuvre fraternelle des artistes », 
producing concerts in the great amphitheater of the Sorbonne, performed by the orchestra of the Conservatoire, 
where alternate poetry (patriotic readings Déroulède, Daudet, Hugo, Peguy between other) music (Franck, 
Magnard and Saint-Saëns for the first concert on November 29, 1914)771. The national anthems of the Allies 
open and close events. The Sorbonne also welcomes companies Concerts Colonne-Lamoureux, the first 
sessions were devoted to Berlioz and Franck, the third to composers under arms or died for their country, 
including F. Schmitt and A. Magnard but also new features, including the work of Lili Boulanger, Pour les 
funérailles d’un soldat and the Berceuse Héroïque of Debussy772. While the latter since the beginning of the 
war was not favorable to the fact that his music is performed in public until the fate of France was not decided, 
the composer created his first works of circumstances at the end of the year 1914773. Scores of the Berceuse 
Héroïque (1913) and Pièce pour le vêtement du blessé (1914, published in France in 1915 by Durand) are 
included alongside those of composers such as Massenet and other contemporary rallied to the cause774. The 
publication of these works is the first contribution to the war effort of the master. The war inspired him 
thereafter as other works, Noël des enfants qui n’ont plus de maison (December 1915) and l’Ode à la France 
(1916), a patriotic cantata with lyrics by Laloy. Finally in 1917, Debussy dedicated to the memory of 
Lieutenant Jacques Chariot, nephew of the publisher Durand, killed in action some time before the second 
piece of En blanc et noir, inspired Ballad against the enemies of France of Villon. Reflecting the work of 
Ravel Le tombeau de Couperin, this type of work that pays tribute to lost loved ones can maintain their 
memories but also a way to do the grief of those who mourn. 
     Meanwhile, the military music is no exception. The composers of military music perform musical works for 
the whole community, soldiers and civilians. In November 1915 at the Comédie française, is organized 
exceptional morning to the heroes of the air. In the program is written the first hearing of La Victoire de la 
Marne, which is a symphony of G. Balay (1871-1943). The work is performed by the music of the Republican 
Guard under the direction of the composer, orchestra which he is also the chef775. Alexandre Courtade (1872-
1951) solo trumpet music of the Republican Guard consists La fourragère du Poilu, march for band trumpets 
and bugles, Le Gourbi which is a double step march requiring the same instrumental forces and L’inconnu, 
which is a funeral march776. The son of composer and editor Bajus Zephyr, Louis Bajus (1896-1940), created 
the Gai retour. Sometimes the marches that inspire composers (of classical music) as the most famous Saint-
Saëns with his Marche interalliée, Alexandre Georges with En route and Jacques de la Presle (1888-1969) 
with Chantez (1916) and Chantez (1917). )777. La Française, Chant héroïque de la Grande Guerre, is a war 
                                                          
770 Stephan Patin, La musique française et la Première Guerre mondiale, une contribution à l’étude des attitudes du corps 
musical dans la nation en guerre, thesis in musicology under the direction of P. Guillot Paris Sorbonne, 1990. 
771 Esteban Buch, « Les Allemands et les Boches »  op. cited, p. 52. 
772 S.-A. Leterrier « Culture de guerre et musique nationale. La musique française dans la Grande Guerre », in Chefs-
d’œuvre et circonstances, (dir. P. Mercilloux), Departmental Archives of the Pas-de-Calais, Arras, 2000, p. 23. 
773 See http://www.archive.org/stream/kingalbertsbook and http://hector.ucdavis.edu/SdC/03ChronologyTP.htm 
774 As Edward Elgar, Edward German et Pietro Mascagni. See http://www.onyxclassic.com/pressrom/ONYX4028.pdf  
775 See http://vads.ahds.ac.uk/large.php?uid=27536 
776 See http://www.delabelleepoqueauxanneesfolles.com/repertoire%20autre.htm 
777  See the page offered by Corisande Evesque page, granddaughter of Jean de la Presle on the site : 
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anthem composed in 1915 by Camille Saint-Saëns and the poet Miguel Zamacoïs at the request of the 
newspaper Le Petit Parisien778. 
Forward against the treachery of bandits without honor, faith. Allies motto "justice and right." 
The chorus of this Française clearly shows the position of the authors and on the published score is inscribed 
the words : animated walking motion. À la France immortelle ! Credo ! of Alexandre Georges, in 1917, offers 
a masterful illustration of the combination of religious and patriotic faith. These works leave the impression 
that their authors take virtually weapons to get started. It is to kick out the enemy, obviously by a spiritual way. 
However when it comes to music that complain the victims of war, composers of liturgical music sometimes 
fall into a rather bland pathos as revealed by the title of a song by Alexandre Georges on a poem by Maurice 
Gauchez : Une femme, petite chose pâle au fond du soir de Flandre, whose sentimentality is touching779. We 
should also mention the song Des fleurs et non des pleurs… of Xavier Leroux on a poem by P. de Choudens 
published during the year 1917, the title of which is a weak pun somewhat discredits the authors780. Other less 
famous composers, such as Henri Augé (1888-1966), part of their repertoire of composers mark the passage of 
this war. This artist is one of those local musicians with multiple musical talents, composers limited but 
prolific reputation. In 1914, he composed his circumstances work at Le Touquet : La chute du beffroi. The 
lyrics of this song, dedicated to the victims of Arras, remember the fire and fall of belfry of Arras were sorely 
felt, with a comparable intensity that caused by fire in the cathedral of Reims781. But the production of works 
of music can not escape the fact exaggerations as evidenced by a letter to Romain Rolland in which he refers to 
the "Kolossal" Hymne des Alliés of Paul Dupin, work for a period of fifty minutes that requires two thousand 
performers. 
 
There are all in there : choirs, marching bands, " lightning, horrors, cheers ", sacred dances, carnivals, medley, 
choirs, organ, harmony, and finally La Brabançonne, harmonized by all the hymns of the Allies, plus four other 
sub- songs782. 
 
 
     In 1918 after four years of a war that drags on, they are works that evoke the hope that composers strive to 
achieve because the general order word is that we must hold on... Finally instead, the approach of the armistice 
they are works prophetically announce the victory and the upcoming return of peace. The Choral (Justorum 
animae in manu Dei sunt) in 1918, of Jacques Ibert inspires contemplation and prayer, however, the final 
suggests a quick and successful end to the conflict. Guillaume Balay even anticipates the issuance of Alsace 
and Lorraine, scoring to his repertoire of the hymn La victoire en chantant783. This year Camille Saint-Saëns 
composed two works Vers la victoire (1918) on a poem by P. Fournier and Hymne à la Paix, a poem by J. L. 
Faure, for choir and orchestra. If the works of circumstances arising in the civil during the conflict, which 
reflect an aesthetic stagnation where merge musical genres and a thousand ways to express feelings, they allow 
us to follow with the music the chronology of the war. It is the same for works created at the front. It is 
important to note that after the emergence of the phenomenon of music at the front then its establishment, this 
art reports the news of the conflict. 
 
 
The circumstances works created at the front 
 
     During this war, some occasional works are composed near the battle by professional of classical music, 
popular, religious and military. The composers are mobilized to the task and give account of facts or feelings 
experienced. All orders of music for orchestra (military or not) will punctuate the happy and unhappy events of 
the conflict. The officers asked the competent musicians to compose heroic marches or hymns for the 
regiments who have distinguished themselves, and the music of mourning and Masses for the dead soldiers. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
http://www.musimem.com/images/JDP.pdf 
778 See the article on the biography of Camille Saint-Saens on the website : http://www.musimem.com/saint-saens.htm. 
779 Moreover Debussy quickly regrets the popular success that his Christmas children who have no home. The simplicity of 
his opus afflicts and composer considers the composition like a sentimentality. See Culture de guerre et musique 
nationale, S.-A. Leterrier, op. cited, p. 65. 
780 Les Annales Politiques et Littéraires, 1917, N° 1793, p. 403- 404. 
781 Culture de guerre et musique nationale, S.-A. Leterrier, op. cited, p. 55. 
782 Choice of letters Romain Rolland to his mother, 1914-1916, Romain Rolland Notebook No. 20, (Letter of January 13, 
1915) Albin Michel, 1971, p. 74. 
783 See The press release by Benoît Saulin, assistant to the Musical Department of the Army Museum. The PDF document 
available online and accessible with a search engine with the entry : Army Museum-Corélia. 
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This is the first book of commissioned works. Meanwhile, musicians mobilized who resumed their interpreters 
activity at the front, gradually regain their creative inspiration. Composers and musicians then write 
spontaneous works on various topics. In this parallel directory, musical genres and content differ because 
recipients vary. It is difficult to date precisely the musical creations of composers at the front because there are 
many possible confusion between the time of completion of the work and that of its public execution. 
However, they emerge from the month of December 1914 784 . It only took a few months to composers 
mobilized to back to work. Their situation at the front inspires or not, they are in a position that motivates their 
creative work, for two main reasons. Following the events of the chronology of the war, these are near the first 
major casualties and the pain of those who mourn that inspire composers785. Then, when the French army 
raises its head and win its first battles, heroic marches are composed, that which consist in calling on the 
patriotism of the regiments. This period of history inspires a few composers who write in a martial style as Les 
jeunes lauriers of Reynaldo Hahn (1915), orchestrated by Leonce Chomel, the Marche du 163ème régiment 
d’infanterie of Florent Schmitt (1916 ), which is a dedication the regiment786 or Le Cri de guerre de la 6e 
Division d’Infanterie, composed by Jacques La Presle on a poem by René Dorin, who was given the first time 
the army June 30, 1915 by the 119 th Infantry Regiment, to Aix-Noulette (Pas-de-Calais)787. But when the 
« theater to the armies » is created in 1916, the types of compositions multiply and merge. Depending 
opportunities, composers must add to the two types of works mentioned above, others that may be some tunes, 
dances, songs, and even operettas. Finally, the type of compositions that generally conforms to the stage 
shows. 
     At the front, the career of composer Joseph Boulnois (choir director at the Opéra-Comique and organist of 
the great organ of Saint-Louis d’Antin) is one example among many that illustrates the existence led by the 
artist engaged in war as well as the influences affecting the works of the designer in this new environment. 
During the five years of war, the organist composer rather specializes in sacred music and now became 
sergeant nurse, compose at the front during the few moments of rest that the war wants to give him. Despite his 
situation, he managed to compose liturgical pieces, melodies, songs, suites for cello and piano but also 
humorous pieces such as his Hymne à Bacchus and his suite Musette et Bidon. During this period, he wrote the 
most important works of his career, he treats genres mingle over time. And life at the front does not inspire 
him as compositions of sacred music and as it appears in the directory, derision soldiery can coexist with more 
solemn works.      
     Two parameters lead composers mobilized to carry out these blends genres in their repertoire. The first is 
the need to meet the strong demand for creation. The second is that the composers of classical music, popular, 
religious or military, are close and that collaboration between specialists from different genres are brought to 
unite for a good cause. Thus the Annales Politiques et Littéraires788 publish during the year 1917 Les gars 
d’Mangin (à nos chers camarades de la Ve division du groupement Mangin), the music of this hymn is André 
Caplet and words of Th. Botrel789. Nobody would have imagined such an association between the first Prix de 
Rome and the Breton popular singer. However, Caplet also collaborates with composers of military music. He 
composed in 1916 Douaumont – Marche héroïque de la Vème division, which is orchestrated by Guillaume 
Balay. In 1918 the reverse happens. The Hymne de la délivrance of Guillaume Balay is orchestrated by André 
Caplet. And as revealed in the writings of L. Durosoir collaborations between the master of the art music and 
musicians of the French army are conducted in a very natural way. 
     In both directories created at the back and the front the scholar, military and religious genres mingle. The 
expression of feelings too. Faith, patriotism and desire to win are the main themes. Obviously, the content of 
all these works is a constant reminder that France is a country that defends its artistic and intellectual values, 
bidding fights bravely against an enemy invasion is illegitimate. However generally for the creators of these 
works, the priority is given to the assertion of French identity and artistic rather than discredit the Germanic 
culture. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
784 (...) "Fernand Halphen in Brény wrote on the front line, December 25, 1914 a Christmas for flute and organ of a 
recklessness that would mention the proximity of the fighting. "(...) See the press release of Benoît Saulin, op. cited. 
785 See http://www.musicologie.org/Biographies/h/hahn_reynaldo.html et aussi le site : http://andre-caplet.fr 
786 Les Annales Politiques et Littéraires during the year 1915, N° 1686. 
787 As the Chanson Poilues et une Suite en sol pour quatuor à cordes (1917). Cf. http://www.musimem.com. 
788 The review consists of texts signed by prestigious names in the literary community, comments and chronicles written by 
Yvonne Sarcey. In 1907, Yvonne Sarcey founded the University of the Annals that the quality of his lectures, added 
much to the reputation of the Annals which in 1917 drew nearly two hundred thousand copies. 
789 Jean-Baptiste-Théodore-Marie Botrel, popular singer, songwriter French (1868-1925). It will retain its patriotic songs 
during the Great War.Les Annales Politiques et Littéraires, 1917, N°1758, p. 192. 
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The reclamation in the press of musical activities at the front 
 
     In the civil, the press tells and incenses the musical activities, that emerge in this war of position. It is full of 
praise for the musicians who beyond their role as fighters animate the troops with music during moments of 
rest granted by the war. Taking advantage of public affection for artists mobilized, columnists detail their 
qualities and emphasize the importance of their involvement in the conflict. They also recall the heroic deeds 
which musicians participated in historic battles and tend to remove from the minds of readers, the idea that 
artists do not have their place at the front. But the press did not just make an apology of the music and 
musicians, it wrongly publishes some staging of music it produces. Journalists exaggerate situations in which 
music played an epic role. 
 
"Thus died a simple farmer, the bugle Louis Richer, number 10518, brought to the agenda as follows: As 
bugle-call in a position responsible for giving the warning "gas", performed its mission in an attack with a 
magnificent disregard for danger and rang until he fell exhausted reached by the gas".790 
 
 
Then when the events described are not ones illustrated with photographs, the publications ask to professionals 
some drawing that recall the pathetic tables of Géricault (Fig. 1) 
 
Fig. 1 : "The bugle Marcel Schmidt, who had lost his arm by a shell, 
took his instrument in his left hand and continues to sound the charge." 
(Drawing Damelans), Le Pèlerin, N°2015, novembre 1915, p. 8. 
 
 
Moreover, in this purview, the sources are to be handled with some caution because the too categorical 
judgments are likely to distort the facts regarding the "sound" of that time. The photographic image that 
follows (Fig. 2) allows us to say that the vision of German music soldiers by the French press is a little 
impartial. 
This photograph strongly suggests that the German soldiers musicians do not have a lot of imagination (see 
the horn replaced by a watering can) and they are ridiculous with their music at the front. However, it should 
be noted that at that time, German "brass" (the performers of brass wind instruments) are the best in Europe. 
The group of musicians in this situation is quite serious because it takes a great technique of embouchure for 
use a watering can  as "horn" and maintain a matching tune to the rest of the orchestra. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
790 Les Annales Politiques et Littéraires, N°1726, 1916, volume 2, p. 103. 
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Fig. 2 : "The Germans have fun out of the reach of our guns." Le Pèlerin, 
N° 1997, p.12. 
 
Unfortunately, from exageration to the fomented lie, there is only a short distance that journalists are quick 
to take. Through the war diary of F. Gervais, we found a trick without common measurement organized by the 
press. Indeed, the concertist evokes a  concert organized with his friends outdoors, for the « Sainte Barbe » (at 
the beginning of December in the calendar). In his personal effects we found a photograph taken during the 
day. On the picture the cellist appears well with other fellow musicians (Fig. 3)791. F. Gervais made it clear in 
his war diary the date and place of the concert by stating that for the opportunity, press photographers were 
present. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: Photograph of a group of musicians from the 313th Infantry Regiment. 
F. Gervais is located at the extreme right. Sainte Barbe 1915, 
personalphotograph of F. Gervais appeared in Le Miroir Sunday, January 2, 
1916. 
 
                                                          
791 François Gervais, War Diary (1914-1919), transcribed for the PhD in musicology, Eric Sauda (2010) : Francois Gervais 
musician Front from 1914 to 1919. Affirmation of identity, social and artistic dir. Mr. Alten, University Paris Sorbonne 
(2010). The original text is preserved along with the photographic image of F. Gervais contained in his personal effects 
in the funds of the Historial de la Grande Guerre in Péronne (Somme 80), France. 
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Carefully poring Press published around the date of delivery, we finally found the photograph of our 
character, published in the weekly Le Miroir 2 January 1916 (Fig. 4). However, in his diary, F. Gervais noted 
that this day was quiet and precisely thanks to this respite, the band took advantage of this lull in fighting, for a 
very enjoyable musical moment. So the next day, the enemy giving them an extension to the truce, these  
musicians have returned to play in these places. But the press provides a deformation that fact. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 : Le Miroir 2 January 1916. 
 
 
 
It offers two shots : the first representing the orchestra playing and the second placed just below shows the 
location where the musicians were playing, empty of its occupants. On the last shot, we can see white stains 
supposed to be artillery explosions. In fact after specialist advice, it turns out that this picture has been 
tampered with792. The illusion is perfect and the caption says: Artists played in front of their battery: they had 
to leave the floor to let the cannon talk. 
     The staging photographic propagandists, are numerous during the First World War. For example, we should 
mention this photograph taken by members of the Red Cross for the weekly Le Pelerin (then taken up in 
Lecture pour tous N ° 2020) reveals an organized masquerade (Fig. 5). We can see from the photograph that 
follows a band of military music that simulates a repetition outdoors.  
 
                                                          
792 In fact, the stains were performed during development of the picture blowing in some places with a straw on the 
developer product, according to Yazid Medmoun, official photographer of the Historial Peronne who is the author of 
numerous photographs contained in Encyclopedia of the Great War 1914-1918, edited by J. J. Becker and S. Audouin-
Rouzeau, Bayard, 2004. 
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Fig. 5 : "Drums, Bugles, Music Head" Lectures pour tous, March 15, 1916. 
 
The musicians are ridiculed because afflicted with gas masks, they can not under any circumstances play their 
instrument. Once again journalists are striving to make the reader believe that the music of the French army 
and the joviality of soldiers can resist weapons of their opponents and even gas793. But these small deceptions 
seem to have only one aim: to demonstrate the interest of patriotic music and its saving effect on French 
soldier morale. Yet civilians, press readers are greatly relieved to discover through articles and published 
photographs, that the soldiers who defend the nation hold good. Taking into account the interest of readers to 
the musical life close combat, journalists highlight the fact that during their time off, the French soldiers are 
creative, they compete imagination and are especially not idle or aimless soldiers. 
 
 
Conclusion 
     The musical activities at the front by the French soldiers become the guarantor of maintaining the morale of 
the troops with the arrogant and chauvinistic demonstration of a form of resistance to the enemy. The general 
idea is to avoid, after invasion, to be culturally robbed by the enemy. So the propaganda of French music will 
send the same slogan to all civilians and mobilized French. Hammering the same message in this case music, 
spread the music and French invading spirits. It is to galvanize the patriotism of French at all costs and this 
will extend to the far borders. But the dual phenomenon embargo/propaganda is more the excessive promotion 
of French music that will create the blockade on the German music desired rather than the reverse. 
     However it is more second-tier players such as intellectuals, politicians or journalists who ostracize the 
German rather than the protagonists of the music business : French composers and musicians. The former want 
the blockade of German music in order to preserve the French culture footprint enemy while the second 
advantage of the situation to advance their own productions of "French manufacturing." Proof that music and 
musicians are not so handy as it seems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
793 The photographs of musicians took at the front and press reports between 1914 and 1918, are innumerable and, in all 
publications : daily, weekly, monthly, of all kinds: specialized press releases to all media for children ... 
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WOMEN IN SPANISH POSTER. ICONOGRAPHY OF AN 
ADVERTISEMENT REVOLUTION 
 
 
Alba Rodríguez Silgo.  
Universidade de Santiago de Compostela 
 
 
Today, every paper about contemporary arts or aesthetics should rest, particularly and beyond whatever is 
purely formal, on the causes for the further development of these works.  
This means that it will always be necessary to appraise what explanations may help to understand, in the 
case we are dealing with, the thematic and representative evolution of female shape in Spanish poster related to 
the female universe. In other words, it should address the reasons that explain the set of advertising works both 
the billboards for the female and the billboards starring by herself, which were produced in three key moments 
in the history of Spain in the 1930s and 1940s: the Second Republic, the Civil War and the fascist dictatorship 
of Francisco Franco. 
It is our goal to show the visual disparity of the image of women from a critical and accurate analysis of the 
different events that took place in Spain, and that have produced a radical change in the moral and aesthetic 
vision of the feminine. Following this strict timeline, we will show the consecutive antagonisms of this 
representation, on the social, political and symbolic sphere. 
Several studies have associated, with the necessary reservations, the Spanish Republican poster with the 
Soviet Union posters. It is true that, in large measure, the leaders of the republican side are associated with the 
Soviet visual mechanisms, which has to do with the ideological equivalences between the social and political 
revolution in the USSR and what the Spanish Republic promised for after the war. The purely social character 
of both posters also encouraged the sharing of compositional formulas and text. 
The fascist poster, for the time being, does not offer a link so directly related to their ideological European 
references and the military regime that was established in areas gained during the war did not use the poster as 
a first order mean of propaganda. This differentiate the so copious relation between ethics and aesthetics of 
other fascist or philo-fascist dictatorships. This demonstrates, by itself, the low importance that Franco and 
who headed the armed uprising granted to popular opinion. 
The Francoist poster during the war was directed mainly to the elements of the basic necessities —food— 
and left on the sidelines any explicit reference to ideology beyond the topic “neither a house without fire, nor a 
Spanishman without bread”, coined by Franco himself. Moreover, the mass media (press and radio), were 
quickly controlled by the military uprising, which made the poster was considered unnecessary. All this serves, 
then, to understand the almost total absence of women-shape at the initial national-syndicalist ideology and 
subsequent national-Catholicism. 
The issue of women, mainly theorized by feminism, come from occupations designated according to the 
gender. The woman, both in the Republic and in Dictatorship and also during the intermediate civil war, will 
remain —in that organization— responsibility for family stewardship and for the home, regardless of the 
degree of freedom that every time she come to achieved from her husband. Both the woman, liberal 
Republican or Catholic Francoist, are always responsible for ensuring the healthy development of the family. 
This reality compels us always to distinguish between political theory and its practice, particularly 
regarding the ideology of the left, because the theory of women’s right —if there is such thing— wanted just 
maintaining the status quo. 
On the other hand, in general, socialism and communism in Spain paid little attention to women’s issues at 
that time. Consequently, the advancement in the rights of females was scarce and usually its materialization 
was almost nil, given that froze on the way to their legislative drafting and, at best, were quickly buried by the 
new legislation of national-Catholic inspiration after the war. 
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Republic. Opening and kidnapping of female issue. 
 
It has been considered that the proclamation of the Second Republic in Spain brought a strong advance for 
the consideration of women beyond their purely reproductive role, both in the physical (sexual reproduction) 
and in terms of the reproduction of the conditions that made possible the preservation of the status quo. 
It is true that during the short Second Republic existed the climate and political will to end the social 
obstacles —not exclusively on feminine theme— that had accumulated during the reign of Alfonso XIII, but 
we should take into account that, after all, the changes were neither as radical as it was thought nor as deep as 
necessary. 
The wording of the draft republican Constitution, held by Luis Jimenez Asúa, was preferably cautious to 
address the conflict between the sexes and was only due to the presence of congresswoman Clara Campoamor 
and their protests that the article has been corrected to look like this: “can not be the basis of legal privilege 
nature, affiliation, gender, social class, wealth, ...” [Article 25]. 
The political will existed, therefore, but it should take care in developing general normatives, which led to 
legislation touching the woman question, at best, in a purely lateral way through a multitude of legal changes 
that affected the family and, thereby, to the woman. In the end, the recognition of civil marriage, the 
suspension of the offense of adultery applied only to women, the right to the parens patria for women and the 
right to paternity investigation and recognition of natural children, were nothing that changes in the general 
state the dependency of women in relation to her husband. Moreover, the creation of mixed schools, the 
abolition of the so-called “domestic matters” in the educational curriculum since the Moyano Law of 
Education of 1857, or the incorporation of women in labor vacancies on merit and without regard to sex, as 
well as the theoretical assimilation in wages allowed women, where there were applied, reaching a level of 
social recognition that encouraged the end of sexual reification that had been submitted by the ideological 
regime of confessional right. 
In any case, the policy of recognition of female issue was exercised by men, due to the absence of a 
feminist movement strongly implanted. Hence the legislative changes adopted by progressive parties that 
supported the Republic had a little social impact. The divorce law of 1932, for example, brought no sudden 
change of marital relations, as feared militant confessional. Before the contrary, sexist education which lasted 
until 1931 made that the women themselves had rejected massively use that right. Not only that, right parties 
positioned against immediately. The CEDA —confederation of Catholic parties— immediately included 
derogation of this law in its political program, and the Catholic Church, so majoritarian in the country and with 
a social presence far above any political party included in their sermons multitude of warnings against divorce 
in line with canonical Vatican law. 
The same is true with the right to vote. Militated against him not only the clerical sector and right, as well 
as most of the left, even if for different reasons. For the right, the political woman could produce discord 
within the holy couple, for the left, the woman lacked independence from religious groups and women’s 
suffrage was tantamount to putting in immediate danger the advancement of the Republic in the separation of 
Church and State. But more importantly was the confrontation between the women themselves. 
These examples allow us to conclude two main ideas. First, that the political effort specifically aimed at 
overcoming the subjugation of women just managed during the Second Republic, only was able to enact 
divorce and suffrage laws. Second, both these laws as those relating to the family which, laterally, had to do 
with the social role of women and intimate, in fact impacted only very superficially in everyday life of women. 
The result was that, in general, they continued submitted, in economic sphere, to the man’s wage and, in the 
occupational sphere, to home and children care.  
Thus, is not strange that in Republican poster of the pre-war is almost impossible to crawl any occurrences 
of a new representation of women as her new legal status, as was said, had very little practical effect. Of the 
few cases that have existed is what we will deal further. 
It is true that the new Republican legislation would allow sat, in the collective consciousness, the bases for 
educational independence of woman from the man — and when we talk about education we are not only 
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referring to regular education, as well as the set of social norms and customs that, changing slowly, appeared 
to normality for generations to come. Even so, the changes were certainly slow, and the graphic advertising 
kept up with society. It is: it kept, at the outset, the assumption of sexual segregation that only very slowly 
started the process of dilution in which today we women are immersed. 
Specifically, around the first decade of the century, the occurrence of women in advertisements related to 
books or encyclopedias was reduced to allegory, as can be seen in messages that redounded traditional female 
occupations, with slogans like “Woman, the family doctor.” [Fig. 1] The trend continued in effect during the 
Republican time, although the modification of normative education. The fact that the law collected new 
considerations for the female did not mean that, from night to day, publicists returned to work to eliminate all 
sexist formulation of advertising. 
During the biennium of the Azaña government (1936-39), teaching has become a serious political conflict. 
The claim to the secularize, as well as to unify schools divided by gender collided head-on with the ideas of 
right and clergy and radicalized both positions. Therein begins the production of posters commissioned by the 
Ministry of Public Instruction and the Federación Española de Trabajadores de la Educación [Spanish 
Federation of Teachers], such those produced for the campaign titled War against illiteracy [fig. 2]. Although 
in this example the messages do not make any explicit reference to female, the woman appears represented in 
various posters, exercising her new right to a unified education, without gender division. And that, by itself, 
constitute a clear breakthrough, even though its reduced range. 
Another of the main scenarios, along with the educational, was labor issue. Statistics show that the 
incorporation of women to the Spanish labor markets was very late compared to the rest of the industrialized 
countries of Europe and America, under two premises: first, the difference in intellectual and professional 
preparation leveraged by traditional sexist education; second place, the inability of labor market to take, 
quantitatively, the massive entry of women in work outside the family dwelling. 
In 1930, there were 6.5 million families in Spain. Women were responsible for domestic work in about 5 
million. The female labor force was that year 24% of total assets, and in that percentage, 80% were widows or 
singles with no dependents. Still, in this 24% of salaried women, approximately two out of three had a 
temporary employment contract or were part of domestic service, while in the other third of the total, 82% 
were skilled workers in the textile sector. 
Indeed, the moral imperative forced woman to procreation and limited, thus, its continuation in the labor 
market. Having reached this point, a single worker should retire to devote to the care of the family because 
they lacked laws which shelter maternity/paternity permissions. 
On the other hand, advances in employment law during Republic time, cannot decreased social burden on 
women. The law of civil marriage and divorce law, both of 1932, just like the law of suffrage, the recognition 
of the right of association and syndication, the eight-hour workday, or the law of Sunday rest —which was not 
applied in domestic service sector, of course— had a minor impact on the labor conditions of women, which in 
practice retained its social role with some improvement very timely, as the establishment of a period of 
breastfeeding and other actions geared for minimal and precarious reconciliation of work and family life, with 
formulas such as might be seen in figure 3: “Mother, work happy! The Ministry of Education looks after your 
children.” 
The absence of posters crying for improvements in social and laboral conditions of women demonstrates, 
first, the absence of powerful feminist organizations like existed in other European countries, where these 
improvements progressed at much more promising speeds. And second, that in general, the political parties of 
the left and the worker unions, not focused on the problem of women with any concrete propagandistic effort: 
their posters were directed to the entire population, without any positive discrimination.  
At that time, the appearance of women in political laborist or labor themed poster —beyond their 
victimization as alleged “weaker sex”— will be in the company of man, at best. At rest, the woman will be 
deleted considering that the male body is representative of the whole social — especially when this set is the 
working class, consisting mainly of men. 
The third major sphere of appearance of the woman in the poster is that of familiar thematic, where 
traditionally it had appeared as a caregiver. According to the customary role of women, is in the family where 
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she undergoes “voluntarily” through procreation. The modernization that the Republic leveraged in this sphere, 
especially with the advancement of the parties of the left and the fall of the center and right, provided new 
opportunities, but changes were not evident in the short span of eight years, the last three of which were of 
bitter civil war. 
Women who come forward, because her age, to require provision of the necessary advances, had yet 
received an State instruction and a moral education directed by the clergy, and her profile was more inclined to 
this pre-subjugation than to the promise that the left, anarchism and trade unions represented in the prelude of 
the democratic state — a promise for now, hard concretion in the short term. There were many women who 
reacted and rebelled against the legal advances that promoted various governments about the status of women, 
reaching even to the point of contradicting the existence of the problem, on balance the problem of 
abandonment of children and the destruction of family balance as an argument. 
On the other hand, if the opinion of the woman had been disregarded by the majority of political forces 
until the proclamation of the Republic in 1931, with the access to female suffrage (1932) there was no doubt of 
the need to organize politically this remnant population. That is when they start running new political devices, 
both the left and the right. Initially, the female membership presents a astounding quantum leap. In 1930 it 
stood at around 35,000 affiliated in Catholics unions, for only 18,000 affiliated in the Unión General de 
Trabajadores (UGT). In 1936, under the slogan ‘equal work, equal pay’, the UGT brings together more than 
100,000 women, and the number grows also in the anarchist union: the CNT. 
On the right, after the disaster of the Patriotic Union, the association Aspiraciones reaches 5,000 affiliated 
and female union Acción Católica (Catholic Action) reaches 38,000 members to go through the territory of the 
state to continue with the work of Catholic indoctrination that had been swept of public instruction, and to 
spearhead protests against the secularization of the state. For this, they schools reject unified, schools; they 
created parallel high schools, they signed petitions, they collect funds for religious order, are they boycotted 
republican stores and widespread in the press the religious and anti-communist message. 
 
Aid and trenche vs. disappearance of woman 
 
In reviewing the few instances of women as figure in posters during the Civil War (1936-1939), both in 
front and in the rear war, it appears immediately two divergent conceptions about their social role. 
In defense of a national-syndicalist Spain, which reserves ideologically the same woman role that had been 
usual, and that is the one which also will play for the national-Catholicism, the woman breaks the short way 
they walked by the republican poster and takes its traditional position. Rather, in defense of a democratic 
Spain, the woman appears in two registers: as victim of the fascist invader or as active combatants along with 
the man. To the left, although these two records, we are talking about the same woman, like uniform concept, 
the protagonist in the front and in the resistance. 
The war was responsible for the biggest transformation of the role of women these years. A transformation 
that was much deeper than that leveraged by the Popular Front (a coalition of the radical left) during its short 
term in government. Was the need for female support in the fight against the fascist military uprising which led 
the leftist political parties to recognize clearly the ability of women to participate and even to command a state 
department. The possibility of doing so had been already included in the Constitution, but until then no woman 
had held a ministerial office. The first, Federica Monsteny (which came from anarchist CNT-FAI) held the 
ministry closer to the traditional role, the Health and Social Care department. 
The emergence of the war, especially in the early stages, led to a general mobilization, not only of the 
army, as for numerous militias linked to political parties and trade unions. Some of these groupings have 
produced their own propaganda in the form of a poster, and there, they showed the first radical change in the 
role of women, which began appearing as a fighter in a variety of formulas that can be divided typologically in 
two large blocks. In one hand, an allegorized woman, the abstracted shape of the feminine that is the woman in 
front and highlights its new social contribution. On the other hand, a desecrated and not denoted woman that 
just appears next to side with the man [Fig. 4] and whose no exceptionality shows, really, the most radical 
change: one in which the woman is truly matched the man, the one in which gender does not determine the 
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role in the fight. So much so that in the communist poster, the female figure used formal post-Cubist visual 
resources to win some masculinization — but not as a requirement for gender, but as logical derivation of the 
war situation [Fig. 5]. 
But this new formulation of the women in the poster does not negate the weight of tradition. The woman, 
who also continues at the rear, keeps appearing in advertising posters of the time according to the traditional 
model, only contextually adapted to war: mothers suffering the uprising [Fig. 6-7] and women in the war, 
working in usual occupations, ie as nurses - never as a doctor [Fig. 8-9]. 
The radicalisation and unexpected duration of the war produced the major change, especially since 1937. 
After the first six months of war, where women had participated in militias because of the urgency, the 
republican authorities decided to re-organize the struggle and again divided forces on a sexual base: men 
forward, women to the rear. The female goal became cover needs production and supply, and extended its 
traditional role of assistance care to the wounded men at the front and to refugees. Several posters show this 
old paper, and also the authorities called for the woman to occupy the vacancies left by men due to male 
compulsory conscription [fig. 10-12]. 
The woman begins taking the place of man in the primary sector [Fig. 13], and immediately trade unions 
and left parties request their incorporation into the industrial sector [Fig. 14]. Consequently, the militarized 
image of woman disappears and is replaced by a new formulation: the “rear heroin”. Again, the female is 
transformed into allegory: is reified. 
The second iconographic strand, the woman-victim, derives from the rigors of war in areas near the 
fighting, as well as the beginning of massive bombing by the Francoist army. The theme of this typology 
presents the woman as victim ideograms, through two formal options. In one hand, the woman appears in a 
form that calls the idealized feminine youth and innocence [Fig. 6]. In the other hand, appears as elderly or, at 
any rate, as a body decayed by war [Fig. 15]. Only one representation of women in the rear escapes that 
framework: the woman turned into a professional context that was already considered feminine: nursing [Fig. 
8]. 
Faced with this explosion of female formulas political in the republican poster, the fascist side has much 
less presence. This is due to a simple but effective reality. The Francoist side controlled, from the beginning, 
the radio. The radio, like mechanism for illustration and indoctrination will not lose weight after the war. 
Otherwise, it will increase its strength in relation to visual media before the appearance of television as mass 
medium. 
Women of Acción Católica, the right largest women’s organization supporting the uprising, had a very 
different role of Republican women during the war. Its functions never exceeded the traditional role: nurses 
and educators. After the war, all the women had to return, by law, to their traditional socio-laboral status, that 
then, with the far right in power, threw away all little social advances of the Republic relating to woman — 
and indeed , to the rest of the themes. 
 
National-Catholicism. From sinful women to total decency 
 
We said that the fascist regime throw the poster away as a mechanism to advertise and publicize the major 
changes after 1939 that had to convert Spain into one of the most socially backward countries of the West by 
prohibiting civil marriage, contraception and abortion, by the stimulation of childbearing and large families, by 
the sexual differentialism in labor and criminal law, and so on. 
As a result, the production of poster works decreases and, in proportion, those in which the woman appears 
or explicitly refer to women almost disappear. Evidently, the typology in which Republic showed women 
access to non-traditional areas was simply swept and we can only crawl a few examples where the wife-shape 
appears linked to household products consumer. 
Since 1941, the Sección Femenina —Francoist organization that controlled women lives under 
dictatorship— held weekly radio emissions in all provinces. After radio, they published magazines addressed 
to women, with three titles that stand out above others: ‘Consigna’, ‘Y’, ‘Medina’ or “Gran Hotel” which 
reproduce the radio model and, however, were reducing the number of copies due to the paper shortage [fig. 
 249 
16]. 
At the workplace, the situation also changed. The Fuero del Trabajo, the basic labor law of the Franco 
dictatorship, establishes that the big achievement of the national-syndicalist State was the women liberation 
from the factories, in order to be in charge of “their” tasks: marriage, motherhood and care of spiritual values 
that inspire the regime [fig, 17-18]. Even those women who worked for the Social Service were not employed 
by the state, but free workers who sacrificed themselves for a ‘future greatness of this country”. 
Education also regains its traditional situation. Mixed schools were abolished and recovered the 
significance of gender educational programs: men will be trained for technics and government; women for 
sacrifice, obedience, the care works at home and, eventually, for improve her artistic skills [Fig. 19]. Under 
order of the Female Section, in 1938 —still during the war— were created 20,000 female training schools, 
totalling nearly half a million students. In 1940, were created Schools of Housewifes and a growing number of 
libraries for women disappearing works of intellectual content and containing only those of moral theme. That 
is because the woman should reproduce ideology, not knowledge [Fig. 20]. 
Woman returns to “her” previous goal: she is transformed into reproducer for children and for conservative 
ideology, theorized from its biological capacity for pregnancy. Hence her closure: the woman is removed of 
the economic and political life to look for a relaxed and conducive ambience for motherhood, her only own 
purpose. 
Every female activity, both public or private, was organized by the Female Section, which becomes a sort 
of mother for mothers and gives them new purposes in his private plane: chastity and purity [Fig. 118] and 
diligence in the home governance. Evidently, it is not a government with decision capability, but only as 
quartermaster of the decisions the man may make, and for what she needs certain management qualities [Fig. 
125-127]. Only later period ads will bet again by a representation of sensual woman who should, more by 
imperative male than by will of the Female Section model, be attractive to her husband [fig. 119-121]. 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Throughout this text we offered an overview in order to show, through the poster, the history of the women 
in the convulsed 1930s and 1940s in Spain. 
Since early in the 1930s, wife-shape has passed through several fields, from the obligatory kitchen to claim 
their own rights, more or less recovered or promoted by the cooptation apparatus of political parties and unions 
of the time. We have seen the woman at the front and at rear, equally with the man or submitted in the most 
absurd and unavoidable way, and also in the form of those allegorized emptied figures that seem to govern, 
almost ubiquitous, the war poster works. 
Such varied places, from the rests of 19th century realism inspired by a romantic spirit that still survived in 
the straggler south of Europe, to the harder abstractive edge, have shown the differences between the 
republican and the fascist poster. Moreover, they show that these differences went far beyond the purely 
quantitative. Even then, the amount may be enough eloquent to proved that after 1936 on both political and 
product poster, the presence of the female-shape falls steeply to almost disappear. 
We should also make a final warning. The differences in current situation of women in relation to the 
1940s and beyond does not prevent, in the field of gender equality, there is a long way to go, regardless of the 
ideology of each and every one of us. 
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Images 
 
 
 
  
Fig.1 “Women, home doctor”. 1910.  Fig.2 “School for everyone”. 1937. 
  
Fig 3. “Mother, work happy! The Ministry 
of Education looks after your children.” 
Fig 4. “They will no pass over!” 
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Fig. 5. “Go on, freedom fighters!” Fig. 6. “Rear comrades: more refuges will 
avoid new victims”, 1938. 
  
Fig. 7. “Murders!”, 1938.  Fig. 8. “Respect nurses. She left her familiy 
to care you”, 1938. 
  
  
Fig. 9. “Wounded soldiers need aid” Fig. 10 “Women can help to victory”, 
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1937.  
  
Fig. 11. “Womem, work by the comrades 
who fight”, 1937.  
Fig. 12. “Women wants win war, too. Let’s 
help her”. 1937.  
  
Fig. 13 “Mobilisation! Peasant women, to 
harvest”, 1938.  
Fig. 14 “We demand industrial schools 
from government” 
 
 
Fig. 15. Communist Party. 1938.  Fig. 16. “Read Gran Hotel. The best 
magazine”, 1945.  
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Fig. 17. “Céréalose. Flour for cooking”. 
1945. 
Fig. 18: “Children are tomorrow men, and 
Spain wants them healthy and strong”. 
1949.  
 
 
Fig. 19: “Be yourself your home artist”. 
1950.  
Fig. 20: “Mars 19, Seminary Day” 
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The creation of Verde Gaio, an Art of Propaganda 
during World War II 
 
Maria João Castro, 
 IHA / FCSH – UNL 
 
 
The twentieth century was surely the Century of War and Propaganda but it was also the century in which 
the relationship between art and power was evidenced in a fixture, and dance was used by nations of the world 
as one of the most effective advertising vehicles. It was a force of political power which had a action of 
deliberate persuasion as a goal, with visual and verbal statements of intentionality studied by manipulating the 
genesis of nationalist political discourse that presented a body of ideas common to all totalitarian regimes. 
The coming to Portugal on December 1, 1936 of Alexander Pavolini, intellectual of the Mussolini era at the 
invitation of SPN to deliver a conference whose theme was “Art and Fascism”, made his views on propaganda 
known, which Ferro also advocated. In his own words, “you need to create (... ) the art of our time, fascist art 
(... ) Art is the essential seal of History. Art and propaganda are two words that should always go together 
being that art is the mother of propaganda.” 794 
If art is a reflection of the time in which it is included, national art produced in decades of dictatorship, 
destroyed any previous sense. After the National Revolution of 1926, with the support of an elite - União 
Nacional795 - and the 1933 Constitution, elements were created that allowed Salazar to build a “legitimate” 
state before Europe. Unlike Hitler's Germany, who preferred to advertise their autos-de-fé (arts and culture) 
promoting fear and terror, Salazar’s repression chose to quell resistance by employing an ethic of disguised 
obedience, which was discreetly shaping national mentality and this was reflected in artistic policies advocated 
by the regime. According José Rebelo’s thoughts, “the regime absolutely needed art. It was art who exhibited, 
painted, carved, architectured and visualized it. Salazar was present even in art that was not conscientiously 
Salazar’s”.796 There is no doubt that Estado Novo felt the need for a visual discourse that illustrated its action 
based on “new aesthetics", carried out in a “new world.” The particularities of national reality meant that the 
nationalism embodied by Salazar government represented a phenomenon of an historical nature identical to 
that of Europeans, of self-expression in a marriage between nationalist values of a conservative matrix and a 
certain moderate modernity. These two features, seemingly difficult to reconcile, made up the followed 
internal line and although they caused some cracks and nuances, it was through them that a political and 
ideological unity of Salazar’s wishes was built. 
For this purpose to come to good term, the univocal guidance of Estado Novo - like other fascist or 
fascistic Europe - sought to run a totalizing project of rehabilitation of spirits and is the line of action that can 
be extended to the route drawn by the heir to SPP797, SPN798, then called SNI799. It was a body which 
                                                          
794 Alexandre Pavolini, “Conferência”, p. 2, Espólio da família Ferro citado por Cidalisa Guerra, Do fervor modernista ao 
desencanto do regime instituído. António Ferro ou Retrato de uma personalidade de luta, FCSH, UNL, Lisboa, 2002, p. 
163 
795 Created in 30 July 1930.  
796 José Rebelo, Formas de legitimação do Poder no Salazarismo, Livros e Leituras, Lisboa, 1998, p. 17 
797 Sociedade de Propaganda de Portugal, created in 1906. 
798 O Secretariado de Propaganda Nacional created in 1933. 
799 O Secretariado Nacional de Informação, Cultura Popular e Turismo created in1944.  
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configured and articulated an entire political propaganda policy, mise en scène of Salazar’s regime and 
unifying centre for the ideological discourse of dictatorship which promoted and legitimized it and within 
which they would redesign the country and an official and unison image. 
Portugal in the early '30s was still a rural and conservative country with elites who supported with effective 
support the establishment of an authoritarian state which was bet on rediscovering Portuguese identity based 
on the idea that it was in the rural - closest to the primitive nature and not contaminated - that the true essence 
of the country was found. 
The binomial Art and Power would be drawnover the 30 years, more specifically between the two World 
Wars and the advent of totalitarian states, which have devoted a new plastic and aesthetic vision based on 
strong nationalism. Within this context, the effectiveness of a realignment of political use of arts according to 
each of the policies pursued by European dictatorships, extended to dance, this being an active agent of 
political propaganda of each nation. USSR, Italy, Germany, Spain and Portugal configured new guidelines that 
changed the course of art of Terpsichore in the Old Continent, influencing the world and allowing the creation 
of an image of strong ideological bias of cultural propaganda. 
In light of these designs can the specifics of Estado Novo’s cultural policies can be examined and which, 
based on strong nationalism, sought to consolidate the historical roots of the “new man “and was materialized 
by a myth of youth through a corporeality exercised by gymnastics, by sport and dance, like other European 
propaganda. 
The nationalism of Estado Novo, founded in veneration of ancestral deeds by mythologized heroes of 
national history as well as the vernacular rural living, achieved a significance of great interest. A good part of 
their national unity was based on cultural richness of folk traditions. Built on four key assumptions - nation, 
territory, history and traditions - Portuguese nationalist discourse was set up as a means of bringing a 
Portuguese identity, indivisible and cohesive. In Eduardo Lourenço’s, “not being possible to undo the past, 
even in a particularly uncritical view that had maintained Salazar’s regime was natural that the past was 
revisited and reconsidered.”800 This was because the government was interested in valuing past glories of an 
imperial nation that helped to those who could not read to do so. To this end, a new discourse was established 
based on scenic folk art and folklore that was worked on in two fronts: internal and external. These two 
complementary but distinct realities SPN / SNI made it a highly politicized body: the internal dimension 
sought to consolidate the ideals of the regime, guiding it to the cultural production of the country, the foreign 
dimension tried to find the support of international public opinion, for which a heavy propaganda campaign 
was imposed through participation in international events. 
Portuguese nationalism was drawn through a popular culture of national and ethnographic roots where a 
cult of celebrations implanted with patriotic motives were of Estado Novo’s élans to expand its hypnotic force. 
Through the promotion of folk art and exaltation of folklore, an image was created of a moderate country 
guided by “gentle manners” disclosed in a timely manner. Within this scope, a culture of elites was built which 
manipulated and led the masses, thus ensuring consensus, conformation, stability and durability of the 
dictatorship.  
Within heterogeneous spaces created by several artists, folk art was consolidated in accurate records, in 
which parades played a pivotal role in the reinvention of new homeland. (Re) invented actions were then 
                                                          
800 Eduardo Lourenço, O Labirinto da Saudade, Gradiva, Lisboa, 2010, p. 12  
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permeated which helped educate the masses and show the values of a national and ruralistic popular culture: to 
Hitler’s National Socialists parades, Salazar replied with processions and António Ferro, "its” popular marches 
(created 1932), which helped to colour the grim universe of impending darkness of Estado Novo. 
SPN, an intermediary between state and nation, had the greatest influence on the construction of an image 
consonant with the dictatorship, developing a broad set of initiatives where art and popular culture were 
particularly highlighted. If the field of competence of SPN there was no reference to popular culture801, the 
diploma proved itself sufficiently wide to be filled with content that its director saw fit. In fact, António Ferro 
bet on the definition of aesthetics that would restore the nation's identity, a formula which turned out to be 
followed by European dictatorships with wide success.  
When the balance of Catorze Anos de Política do espírito802, Ferro acknowledged the developed action: 
organization, promotion and participation in events, fortnights, conferences, concerts, art demonstrations, 
exhibitions and folklore ballets, concerts, press meetings, exhibitions and sections of cinema, Europe and 
America, in an activity that showed a huge accomplished mission and that the body had overcome his errand. 
Asserting itself as the cultural and artistic booster of an entire country, “Politics of the Spirit ", carried out by 
Ferro, was the first attempt to create a national image markedly influenced by ideology, which has been largely 
achieved. 
However, it is interesting to see that popular art disclosed by António Ferro, became more a “manufacture 
“than an investigation into the national popular character. The secretary of the SPN / SNI bet on a “recreation” 
of a folk art that would have been expected with the purposes of Salazar’s regime and it is within this line of 
action that can understand its extensive activity in the promotion of Portuguese folk art. 
Within the relation of folk art and folklore, initiatives were extensive and assertive : 1934 Colonial 
Exposition in Porto, the flag of the National Tourism Council presented each Portuguese region and local art; 
1935 in Popular Art Fortnight in Geneva, by occasion of the UN General Assembly, António Ferro took an 
exhibition of folk art. In 1936, the Geneva exhibition was extended and shown in Lisbon on the occasion of the 
tenth anniversary of the National Revolution, entitled Popular Art Exhibition, in 1937, the Portuguese pavilion 
at the Paris International Exhibition where one of the eight rooms of the Keil do Amaral pavilion was reserved 
to folk art, in 1938, the contest of “most Portuguese village of Portugal “stimulates ruralist speech, helping to 
boost folk practice and a visual, scenic and choreographic country would exist : they are “still-life paintings” 
803: in 1939, at the World Exhibition in New York, Jorge Segurado’s pavilion contained a section devoted to 
tourism and popular art and in the same year the S. Francisco Fair included allusions to the Portuguese 
Discoveries and popular art pavilion. In 1940, Regional Center and Villages of Portugal in the Portuguese 
World Exhibition as well as the creation of the Ballet Group “Verde Gaio”, in 1942, the exhibition in Lisbon 
of materials collected in the contest of “most Portuguese village of Portugal “and in the following year, 1943, 
at the Madrid and Seville Exhibitions, in 1944 new Portuguese popular art show , in 1945 and 1946, SPN 
Regional costumes Exhibition and finally in 1948, the creation of the Museum of Popular Arts in Lisbon. 
                                                          
801 Decreto-Lei N.º 23054 de 25 de Setembro de 1933, I Série, N.º 218, pp. 1675-1676 
802 Catorze Anos de Política do Espírito, Secretariado Nacional de Informação, Lisboa, 1948 
803  Salwa Castelo-Branco e Jorge Freitas Branco, “Folclorização em Portugal: uma perspectiva”, Vozes do Povo, a 
Folclorização em Portugal, Celta, Lisboa, 2003, p. 9 
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From the above list a mark of politics for culture promoted by António Ferro stands out: its outward 
orientation, with a concern to place propaganda at the service of creating a Portuguese image, which resulted 
in a growing number of foreign participations. 
Once the formula was consecrated, all that the director of SPN had to do was to reproduce it. Such had 
been the successful cases in Geneva, Paris, New York, S. Francisco, Madrid and Seville. In fact, the process of 
national identity construction and affirmation of the nation through popular culture, found in the international 
arena, a core area for asserting its identity. This assertion becomes even clearer if we look at the various 
discourses and texts that accompanied such initiatives, replete with references to the homeland and in which 
folk art was presented as a direct emanation of the soul of the nation. 
SPN / SNI, the main promoter of “Politics of the Spirit,” by providing folk art, gave the country the right 
identity, unifying regional diversity under one taste. This nationalization of tradition with an evident rural 
matrix, is seen as a (popular) history lesson that legitimizes an ideological reading, since modernity was only 
interesting “while its benefits could be used to foster continuity, improving of a previous reality, which was 
intended to be unchangeable because it was a reliable source of virtues”. 804 
The image of popular culture built by the Secretariat used ethnographic discourses that revealed rurality be 
the place where the true essence of the country. The official doctrine of Salazar’s regime exhorted early 
traditional values through the celebration of a past carefully reviewed and staged, that celebrated folklore, 
which went against everything that Antonio Ferro was seeing abroad. In the director's own words, “the art, 
literature and science constitute the grand facade of a nationality.”805 And it was with this kind of imperative 
that nationalism made Lusitanian Folklore its flag bearer. Thus, ethnographers, historians, artists and 
intellectuals from several universes, were made to give increasing importance to folk dancing since it was 
identified with an entire past urged for the resurrection of national glorification and exaltation. 
The inflection on traditional dance and folklore is given by historiography itself, since dance was a 
privileged form of incarnation of sacred myths in every culture and was part of those magical rites presided 
over the foundation of indigenous communities. The movements themselves were symbolic and magical in 
nature and so dances also had a didactic function since, of reproducing values of the past, educated a whole 
new generation and it is in this context that the use of the cultural folklore device is integrated by government 
of the Portuguese Estado Novo. 
However, the development of a memory based folk dance meant creating methods, description systems and 
ways to present a new type, which, according to Inge Baxmann, “became a form of specific knowledge, which 
revealed the particularities of the modern world in a nostalgic look on the body techniques of primitive peoples 
and folklore”. 806  This aspect reflected the fascination, the reviving of traditional dances as an indirect 
consequence of the industrialization; of the accelerating life cycle it has caused, since this dynamism - defining 
a modern culture - led to a certain nostalgia about popular traditions, which in turn held Community 
fundamentals which lacked in the modern world then. And it is within this feature that Inge Baxmann 
reaffirms: “Folklore was considered an antidote to the uniformity of modern society, becoming an independent 
model within the bourgeois economic and cultural dynamic.”807 Indeed, folklore would constitute a privileged 
                                                          
804 Joana Damasceno, Obra Cit., p. 47 
805 António Ferro, 1933, citado no catálogo Os Anos 40 na Arte Portuguesa, Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, Lisboa, 1982  
806 Inge Baxmann, “Le Corps, lieu de mémoire”, Obra Cit., 2006, p. 45 
807 Inge Baxmann, “Le fonds folklore des AID entre ethnologie de sauvetage et histoire des mentalités”, Obra Cit., p. 131 
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means of propaganda, being assisted by regionalist movements that performed the will of the Secretariat and to 
which, being seemingly a distant fact, it is no alien: the explosion of exotic dances in Paris. These had 
contributed to strengthen a certain anthropological dance and there is no doubt that folk rediscovery was linked 
to the emergence of a certain taste for the exotic. Therefore, by valuing the different, exotic dances went back 
to the cultural heritage of each people and directed what was more genuine in it, ie, the ancestral tradition of 
folklore. Consequently, many traditional regional dances were revitalized and re-purposed in an attempt to fill 
the new desire for revival of the modern public. 
Thus, and side by side with the “Politics of the Spirit,” “Politics of the Body” was created which guided 
SNI and streamlined, according to the regime's ideological aesthetics but with its foundations in the previous 
century. In fact, since the last decades of the nineteenth century aristocratic and bourgeois media promoted the 
organization of events where the rural world - inspiration source created by romance – had become a fashion. 
From the late '20s, initiatives of folk practice increased in number where, according to Salwa Castelo-Branco 
and Jorge Freitas Branco: “Folklore takes the form of a performative practice where a grammar is coded for 
the interpretation of the nation.” 808 Indeed, the foundation of the republican period of folklore 809  and its 
appropriation of popular culture allowed to use them for political power of Estado Novo. Soon in 1933, the 
year of SPN’s creation, through Community Houses, the stereotypical folkloric was spreading, although it was 
only in the 1940s, that its consecration is structured with favourable circumstances brought about by the Great 
Portuguese World Exhibition in 1940 that the project designed years before by Antonio Ferro would be 
achieved: the creation of the first Portuguese company ballets, Verde Gaio. 
Indeed, it was thanks to the will and impulse of António Ferro that the first Portuguese ballet company was 
created, founded precisely on the celebration of the closing of the Great Exhibition of the Portuguese World. A 
last “stroke“ of colour of national celebrations of the Great Exhibition of the Portuguese World - would close 
its doors on December 2 that year – Verde Gaio was intended to give folk art movement, revitalise folklore. 
Indeed, in its early years, the Portuguese Ballet Group strengthened their performances with the presentation of 
popular songs in which the actress Maria Paula took part playing songs inspired by regional folklore authored 
by Ruy Coelho (1889-1986) and Alexandre Rey Colaço. 
What is important to outline in the context of this reflection is that in addition to Verde Gaio having built a 
path of relative national success, Verde Gaio became a privileged vehicle of propaganda abroad. In fact, 
initially Verde Gaio began by timidly stepping on national stages but it was not long before it left the modesty 
of Salazar’s country to seek applause in concert halls abroad, first in Europe and then the world. The 
propaganda technique and the idea of building a nation helped legitimize the authoritarian regime while 
simultaneously promoting it abroad. Being the possible artistic embassy , Verde Gaio would step stages in 
Spain ( 1943), Paris (1949 ), Switzerland (1957 ), Brussels (1958 ), Brazil (1965 ), Africa (1966 ), Paris 
(1967), Madrid ( 1968) and Japan (1970 ) and Munich ( 1972). 
If the first ballet company was a Portuguese initiative in agreement with the purposes of other European 
totalitarian states, who took responsibility for the arts upon themselves, and dance in particular, to force artists 
to promote their ideologies, in Portugal, the Portuguese “Ballets Russes” acted as a cultural embassy abroad, 
                                                          
808 Salwa Castelo-Branco e Jorge Freitas Branco, Obra Cit., p. 6  
809 See Humberto Ferrão, “Folclore e turismo. Limites estruturais e ideológicos: no Ribatejo e em Portugal”, 1º Congresso 
Internacional de Folclore, INATEL, Lisboa, 1991, p. 1 
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within the known limits. Surrounding itself with a set of national artists, the Company established an à la 
longue project, which the vicissitudes of national cultural policy slowly extinguished four decades later. 
Regarding the theme, viewers were able to enjoy different choreographic works that were projected on a 
high efficiency propagandistic scenic background, a clear instrument for ideological purposes. The variety of 
themes ranged from historical and patriotic themes and topics of regional inspiration. The analysis and 
significance of these ballets can not but deserve attention and perhaps it is even necessary to study some of 
them some more to understand the scope of their expression and consequences. With regards to parts of 
regional influence - folk ballets such as Muro do Derrete and Ribatejo (both 1940), Dança da Menina Tonta 
and O Homem de Cravo na Boca (both 1941) Nazaré (1948) and Passatempo (1941 to 1948). 
O Muro do Derrete tells of a successful date that happens in an environment of a rural village and is 
inspired by an ancient hillbilly custom of when marriageable girls, sat on the wall of love waiting for the love 
competition of boys. The script highlights the Moorish ancestry and character of hillbilly folk and the 
unequivocal national action, the script still leading us to past events, D. Afonso Henriques and the formation of 
nationality, as well as popular tradition in reference to the Mercês Fair and wardrobe inspiration and regional 
folk that is presented according to a standardizing model without any individuality. 
Ribatejo is an ode to the people of Ribatejo in a countryside atmosphere where costumes are presented in a 
naturalistic stylisation of the regional model. 
The action of O Homem de Cravo na Boca stems in a village where a popular festival is presented that 
provides a romantic rendezvous  between two youngsters and that unfolds within a demonstration of faith, 
under the blessing of the sacralised religious cult. The fireproof (enter the oven with it in his mouth taken from 
the Virgin and put a cake there) was a remedy for the illnessess of the village and has the nature of a rite of 
initiation, which is stimulated by the maiden in love. 
Dança da Menina Tonta takes place in a village in Trás-os-Montes where a group of girls teases a silly girl 
that love will transform into the most beautiful girl. In the form of a popular declaration, this ballet portrays 
simple events of rural daily life, safeguarding the morality and character of a kind and sympathetic boy who 
pities the silly girl and falls for her, the narrative ending with a big party with people to offering gifts to the 
beloved. Portrays picturesque rural life and folklore, a traditionalist dimension that will highlight the action of 
good over evil. 
Nazaré tells the story of fishermen, their loves and unrequited loves, under a background based on moral 
tragedy as punishment for those who dared to be unfaithful or fall into addiction. Valuing popular work and 
condemning idleness, Nazaré highlights masculine courage, greatness of sea life and devoted resignation in the 
face of fate. Throughout the choreography it becomes clear, such as in the Christian ideal, punishment and 
surrender mingle under a drama accentuated by dramatic movements of the Nazarene folk and regionalist 
model. 
Passatempo was formed by a small series of short choreographies that intermingled programs of 
performances, presented no plot or large arrangements following a scenic structure of classical ballets 
divertissements and ballet-opera intermezzos of the eighteenth century. The characteristics of the eleven 
choreographies, premiered between 1941 and 1948, reveal however, common treats that justify being grouped 
under the same set. Fado and A Dança dos Pastores da Beira e Os Noivos, A Chula do Douro, Dança de Trás-
os-Montes (all from 1941), Noite de S. João (1944), Tarantela (1946), Farandole (1947), Três Danças e 
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Quatro Danças (both 1948) follow a regional folk line stylized according to certain technical precepts inspired 
by classical dance, where costumes are presented under the conservative aegis regional costumes. 
This theme hints to all the ideological influence that moved SPN / SNI not only in the demand for the 
realization of popular values , regional and rural customs whose existence contributed to the legitimating of the 
nationalist élan but shows the different concerns of choreographers who they came across throughout the 
1940s. However, even in the internationalization observed during the stay of Italian Guglielmo Morresi and 
later Swedish Ivo Crámer (1921-2009 their choreography notes a concern of popular origin, as is the case of 
Farandole or Tarantella. Musical accompaniment itself would no longer be the responsibility of Portuguese 
composers to make way for scores of major classics like Rameau (1682-1764), Rossini (1792-1862) and Bizet 
(1838-1875). Of course the highlight is more pronounced in regional pieces created by Grace Francis as Dança 
de Trás-os-Montes or Os Noivos, all with music by Ruy Coelho, O Fado with Frederico de Freitas music score 
or Dança dos Pastores da Beira with music by António de Melo. 
With regards to the works inspired by historical and patriotic themes, A Lenda das Amendoeiras and Inês 
de Castro (both 1940), D. Sebastião (1941), Imagens da Terra e do Mar (1943). 
A Lenda das Amendoeiras recreates a popular legend that evokes Portugal’s historical background has an 
account where a love story is told, unfolding in the Arabic kingdom of the Algarve’s court, where a princess is 
unhappy missing the snow from her Scandinavia and then the king has almond trees planted which once 
blossoming gave his beloved the illusion of snow, thus curing her of her nostalgia. The action takes us to the 
time of the birth of the nation, evoking one of the main mythical representations of the history of Portugal. 
Inês account the historical and legendary love of Pedro and Inês and its infeasibility by overlapping 
interests of the motherland. S. Alfonso VI has her killed and inconsolable, Pedro, crowned her after death, 
symbolically extending the loving union having his future graves built besides her grave. The two principles 
become incompatible - love and the nation, pleasure and duty, desire and reality, feeling and reason, bring out 
the legendary status of the fourteenth century, supported by a wardrobe, Medieval styled, which hides the body 
and movement and emphasizes the character of redemptive sacrifice and purity. 
D. Sebastião, a ballet with a script by António Ferro based in “an historical matter of great national 
significance,”810 recreates the mythical figure of the legendary episode of Alcácer Quibir, inspired by the 
poetic enthusiasm of Camões (1524-1580). The exaltation of historical past in its messianic aspect, that the 
figure of D. Sebastian (1554-1578) starred in, provides the “Desire One” with the utopianism of fighting death 
itself that will lead to tender sovereignty of another kingdom. The choreographic action is immersed in 
temporal metaphors where light reflects the different atmospheres that occur in the narrative sequence, which 
converge onto the final scene, where the translucent curtain transforms the image of a memory, a legend and a 
haze.  
Imagens da Terra e do Mar presents itself as an allegory about the genesis of the nation: the Portuguese 
homeland is generated of the union between earth and sea that is symbol seminal of Portuguese Ballet. This 
script sets up a polarization of fatalism and ocean nostalgia that links the sea with exultant and fruitful joy, 
associated with land, being the homeland as a result of the forces of nature, corresponds to a divine plan. The 
scenic resort to a huge box where shelves represent the three regions of Portugal animated by their 
representatives, which increases a marking choreographic structure that evokes folk dances. 
                                                          
810 José Blanc de Portugal “O Verde Gaio” in A Acção de 2.1.1943, p.3 
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After focusing on the nationalist repertoire of Portuguese Ballets it is worth mentioning that among the 
misconceptions and paradoxes of Verde Gaio, it was a beguiling ideological weapon, turning dance in 
doctrinal action tools, assimilating its popular forms. In forty years of uneven path, it was the metaphor of 
ideology of Estado Novo an unbearable lightness of dance, before the weight of the sustained power. All its 
mutations were but variants, fitting into standard civilizational matrix of European dictatorships. Still, the 
company set up from a constructed image as if it were an architecture and its interior as a discourse, an almost 
cinematic vision of the nation and displayed in frugal portions.  
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Introduction 
 
In times of war, the clashes aren’t only made with armament, but also with less lethal, although probably as 
effective, instruments such as  propaganda that, in all its forms, it is, precisely, an attack and defence weapon 
used by nations as an instrument of persuasion and legitimation of their claims.  
After the World War II and the end of the III Reich’s occupation of almost half of Europe, the Portuguese 
Estado Novo (1934-1974), as a nationalist and imperialist dictatorship, saw itself confronted with the natural 
and non-surprising increase of independency claims by the colonized people of Africa and Asia territories. 
However, until 1961, the year of the beginning of the colonial war in Angola, the regime, instead of 
consistently resorting to any kind of military weapons,  tried to, in a consciously and cleverly way, legitimize 
its status as a model colonizing nation by using the propaganda as a powerful tool. 
In this context of imminent war or real war, the historical overseas monuments, proves of the antiquity and 
grandiosity of the Portuguese colonialism over the centuries, were used as fundamental pieces of a well 
engendered and applied propaganda machine. This was an obvious fact in Mozambique, which was, after 
Angola, the second most important Portuguese colony in Africa and, consequently, a territory rich in all kind 
of historical monuments, such as churches, chapels, forts or fortresses that evoked the antiquity and importance 
of the Portuguese occupation. Furthermore, as happened in India or Angola years before, the General-
Government of Mozambique also created, in 1943, its Commission of Monuments and Historical Relics, 
whose mission was to safeguard all that architectonic, artistic and archaeological heritage.  
Thus, with this study, we intend to understand in which ways the historical overseas monuments build by 
Portuguese settlers since the beginning of the national Discoveries in the 15th century, were used, during the 
World War II and the Colonial War, by the Estado Novo, as valuable pieces of the aforementioned propaganda 
machine.  
 
 
 
I The Portuguese Monuments in Mozambique (1940’s) 
 
Until 1958, Portugal didn’t have a central commission whose mission was to safeguard and disseminate the 
meaning and importance of the national monuments, build over the centuries, in the colonies such as 
Mozambique, Cape Verde Portuguese Guinea, S. Tomé and Príncipe, Angola, Portuguese India, Macau and 
Timor. Despite the absence of this central service orientated to the colonies and the existence of the General 
Directorate of Buildings and National Monuments whose mission was, exclusively, orientated to the Mainland 
Portugal, it’s important to highlight that we can’t talk about a scenery of total lack of a well orientated 
“heritage consciousness” regarding the Portuguese overseas architectonic heritage. 
In fact, the Portuguese Government of India created, in 1895, the Permanent Commission of Archaeology, 
whose life was dedicated to the safeguard of:  “what still exists from the Past’s live, to choose what to keep in 
the archaeological museum (…) to classify and to list all the monuments that should be consider national, and 
to supervise its most accurate conservation”  
[Visconde de Vila Nova d’Ourém, 1895, p.628] 
 
In Angola, the Portuguese General-Government created, in 1922, the National Monuments Commission, 
because  
 
“There are scattered all over this Province a few African Portugal’s monuments connected to the 
epic achievements of the 16th and 17th centuries, that, because of the patriotic memories that they 
revive and because of the extraordinary historical meaning that they enclose, should deserve all the 
attention”  
[Norton de Mattos, 1922, p.137] 
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Regarding Mozambique, the creation, in 1943, of a monuments commission took place slightly later than in 
Angola, but despite that it wasn’t totally unexpected. After all, during the 19th century, individuals such as 
Manuel Ferreira Ribeiro (1839-1917) [Ferreira Ribeiro, 1882] or Joaquim José Lapa (1843-1896) [Lapa, 
1893], warned the general public about the meaning and importance of those Portuguese monuments built in 
Mozambique, and were accompanied in this true heritage mission by a few, but nonetheless significant, works 
of conservation and restoration promoted during an Public Works expedition (1877) and by a few General 
Governors. Finally, in 1940, in a session of the Government Council, Manuel Simões Vaz (1889-?), founder of 
the Notícias, newspaper of Lourenço Marques (Maputo) and delegate of Gaza, warned about the importance of 
maintain the monuments that “still exist from the occupation of these lands by the Portuguese” [Boletim Geral 
das Colónias, 1940, p.103]. Moreover, during the same session, Simões Vaz proposed to create a commission 
or simply to appoint an individual, to “maintain the conservation of our historical monuments” [Boletim Geral 
das Colónias, 1940, p.103], this because the state of conservation of the majority of the Mozambique’s 
monuments was quite disturbing. 
 
Despite the fact the proposal of Simões Vaz was well received by the General-Governor, who even 
committed himself with the restoration of the Chibuto’s Fort and, mostly, with the beginning of a programme 
concerning the restoration or conservation of the Mozambique’s historical monuments, the Commission of 
Monuments and Historical Relics was, merely, created in 1943. From that point, that commission became 
responsible for the studies, classification, restoration and conservation of the colony’s monuments and 
historical relics, but also for the dissemination of the acquired knowledge and for the cultural and touristic 
propaganda related to that Heritage [Bettencourt, 1943, pp.59-61].  
 
However, considering the theme of this conference – War and Propaganda in the 20th century – it is 
important to understand the reasons why the Commission of Monuments and Historical Relics of Mozambique 
was created precisely in 1943, during the World War II. First, we have to take into account the fast growing 
“heritage consciousness” in Mainland Portugal, where the monuments were clearly understood and used as 
powerful instruments of propaganda of a nationalist and imperialist dictatorship, the Estado Novo (1933-
1974). Thus, if the regime intended to establish a strong and undeniable connection between the Present and a 
glorious Past of magnificent achievements both in the mainland and in the overseas, it’s only natural that the 
monuments built during those times, after a well thought and politically committed restoration, were presented 
as the major symbols of a great and ancient nation. Second, after years of well-known financial instability and 
lack of interest from the central Government, the General-Government of Mozambique established that would 
subtract some funds from the colony’s budget to be applied in the safeguard of the architectonic and 
archaeological heritage. Furthermore, the heritage funds would also be reinforced by aids granted by the 
Mainland Government, autonomous State services, administrative corporations, donations, and revenues from 
the touristic valorisation of monuments or historical relics [Bettencourt, 1943, p.60]. Third, in 1943, the 
anticolonial discussion, even without the strength that would have after the end of the World War II, was 
already a reality, as the cases of Egypt (1922) or Ethiopia (1941) show. In this context and especially after 
1945, the monuments of Mozambique, as we intend to demonstrate in the next chapter, were used as powerful 
instruments of colonial propaganda.  
 
In fact, the use of the Mozambique’s historical monuments as pieces of a gradual highly intricate 
propaganda machine, started, in the context of Estado Novo, in 1939. After all, that was the year of Óscar 
Carmona’s (1869-1951) presidential tour to the colonies of Cape Verde, S. Tomé and Príncipe, Mozambique 
and Angola.  In fact, if we look at the schedule of the presidential tour, we can easily identify the participation 
of the Mozambique’s historical monuments as significant parts of this unequivocally nationalist and 
propagandist initiative. Actually, the beginning of the visit to the Island of Mozambique, “capital of the heroic 
times” [Boletim Geral das Colónias, 1939, p.429], started, on the 6th of August, with a reception from the 
inhabitants right in front of the Saint Paul’s Palace, the former Governors residency, and with cannons blasts 
from the Saint Sebastian’s Fortress. In the evening, a feast took place at the same 17th century Palace. Then, 
on 7th of August, after paying homage to the deceased of the First World War and before leaving the island, 
the President Carmona “slowly visited” [Boletim Geral das Colónias, 1939, p.434] the 16th century Fortress. 
Furthermore, during those couple of days of the presidential tour through the Island of Mozambique, some 
monuments were embellished with different kinds of propaganda elements, such as luminous sayings as “A 
bem da Nação” (“For the Nation’s sake”) – placed on the former Saint Dominic’s convent, then the court.  
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Pic.1 Island of Mozambique’s Court, former Saint Dominic’s convent, during the 1939’s presidential tour.  
Agência Geral das Colónias,  
 
 
 
However, there’s another event that deserves to be mentioned: the visit to the Historical, Cultural, 
Commercial and Agricultural Exhibition of Beira. This because, in this exhibition organized by the 
Mozambique Company, it was built an ephemeral, but still imposing, reproduction of one of the most 
meaningful historical monuments of that colony, the Saint Cajetan’s Fortress. This event is particularly 
interesting because the Fortress, which was, along Quíloa, the first military construction built in the eastern 
Africa shore, thanks to Nature and Human incursions had already collapsed and disappeared from Sofala. 
Thus, attracted by the idea – and necessity – of justify and legitimize the Portuguese administration in 
Mozambique through the valorisation of the historical monuments that were contemporary with the earliest 
moments of the Portuguese Discoveries, and, of course, in the absence of the real Fortress, a “miracle of 
reproduction” [Companhia de Moçambique, 1939] took place not in the primary Sofala but in Beira.  
 
  
 
 
Pic.2 The reproduction of Saint Cajetan’s Fortress in Beira’s exhibition during 1939. 
Agência Geral das Colónias,  
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Now that we have seen the flourishing of a gradual stronger “heritage consciousness” in Mozambique 
during the years of the World War II, let’s devote a few moments to the after-war scenario and, specifically, to 
the utilization of the historical monuments as perfectly thought and rehearsed actors and sceneries produced 
and guided by the regime’s propaganda machine.  
 
II The role of historical monuments during the conflict between Estado Novo and anti-imperialist forces 
(1950’s and 60’s) 
 
Our most recent studies demonstrate that, just like in Mainland Portugal, the relation established between 
the overseas monuments and the Estado Novo’s policy was absolutely real. After all, we are faced with the fact 
– certainly associated with a specific understanding of the national monuments as powerful evidences of the 
legitimacy of the Portuguese colonialism, and with financial ability – that the dictatorship had replied to the 
anticolonialism claims with armament but also with a well thought diplomatic strategy. This approach, as we’ll 
demonstrate, involved a never seen program of valorisation of the overseas monuments. If not, take into 
account India’s and Cape Verde’s heritage examples.  
When Manuel António Vassalo e Silva (1899-1985) was appointed General-Governor of the Portuguese 
India in 1958, one of his first actions was to put together a commission whose mission was to reintegrate the 
Old City of Goa in its historical, archaeological and monastic environment. This mission was presented as 
having a “highly patriotic intention” [Vassalo e Silva, 1960] that is easily understandable if we remember that, 
at the time, the Dadrá and Nagar Aveli case was on trial in Hague’s International Court, this because these two 
enclaves passed, in 1954, from the Portuguese rule to the Indian Union rule. Moreover, a few years later, in 
1960, in a highly tense period of the Portugal/Indian Union dispute, Luís Benavente (1902-1993), the architect 
who was in charge of the centralization of the Portuguese overseas monuments safeguard, went to the 
Portuguese India in order to look into the conservation and restoration of the national architectonic heritage, 
but also into some urban planning related matters.  However, just a couple of months later, Benavente’s 
mission was permanently interrupted by the invasion and occupation of Goa by the Indian Union in 18th and 
19th of December 1961.   
 
 
 
Pics.3 and 4 Portuguese troops attending a special mass in the Basilica of Bom Jesus, 1954.  
Life Magazine. 
 
 
Regarding Cape Verde, we can consider that the 60’s started, from a politic point of view, a new chapter in 
the history of the attention given by the Mainland Portugal to the colony of Cape Verde. This new attention 
was, clearly, a response to the international anticolonial pressure groups but also to the actions perpetrated by 
the Cape Verde nationalists groups, such as the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde 
(PAIGC), and the Movement for the Liberation of Guinea and Cape Verde (MLGC). In fact, even without the 
level of oppression experienced in Angola or Guinea, the Portuguese dictatorship answered with strength and 
vigour to the PAIGC’s and MLGC’s claims, by intensifying the International and State Defence Police (PIDE) 
activities, and with the reinforcement of the propaganda campaigns on behalf of the symbolism of the 
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Portuguese monuments built in Cape Verde since the 15th century. This explains why the program regarding 
the conservation and restoration of Cape Verde’s monuments started to be outlined in 1960, the same year of 
the independency of the borderer territory of Senegal, but also of Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Níger, 
Chade, Gabon, Congo, Ivory Coast, Togo, Benim and Central African Republic, following the establishment 
of the MLGC, in Dakar, by Amílcar Cabral (1924-1973).  
Furthermore, it is important to highlight that the increase of the Estado Novo’s heritage consciousness and, 
consequently, the use of the overseas monuments as powerful instruments of propaganda, was also due to the 
exponential growth of the international anticolonial contestation in the late 50’s and early 60’s. After all, 
‘heritagelly’ speaking, 1958 was the year of the Decree 41:787, which defined the Ministry of Overseas 
General Directorate of Public Works and Communications as responsible for the inventory, classification, 
conservation and restoration of the overseas monuments [Rodrigues Ventura, 1958, p.757]. However, 
simultaneously but not coincidentally, the late 50’s and 1960 was, also, the time during which were held the 
Bandung Conference (1955), the First Independent African States Conference (1958) or the African People 
Conference (1958), but, mostly, the time of the United Nation’s Declaration on the Granting of Independence 
of Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960).  
In Mozambique the situation was no different from India or Cape Verde, with the use of the monuments as 
propaganda instruments to follow the need of legitimize the Portuguese claims concerning the African and 
Asian possessions. Thus, let’s devote a few moments to the role of Mozambique’s historical monuments 
during those first moments of anticolonial contestation and colonial war.  
In 1956, Francisco Higino Craveiro Lopes (1894-1964) travelled to Mozambique within a new presidential 
tour, this being acclaimed, in times of anticolonial debate, as a “highly patriotic event, symbolizing the 
historical national unity” [Boletim Geral do Ultramar1, 1956, p.7], and then, during that excursion, the national 
monuments were, once again, used as convincing actors and attractive sceneries of a show whose purpose was 
to propagandize the legitimacy of the Portuguese colonialism. In fact, once in Island of Mozambique, the 
President Craveiro Lopes was welcomed by twenty one shots fired from the 17th century cannons existent in 
the Saint Sebastian’s Fortress, and by the ringing of the bells from the Saint Paul’s Church. Later, during the 
County President’s speech, occurred a demonstration of the perfectly understanding of the monuments as 
powerful and convincing instruments of colonial propaganda, with the Saint Sebastian’s Fortress being 
presented as “The Fortress that rises, proud and majestic, at the end of the island [and that] represents the 
impregnable bulwark of the Portuguese soul” [Boletim Geral do Ultramar2, 1956, p.463]. The meaning of the 
Island of Mozambique’s monuments and their role during times of anticolonialism was later reinforced by the 
President Craveiro Lopes himself, who, concerning the loss of importance of the former capital city, said: 
 
“However the stones of the old Fortress, the altars of the See, the rooms of Saint Paul’s, the bones of 
our dead, the ancient ambience that surrounds all those sacred things remained to remember, to 
those who live, that in this place were made four centuries of Mozambique history”  
[Boletim Geral do Ultramar2, 1956, p.463] 
 
 Later on that day, both the Fortress and the Saint Paul’s Fortress were used as platforms for the staging of 
propaganda initiatives, such as the performance of Gil Vicente’s plays and acclamations. The historical Saint 
Paul’s Palace was, also, the chosen building to accommodate the President Craveiro Lopes during his stay in  
 
Pic. 5 The presidential entourage during the visit to the Saint Sebastian’s Fortress in 1956. 
Agência Geral do Ultramar. 
en 
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Pic. 6 President Américo Tomás waving from the balcony of Saint Paul’s Palace after his arrival at Island of Mozambique in 
1964. 
Agência Geral do Ultramar. 
 
 
Island of Mozambique. Finally, on his last day in the island, the President and his entourage visited the Saint 
Sebastian’s Fortress – where a ceremony with the honour guard was held –, prayed at the Our Lady of the 
Bulwark’s chapel and revisited the Portuguese colonial Past by admiring the former Saint Dominic’s convent, 
the Saint Francis of Xavier chapel and the Our Lady of Health’s and Mercy’s Churches.  
 
In the 60’s, the colonial war in Africa didn’t slow down the Estado Novo’s machine of propaganda or 
rocked the well-consolidated colonial ideology, but instead it encouraged the continuity of the previous actions 
regarding, among others, the presidential tours and visits to the already restored overseas monuments. In fact, 
in 1964, just a few months before The Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) attack to the administrative 
post of Chai in Cabo Delgado, which marked the beginning of the armed struggle against the Portuguese rule, 
the regime held another presidential tour to Mozambique. During the visit of the President Américo Tomás 
(1894-1987), the Saint Sebastian’s Fortress and Saint Paul’s Palace performed, once again, important roles as 
actors and sceneries of a show which subliminal message was to highlight that, in times of independence 
claims: 
“The biggest treason that a Portuguese could perpetrate against Portugal, would be to contribute to 
the Island of Mozambique, someday, ceased to be Portuguese. The many that died for Portugal, in 
this island, have the right to demand that the Portuguese of today and tomorrow, give their lives, as 
they gave theirs, to always preserve this island as Portuguese.”  
[Agência Geral do Ultramar, 1965, p.375] 
 
 
 
As we’ve mentioned before, the Commission of Monuments and Historical Relics of Mozambique was 
created in 1943 and played its role in the inventory, classification, conservation, restoration, propaganda and 
disclosure of the acquired knowledge until the collapse of the Estado Novo. However, the activity of this 
commission was far from consistent, as we can identify two very different moments, with the one that went 
from 1963 to 1974 being the stronger and most memorable. In fact, after a few dynamic first years with works 
being developed, mainly, at the Quirimbas archipelago, the commission, due to the lack of human resources 
and funds, went through a less productive path. However in 1963, thanks to the integration of the architect 
Pedro Quirino da Fonseca, the commission was revitalized as the monuments benefited, once again, from the 
need of the dictatorship to assert the legitimacy of the Portuguese colonialism. After all, as we’ve mentioned, 
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the colonial war, after the outbreak in 1961 in Angola, was, in 1963, very close to burst also in Mozambique, 
with the FRELIMO being founded, in Dar es Saleem, on June 1962. 
In fact, during his early years in Mozambique, the architect Pedro Quirino da Fonseca developed a well-
thought program of heritage valorisation all over the colony but, especially, in the Island of Mozambique. The 
attraction of the monuments commission towards the island is easily understandable if we take into to account 
its meaning in the history of the Portuguese colonisation in Mozambique, once it was the first capital city of 
the colony and, consequently, the place where the oldest and most noteworthy monuments are gathered. Thus, 
which other city would be a better evidence of the Portuguese colonial claims during a time of war against 
nationalist groups such as Frelimo? 
Apparently, this was the line of thought of the monuments commission and of the General-Government of 
Mozambique, once, in 1969, a program of valorisation of the Island of Mozambique monuments was launched. 
After reading an Alexandre Lobato’s books on the Island of Mozambique, “a true patriotic shrine” [Boletim 
Geral do Ultramar, 1959, p.156], the Governor Baltazar Rebelo de Souza (1921-2002) became fascinated by 
the former city capital and, consequently, instructed the architect Quirino da Fonseca to do the program of 
valorisation of the Island of Mozambique monuments. Thus, during the development of a program whose 
implementation was urgent, the architect tried to reverse the adulterations that were made along the years, and, 
simultaneously, tried to return to the historical buildings their “architecture layout and within its correct places 
and styles” (Boletim Geral do Ultramar 525, p.156).  According to the effective methodology and praxis, this 
means that the architect Quirino da Fonseca worked in order to reverse the alterations and additions that were 
made from the end of the 17th and 18th centuries, the “time during which the island of Mozambique reached 
its greatest splendour” [Diário Lourenço Marques, 1969, p.3]. This line of work could be easily explained by 
the already mention need to prove how magnificent the former capital city of the colony was and how strong 
the relation between that glorious Past and the Present was, but also, and this is particularly interesting in times 
of war, by the will to create a living museum that would be attractive to tourists.  
Thus, on 23rd of November 1969, the Sacred Art Musem was inaugurated in the former Mercy Hospital, 
along with the works of restoration of the Saint Paul’s Palace, Saint Paul’s Chapel, Saint Sebastian’s Fortress, 
Saint Anthony’s Fort, House of the City Council, Gulamo’s Mosque at Lumbo and other historical buildings at 
Mossuril, Cabaceira Grande and Cabaceira Pequena. Simultaneously, the armed struggle between Frelimo and 
the Portuguese Armed Forces kept on going mainly at Mueda in Cabo Delgado, with the death of Eduardo 
Mondlane (1920-1969), the first president of Frelimo, the presence of Samora Machel (1933-1986), president 
of Frelimo, during June and July 1970 at Cabo Delgado, and the ‘Operação Nó Górdio’ that aimed, with partial 
success, to eradicate the infiltration routes of the guerrilla from Tanzania to Mozambique, to destroy the 
enemies bases at Planalto dos Macondes and to assure freedom of action to the Portuguese troops. 
Finally, in the end, something is certain: in 1969 the colonial war gave no hint of being near the end. However, 
the dispute between the nationalist movements, such as the Mozambique’s Frelimo, and the Portuguese 
dictatorship, at the time, didn’t have place only at the northwester plateaus with all sorts of armament and 
strategies assuming the leading roles. In fact, at the same time, the General Government of Mozambique was 
 
 
 
 
Pic. 7 Commemorative plaque remembering the program of valorisation of the Island of Mozambique: “In 1969 the General 
Governor Baltazar Rebello de Souza ordain the execution of important works of conservation and restoration on the General 
Captains Palace, Saint Paul’s Palace, Saint Sebastian’s Fortress, Saint Anthony’s Fort, Gulamo’s Mosque, Town Hall and other 
buildings in the island, Mossuril and Cabaceiras. The city, grateful, therefore ordered to put this memory here.” 
Author’s photography.  
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 putting into practice a more diplomatic and peaceful strategy that took part of a well-thought propaganda 
strategy: the conservation, restoration and disclosure of the historical monuments, hundreds of years old, as 
proves of the Portuguese legitimacy in the disputed territory.  
 
  
Conclusion 
 
Throughout this study, we’ve witnessed the importance of Mozambique historical monuments as actors and 
sceneries in the context of the colonial propaganda promoted, between the 40’s and the 70’s, by Estado Novo.  
First and foremost, it’s important to highlight that the true and consistent attention of the Estado Novo towards 
the monuments of Mozambique and other colonies, only occurred, effectively, upon the growth of the 
controversy around the colonialism, a tendency that arose as a direct consequence of the end of the World War 
II and the creation of the United Nations. The reason behind this shift is easily understandable if we take into 
account the ideology and praxis of the Portuguese dictatorship: the historical monuments were understood and 
valued as the most majestic proves of the Portuguese colonial empire. Therefore, in times of colonial claims, it 
was essential to restore the materialistic and symbolic looks of those magnificent representatives of former 
glorious times. However, the regime’s methodology wasn’t limited to the development of an inventory or 
works of conservation and restoration, once it was fundamental to propagandize this grandiosity of the 
Portuguese Empire and, mostly, this alleged and almost sacred relation between the Past and the Present that 
would assure the legitimacy of the Estado Novo claims regarding the overseas colonies.  
Thus, we´ve witnessed the organization of presidential tours to Mozambique in 1939, 1956 or 1964. On this 
occasions, the propagandistic character of such events obviously nationalistic and imperialistic orientated, was 
reinforced by the well-thought inclusion of historical monuments in the programs outlined to be fulfil by the 
Portuguese President and his entourage. In the end, the propagandized idea in times of colonial claims and/or 
war was simple: Mozambique, as the historical monuments from the Past and the presence of the head of the 
Portuguese State showed, was Portugal.  
Alongside with this presidential tours organized by the central Government, we can’t lack to highlight the 
role performed by the Commission of Monuments and Historical Relics of Mozambique in the disclosure of 
the Portuguese architectonic heritage and in the legitimation of the colonial tradition claimed by the 
dictatorship. After all, by taking into account the activity carried out by this monuments commission between 
1943 and 1974, we’ve realized how committed this department was with both the monuments and nation’s 
safeguard. First, we’ve realized that, since the beginning, the selection criteria for the monuments to be 
restored were permanently, and directly, influenced by the necessity to assert the “Portugality” of 
Mozambique. After all, we can identify an obvious preference for the territories that were, from a historical 
point of view, the most iconic, such as the island of Ibo, but, mostly, the Island of Mozambique, a region 
discovered, in 1498, by Vasco da Gama and the capital city of the colony until the end of the 19th century. 
Second, we’ve realized that the increase of the number and dimension of activities developed by the 
monuments commission during the 60’s clearly followed the evolution of the colonial war, replying to the 
creation and enlargement of Frelimo with the intensification of the conservation and restoration works in the 
Island of Mozambique, the most eloquent symbol of the Portuguese occupation of that territory of Eastern 
Africa.   
As a consequence, we can conclude that the Mozambique historical monuments (and other overseas 
monuments) were, in fact, used, along with more conventional weapons and military strategies outlined against 
independence movements such as Frelimo, as propaganda instruments of a highly stubbornly colonial 
dictatorship.  
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Propaganda and sovereignty: New State and the exaltation of the 
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The Portuguese World Exhibition held in Lisbon in 1940 was the apogee of imperial mystification and the 
corollary of self-identity representations fabricated by Salazar’s New State. Organised to commemorate the 
country’s 800 years and the 300 years of its restoration of independence after six decades of Spanish rule, the 
exhibition was also a celebration of the regime and a symbolic statement to the world. As António Ferro, the 
secretary of National Propaganda put it, it was an 
 
 admirable opportunity to show, to enemies and friends, the eternal drawing of our frontier lines.811 
 
With France already occupied by Nazi troops, Lisbon was transformed in a spy’s nest and a shelter for 
thousands of Jews and refugees waiting for a visa to board towards America. Gleaming with its lights and 
festivities, the Portuguese capital offered a strange contrast to those who fled from Europe’s dark cities 
devastated by combats and air raids. 
Lisbon was then a “vivid and sad paradise,” as Antoine de Saint-Exupéry said in his book Letter to a 
Hostage, recalling his brief stay and his visit to the exhibition. According to the French writer and aviator, 
Portugal seemed to ignore "the appetite of the beast" and “clung to her elusive happiness.”812 Without human 
or material resources to resist any possible attempt to attack its European and overseas territories, Portugal 
could merely hope to succeed through diplomacy and propaganda. To a certain extent, only historical and 
moral arguments could withstand national integrity, and those arguments were persistently used both 
externally and internally. 
Since the Colonial Act – a decree penned by Salazar himself 813 and issued in 1930 with constitutional 
effects -, Portuguese territories overseas were not only legally specified as part of the “Portuguese Colonial 
Empire” but also ontologically legitimated. As the text stated, it was of the “organic essence of the Portuguese 
Nation” to perform its “historical function” of possessing and colonising overseas territories and to “civilise” 
their indigenous populations814.  
As a keystone of the dictatorship policies regarding the colonies, this Act was aimed to other colonial 
powers’ appetites, a recurrent issue in Portuguese agenda since the Scramble for Africa, the British Ultimatum 
trauma in 1890 and the partition agreements concerning Angola and Mozambique established between 
England and Germany in 1898 and 1912-13. For its colonies, Portugal fought the Great War to have a seat at 
the peace conference. However, the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations brought new obligations of 
economic development and a “civilising mission” to post-war colonialism, to which Portugal had to 
correspond. And for which the country was quite often put into question. 
Besides the international responsibilities, a closer look at the Colonial Act preamble gives us crucial 
information about its purposes: to combat "certain international currents" with imperialistic intents which 
threatened the "traditional dogma" of colonial sovereignty, and to put in order the colonial administration, all 
for the sake of Portugal’s “superior interests and destinies.” To sum it up, the Colonial Act bound the colonies 
to Portugal’s own future and independence. And based on the principle of “moral and political solidarity,” it 
established the non-divisibility of all the territories that formed the “Portuguese Colonial Empire.”815 
Needless to point out, after World War II Salazar had to adjust this discourse considering the geo-strategic 
map of the Cold War, the international pressures to democratise and decolonise, and the survival of the regime 
itself.816 The Constitution of 1951 (which replaced the term colonies with the more integrative notion of 
                                                          
 
811António Ferro, “Carta Aberta aos Portugueses de 1940”, in Diário de Notícias (17/6/1939).  
812 Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, Letter to a Hostage, (transl. Jacqueline Gerst), London: Pushkin Press, 1999. 
813 In co-authorship with Armindo Monteiro, future minister of the Colonies. Note that the Colonial Act was prepared and 
issued when Salazar, in accumulation with the Ministry of Finance, was appointed interim minister of the Colonies (first 
time, from 21 January to 29 July 1930).  
814 Decreto n.º 18.570, 8/7/1930. 
815 Idem. 
816 Fernando Rosas, História de Portugal – O Estado Novo (1926-1974), (dir. José Mattoso), vol. VII, Lisboa: Editorial 
Estampa, 1994. 
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overseas provinces) and Lusotropicalism theory817 were two pillars of that only apparent change, conducted 
more on a semantic level than in substance. Back in the 30’s, the New State’s nationalist propaganda enhanced 
the referred ontological matrix by intertwining history, religion and politics to affirm Portuguese sovereignty. 
  
 
Stating the difference and staging the message 
 
As already sustained by historians like Valentim Alexandre, it’s possible to trace a continual discourse 
back from the early years of Constitutional Monarchy (right after the emancipation of Brazil) through the 
Republican period and the dictatorship, regarding African colonies as a priority of national policies and the key 
to Portuguese independence818. It wasn’t, therefore, a discourse created by the New State. What Salazar’s 
regime shaped based on those premises was, in fact, a national image that fit its purposes, blurring the lines 
between nation and ideology. 
Even before Salazar’s rise to power as chief of Government, Portuguese representations in international 
and colonial exhibitions stressed out the role of the empire to the nation’s unity. In accordance, the colonies 
were presented as part of the country and as such incorporated in the national pavilions, with architecture 
playing the function of integrating diversity. With variations that can be related to the political and economical 
goals of those image projections and the budgets assigned, that was the case for the three most important 
exhibitions during the early years of the Portuguese dictatorship. 
To the historicist focus of the Ibero-American Exhibition of Seville, opened in 1929, Portugal replied with 
a sumptuous baroque pavilion inspired in the manor houses of the eighteenth century819, to symbolise the 
nation’s glorious past and its respect for the legacy of the Age of Discoveries preserved throughout centuries 
and regimes. Because the permanent part of the building was intended to later serve as a Portuguese consulate, 
it’s not difficult to see the importance of leaving such a statement in Spain. The only exception to that 
centralised image was conceded to Macau, with a small pavilion resembling the pagoda of Barra, aimed to 
reinforce the propaganda of that territory and to fade international accusations related to opium traffic and 
maritime piracy. 
A very different architectural solution was adopted in 1930 for Antwerp International and Colonial 
Exhibition, where Portugal transformed part of an exposition hall into a small and humble pavilion with Art 
Deco façades820, spending much less than in Seville. Nonetheless, the same message was delivered: the 
colonies were part of the nation and history legitimised Portuguese possessions. Considering the Congo 
frontier with Angola, such a claim in Belgium was clearly a reminder. 
In 1931, for the Paris International Colonial Exhibition, lavishly staged in Vincennes, the political 
discourse did not differ but another kind of solution became necessary. The avenue that crossed the building 
site made it almost impossible to conceive a single pavilion, and therefore it was decided to separate the 
historical section from the colonies display of recent developments and products. However, architect Raul 
Lino, well known for his study and idealisation of the Portuguese House, solved the dissociation problem 
projecting four buildings with strong visual elements associated to metropolitan Portugal, combining 
references from the austere sobriety of its monasteries to the monumental architecture of the golden Age of 
Discoveries. The ensemble was distinctively provided with turrets, arches and tiles, and highlighted by a 
remake of a “manueline” portal, a stylised padrão821 and a 35 meter-high tower crowned in its four faces with 
the Order of Christ’s Cross, presented as the “revered symbol of Portugal’s colonising work.” 822  The 
association of Portuguese empire to Faith was centuries old but the providential myth had, by then, resurged 
with all the weight of an official thesis. 
                                                          
817 Coined by Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre, Lusotropicalism sustained that Portuguese colonisation couldn’t be 
compared to other imperialisms, given the unique background of metropolitan Portugal, the Portuguese ability to adapt to 
tropical cultures, and the long tradition of miscegenation. The theory fitted the New State’s purpose to present Portuguese 
empire as a multi-continental and multiracial nation and was officially adopted from the 50’s on. Many historians and 
researchers (among them Charles Boxer, Cláudia Castelo and Miguel Vale de Almeida) already pointed out its frailties and 
failures.  
818 Valentim Alexandre, “Portugal em África (1825-1974): uma perspectiva global”, in Penélope, n.º 11, Maio 1993, pp.53-
66. Valentim Alexandre, “A África no imaginário político português (séculos XIX-XX)”, in Penélope, n.º 15, Junho 1995, 
pp.39-52. 
819 Projected by architects Carlos and Guilherme Rebelo de Andrade and very similar to the Portuguese main pavilion at 
the Rio de Janeiro Exhibition of 1922, later reassembled according to original plans in Lisbon’s Parque Eduardo VII to 
serve as exhibitions venue (nowadays known as Pavilhão Carlos Lopes).  
820 Projected by Felix Horta, the author of Macau’s Pavilion in Seville 1929. 
821 Stone pillar carried by Portuguese fleets, to set up as mark of discovery. 
822  Exposition Colonial International de Paris (Section Portugaise) – Catalogue Officiel, Commissariat Général du 
Portugal, 1931, pp. 11-33. 
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In a time when colonial powers built exotic pavilions at international fairs to seduce visitors with a “one-
day journey around the world,”823 Portugal stuck to its roots and did not follow the trend. Moreover, the legacy 
of the past was always underlined to justify the present and pave the way for the future. In Vincennes, and for 
the first time since the beginning of the dictatorship with a considerable assertiveness, Portugal presented its 
colonialism as being original and centred on spiritual values, guaranteeing that the efficiency of its 
administration methods conquered the affection of native populations. Of course reality was quite different. 
Nevertheless, as a propaganda resource, this strategy was not only followed during the 30’s but also 
exacerbated by New State’s “imperial mystique” and staged according to the occasions. 
Several internal controversies were motivated by the representations at Seville, Antwerp and Vincennes, 
but the political message was clear: Portuguese overseas territories were parts of the same state and, therefore, 
sovereignty was unquestionable. However, much had to be done to both sustain that message abroad and 
indoctrinate metropolitan and native populations.  
Portuguese imperial propaganda was, obviously, in close relation to the fast changing context of that era, 
when the Great Depression hit economies worldwide and uncertainty dominated international politics. Sure, 
the above-mentioned exhibitions’ presence was scheduled some time in advance but they were representative 
of the Portuguese military dictatorship’s priorities regarding foreign affairs.  
Only after those charm operations in Spain, Belgium and France did the regime decide to organise the first 
(and only) Portuguese Colonial Exhibition. Held in Porto in 1934, it was defined by Armindo Monteiro, then 
minister of the Colonies, as “the exercise of a sovereign faculty.”824 And that stood both for external as for 
domestic purposes, considering Hitler’s and Mussolini’s already declared expansionist aspirations, white 
separatist claims in Angola, internal oppositions challenging and fighting the regime, and the general 
indifference or ignorance of Portuguese people about colonial matters.  
Being the first big exhibition prepared by Salazar’s New State, although its meagre budget, it was intended 
to be a nationalist “lesson” and to operate as a cohesion factor. Once again, faith, empire and sovereignty were 
the pillars of a staged discourse that transformed Palácio de Cristal into an Art Deco inspired Palace of the 
Colonies and the surrounding gardens into a miniature of Portuguese overseas – where natives specially 
brought for the event provided the “realistic” animation in “typical” indigenous villages and added the exotic 
flavour, thus maintaining the old tradition of human zoos for European amusement. 
With its relics, documents, books, artefacts, products, decorations and monumental allegories, Porto’s 
Colonial Exhibition was in line with the previous international representations and was also825 directed by a 
colonialist: army captain Henrique Galvão, soon to be appointed director of National Radio (Emissora 
Nacional) and orchestrator of the Colonial Section and Imperial Pageant of the Portuguese World Exhibition in 
1940, who would later become a regime dissident and lead the famous Santa Maria hijacking in 1961. Yet, at 
the heyday of the “imperial mystique”, Galvão was the man who organised the most powerful representation 
of Portuguese territories: the well-known map Portugal is Not a Small Country, simultaneously a didactic 
image and propaganda motto. 
  
 
A new image for an old discourse 
 
Despite the key role of written and spoken word for the Portuguese regime, in a time when many couldn’t 
read and only a few could afford to buy a radio set image had a core importance in propaganda. Cinema and 
exhibitions were then certainly the most effective media, and not surprisingly they were both used 
complementarily: propaganda documentaries were shown at exhibitions, and exhibitions were registered on 
film to be later presented in movie theatres. The broader the audience, the more disseminated political and 
ideological messages could be. 
Of course the impact of moving images was an important counterpart to the visual statements of 
photography, painting and sculpture, and that combination was recurrent in propaganda exhibitions like the 
ones above mentioned. However, only after António Ferro was designated secretary of National Propaganda 
and put to action his “Policy of the Spirit” became the use of visual discourse a coherent praxis. Not by chance, 
the first Portuguese political propaganda film was produced for the Paris International Exhibition, in 1937, the 
first time Ferro shaped a national representation at a major exhibition abroad. This film, titled A Revolução de 
Maio and directed by António Lopes Ribeiro (who co-wrote the script with Ferro), mingled fiction and real 
footage to tell the story of a communist’s conversion to the cause of the New State. It was an idyllic projection 
                                                          
823 Main slogan of the Paris Colonial Exhibition of 1931. 
824 Armindo Monteiro, preface to Álbum Comemorativo da Primeira Exposição Colonial Portuguesa, Porto: Litografia 
Nacional, 1934, pp.8-10. 
825  Army officer Silveira e Castro directed the Portuguese representations in Seville and Vincennes. The republican 
engineer and historian Armando Cortesão, by then in charge of colonial propaganda (at Agência Geral das Colónias) was 
responsible for the national representation in Antwerp. 
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of an idealised country, intended to soften the image of the dictatorship and to present Portugal as a stable 
player in a time when a global conflict was again on the horizon. 
Being a right-wing dictatorship with close resemblances and relations to Hitler’s and Mussolini’s 
totalitarian regimes, the Portuguese New State couldn’t, on the other hand, discard the vital importance of the 
old Anglo-Portuguese alliance. The risks were obvious. By then, the clash between left and right had already 
led to Spanish Civil War and Guernica. And the support given to the Spanish nationalist Falange could be 
tricky: Salazar knew that Iberism was still an aspiration for many republicans, as much as he knew that the 
Great Iberia unification was in Franco’s plans.826 With internal oppositions closing their ranks, the Portuguese 
dictator hardened both discourse and action. Violence, political arrests and deportations multiplied, and 
censorship tightened, while official anti-communist propaganda urged people to “defend the nation” and the 
Portuguese “order”. 
Paris International Exhibition of 1937 offered the opportunity to stage abroad that proclaimed “order” of 
the New State, but evidently in a composed tone. Formulating a seductive discourse that articulated images and 
words, António Ferro introduced there, though, a modernist enunciation that could hardly satisfy the orthodoxy 
of the regime.827 On the outside, the national pavilion, projected by architect Keil do Amaral, combined 
modernist constructive elements with a bas-relief gallery of past heroes and strong visual symbols, such as the 
Portuguese coat of arms and the Order of Christ’s Cross. Inside, only the present would have place under the 
tutelary figures of Salazar and President Carmona, represented by sculptures. 
Large photomontage panels, slogans, diagrams, decorative paintings, all conveyed the message that the 
dictator’s governance was a “contemporary work of art.”828 For that, Ferro relied on the artistic skills of his 
regular collaborators, among others, the painters Bernardo Marques, Fred Kradolfer, Dordio Gomes, 
Emmerico Nunes, Jorge Barradas and António Soares; sculptors Rui Gameiro, Canto da Maia, Barata Feio and 
Francisco Franco, and photographers Mário Novais and Domingos Alvão. That up-to-date version of the 
Lusitanian House set an iconic reconfiguration of facts addressed to the masses and international political 
leaders. Colonies occupied one room of the building and the map Portugal is not a small country was 
emphasized with depurated aesthetics. Slogans like “we have a doctrine and we are a force” punctuated the 
circuit in pure ideological rhetoric. But reactions were favourable. While Germany, the USSR, Italy and Spain 
staged in Paris a symbolic ideological confrontation, Portugal managed somehow to promote itself as an 
example and to present Salazar as the Professor dictator, thus marking the distance towards other 
authoritarianisms.  
Meanwhile, in Lisbon, the Historical Exposition of the Occupation tried to demonstrate that even in 
adverse periods Portugal had always been able to reinvigorate its overseas legacy and keep sovereignty on its 
territories. 829 Organised by the Ministry of Colonies and set by an executive committee led by Júlio Cayola, 
this propaganda event relayed on documents and artworks to validate the premises of the Colonial Act, to 
which was dedicated an entire room. More than twenty artists collaborated in that visual narrative about the 
empire’s genealogy, among them the modernist painters Fred Kradolfer (who conducted the works), Almada 
Negreiros, Mário Eloy, Sara Afonso and Estrela Faria; sculptors Hein Semke, Diogo de Macedo, Francisco 
Franco and Maximiliano Alves, and photographers Manuel San Payo, Mário Novais and António Duarte. 
From Discoveries navigators to the heroes of the nineteenth century African occupation, a continual lineage 
would lead, with no surprise, to Salazar and Carmona’s regime. 
 On a political and propagandistic point of view, it should be underlined the parallel organisation of 
the first Congress on the History of Portuguese Expansion in the World, that gathered in Lisbon academics 
from several countries. On the aesthetic level, although Ferro had no direct interference in the Historical 
Exposition of the Occupation, its clear similarities to the national representation in Paris seem to demonstrate 
that there was, at least, an update of means, methods and techniques used by national propaganda when 
compared to the early 30’s practices. In 1939 António Ferro was also responsible for the Portuguese pavilions 
at New York World’s Fair and Golden Gate International Exposition in San Francisco, in which the main 
target audience were Portuguese emigrants. As such, anachronism and emotional rhetoric shaped those visual 
discourses, though the national sovereignty issue operated, once again, as the connective tissue. 
Surely one of the most visible proclamations of that concern was the large-scale statue titled Soberania 
(Sovereignty), created by chief-architect Cottinelli Telmo and by sculptor Leopoldo de Almeida (the same 
authors of Padrão dos Descobrimentos), to be displayed outside the Portuguese in the World Pavilion during 
Lisbon’s 1940 celebrations. Given the reality of World War II and all the menaces pending on Portuguese 
metropolitan borders and overseas territories – official “neutrality” was, in fact, a fragile position continuously 
manoeuvred both with Allies and Axis powers -, that statue could only have a symbolic meaning. 
                                                          
826 Bernardo Futscher Pereira, A Diplomacia de Salazar (1932-1949), Alfragide: Publicações Dom Quixote, 2012. 
827 Margarida Acciaiuoli, Exposições do Estado Novo 1934-1940, Lisboa: Livros Horizonte, 1998. 
828 Idem, p.61. 
829 Boletim Geral das Colónias, vol.XVIII, n.º 150, Setembro 1937. 
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The Portuguese World Exhibition, as the general-director Augusto de Castro admitted, was a “city of 
illusions” erected to honor the dead and teach the living, as a testimony of “national consciousness.”830 With its 
historical, ethnographic and colonial sections, its decorated pavilions, its congresses, solemn acts, parades and 
entertainment activities, no wonder it looked unreal to the eyes of a foreign visitor like Saint-Exupéry: 
 
Lacking an army, lacking guns, [Portugal] had raised against the armaments of the invader all her sentinels of 
stone: poets, explorers, conquerors. Instead of soldiers and guns, all the past of Portugal blocked the way. Who 
would dare to crush her in her inheritance of so great a past?831 
 
Even if sentinels were indeed made of metal, wood and plaster, the Portuguese World Exhibition left marks 
not only in the capital of the empire but also in the mythicised image that Portugal fabricated of itself. History 
took its course, the regime was overthrown three decades later and all those propaganda events became a part 
of the past, kept in books, films and old newspapers. Not without placing some navigators, princes and men of 
arts and sciences permanently anchored on the Tagus bank, on a limestone replica of their 1940’s modernist-
style caravel.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cover of the propaganda album Portugal 1940 (Lisboa: SPN), with the statue Soberania at the Portuguese World 
Exhibition 
 
                                                          
830 Augusto de Castro, “Discurso inaugural da exposição em 23 de Junho de 1940”, in A Exposição do Mundo Português e 
a sua Finalidade Nacional, Lisboa: Empresa Nacional de Publicidade, 1940, pp.54-70. 
831 Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, Letter to a Hostage. 
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Heinrich Hoffmann, fotógrafo oficial do regime Nazi e amigo pessoal de Adolf Hitler, teve um papel 
fundamental na construção do mito e da estilização da imagem do Führer, como líder forte e carismático. 
Hoffmann foi capaz de traduzir em fotografia os ideais do Social Nacionalismo, criando elementos estético-
expressivos que corporizavam as estratégias propagandísticas de Josef Goebbels. Publicou vários livros com 
fotografias do Chanceler sendo um dos mais conhecidos “O Hitler que ninguém conhece: 100 fotografias da 
vida do Führer” (1933), um absoluto êxito de vendas: as 420.000 copias impressas esgotaram. Na capa do 
livro, Heinrich Hoffmann, apresentava-se como “O repórter fotográfico do Império do Partido Nacional 
Socialista dos Trabalhadores Alemães”, título informal que ostentou durante toda a sua vida. 
A fotografia sempre teve uma forte influência na vida das pessoas, estando presente nos meios de 
comunicação de massas, aportando informação e influenciando condutas e pensamentos. Walter Benjamim 
(1992) considerava a fotografia como um meio de reprodução verdadeiramente revolucionário, pois 
transformou a forma como vemos o mundo e como olhamos para o outro. 
De acordo com Kossoy (1999), a imagem fotográfica sempre foi um poderoso instrumento para a veiculação 
de ideologias, a formação e a manipulação da opinião pública, em função da credibilidade das imagens, já que 
os seus conteúdos são aceites e assimilados como a expressão da verdade.  
As fotografias de Hoffmann foram pensadas e utilizadas sob o prisma da estratégia de propaganda nazi e 
com um objetivo claro: engrandecer a imagem de Adolf Hitler, torná-lo um mito. Mas as produções 
fotográficas de Heinrich Hoffmann foram apenas uma peça de puzzle dentro do grande plano de propaganda 
ideado por Joseph Goebbels. O universo da propaganda incluía todos os meios de difusão: imprensa, rádio, 
filmes e produções para cinema, comícios políticos e eventos culturais, revistas, manuais escolares, 
arquitectura, uniformes, folhetos, livros, música, material comemorativo, etc. Segundo Lasswell (1927) a 
propaganda adoptava técnicas de persuasão tendo por objectivo fazer com que as massas seguissem o líder e 
estivessem dispostas a “odiar o inimigo, amar sua pátria, e devotar-se ao máximo ao esforço de guerra”. 
 
O homem detrás do mito 
 
Henrich Hoffmann, mais do que fotógrafo, era confidente, amigo íntimo e o consultor de imagem de Adolf 
Hitler. A sua produção artística combinava técnicas de fotogenia, luz, enfoques, cenários, poses, roupas e 
expressões de forma a conseguir textos-imagem propagandísticos, carregados de simbolismos. Desenvolveu 
um trabalho notável de assessoria de imagem, as suas fotografias contribuíram de forma intencional para a 
criação do mito político, tentando por um lado humanizar a imagem do líder e por outro criar uma figura 
invencível. 
Ao utilizar o termo mito político, referimo-nos aos conceitos e propostas teóricas e percepções sobre a 
dimensão da imagem e o mito de autores como Claude Lévi-Strauss, Mircea Eliade e Raoul Girardet. Um mito 
político não é apenas um fenómeno, uma pessoa, um partido ou uma ideia, mas sim a representação que se faz 
de determinados fenómenos, pessoas ou ideias, defende Girardet (1987) em Mitos e “Mitologias Politicas”. 
Para o semiólogo, a elaboração do mito acontece a partir da contínua repetição e reelaboração de uma imagem, 
da sequência de uma história contada, repetida e reelaborada que vai dando corpo e substância ao mito. Assim, 
o capital imagético (Bourdieu, 1989) de Hitler foi construído intencionalmente para a exposição contínua e a 
divulgação mediática.  
A situação económica e social da Alemanha da época era tensa e o imaginário social estava receptivo ao 
consumo de mitos. A criação de mitos políticos é enfatizada em momentos da história em que há inquietações 
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políticas, lembra Girardet (1987). 
 
Os mitos políticos das nossas sociedades contemporâneas não se diferenciam muito, sob esse aspecto, dos 
grandes mitos sagrados das sociedades tradicionais. A mesma e essencial fluidez os caracteriza, ao mesmo 
tempo que a imprecisão de seus respectivos contornos. Imbricam-se, interpenetram-se, perdem-se por vezes 
um no outro. Uma rede ao mesmo tempo sutil e poderosa de liames de complementaridade não cessa de 
manter entre eles passagens, transições e inferências. Girardet (1987:15)  
 
 
As reportagens fotográficas de Hoffmann exaltavam os princípios ideológicos sob os quais estava fundado o 
Nacional-Socialismo: o autoritarismo e expansão militar próprios da herança prussiana; a tradição romântica 
alemã que se opunha ao racionalismo, ao liberalismo e à democracia; diversas doutrinas racistas que 
consideravam que os povos nórdicos, os arianos, não só eram fisicamente superiores às outras raças, como 
também o eram na sua cultura e moral.  
Lasswell (1927) entende a propaganda como a gestão das atitudes colectivas, através da manipulação de 
símbolos e Hoffmann soube incorporar nas suas criações fotográficas estes princípios, nomeadamente o uso de 
símbolos e estereótipos. 
Um dos trabalhos mais notáveis de Hoffmann é uma “box monográfica” publicada em 1941 que contém 12 
revistas com fotografias de Hitler organizadas por temas: Hitler e os Jovens, Hitler na Montanha, Hitler na 
Polónia, Como Hitler construiu a grande Alemanha, Hitler em casa, etc. É um exemplo idóneo de cuidada 
comunicação politica, a propaganda ao serviço do regime e que retrata em fotografia, o conceito de Ein Volk, 
Ein Reich, ein Führer (um povo, um império, um líder). 
Com esta colecção pretendia mostrar as diferentes facetas do chanceler: o carismático político; o grande 
estratega de guerra; o homem sensível e amante dos animais; o coração terno que amava as crianças e a 
natureza. A colecção foi seleccionada e recebeu um Prémio de Honra por Richard Darré, na altura, ministro da 
Alimentação e Agricultura (1933-1942).  
A fotografia segundo a perspectiva de Vilém Flusser (1998) é uma mediação entre o homem e o mundo e as 
imagens substituem eventos por cenas. Através desta colecção Hoffmann apresenta-nos uma narrativa mítica, 
do mundo do Terceiro Reich (1933-1945), a visão do líder e as suas diversas facetas, de herói a homem 
sensível. As cenas captadas em instantâneos de carácter aparentemente objetivo, porque o leitor alvo confia 
nas imagens como nos seus olhos, e ao decifrá-las fá-lo utilizando visões do mundo, neste caso, influenciadas 
pela propaganda. A objetividade aparente deriva apenas do significado que se imprime de forma automática 
sobre a superfície das imagens, mas, como elas também são simbólicas, precisam ser decifradas.  
Ao analisar esta colecção encontramos símbolos relacionados com a igreja, mitos e tradições, apelando ao 
que de mais germânico existia na mente e alma dos alemães. Por exemplo, uma das imagens de Hitler a sair 
casualmente de uma Igreja com a cruz estrategicamente colocada em cima da sua cabeça, conferindo-lhe uma 
certa aura messiânica. A introdução nas fotografias de elementos simbólicos relacionados com a família, as 
crianças, ou os animais, apelavam ao sentimentalismo, ao instinto de protecção, o defender a pátria, alentando 
assim os homens a ir à guerra e lutar por uma vida melhor e pelo futuro dos seus filhos.  
Ao introduzir estes símbolos e sugestões psicológicas nos seus textos-imagem, Hoffmann, estava a 
reproduzir uma das técnicas mais aclamadas da propaganda. Conforme Kimball Young citado por Rodero 
Antón (2000) na propaganda encontra-se o uso sistemático e deliberado, de símbolos, principalmente através 
da sugestão ou de técnicas psicológicas similares, com a intenção de alterar e controlar opiniões, ideias, 
valores e em última instância, incitar acções. 
Em várias fotografias, observa-se a apurada estética, os cabelos rigorosamente penteados, os fatos 
impolutos, o olhar frio, cativante e enigmático do Führer. De acordo com Kossoy (1999) a fotogenia dramatiza 
ou valoriza esteticamente os cenários, modificando a aparência do retratado, alterando o realismo físico da 
natureza das coisas, omitindo ou introduzindo detalhes. As técnicas de fotogenia e estetismo presentes na obra 
de Hoffmann, engrandecem o líder, mitificam o homem e contribuem para o êxito da propaganda nazi. 
 
O trabalho de Hoffmann não se limitava a pressionar o botão da câmara fotográfica, ou escolher os cenários 
ou cenas carregadas de simbolismos. Trabalhavam juntos as posturas e as coreografias dos discursos dos 
comícios políticos. Fechados no estúdio, Hitler gesticulava e Hoffmann tirava fotografias que serviriam depois 
para que o Führer escolhesse os ângulos e as poses mais dramáticas para seduzir as massas. Hitler sabia bem 
que os comícios viviam da emoção fervorosa da multidão e para estimular essa resposta tinha que oferecer 
discursos carregados de drama e sublinhados com poses vigorosas, energéticas, construindo a imagem de líder 
invencível. As poses estudadas minuciosamente, tinham o poder de criar no espectador, segundo Georges 
Sorel, “pela intuição, a massa de sentimentos capazes de incitar a luta política”. 
Assim, as fotografias assinadas por Hoffmann têm a particularidade de constituir imagens-mito, no sentido 
proposto por Roland Barthes, onde o mito é uma linguagem a ser desvendada e um "sistema semiológico 
segundo”. De acordo com Barthes: 
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(...) no mito existem dois sistemas semiológicos, um deles deslocado em relação ao outro: um sistema 
linguístico, a língua (ou os modos de representação que lhe são assimilados), a que chamarei linguagem-
objecto, porque é a linguagem de que o mito se serve para construir o seu próprio sistema; e o próprio mito, a 
que chamarei metalinguagem, porque é uma segunda língua, na qual se fala da primeira (1989:137). 
 
Seguindo a linha de pensamento barthesiana, ao ler as fotografias de Hitler assinadas por Hoffmann, 
encontramos o rosto iluminado, o olhar enigmático e frio do Führer. Esse é o primeiro sistema semiológico, o 
significante do mito. O significado remeterá à autoridade vigente no seio do Terceiro Reich, a superioridade, o 
líder, o salvador da nação, o herói messiânico. A leitura mítica de hoje destas fotografias de Hoffmann é 
bastante diferente daquela que foi feita na sua época. O nosso sistema cultural e de entendimento do mundo, 
bem como a informação de que dispomos sobre os efeitos da ideologia nazi e do Holocausto condicionam a 
nossa descodificação. Lembrar que a consciência do povo alemão estava manipulada e portanto ao 
descodificar as fotografias do Führer, activavam-se todos os valores semeados pela propaganda. Aplica-se aqui 
a conceitualização de mito de Gerardet, ao explicar o mito político de Napoleão Bonaparte:  
 
(...) todo o mito desse tipo ganha uma certa amplitude colectiva, ele tende a combinar vários sistemas de 
imagens ou de representações, a constituir-se em outras palavras, como uma espécie de encruzilhada do 
imaginário onde vêm cruzar-se e embaralhar-se as aspirações e as exigências mais diversas, por vezes mais 
contraditórias. Mais uma vez aqui a lenda napoleónica constitui aqui a mais significativa das referencias. 
Conforme os momentos e conforme os meios, Napoleão encarnou ao mesmo tempo a ordem e a aventura, o 
messianismo revolucionário em marcha e o principio da autoridade restaurado. (1987:72-73) 
 
Em 1955, Heinrich Hoffmann, publicou um livro intitulado “Hitler, meu amigo” que incluía uma coleção de 
fotografias tiradas durante os ensaios para os discursos. Hitler tinha dado ordem para que as fotografias dos 
seus ensaios fossem destruídas, mas Hoffmann guardou-as e acabou por publicá-las no período pós-guerra. Se 
analisarmos esta particular coleção fotográfica, detectamos como a pose e a expressão corporal e facial são 
significativas na construção do mito político. 
Também Kossoy (1999) defende que a pose, além de transmitir determinados significados, é um poderoso 
instrumento para a veiculação ideológica e formação de opinião pública. Hitler pretendia transmitir 
intencionalmente: carisma, radicalidade, respeito, emoção, esperança, confiança, medo. Estavam pois, a ser 
dados os primeiros passos da comunicação política moderna, adequando técnicas e procedimentos do líder 
para mesmerizar o seu público ou eleitorado potencial. (Figueiredo, 2000). 
De acordo com Kubrusly (1986) as pessoas são capazes de interpretar e reconhecer o líder pela expressão do 
seu rosto, que fornece ademais informações sobre a disposição e o estado de espírito da pessoa. O autor afirma 
que o público é capaz de interpretar o significado de um olhar, de uma pose, de um braço levantado. Nas 
fotografias dos ensaios, a expressão dos olhos, lábios e posição dos braços e mãos do chanceler estão a ser 
ensaiadas, de forma a encontrar a fórmula mais persuasora, capaz de incendiar multidões. 
 
As fotografias que Hoffmann tirara do Führer vendiam-se às dezenas de milhares; os bilhetes postais aos 
milhões. Hoffmann potenciou sabiamente o poder de atração do seu modelo através de poses heróicas e de 
uma iluminação eficaz, transformando o seu mentor no último e no maior dos Cavaleiros Teutónicos. 
Através da sua lente, no seu estúdio, Hoffmann criou o líder mítico há tanto esperado e destinado a conduzir 
a Alemanha a um futuro glorioso de 1000 anos. (Lambert, 2006: 23) 
 
Hoffmann soube captar a magia hipnótica que destilava o líder (Speer, 1970) e que era reconhecida por 
todos os que o rodeavam, para divulgá-la ao povo alemão e ao mundo através da máquina propagandística de 
Goebbels, que controlava os meios de comunicação. Herbert Döring, o administrador do Berghof (Lambert, 
2006) recorda o olhar penetrante do Führer: “O seu olhar... podia realmente trespassarmos com o olhar”. 
O mito político, a imagem de Hitler composta pelas fotografias de Hoffmann oferece como significado o 
que Girardet (1987:11) define como o processo de heroificação: “o apelo ao chefe salvador, restaurador da 
ordem, ou conquistador de uma nova grandeza colectiva”. Como defende Girardet (1987:13) o mito politico é 
“fabulação, deformação ou interpretação objectivamente recusável do real” também como narrativa 
legendária, ele exerce uma “função explicativa, fornecendo certo número de chaves para a compreensão do 
presente” e se desdobra em “papel de mobilização”.  
E se hoje, ao revermos as fotografias do Führer estas representam geralmente a encarnação da loucura 
humana, na época do Terceiro Reich (1933-1945) representavam exactamente o contrario para a sociedade 
alemã. “(...) um mesmo mito é susceptível de oferecer múltiplas ressonâncias e não menos numerosas 
significações. Significações não apenas complementares, mas também frequentemente opostas.” refere Raoul 
Girarder (1987:14). 
De acordo com o artista e semiólogo alemão Rudolf Herz (1994), as imagens em especial as fotografias de 
Hitler, foram e ainda são, o epítome da sedução. Herz e Halfbrodt criaram um trabalho para o museu de 
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Munique em 1995, intitulado “Hoffmann e Hitler”. O objetivo da investigação era demonstrar a importância da 
estética para a criação do mito de Führer, fornecendo material para uma critica empírica da teoria de 
manipulação da propaganda. A exibição deveria ter prosseguido de Munique para o Museu da História Alemã 
em Berlim, mas foi cancelada devido aos protestos do público. Os artistas queriam enfocar a estética das 
imagens de Hitler e analisar a forma como as poses, cenários, jogos de luz, contribuíram para a manipulação 
das massas. No entanto, a sociedade alemã encarou o projecto não como uma proposta artística, mas sim como 
um acontecimento politicamente incorrecto. Não obstante às objecções sociais e politicas, o carácter científico 
e a proposta crítica do projecto foram reconhecidos. Embora as fotografias fossem legendadas com um 
comentário critico de ideologia anti-Nazi, não deixaram de ser alvo de múltiplas criticas, já que a exibição 
pública de imagens do Führer constitui até hoje um tabu social. Os artistas defendiam que estavam a ser alvo 
de criticas injustas e exageradas já que, desde há vários anos que as imagens e vídeos de Hitler apareciam de 
forma regular em documentários e filmes, na televisão, cinema e na imprensa, e nenhum desses suportes foram 
tão criticados. Este acontecimento e a reação da sociedade, demonstram segundo Rudolf Herz, que as 
fotografias do Führer assinadas por Hoffmann têm um poder de sedução e magnetismo superior a outros 
suportes mediáticos. 
 
 
 
Uma breve Biografia 
 
Quatro anos mais velho que Hitler, Heinrich Hoffmann nasceu em 1885 em Führ, perto de Nuremberga, 
entre pesadas máquinas fotográficas. Já o seu pai, Robert  Hoffmanne o seu tio eram fotógrafos do príncipe 
regente Luitpold e do rei Ludwig IIII e moviam-se entre os mais altos círculos da sociedade real alemã.  
O menino ganhou-lhe o gosto, aprendeu o ofício e cedo começou a sua carreira como fotógrafo. Inicialmente 
trabalhou como ajudante de fotógrafos itinerantes e mais tarde em dois ateliers de fotografia na cidade de 
Munique, capital da Baviera. Um dia, acaso do destino, fotografou um acidente com um cavalo e um peão e foi 
nesse momento que decidiu ser fotojornalista.  
Hoffmann trabalhou com Hugo Thiele, fotógrafo da corte do Grão-Duque de Hesse, em Darmstadt, para 
Langbein em Heidelberg e com Theobald em Frankfurt. Depois mudou-se para Londres e publicou vários 
livros de arte, para alem de desenvolver o seu trabalho como fotógrafo. Em 1908, abriu o seu primeiro estúdio 
no número 33 da Schelingstrasse também na cidade de Munique, mudando-se mais tarde para um 
estabelecimento maior, no numero 50 da mesma rua.  
O seu trabalho era altamente reconhecido e durante a Primeira Guerra Mundial, serviu como fotógrafo 
oficial do exército bávaro. Em 1919 publicou o primeiro livro de fotografia na Alemanha. 
Também em 1919, (no mesmo ano que Hitler) filiou-se no Partido Nacional Socialista dos Trabalhadores 
Alemães - Reichsbildberichterstatter der Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP). Foi numa 
sessão do partido, na cervejaria Baviera, que conheceu um jovem austríaco de seu nome Adolf Hitler.  
De acordo com Joaquim Fest (1974:42), um dos biógrafos mais reconhecidos do Führer, Hitler filiou-se no 
NSDAP com o número 555, embora o partido tivesse uma dimensão muito menor do que o número possa 
demonstrar, já que para inflacionar o numero de militantes, a numeração começava em 501. A amizade entre 
os dois cresceu, partilhavam ideologia e valores, amor pela arte e pela música tradicional alemã. 
Hitler ainda pouco conhecido, começou a ser visita constante na casa de Hoffmann, situada no elegante 
subúrbio de Bogenhausen. Hitler era também estimado pela esposa do fotógrafo. A casa dos Hoffmann passou 
a ser o seu porto de abrigo, o “um lugar onde podia descontrair, saborear bolos caseiros e falar sobre arte e 
música” (Lambert, 2006:19). 
 
Kurt Lüdecke no livro “I Knew Hitler” (2011) recorda que quando Hoffmann e Hitler, se conheceram, Hitler 
ainda recusava ser fotografado. Lüdecke, descreve que Hoffmann convenceu Hitler do poder da imagem para o 
êxito da propaganda politica.  
Quando em 1924, Hitler saiu da prisão de Landsberg e retomou as atividades políticas, Hoffmann tornou-se 
o seu fotógrafo pessoal. Identificou o potencial de Hitler como líder político e figura icónica, assegurando para 
si as funções de fotógrafo oficial “quando o agitador do NSDAP mal parecia digno de registo” (Lambert, 
2006:20). Foi nessa altura que registou os direitos de propriedade e impressão da imagem do Führer e começou 
a fazer fortuna. Este passo estratégico, assegurou-lhe que pudesse cobrar uma comissão por cada fotografia 
publicada de Hitler e em apenas alguns anos, transformou-se em multimilionário. Em 1929, Hoffmann já tinha 
filiais em Berlim, Viena, Frankfurt, Paris e Haia. “O hospedeiro e o parasita satisfaziam as necessidades 
mútuas. Cada um era inestimável para o outro.” (Lambert, 2006:20) 
 
A relação profissional e de amizade entre Hitler e  Hoffmann foi crescendo com o passar dos anos. Segundo 
as memórias de Albert Speer (1970) “Inside the Third Reich”, Hitler frequentava assiduamente a casa dos 
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Hoffmann, onde apreciava a vida familiar, a boa comida caseira, o contacto com as crianças. Era também aí 
que se encontrava muitas vezes com os seus correligionários, Ernst Röhm e Bernhardt Stempfle, que tiveram 
uma influência muito importante na sua filosofia política. 
 
Quando havia bom tempo, o café era servido no jardim dos Hoffmann, Rodeado pelos jardins das outras 
casas, não teria mais de 180 metros quadrados. Hitler tentava resistir ao bolo, mas acabava por aceitar, com 
muitos elogios a Frau Hoffmann, que lhe pusessem uma fatia no prato. Se o sol brilhasse, o Führer poderia 
inclusive tirar o casaco e estender-se na relva, em mangas de camisa. Com os Hoffmann, sentia-se em casa. 
(Speer, 1970:43) 
 
 
 
Quando Hitler subiu ao cargo de Chanceler do Reich em Janeiro de 1933, a fortuna e a carreira de Hoffmann 
foram impulsionadas. Deslocava-se com frequência a Berlim, a Bona e um pouco por todo o lado para 
fotografar ao Führer. Curiosamente, foi no estúdio de fotografia de Hoffmann que Adolf Hitler conheceu a Eva 
Braun, aquela que terá sido a sua mais longa relação e com quem contraiu casamento no bunker, momentos 
antes de cometer suicídio. Eva Braun era ajudante de fotografia de Heinrich Hoffmann e tinha também uma 
paixão pela fotografia e pelo cinema.  
 
Hoffmann era também amigo íntimo de Wilhelm Ohnesorge, que ocupou a posição de Ministro dos Correio 
durante o Terceiro Reich. Devido aos seus conhecimentos sobre royalties de publicação de livros e fotografias, 
Hoffmann ideou com Ohnesorge um sistema pelo qual Hitler recebia um royalty por cada vez que o seu perfil 
fosse impresso num selo. 
A família Hoffmann, para alem da estreita amizade com o Führer, movia-se nos mais altos círculos de 
influência nazi. A filha de Hoffmann, Henny, casou com o líder da Juventude Hitleriana, Baldur von Schirach. 
Em 1938, Hitler distinguiu Hoffmann com o título de “Professor” em respeito ao seu trabalho artístico e 
assessoria de imagem. Foi também Hoffmann que seleccionou as obras de arte que se exibiam nas exposições 
anuais no Haus der Deutschen Kunst em Munique. Em 1940, Hoffmann foi eleito para o Reichstag do distrito 
de Düsseldorf-Leste.  
 
No final da 2ª Grande Guerra, em 1945, a série de fotografias e livros que Heinrich Hoffmann produziu e 
vendeu, tinha-o feito o mais rico e também o mais procurado dos fotógrafos do Terceiro Reich. Com 61 anos, 
foi julgado e condenado a quatro anos de prisão por participação nos lucros de guerra. A empresa editorial 
Max-Schirner-Verlag fundada por Hoffmann detinha os direitos de autor das fotografias e de todas as 
produções onde eram publicadas, desde selos oficiais, livros e postais, que se venderam aos milhares durante a 
década que Hitler esteve no poder. Fez uma verdadeira fortuna com a venda da propaganda Nazi. Em 1947 foi 
julgado no tribunal de Nuremberga e condenado a 10 anos de prisão, dos quais apenas cumpriu metade e foi-
lhe confiscada quase toda a sua fortuna pessoal. Saiu em liberdade em 1950 e continuou a viver em Munique 
onde faleceu com 72 anos, a 16 de Dezembro de 1957. 
 
A sua obra, inclui mais de dois milhões de fotografias de Hitler e grande parte esta guardada atualmente na 
Die Bayeriche Staatsbibliothek (Biblioteca Estatal de Munique). O arquivo fotográfico de Hoffmann contém 
material relacionado com o NSDAP durante a República de Weimar, o Terceiro Reich, a Segunda Guerra 
Mundial e os primeiros anos do pós guerra e está disponível para consulta online. 
 
 
 
Considerações finais 
 
Embora este artigo se tenha centrado na construção do mito e imagem política do Führer através das 
produções fotográficas de Heinrich Hoffmann, importa contextualizar que o seu trabalho, não deixou de ser 
uma pequena peça do grande puzzle que constituiu a maquina de propaganda do Terceiro Reich liderada por 
Joseph Goebbels. Através das diferentes estratégias promovidas pelo ministério de propaganda, a mensagem e 
a imagem manteve-se constantemente nos meios de comunicação impregnando o povo alemão com a visão do 
novo messias germânico, o libertador do povo alemão. 
Sem a estratégia comunicativa e propagandística de Goebbels, Hitler nunca teria chegado ao poder. 
Goebbels que atuou como consultor de comunicação da campanha que ganhou as eleições e que conduziram 
Hitler ao cargo de Chanceler. Uma vez sentado no trono do poder, Hitler, confiou o Ministério Nacional para 
Esclarecimento do Povo e Propaganda ao “Herr Doctor Goebbels”, permitindo-lhe o controlo absoluto de 
todos os media e arte na Alemanha (Roberts, 1956:7). 
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No livro “State of Deception: The Power of Nazi Propaganda”, Bachrach (2009) documenta como entre 
1920 e 1930, o partido Nazi utilizou posters, jornais, fotografias, rádio e o cinema para convencer milhões com 
a sua visão messiânica para uma nova Alemanha. A propaganda reforçava também o medo dos inimigos do 
Estado, os judeus, ciganos e outros grupos étnicos considerados inferiores e aos países que se opunham à 
ideologia nazi. As imagens promoveram a passividade social em relação ao sofrimento de vizinhos 
perseguidos ou enviados a campos de concentração, a aceitação de medidas iminentes contra os judeus, 
ciganos e outros grupos sociais e incitaram pessoas normais a realizar acções de violência.  
 
A força galvanizadora do irracional era a sua arma secreta. O NSDAP estava próximo do cidadão comum e 
possuía uma capacidade inata de discernir e dar corpo aos anseios das massas, ainda que não formulados, 
tanto pessoais como patrióticos, recorrendo à organização de comícios gigantescos onde conseguiam 
hipnotizar os seus membros com a magia negra da oratória de Hitler. Primeiro os sonhos e as emoções; 
depois a razão, o cérebro, as estatísticas, os factos, a política. Ei-los nos filmes de Leni Riefenstahl ou em 
fotografias de propaganda (...) (Lambert, 2006: 95) 
 
O objectivo do Ministério de Goebbels era garantir que os ideais preconizados pelo regime fossem 
transmitidos com sucesso através da arte, da música, do teatro, de filmes, livros, estações de rádio, materiais 
escolares e imprensa. Pretendiam criar uma lealdade política e uma consciência racial, preparar o povo para a 
guerra. A fotografia foi apenas um dos elementos comunicacionais utilizados pela máquina de propaganda. A 
rádio, o cinema, em especial as obras de Fritz Hippler e Leni Riefenstal foram muito importantes na 
disseminação do anti-semitismo racial, da superioridade do poder militar alemão e da essência malévola de 
seus inimigos. A imprensa alemã, em particular, o tufão “Der Stürmer” publicavam caricaturas anti-semitas 
para descrever os judeus.  
Sobre a propaganda, em 1924, Hitler escreveu no Mein Kampf, “É uma arma terrível, se cai nas mãos de 
um especialista”. (Hitler apud Bachrach et al, 2009)  
Lasswell (1927) defendia que a propaganda obedecia a quatro princípios básicos: convocar o ódio contra o 
inimigo por meio de histórias de grande atrocidade; manter a amizade dos aliados; preservar a amizade e 
procurar a cooperação dos que se mantêm neutros; desmoralizar o inimigo. Segundo a análise de Jean-Marie 
Domenach (1950) em “A Propaganda Política”, a propaganda baseava as suas ações e estratégias de 
comunicação politica em onze leis, das quais destacamos: a lei da simplicidade, de forma a que mensagem seja 
recebida e entendida sem esforço, sendo portanto importante o uso de símbolos e de slogans, e a fotografia um 
dos meios mais imediatos e mais simples para comunicar. Pretendia atacar os espíritos das massas pelo seu 
lado mais débil e inesperado utilizando uma forte carga emocional, instigando fobias comuns e tradicionais. 
Domenach ressalta ainda a lei da simpatia, as opiniões e os argumentos, não se combatem com a lógica mas 
sim com imagens que evocam sentimentos. Os veículos de propaganda incluíam assim todos os meios de 
informação que ajudassem na criação de uma aura de poder: eventos culturais, comícios políticos, grupos 
uniformizados, insígnia do partido. 
 
Assim, se Hoffmann foi um grande contribuidor para a formação da imagem de Hitler, Goebbels foi o génio 
comunicador que conseguiu fazer chegar a ideologia nazi de forma efectiva a milhões de alemães. As 
fotografias de Hitler produzidas por Hoffmann tiveram um papel preponderante na construção e fortalecimento 
da imagem do líder. Não obstante das qualidades pessoais de Hitler, Hoffmann teve o talento de conseguir 
transmitir essa aura de magia e misticismo que embriagava multidões. O produto político “Hitler, o sedutor” 
presente nos narrativas míticas de Hoffmann foi o resultado do carisma e personalidade do líder, o trabalho 
estético de Hoffmann e efeito da propaganda do Nacional Socialismo ideada por Goebbels.  
 
 
 
 
Imagens: 
 
Fonte : Bayerische Staatsbibliothek München/Bildarchiv  
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Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to study the English language propaganda of the Organization of Ukrainian 
Nationalists – Ukrainian Insurgent Army (OUN-UPA) in Polish Galicia between 1945 and 1947. I will argue 
that the narratives propagated by the Ukrainian Underground associated with the OUN-UPA were carefully 
crafted to attain moral high ground over its opponents, crafting myths designed to attain legitimacy. 
I will start by analysing the context of the Ukrainian resistance, before, during, and immediately after 
World War 2 (WW2). Then, I will asymmetrically compare the propaganda with current scholarship, focusing 
on how the agents are crafted in these narratives as being provided with intentions. Subsequently, I will 
analyse "discursive black holes"832 - instances where episodes of history are taken as essential and without 
counter-point – by comparing the actions of the OUN-UPA as portrayed by the propaganda under analysis 
with what we know this group did. Not only was this selectivity in terms of episodes remembered and 
forgotten, but it is also apparent in terms of the use of language. Finally, I will focus on the three 
characteristics I find most prominent in these texts: victimhood, resentment and violence. 
The sources analysed are articles from a collection published in Toronto: the Litopys UPA833. These are 
articles from underground periodicals that were published in Ukrainian resistance journals and then translated 
into English by the Ukrainian Underground in Polish Galicia, close to the frontier with the Ukrainian SSR, 
between 1946 and 1947, being then delivered to various western embassies in Warsaw, including the 
American Embassy.  From there, they were taken to the USA and kept in the National Archives until they were 
discovered in 1982834.  One can discern that there was a double audience: the Ukrainian people who read the 
publications in Ukrainian, and the Western Allies who were reading the English translations. Most of them 
were written by Iaroslav Starukh, the leader of the UPA beyond the Curzon Line835. 
 
 
The OUN-UPA: A brief introduction 
 
 The OUN was created in 1929 by Yehven Konovalets, a veteran of WW1. It was mostly active in western 
Ukraine, which was the traditional birth-place of Ukrainian nationalism, in inter-war Poland836. With Poland's 
turn to nationalism in the 1930s, the OUN gathered support, especially among Galician youths. The OUN 
wanted an independent Ukraine, under the principle of self-determination, and they did not attempt to 
cooperate with the already uncooperative Polish government. They used terrorist tactics and subscribed to 
Dontsov’s integral nationalism, an ideology that could be encompassed within the central-European turn to 
fascism during this period. In 1938, Konovalets was killed by a soviet agent and Andriy Mel’nyk, a moderate 
in line with the higher echelons of the movement, became the new leader837. The lower echelons, dominated by 
radical young members from Galicia, were not satisfied and in 1940 organized a secret conclave where they 
chose Stepan Bandera, a radical, to lead. Thus the OUN split into OUN-Mel’nyk (OUN-M) and OUN-Bandera 
(OUN-B)838. 
                                                          
832 Patrick Finney, "On Memory, Identity and War", Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice, 6 (2002), p. 
9. 
833 Petro Potichnyj, ed., Litopys UPA: English Language Publications of the Ukrainian Underground, volume 17 (Toronto: 
Litopys UPA, 1988). 
834  Potichnyj, Litopys UPA, p. 13. 
835  Peter J. Potichnyj and Yevhen Shtendera, ed., Political Thought of the Ukrainian Underground: 1943-1951 (Edmonton: 
Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies – University of Alberta, 1986), p. 404. 
836 Andrew Wilson, The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 127-129. 
837 Wilson, Ukrainians, p. 131; Snyder, Reconstruction, pp. 163-164. 
838 John Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 2nd ed, (Littleton: Ukrainian Academic Press, 1980), pp. 55-58. 
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With the Molotov-Ribbentrop treaty, in 1939, and the division of Poland, western Ukraine became part of 
the Soviet Union. This was the beginning of the process that turned this region into what Timothy Snyder 
came to call the "blood lands". Stalin deported and killed most of the intelligentsia of the region, narrowing the 
political spectrum and leaving the OUN as the only choice for those who wanted to resist839. Soon after, in 
1941, the III Reich invaded the newly acquired soviet territories. This was the "second imposition of 
totalitarian practices in three years", and it would be a "formative"840 one for many Ukrainians: some had 
already been policemen during the first soviet period, and they would become policemen during the Nazi 
occupation. This seems to have been truer for the OUN-B841. By the time of the German occupation, they 
expected a new Ukrainian independent State to be supported, but it soon became clear that it was not going to 
happen. The Germans foiled both attempts to create an independent Ukraine (one by OUN-M, another by 
OUN-B), arrested the members they could, which included both leaders, and deported them to concentration 
camps and/or killed them842.  
While the OUN-M continued to collaborate, forming what became known as the SS-Galizien843, the OUN-
B officially started to resist the Germans. In the meantime, they had also been engaged in struggles against 
other partisan groups, but it would be in 1943, with Stalingrad and the OUN-B congress, that the physical 
conflict would intensify, with the formation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). This military 
organization was mostly composed of OUN-B partisans who were previously in the Nazi police squads, where 
they contributed to the Holocaust844. In that endeavour, these men learned how to perform successful acts of 
ethnic cleansing with logistic efficiency, which would prove fundamental for their actions in 1943 and 1944845. 
In these years, while fighting the Nazis with doubtful effort and efficacy846, they also fought the Soviet 
Partisans, the Red Army and the Polish Home Army (AK). In all likelihood, while collaboration with the Nazis 
was limited and some small independent partisan actions were taken, most efforts were directed at Polish 
civilians. A campaign of ethnic cleansing was unleashed against them in Galicia and Volhynia in order to 
reduce the Polish presence in these regions. The reasoning was that Poland wouldn’t be able to claim these 
territories after the end of the war if they had no Polish people in them. This was made possible by their 
expertise in ethnic cleansing tactics gathered in the police and by their growing numbers. At this time, there 
was such a presence of the UPA in Galicia that they effectively controlled most of the rural territory in the 
region. Around the same time, the AK started a campaign of retribution with comparable cruelty against 
Ukrainian villages in both regions.847 
Despite the integral nationalist ideology, 1943 was the year when the OUN-UPA claimed to shift towards 
democracy and away from authoritarianism, although nationalism remained a constant. It seems somewhat 
contradictory that, in the same congress, the movement decided for democracy and for Polish "eradication"848. 
Finally, after attempting to stop the Red Army unsuccessfully, the OUN-UPA continued to oppose the 
Soviet occupation of western Ukraine after WW2, both behind and beyond the Curzon Line (in the People’s 
Republic of Poland, where the Polish Army was led by Soviet commanders849). It is on this particular region 
that this paper focuses, in western Galicia, where the Polish Army started a campaign to send the Ukrainian 
and Lemko population to the Ukrainian SSR850. The UPA, mainly consisting of ex-members of the OUN-M 
faction who had joined in 1945, resisted this policy however they could. The violence of the Polish 
displacement was comparable to the violence the UPA had unleashed in the same region only 2 years before. 
These operations culminated in operation Vistula (1947), where the remaining population who refused to be 
resettled in the Ukrainian SSR was forcibly dispersed throughout the western margin of the Vistula. 
Disseminated through a vast amount of land, and without the possibility of resisting anymore, the OUN-UPA 
ceased acting beyond the Curzon Line, but would continue inside Soviet Ukraine until the mid-1950s, though 
mostly underground851. 
 
                                                          
839 Snyder, Reconstruction, p. 163-164. 
840 Ibid., p. 159. 
841 Ibid., pp. 156-162. 
842 Ibid., pp. 164-165. 
843 David Marples, Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine (Budapest: Central European 
University Press, 2007), pp. 183-193. 
844 John-Paul Himka, , "The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, the Ukrainian Police, and the Holocaust" (paper 
presented at the Seventh Annual Danyliw Research Seminar on Contemporary Ukraine, 20-22 October 2011). 
845 Snyder, Reconstruction, p. 162. 
846 Alexander Statiev, The Soviet Counterinsurgency in the Western Borderlands (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), p. 116. 
847 Snyder, Reconstruction,  p. 169. 
848 Snyder, Reconstruction, p. 174. 
849 The representatives of the Ukrainian Population living beyond the Curzon Line, "New Lidice", in Litopys UPA, p. 18. 
850 Snyder, Reconstruction, p. 190-193. 
851 Ibid., pp. 195-200. 
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A myth of good and evil 
 
OUN-UPA propaganda was an important point of focus of the Ukrainian Underground. This was as true 
inside of the Ukrainian SSR as it was beyond the Curzon Line. Regardless of where the UPA was acting, their 
style of guerrilla warfare required the support of the population not only for logistical reasons, but also for new 
recruits and for legitimating their own existence. This was the reason why, after Operation Vistula, the UPA 
stopped acting in Poland852. The attaining of popular support was, in large measure, due to propaganda through 
a moral explanation: the good fight: 
 
"[… W]e are not afraid at all of an open discussion, polemic, critique, as well as political fight against 
anybody, for we are persuaded of doubtless righteousness of our point of view, and believe that any honest 
man being acquainted with it must agree with us, here." (my emphasis)853 
 
The way to attain moral high ground was through the deconstruction and rebuilding of the characters 
involved in the recent conflicts. In large measure, this was through the equating of Soviet Bolshevism with 
German Nazism 854 . These were portrayed as oppressors, seeking a "total dictatorship" with "complete 
disregard for the individual". Their "centralist system" was provided with "police terror", "government 
propaganda", "glorifying the person of the dictator", "megalomania", "monopolistic parties", white washing of 
their past crimes, "militarism", "racism" and, above all, "imperialism"855. When comparing the two kinds of 
political systems, they state "that there are identical terrorist methods, identical systems and identical criminals 
- perpetrators of genocide"856. The thickness857 of such concepts as "terrorist", "criminals" or "perpetrators" is 
apparent: there is a strong negative connotation. These are obviously value-laden concepts that portray the 
object of study – Soviet Russia – as a moral evil858. 
Moreover, those responsible are intentionally pursuing and concealing such policies. One of the articles 
produced in Polish Galicia tells us how the hunger of 1947, much like those of 1923 and 1932, was part of the 
nationalities policy859. It is described as "political dryness [sic]"860, and just as before, thick concepts abound, 
not only pertaining to the morality of the situation, but to the intention and personality behind it: 
 
"[... T]he hunger, this the greatest mass murder of millions of men, is a conscious, plan, organized action by 
the bolshevik Muscovy which considers the famine as an instrument and weapon of her imperialist policy 
for enslaving and exterminating the other nations! [sic]" (my emphasis).861 
 
In fact, it is argued that there was no drought. The cereal that was supposed to feed the people was sent to 
foreign countries as propaganda862. This action is made all the more heinous because of where it is perpetrated 
– where cereal was produced:  
 
"Thus, they have cleaned out, sucked up everything, that to-day it is, indeed, dreadful to look at this the 
most fertile, the richest country in whole Europe, where now starve millions of people, where the men eat 
each other! [sic]"863 
 
All of this because the Ukrainian people would not conform to Soviet oppression. This is a clear exposition 
of the dichotomy between civilization and barbarity that is recurrent in east-European propaganda throughout 
the century864. The attribution of agency to a partly fictionalized personality – the "Muskovite Bolsheviks" – 
                                                          
852 Snyder, Reconstruction, p. 200. 
853 Ukrainian Insurgents, "To Brotherly Czech and Slovak Nations", in Litopys UPA, p. 132. 
854 Iaroslav Starukh, "The Spectre of Fascism", in Political Thought, pp. 143-167; This text is also in the Litopys UPA, but 
the translation is better in the aforementioned version. 
855 Starukh, "The Spectre of Fascism", pp. 146-152. 
856 Ibid., p. 156. 
857 Thick concepts are concepts that share descriptive content with a moral evaluation of virtues and vices; Simon Kirchin, 
ed., Thick Concepts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).  
858 For illustration: "Stalin decided to finish [Hitler's] work of Ukrainian displacement that he began with Hitler together"; 
Representatives, "New Lidice", pp. 17. 
859 Iaroslav Starukh, "New Famine Catastrophy in Ukraine", in Litopys UPA, p. 74. 
860 Ibid., p. 73. 
861 Ibid., p. 74. 
862 Ibid., pp. 76-77. 
863 Ibid., p. 78. 
864  In Finney’s argument, the template of good versus evil is WW2, not a larger conception of imperialism, but 
conceptually both cases are very much commensurable; Finney, "On Memory", pp. 1-2. 
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which is the sum of all evils against which the UPA fights – is also a common framework in propaganda865. It 
is an essentialization of the enemy which is attributed with a psychology. This psychology differs greatly from 
the one attributed by modern scholars, who often characterize these developments as rooted in 
miscommunications within the chain of command, not to mention as improvisation in an experiment quite 
different from anything tried before. The case of the nationalities policy is a clear example of this: it is seen by 
Martin and Suny as a case of pragmatism rather than intentional malicious punishment866. 
 
 
 
Remembering and forgetting 
 
The propaganda of the OUN-UPA in Polish Galicia did not only depend on how the issues were framed. It 
also depended on what episodes were propagated and which ones were forgotten. As we have already seen, the 
UPA remembered quite distinctly the episodes of starvation that had happened, along with those still 
happening. However, it cannot be said that these particular tokens of memory distributed regularly throughout 
the past. In fact, 1943 was remembered as the year of the beginning of the struggle, but very little of that 
struggle was talked about. This is what can be called a "discursive black hole": where the recent history is 
somewhat forgotten, but a more distant past is clearly recalled as myth, often even as myth of origin, in order 
to sustain present identity867.  
A very clear case of the use of memory in UPA propaganda was the episode where the Polish Army 
"ruined" the village of Zavadka Morokhivska, in the Carpathians, in 1946. The article published denouncing it 
referred to how "the present Polish army under the command of soviet officers let unfettered an awful 
terrorism against the Ukrainian population"868, describing the gruesome deaths in detail, using the memories of 
those who survived. Cutting limbs, burning people alive, disembowelling, poking eyes, were some of the 
methods used, and were also confirmed by depositions of polish soldiers captured by the UPA, although most 
likely under duress869. 
It is somewhat unremarkable that these methods were used, since, just as the UPA learned many of such 
methods during WW2, so did the Poles forming some of the ranks of the Polish Army after the war. What is 
remarkable is that these very same methods, portrayed in sources as the doing of animals and "sadists", were in 
fact popular during the UPA-led ethnic cleansing of Poles in Galicia and Volhynia. Indeed the narratives from 
Zavadka Morokhivska, aptly called new Lidice in reference to the Czech massacre of 1942, and that of 
Gleboczyca, told by Snyder, where the UPA massacred Poles, are so similar they could be confused with each 
other870. One could speculate that those fighting in the Polish Galician UPA in 1946, being mostly former SS-
Galizien members, were not involved in such atrocities, nor were they aware of them. They were, after all, not 
involved in the Holocaust871. However, the ethnic cleansing was thorough and in the same regions. Much more 
likely is that they either thought that, as collaborators, the Poles deserved it, or that such accounts were 
exaggerated. While many historians nowadays consider the UPA a gruesome partisan army, it is much more 
likely that some members or supporters, being acquainted with such narratives, simply did not believe them 
entirely.  
The following black hole represents another more ominous kind of black hole, which implies white-
washing of history. I speak of the notion of a democratic, freedom-loving OUN-UPA. This is seen through the 
profuse usage of freedom, liberty, democracy, independence (suggesting peaceful coexistence for all peoples), 
throughout the sources. Despite the slogan "Freedom to Peoples, freedom to the individual" 872, the turn 
towards democracy in the 1943 OUN conference was merely a widening of the ideology. Individual liberties 
were stressed, but the ethnic cleansing of Poles was also approved873. Clearly, liberty and democracy applied 
only to ethnic Ukrainians, and not even to all of them, as would be proved by the OUN-UPA actions against 
any Ukrainian who would not support them874. Such terror practices were indeed the reason why they lost 
support later, especially what little support they had in the eastern regions of the Ukrainian SSR875. Integral 
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869 Ibid., p. 18-30.  
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nationalist methods and goals had not left the ideological framework of the resistance movement. Probably, 
democracy was emphasised in propaganda to seek help from the western allies, particularly the USA876. These 
texts were, after all, translated into English to reach them. 
And yet, when speaking of the elections in the USSR, their lack of democratic value and lack of freedom of 
the individual and freedom of the general will to pursue its destiny, not to mention soviet coercion, are 
extremely emphasised: 
 
"Whatever critique, in this system, even if sometimes allowed, is likewise only that official, that 
"organized" one – a part of propaganda delusion. […] The population of the Ukraine having not any 
possibility in any way to manifest its will in elections, manifested it by the boycott of them. […] During all 
that anti-electoral campaign were killed on battle-field in defence of free, independent will of Ukrainian 
people more than five thousand of U.P.A. officers and soldiers as well as leaders of Ukrainian evolutionary, 
free movement. […] the Ukrainian people stood up unanimously for liberty of manifesting their own will. 
[sic]"877 
 
This is also to be seen in a letter to the Czechs and Slovaks, published in 1947, again during the period of 
greatest violence of the OUN-UPA against Ukrainian peasants. The Bolsheviks were "the enemies of any 
national and human freedom"878. The UPA was "against any reaction, against any powers of reactionary 
imperialism, against slavery of nations and man"879. It is explicitly said that the UPA never collaborated with 
the Germans880. Even the killings in Volhynia were exclusively attributed to the Germans in 1943: 
 
"Why, no one may contradict the fact that U.P.A. rose, organized itself and attained its great power just in 
the fight against the Germans! Ask your brethren, the Czech peasants from numerous Czech colonies in 
Volynia who saw our struggles, and they will tell you about the beginnings and growing of the U.P.A."881 
 
As we have already previously learned, this is not true. In Volhynia in 1943 and 1944, the efforts of the 
UPA were primarily directed towards clearing the Polish population so that no territorial claims could be made 
after the war882. As we can see, this actually goes beyond selectivity into re-writing history. A great deal of 
forgetting is present in these accounts. 
 
 
From memory into propaganda 
 
The narratives that are constructed in this collection display three main characteristics which separate them 
from what would otherwise be another instance of chaotic, value-laden, experience-based memory. We have 
the victimization of the Ukrainian nation, narratives that are built on, and propose to develop, a background of 
resentment that is widely felt, and violence, not only because these narratives deal with violent events – a 
struggle – but because they are that struggle, aiming at the changing of hearts and minds, the rallying of the 
Ukrainian population, through the use of powerful, tragic prose.  
 
 
Victimization 
 
Episodes of pain abound in these texts, as does the rhetoric that comes with them. The aforementioned 
article on the ruin of Zavadka Morokhivska might be the most expressive, being based on personal accounts 
and emphasising the suffering of the Ukrainian and Lemko population of the Polish side of Galicia. Another 
good example is the displacement of the Bishop of Peremyshl:  
 
"As part of this martyrology of Ukrainian people are unheard of, barbarian cruelties which is surpassing 
this share of Ukrainian population that remained in the borders of present Polish State, westerly Curzon 
line. [...] With that outrage act were broken once more all the human rights, were trampled all the religious 
and national holiness and human laws. The resembling violence, lawlessness and terrorism acts as another 
                                                          
876 Himka, "The organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army: Unwelcome elements of an 
Identity Project", Ab Imperio, 4 (2010), p. 92. 
877 Iaroslav Starukh, "Elections in U.S.S.R.", in Litopys UPA, pp. 44, 45, 49, 50-52. 
878 Ukrainian Insurgents, "To Brotherly Czech", p. 132. 
879 Ibid., p. 140. 
880 Ibid., pp. 144-145. 
881 Ibid., p. 152. 
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many times worse, are being perpetrated over the Ukrainian people, as well as over the other, by 
bloodthirsty Muscovite-bolshevist terrorism enslaved peoples, allwhere reaches its power. [sic]"883 
 
"Martyrology" should read martyrdom, but it is a fortunate mistake in that martyrology highlights the logic 
of martyrs in discourse. It is the likelihood that this is not merely a naïve concept that makes it so identifiable 
with propaganda. Another instance that indicates the all-pervasiveness of martyrdom is the assertion that 
"[Ukrainians] know the best the lot of a slave"884. That this is in the text that introduces a nationalist resistance 
movement to another nation (Czechoslovakia) is quite revealing of its identity value. 
This is further justified by the awareness of such rhetorical techniques evidenced in other texts from the 
Ukrainian SSR. Poltava, writing about the justification of the necessity of an Ukrainian national state, analyses 
in depth the myths that would allow the bourgeois to rally the masses throughout the 19th century. He further 
connects that sort of reasoning to the myth of the lack of German lebensraum as an abuse of the concept of the 
nation against its own interests885. This article, together with other articles from the same collection886, serves 
as proof that the OUN was not merely a group of bandits in the Ukraine, but a sophisticated resistance group 
with knowledge of and considerable dominion over the notion and techniques of propaganda. 
 
 
Resentment 
 
Resentment is usually the consequence of a history of victimhood. It can only develop without a counter-
punctual reading of history887. In the Ukrainian-Polish/Russian case, there are plenty of reasons that can 
generate resentment provided that there is a selective use of history. Right after the Ukrainians tried twice to 
form an independent republic after WW1, the territory was divided by the Poles and the Russians. While this is 
not often explicitly stated, Poltava writes about it in his ideological paper about the Ukrainian nationality and 
the necessity of independence: "The concept of an independent Ukraine is also a response to the bitter 
historical experience of the Ukrainian people"888. The Nazis also profited from driving Poles and Ukrainians 
against each-other, which undoubtedly rehashed resentments from the interwar period. Finally, the resistance 
movements in the blood lands generally killed many more civilians than military targets. This was as true for 
the UPA as it was for the AK and for red partisans889, not to mention other units dressed as either Polish or 
Ukrainian precisely in order to incite to violence890. 
But resentment has deeper roots in these texts. It is not simply that these texts are partial, using silences as 
well as outcries. They also aim at a narrower view of events. The systematic use of metonymy - the trope of 
language whereby a whole is summed up in an essential part - is overwhelming as a method of explanation in 
these texts. It is not just the characterization in terms of victims and perpetrators: elections are explained 
through a reduction to a "propaganda campaign"891; hunger is reduced to political act892; communism is 
reduced to fascism893. If we add that explanation often rests on causal relations, we have an almost clear-cut 
example of tragic emplotment of the past894. Through such a prism, it becomes easier to understand how such 
explanations are more conducive to narrowed perspectives: after all, either hunger is political (and intentional) 
or it is accidental. By arguing it was not accidental, the propagandists are actually arguing for an intention to 
harm, and thus writing a tragedy - an account of inevitable conflict. Resentment can then be seen as a 
consequence of a "squinting" point of view - that a people is either victim or perpetrator. A certain brutality is 
inherent in these tragic plots. 
 
                                                          
883 The representatives of the Ukrainian Population living beyond the Curzon Line, "The Displacement of his excellency 
Bishop Josaphat Kotsylovsky and Ukrainian Catholic clergy of Peremyshl", in Litopys UPA, pp. 31, 36. 
884 Ukrainian Insurgents, "To Brotherly Czech", p. 136. 
885 P. Poltava, "The Concept of an Independent Ukraine and current political trends in the World", in Political Thought, pp. 
182-188. 
886 Potichnyj, Political Thought, pp. 119-225. 
887 This can be clearly seen in the Polish case, where resentment towards other European nations is often accompanied with 
the exclusive focus on the victim’s account of a country that was divided and occupied multiple times against its will; 
Marc Ferro, Resentment in History (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), pp. 74-76. 
888 Poltava, "Independent Ukraine", p. 175. 
889 Statiev, Soviet Counterinsurgency, p. 125. 
890 Jeffrey Burds, "Agentura: Soviet Informants’ Networks & the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia, 1944-1948", East 
European Politics and Societies, 11:89 (1996), p. 96. 
891 Starukh, "Elections in U.S.S.R.", p. 44. 
892 Idem, "Famine". 
893 Idem, "Spectre of Fascism". 
894 Using Hayden White's theory of tropes and his notion of modes of emplotment; vide Hayden White, Metahistory: The 
Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973). 
 292 
Violence 
 
The violence used in these texts is not simply in their describing violent affairs, but in portraying an 
unavoidable conflict. This can be seen, first of all, in the type of thick concepts that are used. They are not 
marginally negative or positive: they are tremendously powerful: "awful terrorism", "ruthless expelling of all 
Ukrainians", martyrdom, "Tens of years of heroical tradition [sic]", just to mention a few, both negative and 
positive895. 
More importantly, these accounts turn suffering into moral and political capital, even when the suffering 
was partly caused by those publicizing it. Because these men struggle as they do, virtuously, they deserve self-
determination. Because they are so heroic, they deserve to lead their nation. No doubt this influenced many to 
join their ranks, if the otherwise widespread brutality hadn’t done so already, and as for those that didn’t 
support their cause, they were traitors and were abused, often being killed896. This supports the notion that 
organized violence is narrative building and narrative building becomes organized violence. Tragedies are 
stories of conflict, and conflict isn't just told: it is lived. 
These narratives, being as violent and powerful as they are, were an important part of the process of 
identity formation in the Ukraine, particularly in the west, where the UPA was most supported and active. 
Despite claims by authors such as Himka that the UPA was not and is not representative of the Ukrainian 
people897, it must be acknowledged that they had a profound effect that is still divisive decades after898. These 
are not merely descriptive texts, they are inscriptive, perhaps as much as the atrocities committed in this 
period. 
 
Conclusion: 
 
This paper shows how the propaganda of the OUN-UPA beyond the Curzon Line in the post-war period 
aimed at attaining a moral high ground that would justify their continuing the struggle against communism, 
towards independence. This was attained through the deconstruction and rebuilding of the participants in this 
conflict, making convenient characters in a myth of good versus evil. Essentialism and attribution of intentions 
were paramount in this exercise. Without them, tragedy would not be evident. This implied a great deal of 
selectivity in telling the story of this struggle, which resulted in a set of narratives based on the victimhood of 
the Ukrainian nation, supporting its resentment and acting as an agent of violence within an already violent 
environment.  
This amounts to a radical form of "othering" with a teleology. The "us versus them" logic pervades the 
propaganda towards the continuation of a war under the guise of resistance to it. In order to do that, it was 
understood that a nation willing to fight for its existence was necessary, and the making of such a body implied 
the tearing apart of another: the Ukraine that would accept communism. Destruction was a form of building. 
Despite the rhetoric about the natural necessity that was the ethnic nation, neither memory nor identity were 
entirely regarded as natural facts. 
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Abstract 
 
At the end of World War II, the new world order was conditioned by the creation of two opposing geopolitical 
and defence blocks that confronted each other in the so-called Cold War. The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) was created in 1949 in opposition to the Soviet sphere of influence in order to secure the 
defence of Western Europe in alliance with Canada and the United States of America. 
At the beginning of this new war, which was often experienced in a non-explicit way, propaganda mechanisms 
served to construct the idea of the Atlantic Community founded on four main pillars: liberty, democracy, 
development and defence. Cinema and television were important media in spreading the message of Western 
military cohesion in association with the Marshall Plan, bringing new patterns and language codes for national 
development according to North America. 
The Atlantic Community documentary series, produced for NATO during the 1950s, dedicates one episode to 
each country member of the Alliance. The series strongly reflects Western European reconstruction efforts 
under the Pax Americana rule, an attempt to amalgamate nations that sometimes had very different and 
antagonistic origins and historical trajectories. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The nature of the globalized images capable of summarizing and explaining the world underwent 
significant changes during the second half of the twentieth century.899 With the end of the Second World War, 
Hollywood asserted its supreme position in international film production and distribution to Western countries 
as a result of a concerted policy reflecting North American hegemony over one of the two parts of the world 
divided by the Cold War. During the 1950s, the reputation of each country was forged by the US on all levels 
and in all cinematic genres and sub-genres. Whether historical or espionage, educational or entertainment 
films, or even large-scale Disney productions, many of these productions transmitted visions of the world – 
and certain countries in particular – that conformed to a North American perspective. Many of them were 
based on the system of film stars, who left off fighting the forces of the Axis (Trumpbour 2002: 78; Mateus 
2010), in order to take up the fight in the postwar period against the Communist ideologies of the other side of 
the world (May 2000: 175). These images were the result of a long tradition of stereotypes, preconceived ideas 
that frequently depended on the ethnic background of the filmmakers, many of whom were immigrants or 
came from families that had emigrated (Fraser 1988). This process clearly began before the Second World War 
with the association Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America (MPPDA) (Vasey 1997) and was 
closely linked with US foreign policy during the Cold War. 
The present study is an analysis of this cinematic construction of the world, focusing on a series of 
documentaries produced in the 1950s by NATO. The Atlantic Community comprises 15 episodes, each of 
which is dedicated to one of the countries that formed part of the Alliance at the time. Having first reflected on 
the social and political context in which the series was created and produced, this study then attempts to 
                                                          
899 An initial version of this text was presented at the 3rd International History and Film Conference (III Congreso 
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identify some of the main patterns employed in creating these documentaries, which are worthy of a 
comparative analysis. 
 
 
2. Context and analysis criteria 
 
In the years immediately following the Second World War, the new map of Europe was constructed based 
on a series of military and economic initiatives undertaken on each side of the two geopolitical blocks 
constituted by the United States of America and the Soviet Union. 
This new world order based on a military and ideological definition of Atlanticism was founded on a 
succession of treaties, programmes and new institutions (Moreira 2001: 52-58). The formation of a trade and 
defence union in the countries occupied in part by the United States soon became a priority. Following the first 
treaty on mutual support between France and the United Kingdom (Dunkirk, 4 March 1947), the European 
Recovery Program was launched in Washington (Harvard, 5 July 1947). This programme was previously 
“offered”, according to US conditions, to all European countries but was eventually rejected by Molotov in the 
name of countries under the influence of the Soviet Union during the Paris talks of the summer of that year 
(Gilbert 2009: 937-938). The programme adopted the title of the Marshall Plan and was finally approved in 
Congress in Washington during the following year, based on the administration of a first lot of annual credits 
to be applied until 1952 (Droz, Rowley 1988: 192-193). 
The dissemination of the Marshall Plan was founded on a solid production of more than 200 documentaries 
dedicated to informing the public on how the funds were used in various reconstruction and development 
projects, as well as providing scientific knowledge and general information.900 Of the series produced by the 
Marshall Plan Motion Picture Section in Paris (Selling 2011) we can highlight The Marshall Plan at Work in… 
(1950) with episodes each dedicated to one of the 13 countries where the Plan was to be implemented; 
Changing the Face of Europe (1951), comprising 6 episodes translated into 13 languages and distributed in 18 
countries, and Strength for the Free World (1952), made up of 24 episodes targeted at North American 
audiences (Marshall 2011). 
 
 
Figura 1. Poster featuring the flags of the countries assisted by the Marshall Plan (1950-1951). 
 
It is in this context, in an attempt to reproduce and build on the synergistic propaganda achieved in the 
dissemination of the Marshall Plan, in which the series The Atlantic Community – Know your Allies should be 
understood, as part of other informative and training materials produced for NATO. In fact, featuring in the 
scant technical records available for each of the episodes it is possible to find directors such as Vittorio Gallo 
and Ytsen Brusse, and even the photography director Francesco Vitrotti, who had already produced a large 
number of documentaries for the Marshall Plan. 
                                                          
900 For a more precise idea of the use of cinema as a propaganda tool in Portugal, see “The extraordinary adventure of a 
quart of milk” (Rollo, 2007: 596-598). 
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The NATO documentaries correspond to a strengthening of defence propaganda in relation to the economic 
component of the organization. The Marshall Plan documentaries were first produced in the sphere of the 
Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) which was replaced at the end of 1951 by the Mutual Security 
Agency (MSA). This is also why the series reflects the gradually increasing concern with defence at the 
expense of a first phase in which economic support and food aid had an equally important role. 
 
The series The Atlantic Community dedicated each of its episodes to one of the 15 members that made up 
the Alliance before the admission of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955. Despite the fact that we only 
know the production date of the documentary on Canada (1956), it can be supposed that the series as a whole 
was produced between 1953 and 1957. The period corresponds to the first years of activity of the Committee 
on Information and Cultural Relations (CICR) formed in 1953 as a successor to the Working Group on 
Information and Cultural Cooperation (1952-53), in collaboration with the Nato Information Service (NATIS) 
and NATO Secretariat (NATO 2011). The documentaries do not refer to the Treaty of Paris 1957 that founded 
the European Economic Community (EEC), let alone the withdrawal of the French Mediterranean Fleet in 
1959, although some of the documentaries do mention the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
established in 1951. 
 
The CICR was not only responsible for the identification of activities adapted to cultural cooperation 
between the organization’s member countries but also for the definition of the messages to be transmitted to 
the different countries and the methods to be employed in each situation (Milloy 2006: 90). Despite the fact 
that the information programme was allocated a much lower percentage of NATO’s total operating value (in 
1955 the information budget was US$300,000 while the defence budget was US$50 billion [Milloy 2006: 91]), 
the production of this kind of materials was associated with a comprehensive offer of various products linked 
to dissemination, military training and the training of civilian teams (Ismay, 1954). They included youth 
exchange programmes, grants and scholarships, dissemination activities undertaken in collaboration with the 
press, and the publication of the illustrated book Atlantic Alliance in all Community languages, with an initial 
250,000 copies destined for schools and travelling exhibitions in the sphere of non-military cooperation, 
including the so-called Caravan of Peace exhibition which was visited by 3 million people in Italy, Greece and 
Turkey and toured the capitals of the French provinces between 1953 and 1954 (in Rennes in May 1954 it had 
reached 1 million visitors, while a reduced version visited Portugal in the autumn of 1954). This was followed 
by other exhibitions up until the 1960s (Risso 2011). The exhibition programme comprised two main sections. 
The first was dedicated to the so-called “NATO theme”, and explained, by means of maps, photographs and 15 
and 35 mm films, the importance of the peace and freedom defended by NATO as an “Answer to the Threat” 
caused by the “acts of Soviet aggression between 1945 and 1950” (NATO 1954). The second part, dedicated to 
the “national theme”, aimed to explain the contribution and position of the host country receiving the 
exhibition in relation to the Alliance as a whole. 
 
The true number of viewers that saw the series The Atlantic Community is not known, but it very probably 
included the visitors to the travelling exhibitions, the military staff and civilians who had attended the many 
training activities held, “information officers” and many audiences at education centres (Gheciu 2005: 57-58). 
The series also contained messages of two different types: the first concerned the general context and 
propaganda of the organization, while the second were related to the specific characteristics of each country.  
 
 
3. A comparative analysis 
 
Despite being produced by different directors and dealing with a range of countries, the various episodes 
were structured around a similar format, meaning that they are easily identifiable as belonging to the same 
series. The generic opening sequence consists in the projection of the name of each of the fifteen countries 
superimposed on the image of their respective flags in alphabetic order in English: Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. The sequence of images and flags fluttering in the 
wind, accompanied by a military march both vibrant and soothing by turns, is always followed by the NATO 
flag and the words “NATO presents a New Film Series The Atlantic Community”, with the 15 flags as a 
backdrop. The title “Introducing…” followed by the name of the country opens the narration of each episode, 
voiced off-screen by Robert Beatty (1909-92) in the case of the majority of countries, excepting France and 
Germany. The same voice, one that was well known to BBC radio listeners, marks the common identity of all 
the various episodes in the documentary series. 
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The presentation of each country also follows a particular pattern. In general, the episodes start by 
exploring some aspects of the history and culture of the country in question, accompanied by maps showing 
the strategic position of each one. Then, some specific features of the country’s agriculture and industry are 
described. Subsequently, democracy and education are also covered before the episodes end with messages 
about the country’s contribution to the defence capacity of the Alliance as a whole. This order is a general 
trend although it is not strictly adhered to in all cases. Often, cultural aspects are also referred to in the middle 
of the narration, and images of progress are alternated with others related to military defence measures. Each 
episode ends with a “filmic metaphor” which aims to leave viewers with a constructive message summing up 
the intrinsic character of each people and its contribution to a possible if necessary joint response from the 
heart of the organization. 
 
 
Figura 2. The flags shown during the opening sequence of the series The Atlantic Community, © Nato Channel TV 2011. 
 
 
3.1. Common traditions and historical experiences 
 
The documentaries refer to the golden moments of the history of each of the European countries, as well as 
to their military capability and the historical defence of their territory. Clichés are presented from their glorious 
pasts as warriors (the Scandinavian countries), explorers (Portugal) or artists (France). Italy, Greece and 
Turkey are presented as the descendents of millennia-old civilizations. Greece is portrayed as having 
contributed philosophy, France the modern concept of democracy, and the United Kingdom “a complex social 
adventure”. The images show the numerous museums, art cities and rich cultural heritage that evidence their 
contribution to Western culture. 
While every European country is distinguished for one historical or cultural aspect or another, the United 
States and Canada are portrayed as nations aware of the “historical debt” they owe to their European cultural 
origins. In the documentary on Canada, the narrative claims that the country is a “North American nation”: 
“Though Canadians wouldn’t thank you to be confused with their neighbours, their understanding of American 
ways is as friends and relatives instead of strangers”. Nevertheless, the narrator states, “Their motto is je me 
souviens ("I remember")”. 
The United States of America are also presented as a country constructed with the efforts of all European 
peoples. In the US episode, the 13 European countries are all mentioned, completing the phrase: “To this land 
they have been coming for over 300 years: peoples of Europe […] They and their descendents came into 
wilderness and created one nation, the United States of America”. 
Beyond the establishment of an “area comprised culturally of the Greek, Roman and Judeo-Christian 
legacy” (Moreira 2011: 52), the portrayal of the countries of the Alliance is always accompanied by maps that 
more efficiently explain their geostrategic location and position in relation to the Allies and Soviet countries in 
a schematic way. In this context, the main messages can be summed up as follows: the Canadian territories of 
the Arctic form an important flank of the Atlantic Community; Belgium is situated at the crossroads of the 
European territory; Denmark surveys the Baltic Sea; France is a world power with territories in the South 
Pacific and Equatorial Africa; Germany is divided by the Iron Curtain; Greece has borders with hostile 
countries (Albania and Romania); Luxembourg is the only NATO country not to have a coastline; Norway has 
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a border with Russia; Portugal’s Archipelago of the Azores has a strategic position in the Atlantic Ocean; 
Great Britain is a European and world power; and Turkey controls the Bosphorus, between Asia, Russia, the 
Middle East and Africa. The map of the United States and Canada clearly shows their territorial superiority in 
contrast with the other 13 countries of the Alliance. 
 
 
Figura 3. Millennia-old heritage and modernity in Istanbul, © NATO Channel TV 2011. 
 
 
3.2. Development, present needs and economic cooperation 
 
In the previous chapter we have seen how each country distinguished itself in an equal measure in the 
constitution of the Atlantic Community. This equal contribution ends when it comes to the level of economic 
development. In a similar way to the messages put out by the Marshall Plan, each country is subjected to an 
implicit selection and classification process in line with North American standards. The enduring image that 
can be taken away from a viewing of the whole series is that of a breach between the countries of North and 
South. This division is between countries essentially based on agricultural suffering from considerable 
backwardness, and those where agriculture and industry had been experiencing significant growth. Despite the 
fact that images of agricultural mechanization are used in the depiction of all of the countries, in the case of 
some nations these images are not as common as those showing carts pulled by horses or cattle. This is the 
case of southern Italy, Portugal and Greece. In fact, Italy is treated as a two-speed country, made up of the 
agrarian, backward south and the industrialized, developed north, the result of the country’s recent constitution 
from various kingdoms. The documentary on Greece states that “Until new factories can be established using 
her power sources, much of Greece must remain a farm and a mule economy”. Paradoxically, in the episode 
dedicated to Turkey there are numerous images of tractors, harvesters and enormous silos that contribute to 
mitigating the image of a “mule economy”. 
All countries are shown to have constructed new reservoirs, roads and collective living complexes. 
Nevertheless, the countries of the North occupy high positions in the global rankings of agricultural 
production, mining and industry. The documentaries point out that six of these countries (France, Germany, 
Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) belong to the European Coal and Steel Community (CECA) 
created in 1951. As is pointed out in the episode on the Netherlands, of these six countries three – Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg – form the “Benelux Union, this idea of economic cooperation as the model for 
an Atlantic Community in which trade and travel should be free of national restrictions”. 
Belgium is notable for its naval repair shipyards and its mines in the Congo, which made it Europe’s largest 
copper manufacturer. Canada is highlighted for its colossal mining resources, important stock exchange, large-
scale engineering projects, nuclear research and labour unions which “are built in the American pattern”. The 
pharmaceutical industry and efficient meat and dairy production are Denmark’s distinguishing features. The 
French, apart from their vast industrial capabilities, are hailed as having the fastest trains in the world. 
Germany is noted for the power and reconstruction force of the Ruhr valley; Iceland has an important fishing 
industry; Luxembourg is noted for its steel industry and Norway for its aluminium, zinc, nickel and coal 
industries. Northern Italy produces the best cars and excellent fighter planes. The Dutch are noted as having 
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the enormous ports of Rotterdam and Amsterdam, as well as for their planning capacity. The United Kingdom 
is noted for its coal and nuclear power plants, production, sale, manufacture and export to the rest of the world. 
The documentaries tell viewers that USA provides the economic model for the Atlantic Community as a 
whole, as well as the Marshall Plan: “They send food, supplies and machinery in a national effort to help world 
recovery”. 
In contrast, in the South images of age-old agricultural practices are accompanied by a reference to Portugal as 
the world’s greatest producer of cork and its importance as a wine and oil producing country. Greece possesses 
the world’s third largest merchant fleet, but its roads are made of beaten earth. In Southern Italy, young people 
gripping the railings that prevent them from reaching the docks dream of emigrating to the US. In Turkey, a 
soldier trained in the army to repair war tanks repairs tractors following his return to civilian life. 
 
 
Figura 4. In Southern Italy, young people see the boats and dream of emigrating to the USA, 
 © NATO Channel TV 2011. 
 
Scientific research and social security for the elderly and children are also considered development and 
education criteria, referred to in particular in the case of the countries of Northern Europe. Finally, female 
emancipation is referred to in the episode on Turkey, where women who do not wear the veil are doctors, 
teachers and bankers, discussing financial contracts with their male counterparts as equals. 
 
 
3.3. Personal liberty through Democracy 
 
In relation to the portrayal of conditions of democracy and freedom, it is possible to identify clear 
differences between the countries, which can be divided into three types: constitutional monarchies, full 
democratic republics and republics with democratic potential. 
Constitutional monarchies such as Canada are depicted through their ruling crown, generally filmed during the 
parliamentary opening ceremonies – or in the case of Greece, in uniform and in a vigilant pose. Presented as 
the symbol of a nation as a whole, the monarch is the guarantee of a democratic state along with the 
constitution. In this group, the reference model is that of Queen Elizabeth II of the United Kingdom. 
According to the narration, “They guide their people on the path of dignity and independence. The 
colonization era is over […] What was once an empire has become a community where both freedom of 
speech and blood ties coexist […] The Queen is the leader”901. 
The group of democratic republics comprises the USA and Northern European countries. The image of New 
York is linked to its status as the home of the United Nations, while France provides one of the European 
models as the embodiment of European republican feeling: “I do not agree with what you’re saying but I will 
defend to the death your right to say it. This is the credo of France”. 
                                                          
901 “Ils guident ses peuples sur le chemin de la dignité et de l’indépendance. L’époque de la colonisation est révolue […] ce 
qui était un empire est devenue une communauté où existe au même temps la liberté de parole et le lien du sang […] la 
reine en est le chef”. Our translation. 
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Finally, democracies as yet not fully established are diplomatically portrayed as the necessary result of 
their own history and a guarantee of economic stability. The documentary on Portugal shows an image of 
Salazar voting, most likely in the National Assembly elections of 8 November 1953, introducing him as “the 
man who in 1928 began to steer his country towards its present stable economy”. Turkey’s economic growth is 
attributed to the reforms initiated by Kamal Ataturk (referenced in the image of the changing of the guard next 
to his mausoleum in Ankara) and continued in the multi-party system that brought about the change of party in 
government following 30 years in power. In Italy, images depicting the differences between an insignificant 
meeting in the rural south and a crowded demonstration in Milan, in the north, speak volumes. 
Finally, special reference must be made to the case of Germany. As in the case of Italy, which had also 
formed part of the Axis forces, the fact that Germany lost the war is never mentioned. Using the ruins of the 
Reichstag as a backdrop and accompanied by some tragic music, viewers are reminded that “This was where 
the first German republic came to a tragic end in 1933 after being weakened by repeated political and 
economic crises and finally brutally overwhelmed by a totalitarian party”902. 
 
 
Figura 5. Salazar voting in Lisbon in 1953, © NATO Channel TV 2011. 
 
 
3.4. Peace, the cause worth fighting for 
 
The main military message reiterated in different forms throughout the series is that of the need to invest in 
a vigilant defence as a priority, the only way of securing and guaranteeing peace. In this sense, once more an 
apparent equality is defended in the films. All the countries are depicted as being useful, indispensable, and it 
is suggested that all military means that the countries have at their disposal should be accepted. 
Nevertheless, the images shown have the power to fix the hierarchy of each country’s military and naval 
capacities in the minds of viewers. In the case of the great powers of the USA, United Kingdom and France, 
the differences between the countries are less evident. NATO’s European headquarters were still located in the 
Chaillot Palace in Paris. However, the USA is the only country able to show an image of the first nuclear-
powered submarine, the only one of its kind in the world. 
The warring capacities of the countries of the North are cited in the form of Belgian munitions factories, 
joint airbases in Germany, the inexistence of armed forces in Iceland, and the denomination of Luxembourg as 
the “Gibraltar of the North” due to its “military preparedness”. 
An emphasis is placed on the aeronautical production and “mechanical skill” of the Italians, while audiences 
are reminded that “as one that has suffered from war as much as most, the Italian solider knows too well that 
peace is well worth striking for”. With regard to Portugal, the series underlines the “small but efficient 
Portuguese navy”. In the case of Turkey and Greece, images of cavalry troops are interspersed with others 
depicting modern tanks. 
                                                          
902 “C’est ici que la première république allemande eut un fin tragique en 1933 déjà affaiblie par des crises politiques et 
économiques répétées et finalement terrassée brutalement par un partis totalitaire”. Our translation. 
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Figura 6. The Nautilus atomic submarine, © NATO Channel TV 2011. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Understanding the context in which these documentary films, responsible for the creation of globalized 
film images of the world, were designed and produced is an essential research activity which should be carried 
out in depth. The association of each country with particular historical figures or events, ethnic or religious 
characteristics, agricultural or industrial production and – very often – with a specific level of development on 
a scale defined implicitly in relation to the USA, was consolidated or reconstructed in line with the strategic 
interests of the time throughout the twentieth century. 
The NATO series The Atlantic Community is particularly illuminating in this research field, in contrast to 
other works produced by the Marshall Plan. Apart from summarizing historical and economic characteristics, 
the series also manages to present an overview of the democratic and defence priorities of the 15 countries that 
made up the Atlantic Alliance in the 1950s. 
Based on this initial analysis, we can conclude that this set of documentaries provides a snapshot of the 
existing power relationships in Europe at the time, while also expressing the reputation of each country 
according to North American standards. 
It is also interesting to note that the majority of stereotypes set out in these North American productions are 
the result of pre-existing, preconceived ideas, many of which still persist today on a global level. Among these 
we can find the distinction between the countries of North and South, and between highly industrialized and 
peripheral countries. These distinctions are not overtly stated, since the tone of the messages that these 
historical documents aimed to transmit were above all linked to equality of rights and opportunities in a 
politically correct discourse which is repeated in our times. 
The series The Atlantic Community is clear evidence of the desire to construct a European Community in 
which products and labour might freely circulate as a means of reconstructing a Europe partially destroyed by 
war. Fifteen countries are presented within a script of freedom and defence, democracy and development at the 
service of NATO’s political strategy, which aimed to demonstrate that Atlanticism was the only road to a 
united defence that would guarantee peace. It is an exercise in propaganda characterized by a North American 
vision of the world – and, therefore, of Europe – which Europe has not ceased to adopt as its own ever since. 
 
 
 
Sources 
The following websites have been consulted where the documentaries which form the main source of this study are 
available: 
http://www.nato.int/ebookshop/video/declassified/#/en/sources 
http://www.natochannel.tv/ 
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From 'oriental quarrel' to 'bloody vengeance!'; British newsreels 
and war in the Far East, 1937-1942 
 
Ian Kikuchi, 
Imperial War Museu and Queen Mary university of Lodon 
 
This paper explores the ways in which three British newsreels represented warfare in east and south-east 
Asia between 1937 and 1942. More specifically, it examines the representation of three particular phases; the 
Japanese assault on Shanghai in 1937 during the early stages of the Sino-Japanese War, the opening of 
hostilities between Japan and Britain in December 1941, and the collapse of the British colony of Singapore in 
February 1942. It examines the coverage of Pathe Gazette, Gaumont British News and British Movietone 
News, and considers both the newsreels' use of imagery and the tone and interpretation of their commentators. 
It considers differences and similarities in the coverage of these newsreels, and to what degree these changed 
in response to wartime pressures such as the censorship of the Ministry of Information. Similarly, it considers 
how these wartime pressures, obliging the newsreels to become a form of government-approved propaganda, 
conflicted with the newsreels' pre-war function as successful purveyors of highly stylised topical 
entertainment. This paper emphasises that the newsreel, as an entertainment medium, was fundamentally ill-
suited to the reporting of the humiliating military-political catastrophes that followed the outbreak of war with 
Japan. This paper hopes to offer significant insights into the way in which a major phase of the Second World 
War was depicted in cinemas.  
The study of newsreels has benefitted from, in recent decades, increased academic interest and widened 
access via new technology. The British Universities Film and Video Council's (BUFVC) News on Screen 
database allows the records of newsreel content to be searched, and access to some primary documents such as 
commentary scripts and shotlists.903 The newsreels themselves were shot, produced and distributed on 35mm 
black and white film, and continue to be available on film in the major national film archives or via the 
commercial footage libraries that now own and sell newsreel footage. The newsreel content discussed in this 
essay was first identified via the News on Screen database,904 the individual issues or stories viewed via the 
internet, and then transcribed and annotated. This paper examines Pathe, Gaumont and Movietone partly for 
reasons of accessibility and also to limit the source material to a manageable quantity. The annotated stories 
and commentaries were then compared as a basis for analysis. This analysis focuses on a qualitative analysis of 
visual and verbal content; it has not attempted any kind of statistical analysis. 
The Sino-Japanese War broke out following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on 7 July 1937. The war 
presented serious problems for Britain. Unable and disinclined to use force, Britain sought to protect its 
strategically and financially important outposts in China by diplomacy. Britain's domestic media were 
repeatedly antagonised by events including the machine-gunning of the British ambassador's car by Japanese 
aircraft on 24 August and the shelling of a Royal Navy gunboat on the Yangtze in December. Within the 
newsreels' coverage of the Sino-Japanese War, a recurrent theme is the importance of spectacle and 
spectatorship, with an evident belief that the newsreels possessed an educative, anti-war power. Gaumont and 
Movietone explicitly emphasise witnessing, even if the conflict itself was thought incomprehensible; Gaumont 
proffered one story 'so that you may see, even if you cannot guess, what this war means'.905 The camera's 
supposed truthfulness was used to bolster claims of veracity; Pathe's coverage 'truly reported' the war,906 while 
Movietone's captured 'the vivid truth of an eyewitness'. 907 In another case Movietone claimed its footage 
should 'stimulate reflection'908 and its commentary tended towards the pseudo-philosophical; 'in the midst of 
                                                          
903 See www.bufvc.ac.uk/newsonscreen Accessed 13 November 2013 
904 For sake of consistency, newsreel stories are cited by reference to the BUFVC, which is freely accessible and links to 
rights holders' content that may require a log-in.  The newsreels referred to include Pathe Super Sound Gazette, later 
renamed Pathe Gazette (hereafter PSSG/PG), Gaumont British News (GBN) and British Movietone News (BMN). All 
BUFVC links were accessed on 13 November 2013. 
905 GBN (27 September 1937) http://bufvc.ac.uk/newsonscreen/search/index.php/story/56686 
906 PSSG (20 September 1937) http://bufvc.ac.uk/newsonscreen/search/index.php/story/95171  
907 BMN  (13 September 1937) http://bufvc.ac.uk/newsonscreen/search/index.php/story/7986 
908 BMN (14 October 1937) http://bufvc.ac.uk/newsonscreen/search/index.php/story/8104 
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the wreckage our camera captures a child...Is it for... the child, or to desolation that our civilised world 
progresses?'909 This attitude also reflected a wider sense that the Sino-Japanese War represented a barbarous 
affront to civilised modernity; Pathe asked rhetorically: 'need I remind you once again that this is civilisation's 
twentieth century?'910 Some of this coverage had considerable impact; footage of the bombing of Shanghai was 
cited in the House of Commons as evidence of 'all the horrors and brutalities which surround bombing from 
the air' that 'turned [audiences] sick with horror'.911 
The counterpart to this use of spectacle as education or warning, is the clear use of spectacle as sensation; 
historian Nicholas Pronay has suggested that these images had 'considerable pulling power', drawing audiences 
to cinemas. 912  Both story titles and commentaries encouraged audiences to enjoy shocking images as 
excitement; Gaumont trumpeted its 'sensational pictures' of a Japanese bombing raid,913 and later titled a story 
as the 'most amazing machine-gun battle ever filmed'.914 Pathe urged its viewers to 'watch close...you can 
actually see the bombs twisting down!'915 and Movietone claimed a scoop with 'these first authentic pictures, 
the actual scene in Shanghai'.916 The editors appear not to have seen any contradiction between education and 
entertainment; Gaumont commented ironically on 'this year of grace 1937' in the same story that it crowed 
over 'sensational pictures'. Adding an extra layer of excitement, commentators hailed the cameraman as a 
swashbuckling derring-doer; '[gambling] his life by day and night', 917  with 'their cameras rocked by the 
concussion of the guns'.918  
A striking point of commonality among these reels is the dearth of footage showing Chinese forces in 
action, and a reliance on footage either from Japanese sources or shot in company with Japanese forces. This 
highlights a fundamental problem in the newsreels' ability to cover international stories and presented an 
insuperable problem for the editors; while commentators regarded the Japanese as illegitimate aggressors, the 
total visual absence of Chinese resistance gives the impression that the Japanese were either superior, or 
meeting no resistance. This impression is bolstered by the dramatic quality of the footage; Japanese troops 
appear aggressive and visually exciting. This implied Japanese superiority was occasionally reinforced by the 
commentators themselves, albeit perhaps unintentionally; approving references were made to the 'deadly 
efficient soldiers of the Far East'919  who were 'trained, disciplined and equipped like Western troops'. 920 
Movietone in particular occasionally lapsed into admiration for the Japanese Army.921 Among these newsreels, 
Pathe made the most effort to praise China, in one issue describing Chinese resistance both in combat and by 
expatriates subscribing to a defence fund.922 All used images of Chinese refugees and casualties to balance 
footage of Japanese troops. Some of these shots are distressingly effective; a shot of a wounded baby at a 
Shanghai railway station remains a haunting image of innocence and terror. However, the general dichotomy 
between Japanese soldiers and Chinese civilians, between active perpetrators and passive victims, largely 
rendered the Chinese people as an unresisting mass. 
The international settlement, an extraterritorial colonial concession to foreign powers in China, was key to 
the way the newsreels constructed a vision of the war. Gaumont, which was the most emotional, described it as 
an 'oasis of peace' bounded by the 'gates of mercy'.923 There is a sense that this European enclave became the 
audience's vantage point for the war in China, often furthered through evocative imagery; such as a French flag 
                                                          
909 BMN (27 September 1937) http://bufvc.ac.uk/newsonscreen/search/index.php/story/8033  
910 PSSG (9 September 1937) http://bufvc.ac.uk/newsonscreen/search/index.php/story/95127 
911 Labour MP Manny Shinwell, recorded in Hansard HC Deb 02 February 1938 vol 331 cc342. Hansard 1803-2005 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1938/feb/02/bombing-of-civilians#S5CV0331P0_19380202_HOC_380 
accessed 29 February 2012  
912 Pronay, Nicholas 'British newsreels in the 1930s: Their Policies and Impact' in McKernan, Luke ed. (2002) p. 154. 
913 Ibid. 
914 BMN (25 November 1937) http://bufvc.ac.uk/newsonscreen/search/index.php/story/8224 
915 PSSG (15 November 1937) http://bufvc.ac.uk/newsonscreen/search/index.php/story/95380 
916 BMN (13 September 1937) http://bufvc.ac.uk/newsonscreen/search/index.php/story/7986 
917 GBN (1 November 1937) http://bufvc.ac.uk/newsonscreen/search/index.php/story/56862 
918 PSSG (16 December 1937) http://bufvc.ac.uk/newsonscreen/search/index.php/story/95499 
919 GBN (26 August 1937) http://bufvc.ac.uk/newsonscreen/search/index.php/story/56560 
920 BMN (19 August 1937) http://bufvc.ac.uk/newsonscreen/search/index.php/story/7906 
921 BMN (1 November 1937) http://bufvc.ac.uk/newsonscreen/search/index.php/story/8157 
922 PSSG (20 September 1937) http://bufvc.ac.uk/newsonscreen/search/index.php/story/95171 
PSSG (6 September 1937) http://bufvc.ac.uk/newsonscreen/search/index.php/story/95123 
923 GBN (25 November 1937) http://bufvc.ac.uk/newsonscreen/search/index.php/story/56977 
BMN (25 November 1937) http://bufvc.ac.uk/newsonscreen/search/index.php/story/8224 
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flying amid flames,924 or a British flag apparently pierced by gunfire.925 Such images still create a powerful 
sense of the international settlement as a Western outpost threatened by the violation of an 'oriental' war. 
Cultural critic Edward Said has defined Orientalism as a wide-ranging and hegemonic cultural project that 
facilitated the incorporation of the Orient into Western consciousness.926 The newsreels appear to have formed 
part of that 'project', and presented a view of the Orient consistent with existing depictions in popular culture. 
Gaumont and Movietone referred to the Japanese army as the 'Mikado's men', a term presumably familiar to 
audiences from the enduring success of Gilbert and Sullivan's 1885 comic opera The Mikado,927 and implied a 
medieval kingly leadership of armies in battle that detached Japan's military and state from civilianised 
modernity. The use of British material culture as points of familiarity is also seen in a Gaumont description of 
'the peaceful scene of a willow-pattern plate' becoming a battlefield.928 Movietone twice referred to an 'oriental 
quarrel', implying the conflict was both trivial and reflected some facet of the 'oriental' character. Despite its 
sympathy for China, Pathe made strikingly Orientalist references, evoking Kipling's 'strange things happen 
East of Suez'929 and claiming that stay-behind Chinese snipers could be found 'meeting death with an oriental 
smile'.930 The effect of these references was to establish the Far East as an alien environment where 'the war 
gods [could] only be appeased with blood'931 and to construct a view of the Orient that was entirely consistent 
with earlier renderings in popular literature, applied art, and musical theatre, and assumed a huge moral and 
cultural divide between modern Europe and oriental Asia. 
The early coverage of the Sino-Japanese War displayed several general characteristics. While the degree of 
commentary support for China varied, there was a consensus that Japan bore responsibility for the outbreak of 
the conflict and for atrocities committed against civilians. Newsreels saw no contradiction in presenting 
carnage as both education and entertainment. Likewise, they viewed the war over the shoulder of advancing 
Japanese troops and from the rooftops and streets of the international settlement. Although one-sided and 
patronising to the Chinese population it seems likely that these stories, nestled among endless peacetime 
coverage of American beauty contests, sporting fixtures, and movements of royalty or politicians, provided 
their audiences with a carefully calibrated mix of public concern for British populations overseas ('where white 
men and women live beneath a cross of fire'),932 with dramatic and exciting war footage, and a voyeuristic 
thrill of carnage playing out in a safely alien country.  
The war in China witnessed years of atrocious Japanese aggression while British diplomacy proved itself 
impotent. By December 1941, Japan had occupied French Indo-China and been stung by the imposition of an 
American oil embargo. Gambling on forming an autarkic economic bloc bounded by a strategic defence 
perimeter, Japan attacked western possessions in south-east Asia and the western Pacific. This development 
came at a time of acute anxiety in Britain; at war against Nazi Germany since 1939, German and Italian forces 
remained a serious threat, while the failure of Hitler's invasion of Russia was not yet apparent. For Britain, 
American co-belligerency came as a relief, but did not remove the risk of a catastrophic overstretch of military 
resources. Catastrophe ensued in the Far East, as superior Japanese forces relentlessly exposed and exploited 
the many weaknesses of the Far Eastern garrison.  
 
Like hapless British forces in the Far East, the Ministry of Information had a catastrophic start to its war. 
Hamstrung by a lack of both high-level leadership and support in Cabinet, the Ministry became a laughing-
stock, ordering absurdities such as the confiscation of London newspapers from the hands of startled 
commuters. By December 1941, however, the Ministry  had reached a certain maturity; from the latter half of 
1941 it was applying censorship only on the most necessary grounds of security and had largely abandoned 
                                                          
924 BMN ( 16 December 1937) http://bufvc.ac.uk/newsonscreen/search/index.php/story/8301  
925 PSSG (20 September 1937) http://bufvc.ac.uk/newsonscreen/search/index.php/story/95171 
926 Said, Edward (1995) Orientalism (London: Penguin) p.6 
927 GBN (11 October 1937) http://bufvc.ac.uk/newsonscreen/search/index.php/story/56777 
BMN (12 August 1937) http://bufvc.ac.uk/newsonscreen/search/index.php/story/7885 
928 'Willow pattern' plates were a form of mass-produced crockery depicting an entirely fictionalised 'Chinese' story which 
nonetheless achieved lasting commercial success for English potteries. GBN (11 October 1937) 
http://bufvc.ac.uk/newsonscreen/search/index.php/story/56777 
929 PSSG (16 December 1937) http://bufvc.ac.uk/newsonscreen/search/index.php/story/95499  
930 PSSG (15 November 1937) http://bufvc.ac.uk/newsonscreen/search/index.php/story/95380 
931 PSSG (4 November 1937) http://bufvc.ac.uk/newsonscreen/search/index.php/story/95344 
932 GBN (27 Sep 1937) http://bufvc.ac.uk/newsonscreen/search/index.php/story/56686 
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heavy-handed exhortation.933 While the newsreels had not previously been formally censored in the same way 
as feature films, the Ministry exercised a rigorous control of news and the newsreels. Firstly the news agency 
wire services, upon which the news media depended, were controlled by the Ministry, which enabled it to 
shape the general parameters of news reaching the public. Newsreels were subjected to close scrutiny; their 
raw film, commentary and final edit were all liable to Ministry-ordered alterations, and a cut could throw a 
company's distribution schedule into costly disarray. Despite this cumbersome imposition, the wartime 
situation for the newsreels could have been much worse; Gerald Sanger, editor of British Movietone News, 
feared that 'the Ministry...might close down all independent commercial newsreels and issue instead its own 
propaganda reel, which all theatres would be compelled to exhibit'.934 Instead, the Ministry allowed all five 
companies to continue to present their reels, within the bounds of censorship, with their own choice of stories 
and emphasis. Paradoxically, if the 1937 newsreels were strikingly homogenous, the censored wartime reels 
offered a surprising range of interpretations of the war against Japan. By then, the Ministry was under the 
'uniquely successful' leadership of Brendan Bracken,935 a figure who succeeded in running the Ministry with a 
confidence that had eluded previous incumbents. 
War with Japan came at a time when the global military situation was dangerously marginal but the 
propaganda situation was beginning to improve. By looking at the same three newsreel companies' coverage, 
we can see how the industry was able to maintain a marked degree of editorial independence. Although the 
newsreels could no longer construct imaginary barriers between detached British spectatorship and the reality 
of a powerful, aggressive and hostile Japanese war machine, newsreel viewers would have been familiar with 
the notion of the Far East as a dangerously warlike region, albeit hitherto characterised by quarrelsome oriental 
infighting. To negotiate the transition from a regionally limited 'oriental quarrel' to aggressive war against 
Western powers, the newsreels had to interpret the Japanese decision for war. Pathe, Gaumont and Movietone 
all issued a reel on 11 December 1941 and though not explicitly stated, they implied that Japanese aggression 
arose from a cultural propensity to treacherous violence, in contrast with an Anglo-American democratic and 
liberal aversion to war. The depiction of Japan as an oriental 'other' grew in intensity and vehemence; Pathe 
painted this difference in shamelessly racist biological or pathological terms, while Gaumont and Movietone 
emphasised it as moral and political. Pathe Gazette adopted the most hysterical tone, concluding that Japan 
was an 'ant-heap' of 'yellow termites' to be 'purged' by democracy. 936  Consistently referring to Japan as 
deceitful and treacherous, Pathe's first reference to Japan depicted the nation unmasking itself, a craven 
'willing victim...infect[ed by] treachery and greed'. A brief shot of a man dressed as a samurai warrior, sloppily 
swinging a sword towards a superimposed map of the Kra isthmus, was used to re-emphasise Japan's 
supposedly medieval backwardness and illustrate imagined strategic ambitions. 
While Pathe made hyperbolic claims about an invasion threat to the American west coast, it, surprisingly, 
completely ignored the war in China. Gaumont adopted an entirely different editorial approach; its opening 
words rooted the outbreak in 'ten years...of aggression and plunder'.937 Gaumont's story catalogued Japanese 
outrages in China, and the editor clearly expected his audience to remember such events as the colonisation of 
Manchuria and Japan's departure from the League of Nations, the bombing of Shanghai, the sinking of the 
American gunboat USS Panay and the shelling of HMS Ladybird. This catalogue moved from descriptions of 
the Japanese in China, which emphasised both Japanese avarice and brutality ('[China] fell easy prey to the 
greedy little men who made...a profit out of bloodshed'), 938  to establish Britain's self-restraining moral 
superiority in the face of alleged Japanese diplomatic insults ('our wish to avoid war persuaded us to pocket 
that kind of insult').939 While Gaumont eschewed a Pathe-esque invective racism, it instead depicted Japanese 
duplicity by visual juxtaposition. Envoy Kurusu, in Western dress, was shown speaking fluent English while 
addressing journalists about the difficulty of his peace mission. Cutting to a shot of sumo wrestlers grappling, 
                                                          
933 McLaine, Ian (1979) Ministry of Morale: Home Front Morale and the Ministry of Information in World War II 
(London: Allen and Unwin) p.240 
934 Sanger, Gerald (1946) 'We lived in the presence of history: The story of British Movietone News in the War Years' in 
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938 Ibid. 
939 Ibid. 
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the commentator intoned 'Yes, Japan always hides its warlike intentions behind a smiling face'. 940  The 
sequence rendered Kurusu as a symbol of Japan's recognisably Western persona, deceptive and treacherous, 
while the wrestlers revealed the alien savage beneath. 
Movietone's coverage was unique in that it identified the Japanese people as a motive force behind their 
country's aggression, accused them in two references. The first stated 'From the Japanese emperor downwards, 
the Japanese people by their treacherous attack on America and on Britain have marked a day that will live in 
infamy'.941 This opening sentence identified the whole of Japanese society as treacherous, while the quotation 
from Roosevelt, without attribution, identified the newsreel with the President's statement. Continuing its 
indictment of the Japanese people, Movietone accused Japan's populace of 'support[ing] the suicidal ambitions 
of their militaristic leaders'. While lacking the visceral tone of Pathe's story, Movietone's attitude was 
nonetheless strongly exhortatory; its opening paragraphs used the imperative: 'Japan [has] got to be 
broken...aggression...has got to be stamped out'. Unlike Pathe and Gaumont, Movietone was also marked in 
comparing Japan and Germany. The most pointed of these, in which Japan was expected to 'fight with all the 
ruthlessness of the Hun himself', linked Japan with historical eastern barbarism, and, more emotively, to 
German brutality in Belgium during the First World War.942 
 
These three editions demonstrate highly individual depictions of Japan. Pathe's hysterics contrasted sharply 
with Gaumont's sobriety, while only Movietone blamed the Japanese people. All three ignored Japan's 
strategic motivations, instead portraying Japan as hot-tempered and irrational, and in unmistakeably Orientalist 
ways; Pathe's unconvincing samurai suggested a Japanese preference for the sword, while Gaumont's violent 
and brutish sumo wrestlers are 'revealed' as somehow more authentically Japanese than a cheerful-looking, 
English-speaking diplomat in western dress. 
These newsreels all refer to Japan's late declaration of war as evidence of its rejection of civilised politics. 
Gaumont described the Japanese as a nation of malevolently influential 'military families' and the misguided 
devotees of a weak Emperor, later showing civilians and servicemen arriving at Downing Street for 
discussions with Churchill. The editing here showed civilian politicians arriving before the military men, 
suggesting civilian primacy in government, while a shot of Churchill emerging from No. 10 reemphasised his 
status as a civilian Prime Minister. By cutting to show Roosevelt's address to Congress, Gaumont signified 
united Anglo-American democratic resolve. Roosevelt also featured prominently in Movietone's coverage, 
even having the issue's last word. Over a sequence of otherwise silent shots of American warships on 
manoeuvres, Roosevelt's oratory performed a similar function to Gaumont's Cabinet sequence, asserting his 
position as a civilian military supremo and voicing the (self-)righteous determination of a democracy at war. It 
also formed a democratic opposite to the alleged treachery of the Japanese Emperor and people. At Roosevelt's 
final words, the on-screen battleships open fire; Movietone's sequence thus fused democratic legitimacy with 
avenging naval power. These images of naval strength also form a point of similarity; the newsreels all 
expected swift victory at sea. However, these confident pronouncements, having passed censorship and been 
recorded some days previously, must have rung hollow on 11 December 1941, the same day that the sinking of 
HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse made excruciating headlines in British newspapers.943 
By 15 February 1942, Japanese forces had advanced south through the Malay Peninsula, invaded 
Singapore, and forced the capitulation of tens of thousands of British troops. It was an unparalleled catastrophe 
and one that proved utterly indigestible for the newsreels. Their reactions to it demonstrated a very wide 
degree of divergence. Gaumont's response, entitled 'Closing chapter in Singapore', is remarkable in utilising 
the surrender as a opportunity for moral renewal.944 The commentary divided itself into two parts, the first 
looking back to rue the loss of Singapore, the second looking forward, claiming that the disaster offered a 
chance for the Commonwealth to prove its worth. The piece functions in interesting ways; it begins with such 
words as 'bitterness', 'unrest' and 'heavy-heartedness', but moves on to speak in terms of a 'light shining to 
                                                          
940 Ibid. 
941 BMN (11 December 1941) http://bufvc.ac.uk/newsonscreen/search/index.php/story/12069 
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944 GBN (26 February 1942) http://bufvc.ac.uk/newsonscreen/search/index.php/story/62524 
 309 
guide', surely evoking a romanticised Churchillian belief in a 'finest hour'.945 In a similar vein, Gaumont's 2 
March issue used the loss of the Malayan tin mines as motivation for greater economy on the home front.946 
 
By contrast Movietone's story 'Singapore's last days' hardly acknowledged the surrender, Showing European 
women and children calmly boarding a ship for evacuation so calmly that the commentator felt obliged to 
point out that 'the departure of such a ship must have been a more poignant event in the lives of these people 
than you would think from the picture itself'.947 Pathe related the fall of Singapore by showing the arrival of 
refugees in Britain.948 By showing only the return of women and children to 'the sympathy and help [of] the 
Motherland', and showing nothing of Singapore, Pathe's version sought to establish a safe distance between the 
viewer's domestic safety and disagreeable faraway defeats. It also striking in its subdued, even mournful, tone; 
a reference to 'the Japanese advance' seems almost respectful when its 15 January coverage had preferred to 
speak of the 'Japs' as an infectious 'yellow plague' carried by 'scurrying...monkeys'.949 Having established this 
sense of distance between Britain and the war in the Far East, a few days later Pathe's coverage made an 
astonishing change of tack, instructing its audience to: 
 
Look carefully at this man. He is the Emperor of Japan, whose forces have committed the appalling 
atrocities against British, Empire and Chinese troops and civilians, men and women, in Hong Kong. These 
are the swine who bound and bayoneted our helpless soldiers in their hands. If these pictures serve to kindle 
a flame of vengeance throughout the civilised world, they will have served their purpose. Let the cry be 
vengeance! Bloody vengeance!950 
 
This extraordinarily hysterical invective, shown alongside tedious stock footage, seems utterly impotent. 
Possibly sparked by reports of a massacre at Hong Kong's St Stephen's College, it reaches a shrillness of tone 
unmatched by any other story, the editor perceiving no contradiction in 'the civilised world' exacting 'bloody 
vengeance'. For a newsreel that directed the basest kind of dehumanising propaganda towards Japan, this 
outburst seems a humiliated and frustrated coda to Pathe’s earlier bombast. 
These newsreels demonstrate strikingly diverse responses. Movietone exhibited little in the way of obvious 
emotion. Gaumont, strikingly, used Singapore as a way to talk about what Britain should aspire to be, while 
Pathe allowed itself a self-indulgent outrage. Although it is tempting to imagine that Gaumont's positive 
response to the defeat was the most effective propaganda, it certainly seems possible that a desire for 
retribution might have been widespread. This problem of assessing impact aside, studying the depiction of war 
in the Far East demonstrates some broader themes. The 1937 coverage, while using the Sino-Japanese war as 
both entertaining spectacle and grave moral warning, was clearly mindful both of the existing reality of war in 
Spain and the risk of a general war in Europe, while seeking to present that risk without provoking anxiety in 
their audiences. Movietone's 1937 Review of the Year unfortunately chose to 'prophesy...that there will be no 
great war in 1938',951 while Gaumont used a parade of middle-aged First World War veterans of the American 
Legion in New York City as counterweight to the threatening militarism of the Rome-Berlin Axis. 952 
The period between December 1941 and February 1942 demonstrates how the war impacted upon the 
newsreels. It is worth reemphasising that Gerald Sanger's fear, of a monolithic state newsreel foisted upon 
exhibitors by the Ministry, never came to pass. The strikingly different depictions of the outbreak of war with 
Japan would seem to show that editors did indeed retain their right to individuality in presentation. The same 
individuality of presentation is evident in the reaction to the fall of Singapore; Gaumont seems to have taken 
pains to show every setback as a moral lesson and to mitigate obvious disasters by suggesting reassuring 
                                                          
945 We might also note the use of 'British Empire' in the backward-looking section, and the use of 'Commonwealth of 
Nations' when looking forward. Given the closeness with which commentary was edited, this distinction must be 
deliberate, but the author hesitates to offer an analysis of it.  
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950  Italics added to reflect the commentator's vocal emphasis. PG (12 March 1942) 
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comparisons, describing the aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attack as 'the Dunkirk days of the Far East, but 
Dunkirk wasn't the end of the war and this isn't either'.953 Movietone and Pathe's initially restrained tone in 
relating the fall of Singapore seems to have masked an underlying outrage; Movietone later demonstrated a 
marked hostility to the Indian nationalist movement and, in particular, Gandhi. 
We should not, however, allow these apparent demonstrations of individuality to make us forget the 
Ministry's underpinning bedrock of censorship. The responses to the fall of Singapore reflect a variously 
mournful or outraged incomprehension, without any criticism of government policy or military strategy. The 
individuality of presentation must be set against strong commonalities of interpretation; this is mostly clearly 
seen in the chorus denouncing Japanese treachery in December 1941, a narrative in which honourable Britain 
was betrayed by untrustworthy Orientals. The uniformity of this portrayal suggests that this position might 
have been obligatory under censorship. The newsreels make no suggestion whatsoever that Japan's success 
was facilitated by an utter failure of British diplomacy, strategy and intelligence. It seems that the Ministry was 
able to firmly set the parameters of the newsreels' stories, within which they were allowed a relative freedom 
of expression. Likewise, none of the coverage of the fall of Singapore acknowledges the scale of the 
catastrophe. Even Gaumont's 'motivational' interpretation may not have been effective propaganda; its lofty 
tones smack of the Ministry of Information's earlier (and notably ineffective) poster campaigns that urged 
people to 'keep calm and carry on'. In fact, Gaumont's loftiness reveals a fundamental weakness in the 
newsreels' interpretation; if Singapore was to act as 'a warning beacon', then the reasons for the loss would 
need to be discussed and debated by the public. Being unable to offer reasons for the loss of Singapore, the 
newsreels could offer only a beacon that could neither heard nor seen. 
Events in the Far East posed a daunting propaganda challenge in which the unavoidable reality of defeat 
undermined and then demolished the newsreels' Orientalist outlook. This Orientalism was originally a 
reassuring narrative device, distancing and insulating Far Eastern war at a time of profound concern about war 
in Europe. It then became a means of psychological self-defence, belittling an underestimated enemy. In this, it 
proved first ineffective and finally counter-productive. The newsreels had evolved in the 1930s to became a 
highly entertaining form, offering escapism and entertainment through sport, travel, royalty, celebrity, novelty 
and the occasional spectacular horror of faraway wars fought by and among foreigners. The newsreels 
conformed to the cultural norms of their age in their abhorrence of (and fascination with) modern war, their 
Orientalism, and their safely conservative imperialism. All of these characteristics play out in the 1937 
coverage, and while European war from 1939 introduced a censorship that forced a modification of usual 
practices, these characteristics are still discernible in December 1941. The fall of Singapore, however, 
undermined all of these norms to a degree that rendered them irrelevant; it is striking that a limited survey of 
subsequent newsreel commentaries shows an emphasis on how British forces in the Far East overcame 
challenges of climate, terrain and disease, rather than continuing to denigrate and dehumanise the Japanese. 
The newsreels had never sought to challenge the thinking of their audience, nor to undermine their sense of 
inviolable national sovereignty. The fall of Singapore was thus inexplicable in the standard terms of imperial, 
military and naval grandeur in which the newsreels had previously functioned. That the fall of Singapore 
prompted a scatter-gun of different responses seems to underline how difficult it was for the newsreels to 
digest and represent such a sudden and appalling shock. The newsreels spent the 1930s assiduously presenting 
the world in terms that evaded the role of bearer of bad news; the disasters in the Far East made it unavoidable. 
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Advertising as propaganda during the Second World War 
 
Tiago Tadeu, 
CEIS20- Universidade de Coimbra 
 
1-Portugal and the war 
 
Portugal, contrary to what happened during the Great War, did not participate in the second conflict, 
assuming from the beginning a position of neutrality, in spite of the secular alliance that kept with the United 
Kingdom. Apparently the country would follow the war from a secure distance, because it was geographically 
far from the front and did not have the immediate strategic and military importance to attract the attention of 
any of the contending parties. However, the tactical/military scenario evolved and this resulted in the 
appearance of propaganda coming from various nations at war, namely: United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, 
Japan and the United States of America. 
 
The power of propaganda was well-known, especially given the recent experience provided by the Great 
War. British and Americans took that moment to create the organisms954 responsible for the preparation, 
publication and dissemination of numerous pamphlets, newspapers and reports, either in allied nations, 
attempting to mobilizing people, or in neutral countries, seeking to obtain the sympathy and perhaps the future 
collaboration in the conflict.  The relevance of propaganda was very present within the Germans since they 
identified her, more precisely the lack of her955, as one of the causes of their defeat in 1918. It was during the 
postwar period, during the growth of the U.S. economy, that propaganda got new means for its dissemination 
such as radio, cinema and advertising. This last one was becoming the ideal channel to broadcast a message to 
a wide audience in an almost imperceptible transforming itself in a “seller of dreams” 956. 
The work that is presented here was based on the analysis of ads published by the belligerents during the 
period of the war, in the newspaper "Diário de Lisboa". In the study I found over 1000 announcements of those 
countries, 353 belonged to the Axis nations (Germany, Italy and Japan), while the remaining were from the 
Allies (British and Americans with 237 and 441 respectively). These last ones were separated due to the 
magnitude of their numbers and to allow a more comprehensive analysis, argument that wasn’t valid for the 
few Italian and Japanese ads that joined the German ones. 
                                                          
954 Taylor, Philip M. “Munitions of the mind – a History of propaganda from the ancient world to the present day”, 
Manchester University  Press, Manchester, 1995, p.183 e 187. 
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Through a first observation of the graph, and before we proceed to a more detailed analysis , it appears that 
the belligerents , in this case Germany and the UK, only began publishing ads regularly from June 1940. This 
fact must be connected with the German offensive to Western Europe, which resulted in the invasion of 
Netherlands, Belgium and France. These military movements gave significance to the territory and to the 
Portuguese population, one that compelled the daily publication of their ads almost until the end of the war. 
The Americans ads only appeared definitely in the newspaper in June 1942, nearly seven months after Pearl 
Harbor. The delay must be connected with the creation of the United States Office of War Information957 in 
that same period of 1942, the agency that would coordinate the propagandistic effort of Washington. The chart 
also shows that the arrival of the Americans resulted in a gradual reduction of the British ads, a sign of a 
probable coordination between the Allied propaganda machine.  There are more two key moments that are 
displayed in this representation, namely July of 1943 and May/June of 1944. The first points the beginning of a 
spectacular and sustained growth of the number of U.S. ads, an increase that matched with the first Allied 
offensive on European soil, the landing in Sicily and in the invasion of Italy. The other date marked the 
decrease in the American ads, again connected with military operations, this time with the landing on the 
Normandy beaches. These indications, like the one registered initially, confirm the importance of propaganda, 
precious ally of military machines, whose goal for Portugal would be to gain the sympathy and support from 
the population for the nations and causes that were in war. 
A more detailed analysis showed that 1939 did not bring new significant propaganda in the Portuguese 
front, somewhat similar to what happened with the military conflict. The exception was the presence of a 
couple of ads from Radio Corporation of America in the first months. The American company created by 
General Electric worked in the telecommunications field (radio; telephone) and owned the NBC (National 
Broadcasting Company). Another part of their business was connected with the production of home appliances 
such as radios and phonographs. In the 40s and 50s shifted the attention to television and electronics. 
The RCA announcement that appeared in late 1939 (RCA - 1) regarded the launch of new radios for the 
following year, reminding the public of the "superiority of American industry". According to the message in 
the ad the company had the necessary materials and technicians and also could devote herself to the production 
of those goods, reality that couldn’t be assured by the European companies. 
The second year of the war, 1940, would impel a new rhythm to the military conflict, which resulted in the 
appearance of several announcements of the belligerents. Germany made its entrance in the "Diário de Lisboa" 
with "A book of sensation!" written by one Adolf Hitler (KAMPF - 1). The months of May and June were 
characterized by the Nazi offensive to the west which culminated in the occupation of Belgium, Netherlands 
and France, a proof of the superiority of the German army to all Europeans. Fully aware of the German 
victory, August was the month that brought the announcements of the British Overseas Airways, where was a 
clear appeal to the maintenance of the old Anglo-Portuguese alliance with the following slogan: "The old 
friends are the best" (BOA - 1). The reader could still read the in the body of the ad that Portugal "was the 
oldest ally of Britain", a reason to the maintenance of its air routes through the country, even during "the 
greatest war in history" because it was important to keep "the bonds that always united these nations." The 
connection with the UK would be strengthened in September of 1940 with the presence of the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in the newspaper ads. The first announcements had a simple composition, 
only informing the reader of the news schedules and frequency of the emissions (BBC - 1). Interestingly, the 
initial ad of the German radio station appeared in the following day, reminding the readers in bold letters that 
"Germany speaks" (FUNK - 1). The announcement was very similar containing information on the schedules 
and frequencies, adding only that the emissions were in Portuguese and French. Such information didn’t go 
unnoticed and lead to a new ad from the BBC topped by the slogan " La voix de Londres" (BBC - 2), in which 
the message almost the same as the first published, only with the difference that all the text was in French. 
As mentioned before we believe that there was a link between the advertising/propaganda and the events 
that unfolded in the military scenario. This relationship was strengthened with the ads of the spring and 
summer of 1941 that coincided with the operation Barbarossa. 
The magazine "Der Adler" was a publication of the Luftwaffe published between 1939 and 1944. However, 
her ads only appeared in the Portuguese newspaper during the of the Axis offensive on the Soviet Union. 
Initially and since the attack took place only at the end of June, the announcements of April and May only 
called the reader's attention to the technical achievements of German aviation, like the use of oxygen by its 
pilots that allowed them to achieve greater heights in the stratosphere (ADLER - 1). In June the attention was 
on the her weapons capabilities, presenting the reader with the "violence of the blows inflicted in Greece" and 
"secrets ... from the other side of the Channel" (ADLER - 4), challenging the reader to be informed of the "new 
operations of the aerial German gun" (ADLER - 5 ) . In July the magazine focused on the British, talking about 
the German attack in the port of Tobruk (Africa) , and of the success in bombing Her Majesty’s ships that 
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forced "The American pavilion to go away little by little of the Union Jack! " (Adler- 6). To clear all the 
doubts there was a figure of a British plane engulfed in flames accompanying the text.  
The power of the German army would be praised again in July, when the Adler’s announcement prompted 
the reader's attention to a number "305", the time that would "be remembered by history", because it was the 
beginning of Operation Barbarossa. The advance to East got again the spotlight of the magazine ads in 1941, 
in July and December, describing the apparent success of the military offensive, explicit by the images of a 
burning plane and train (ADLER– 9,10), both Soviet’s, and by the Luftwaffe message saying that she "wasn’t 
let them take a breath." The Axis propaganda offensive would be boosted with the radio ads that appeared in 
May 1941, with this slogan "Germany speaks and the world listens!"(FUNK – 2). The message was very clear 
and got the support of the Italian broadcaster ads, which urged the readers to take notice to Rome (ROME - 1). 
The BBC contested the Axis radio ads, specially the German ones, with new announcement that questioned the 
message from the III Reich, implying their lack of credibility because "The voice of London speaks and the 
world believes!"(BBC- 3). The German response was very feeble, since it only announced in her next ads the 
transmission of Portuguese music concerts in June and July (FUNK - 3). 
The reports of the initial success of the offensive Axis eastward and the continuous bombing on Britain 
were certainly known, causing the demoralization of the population and forcing it to ponder the defeat. The 
propaganda, often used to criticize and scorn the enemy, had now to take an active role in convincing and 
mobilizing for victory, message that was very perceptible in ads that filled the pages of the "Diário de Lisboa". 
August was the month chosen by BBC to inform the readers that Britain still resisted, as could be seen by 
several images of the famous buildings of its capital. The first choice was the London Tower Bridge, 
accompanied by the usual message of the radio station (BBC - 4). Others followed in September, namely the 
Big Ben with the Palace of Westminster (BBC - 5), the BBC headquarters (Broadcasting House) and the 
famous Saint Paul’s cathedral (BBC - 8), the building that had become a symbol of resistance during the 
London Blitz. 
The change in the BBC’s ads gave her a new role, the leader of the British’s courage. In October BBC 
assumed formally that part by publishing an ad with the Union Jack in the background. The change was also 
accompanied by Germany, whose radio announcements brought the imperial eagle and the swastika (Funk- 4), 
till the appearance of a Berlin’s icon in November and December of 1941, the Brandenburg Gate (FUNK - 5). 
In the use of symbols we highlight the presence of the journalist Fernando Pessa in some of the BBC ads 
(BBC - 10) a figure that gathered some popularity among the Portuguese population and that had shown up 
before in the newspaper, but to advertise the brand the Philips appliances. 
 
2-America arrives in Europe 
Seldom a war that has multiple fronts is won or lost in a single battle. However, the end of the year 1941 
was decisive in the outcome of the conflict, with the Japanese decision to attack the Pearl Harbor. The new 
front of the war dragged the U.S., the most powerful nation, with her economic and military power and 
assumed once more the reins of the war, has it happened in 1917. 
The first months of 1942 didn’t brought significant changes in content and in the layout of the ads 
published in the "Diário de Lisboa". The fight between the German and British radio continued with the use of 
emblematic buildings of its capital, revealing the BBC some slight cosmetic changes. Meanwhile the magazine 
"Der Adler", reported again the victories of the Japanese ally in the Pacific (ADLER - 11). 
The globalization of the conflict brought back the announcements of the Italian radio, but this time they 
made a clearly and directed appeal "Listen Rome", that was followed with an map of the Iberian Peninsula 
with the airwaves spreading from Italy to Spain and Portugal (ROME - 2). In a time of uncertainty about the 
future of the Axis that change was certainly intended to mobilize and thus appeal to the solidarity of that two 
nations that were also fascists but remained largely out of the conflict. In the meantime the BBC, maybe 
moved by the new appeal of the Italian rival, presented a new ad (BBC -17) which showed an image where the 
reader could see that their transmissions had a worldwide reach. 
The U.S. made its reappearance in the ads of the "Diário de Lisboa", almost half a year after its official 
entry into the war, publishing the schedule and frequency of the American radio station (USA - 1). The 
announcement also had a picture of a typical American city with its skyscrapers and a slogan in bold letters 
indicating the disposition of the Land of the Free to "Listen to the Voice of America on the march." The arrival 
of U.S. propaganda would transform the publicity of the journal due to the high frequency of her ads, but 
especially with the content, since her messages wanted most of the time to propagandize American ideals. If 
the first American radio announcement showed the wealth and development of their cities, the one that 
followed (USA - 2), had in the background the iconic Statue of Liberty, reminding the readers on whose side 
was the free world. Messages in American radio became a constant, overlapping the British ads, which went 
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into decline with the entry of the propaganda machine in Washington. The Germans were still leading the Axis 
announcements, occasionally joined by some Italians. Notwithstanding we highlight the brief presence of the 
Tokyo Central Broadcaster Radio (NIPON - 1), with a simple ad in December of 1942, which had the 
particularity of broadcasting news in eight different languages (Portuguese, Spanish, English, French, German, 
Italian, Japanese and Russian). 
January of 1943 was the moment chosen by the Axis to release new radio ads from Rome and Berlin 
respectively. The Italian wanted the readers to remember the link between the Fascist Italy with the Roman 
Empire, showing in their ads one of the many triumphal arches that existed in the capital (ROMA- 3) and the 
image of the Lupa Capitolina (ROMA- 4) a representation that shows the Romulus and Remus feeding from 
the wolf. Meanwhile the German broadcaster strengthened its ties with the Portuguese by publishing an 
announcement which was established a direct link between the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin and the Triumphal 
Arch of Augusta Street in Lisbon (FUNK - 6). The image would convey the idea that her emissions would be 
heard by the Portuguese, particularly by their rulers because several government ministries were located in that 
specific square, “Praça do Comércio”. 
In the other side of the Atlantic the American ads would bring a new transformation during the summer, 
coinciding with the military operations that led to the Allied landing in Sicily. The message came in the radio 
ads that brought more symbols of freedom and the American democratic system. The building chosen was the 
Capitol, specifically its dome (USA - 3). That was the site of the legislative power and the house of the Senate 
and Congress. To emphasize the American military power in one of the ads the readers could see the Capitol 
dome being overflown by numerous aircrafts. 
In August of 1943 marked a new stage of the advertising / propaganda in the "Diário de Lisboa" since it 
was the arrival of the American companies and their products. The first one to draw attention of the minds and 
stomachs of the Portuguese was the corn flour “Maizena” (CORN- 1), which demanded the collaboration of 
the public to make a" A Brave New World ", recalling that the uncertainty of the future could be tackled more 
easily if people trusted " in the old friends." The American corn flour wasn’t alone in the paper since the 
American radio published new ads where there was an association of old elements already presented, such as 
the Statue of Liberty and the skyscrapers, with new symbols that included the “Star and Stripes” and the figure 
of Abraham Lincoln (USA -7). The representation of the former president was made through the image of his 
memorial, reminding readers the American hero and martyr who fought and died to give better living 
conditions to the population. 
Albeit no one could predict the outcome of the conflict in 1943, the American propaganda machine began 
the preparations for the post-war period, informing the Portuguese public of the power of its economy and the 
lifestyle that it provided to the Americans. The contact with that reality began with “Budd”, a firm that  made 
trains, airplanes and cars, some of them visible in the picture that accompanied the announcement, although it 
explained the readers that in that moment  all the production was going to the war effort (BUDD -1). The 
future was the main concern and was well expressed again by the corn flour “Maizena”, talking about the time 
"When peace comes " (CORN- 2), or by the United States Steel that informed potential buyers of its global 
presence and experience, that would allow to give the materials to "improve the conditions of life and to build 
a better world " (STEEL- 1). Even the aviation industry namely “Glenn L. Martin”, that would have very few 
direct clients in the newspaper readers, advertised itself as the facilitators of "trade and travel between friendly 
nations" (MARTIN - 1). The purpose of the ads wasn’t to encourage the purchase, but to seduce the minds of 
the audience with to the “American Way of Life” that the U.S. could provide its allies. 
Some more attainable goods also emerged with the ads of the Diamond T Motor Car Company that 
promised to provide the best vehicle for peace time (TRUCK- 1). Ford also started publishing ads where the 
advertised product wasn’t cars but the U.S. power and scientific development. The first announcement of the 
Detroit’s company answered to the wishes of a 10 years old kid (FORD - 1) ensuring him that they were 
already "sighting the peace" and could assure him that the technological advances would allow a quick 
recovery from the war, "even before you grown up." That was also the motto of the second ad, which pledged 
to put the scientific advances originated by the war "to the service of mankind." The same idea was conveyed 
by United States Steel, compromising to put their steel and their scientists in the service of "Future Peace" 
(STEEL- 3), particularly in the construction of skyscrapers (STEEL- 2), pipelines (STEEL- 5) and in ordinary 
products such as pins and thimbles (STEEL- 4). 
According to the American ads the post- war was just about around the corner, so that readers were advised 
by the corn flour “Maizena” to get a space in the stockroom (CORN- 3) and start planning the "peacetime 
menu" (CORN -5). Ford Motor Company also told the readers to be looking to the future and promised them a 
world with "a standard of living far beyond what any other thought possible until now" (FORD - 3). They 
guaranteed the "best cars, faster air travels and better house conditions" (FORD - 5) all thanks to the advances 
gained with the war effort. 
The beginning of 1944 brought back the RCA, whose ads intensified the propaganda of American lifestyle 
among the Portuguese population. Through seven new ads published during the first half of the year, the 
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readers were informed of the close connection between the developments of the war effort and with the 
emergence of numerous appliances for the peacetime world. There were several applications, from the sewing 
without needle that had facilitated the manufacture of the fabric of the parachute, to the electric iron that 
accelerated the construction of airplanes or even the improvement of the microscope, television and radio 
receivers and even in the area of the recording sound and video (RCA-2,3,4,5,6,7). The link between the 
military operations and the flow of ads was again noticeable, this time during the Allied disembark in 
Normandy (June 1944). In that same month began a significant fall in the number of U.S. ads, probably related 
by the strong physical presence that the allies started having in Europe and made  the propaganda effort less 
necessary. On the other hand, that same reason should been at the origin of an outbreak of ads, between July 
and October, of one of the well-known companies of the Third Reich, “Bayer”. The pharmaceutical company 
was always a steady presence throughout the period, but her announcements had a very simple message, 
showing only the brand and the product (BAYER – 1). The changes only began in July, after D-Day, and 
presented substantial differences. For the first time “Bayer” identified herself with the "German Science" 
(BAYER - 2) and reminded that its logo was the cross. These radical modifications ought to be made with the 
sense to establish the connection between Christianity and Germany, maybe promoting some of those religion 
principles such as peace, mercy or clemency with the populations of the enemy countries that were mainly 
Christians. The company published another ad where it said clearly that those drugs were "from Germany" 
(BAYER - 3) and permitted the fight against numerous diseases, enabling the salvation of "several 
populations" and even allowed the colonization of inhospitable regions. The appeal of pharmaceutical 
company marked the death rattle of the German propaganda even though there where some radio ads in the 
first months of 1945. 
Germany was defeated, at least in the newspaper, but the U.S. and UK maintained their presence and 
modus operandi in the newspaper, despite the reduction in the number of their ads. The British continued their 
announcements with BBC, although they went back to the initial simple form and message, providing only 
information about schedules and frequencies, leaving the field completely open to the Americans that 
continued the preparation of the postwar, keeping the reader’s attention on the technological advances of their 
industries, particularly in the steel and automotive industries. 
The last months of the war would be used by “Republic Steel”, easily identified by the bald eagle 
(REPUBLIC- 1) to remind readers of the numerous applications gained with the war effort. Now, that material, 
whose excellence and superiority were praised in the ads, presented himself as essential to the recovery of 
economies since it was used in agriculture and shipbuilding, the canning industry and construction of buildings 
(REPUBLIC-2,3,5,6). The same versatility was also the main argument of the “International Harvester 
Company” that defended an easy adaptation of their trucks and tractors, old machinery of war, in the works of 
reconstruction (IHC - 1, 2). Again the concern of American advertising was more focused on the postwar 
world even before the conflict ended. Such determination was shielded in its strong military power, but 
especially on its prosperous economy, which faced the war not as a struggle for new territories but for new 
markets. 
 
 
3-Conclusions 
 
From the analysis of the announcements published in the "Diário de Lisboa" we found that during the II 
World War the belligerents used advertising to spread their message in Portugal and thus seek the sympathy 
and support from the people to their causes and values . This was confirmed by global dynamics established 
between the ads and the military operations, which determined the flow and content, becoming good 
storytellers of the armed conflict. 
A more precise assessment shows that in the initial phase of the war the Axis countries ads especially 
Germany, dominated the number of advertisements. This behavior reflected the military superiority at that 
time, as well as some friendliness and openness of the Portuguese population, especially their rulers, for this 
set of countries. The British always assumed a secondary position, although being old allies of Portugal, 
certainly conditioned by the military events that were consuming their precious resources. This become clear 
since the arrival of the U.S. ads led to a substantial reduction in the number of British announcements even 
though their presence continued throughout the period. 
The appearance of the American propaganda machine, even if late, transformed the advertising because of 
the strength of its numbers, but especially by the mobilization of its companies to participate in the fight. 
Surely the private companies’ activities would be conditioned by the state during the war, but since the public 
was not always aware of what happened behind the curtains, the advertising that came from that source would 
have a better chance of being well received. Meanwhile the UK and the Axis, despite the latest ads of “Bayer”, 
showed that they didn’t master this important aspect of advertising because almost all of their ads were from a 
small group of companies strongly identified with the sovereign state. This practice would also determine the 
 316 
content of the advertising message, accentuating a more negative propaganda in order to manipulate the mind, 
instead of the more efficient suggestion and persuasion which was conveyed by the Americans 
announcements. Thus, we can say that the propaganda war was won not with the use of military power or the 
moral superiority or even the political and religious similarities, but by selling the dream to transform Portugal 
in America. 
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Introduction 
 
Although little studied in Brazil, the propaganda posters are subject to a wide area of studies in North 
America and Europe. Even if its improvement is situated between the 1820s and 1860s, its popularity occurs 
only from the 1880s through themes (travel, political, sporting, cultural, governmental, commercial, military 
etc.) and techniques (photo-lithography, self-lithographs, chromo-lithographs, lithograph hand etc.) that varied 
according to the period and context. 
It was from the 1910s, especially during World War I, that the posters entered definitely on the list of most 
utilized media to 'win hearts and minds'. There were good reasons for the widespread use by both the public 
and the private initiative: they were cheap, affordable and easy to distribute. Most often with simple slogans 
and focusing on needs and goals, the posters were a means of communication considered very efficient, 
informed and persuaded fairs, factories, department stores, government offices, newspapers, magazines and 
public roads. 
In the World War II, they helped to mobilize societies somehow involved with the conflict. In the case of 
government propaganda, the posters were prominent enough among privileged artists, illustrators, art directors 
and advertising agencies. The confluence of war, art and propaganda made advertising agencies to begin to 
make contributions of first order. At that time, it was believed that all the posters could help, but the good 
posters would work faster and better. Thus, specialists of the period advised that two issues should be made to 
all of them: 1. This poster appeals to the emotions? 2. This poster is a literal image in photographic detail? In 
these perspective, no matter how beautiful it was, how they were strident colors and how clear was the idea, if 
not appealed to human emotions, not cause a deep impression. Abstract designs and symbolism should also be 
avoided because the representations needed to be closer to the people 'as they are '. 
The works produced by historians about the 1930s and 1940s form a large and dense field of study. Often 
debates on populism, labour legislation, the trajectory of the Brazilian Labour Party - PTB, the challenges 
faced by the Left, attempts to institutional breakdowns and Brazil's participation in World War II sometimes 
seem exhausted, it takes a few years have passed for them to be approached from new issues, new keys of 
interpretation and new sources. 
We will try to outline in this chapter some ways that we consider poorly covered and that are, in our 
opinion, on the periphery of the Vargas historiographical period (1936-1945). To do this, we will take as an 
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example, propaganda posters and some issues related to diplomacy, but not take them as instances, fonts or 
objects inseparable from each other. 
The impact of advertising is addressed in this text, not as an assumption or premise of research, but as an 
object of study. Furthermore, it should be noted at the outset that, in part of Brazilian historiography, political 
propaganda in that period is commonly associated with fascist and Nazi propaganda. 
We will try to make some observations about the presence of U.S. propaganda, without prejudice the 
argument that there were links with other advertising schools. 
 
1. The U.S. propaganda in Brazil 
 
At the end of the 1930s, although in the government there were Axis sympathizers as Franscisco Campos 
and Lourival Fontes, there were attitudes that seek a 'Brazilian solution'. These placements emphasized 
nationalism and peaceful transformation to address social issues in a reformed State. Roughly speaking, this 
was the position of those who deny the similarities of the state with New Fascism or Nazism. It was the 
position, for example, of Azevedo Amaral, Oliveira Vianna and the president, Getulio Vargas. 
The meeting between Brazilian and U.S. propaganda comes amid prospects that sometimes approached, 
sometimes distanced themselves from influences of economic, political or cultural of American or European 
societies. The meeting takes place through the arrival in Brazil of several U.S. companies at the end of the 
1920s and beginning of the next, as: the J. Walter Thompson in 1929, whose director James W. Young, who 
will later be the director of the Division of Communications of the Office of Coordination of Interamerican 
Affairs, the Ayer & Son in 1931, one of the oldest U.S. agencies, the Foreign Service Advertising Bureau Inc. 
in 1930, the Standard in 1933, and McCann - Erickson in 1935. These companies are constantly receiving U.S. 
evidence of advertisements, catalogues, posters, brochures, manuals and technical journals. As a result of this 
movement, there was an immediate breakthrough in Brazilian advertising. Many entrepreneurs hoped to 
improve their profits through the Americans 'big shots' who were attending Ford, the Gessy and Chevrolet, 
among others. 
In the 1930s the modernization came of the U.S. - U.S. propaganda contributed to what appeared to be the 
source of endless progress, science, technology, abundance, rationality, efficiency and scientific management. 
At that time, new terms have become part of the national advertising market, such as Media, Copy, and Layout. 
But not only that: they also brought marketing and research, planning and technique. In 1937 came the first 
two professional organizations in this area: Brazilian Advertising Association - BPA and Paulista Association 
of Advertising - APP, which goes from 1940 to be directed by Cassiano Ricardo. They now offer regular 
conferences and courses as psychology of advertising, Problems and difficulties of propaganda and advertising 
newsroom. 
Then dawn the magazine 'Propaganda' written and edited by industry professionals. In it, the 'Propaganda' 
teemed not an expense, but as encouragement to progress and wealth of the country. In this favourable context 
for propaganda, arises in 1936, the 'Day of Propaganda' and several books written by Brazilians on the topic. 
Also in 1937, the first advertising agencies in the modern sense began to take shape in the U.S. standards. 
The largest of these was the Ayer & Son. These agencies were in close harmony with the American literature, 
with authors like Edward Bernays, Harold Laswell and Ellis Freeman. Such authors had composed the most 
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sophisticated political propaganda in the United States. Are these authors as a basis for discussions about 
which direction the advertisement should follow after the creation of the Office of War Information in 1942: if 
the path information, or the conviction and persuasion. Through the concept of 'state entrenched’, for example, 
Harold Lasweel indicated the U.S. government how to militarize the country's culture in a way that was not 
effective and widely questioned. Edward Bernays, the father of modern advertising, argued as early as 1928, 
Advertising as the scientific manipulation of public opinion to avoid conflict and chaos. The manipulation 
through the subconscious, he said, was a key element in democratic society. Among its main customers were 
Procter & Gamble, the American Tobacco Company, Cartier Inc., Best Foods, CBS, General Electric, Dodge 
Motors and the United Fruit Company, the latter would be particularly famous by his role in the coup in 
Guatemala in 1954. 
In 1939, there were 19 agencies in Sao Paulo - 10 directly linked to U.S. agencies or professionals, and in 
the following year, 56 agencies operating in the country. In the same year, the Director of advertising of the 
newspaper A Noite, Francisco Neto, said: "it is necessary that the announcement go on the same way of the 
reader, without it to look for. It is necessary for the effectiveness of advertising, that this jump in the public 
eye." The Infallibility and Rationalization in Advertising - whose example more efficient would be Nazi 
propaganda - was one of the theses defended by Ellis Freeman on Conquering the Man in the street. 
An example of how these professionals that was working in Brazil saw Vargas, can be seen in the number 
11 of the journal created in 1939 by Licurgo Costa, Propaganda : "[...] no other president knew so well how to 
use propaganda element of national unification guiding public opinion, revealing Brazil for the population and 
abroad." In fact, there were no major conflicts between these agencies and the Departamento de Imprensa e 
Propaganda - DIP, starting in 1939, even as many had as customer the Brazilian state. It was the case of Ayer 
& Son, who made some projects to Departamento Nacional do Café. 
Literature on the History of Advertising in Brazil indicates that the line was so good that almost all got a lot 
of money with political propaganda during the war. Accordingly, there is evidence of a broad process of 
overlap between market forces, government and media interests with the U.S. government, in a phenomenon 
that Antonio Pedro Tota called 'Americanization of Brazil'. The largest market research developed in Brazil, 
for example, by the end of World War II was made by Ayer & Son for National Coffee Department in 1942. 
During five months, were interviewed 71,733 consumers in 22 cities of 18 states. 
However, if the density of the field of propaganda in the 1930s suggests strong ties with the United States, 
why such ties with U.S. propaganda appear so little in Brazilian historiography? We hypothesized that the 
association with the advertisement (not always) democratic and liberal U.S. bothered the authorities of the 
New State, since often it could be confused with opposition to the regime. Moreover, a major problem for the 
study of this area is the lack of sources. The poster, the source we focusing this time, presents certain 
methodological problems when taken as a research resource. Generally have unknown authorship, since they 
are often not signed nor dated. Furthermore, the reduced amount of posters produced in Brazil during World 
War II, in comparison with the United States makes them a material of relatively low research. 
In the U.S. were made during the war about 2,000 posters, some with a circulation of about 2 million 
copies. In Brazil, based on our research, we estimate that this number does not exceed two hundred. The 
reason for this small amount is at least two: the shortage of raw materials caused by difficulties in logging on a 
large scale in the processing of pulp and character bit mobilizer New State Advertisement. New State 
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propaganda was directed largely to elites, it impacted the production of posters, as they traditionally had 
addressed the popular classes and in particular workers. 
The orientation propagandistic of New State has not, however, a strong approach to the topics that defined 
and guided the U.S. propaganda during the same period: people marching, discipline, bravery, loyalty, 
dexterity, efficiency, endurance, clearing, courage, organization, vigilance, sacrifice and unity. Although these 
themes were dominant, some posters resorted to good humour, which was discouraged by propaganda 
specialists. 
These traits were already present before the war, and after 1942 became part of the political game/domestic 
propaganda of the Brazilian government. The work, as emphasized by the New State regime, was in harmony 
with the American propaganda. Workers were seen as soldiers of production. And, both in Brazil and in the 
U.S., was careful to warn if the population for possible sabotage. Thus, the confluences of the two propaganda 
systems still in the 1930s, and especially the entry in World War II in 1942, are among the factors driving the 
development of propaganda campaigns in Brazil with a pronounced American inspiration. 
The impositions of authority to populations reluctant, recalcitrant or sceptical passed often by the School 
Futurist aesthetic, which was worth of electricity, efficiency and speed as resources imagistic and made them 
the main themes. What we can see in these signs, plus a standard presentation of the ads - more pronounced as 
the use of white space as an element of meaning - is still considered modern dwell on topics such as industry, 
machine, aerodynamics, engineering and functional geometry - all focused on an attempt to create a 'futuristic 
style'. 
Give 'Em Both Barrels is a good example of the effect mechanized images. This poster was designed by 
artist Jean Carlu based on what was known as war graphics: contemporary designs for military purposes. In it 
there is a simulation of a forward motion. The efficiency was quite a theme emphasized by both the U.S. 
propaganda system as the Brazilian. The modern sense of these posters united the theme warmongering 
rational style with a streamlined aesthetic. This perspective stemmed from the Bauhaus pedagogy, 
emphasizing industrial design and low cost as part of a democratization of art. 
In 1942, even before the entry of Brazil into the war, occur several campaigns across the country - 
Campaign vitamins for the people; Labour Victory, Victory Gardens - alibis to establish a climate of collective 
deprivation. Overwhelmingly, these posters were broadcast or encouraged by the offices of the Office of 
Interamerican Affairs. The War was also the backdrop and an alibi. And the poster was at the heart of these 
concerns. 
From 1942, New State advertising started playing with more emphasis campaigns and slogans Americans. 
Among them, the 'Victory Gardens'. In this sense, the Brazilian Legion of Assistance and Food Service Social 
Security - SAPS warned that every home should have its garden of victory. 
In an article published in the Official Night in March 1943, the 'victory gardens' are placed as an urgent 
issue for Brazilian society. But not only that: in addition to incite the population to grow and consume more 
vegetables, Brazilian Legion of Assistance and Food Service Social Security - SAPS, developed a campaign 
dogged in favour of ‘victory gardens’ and for more food in the cities. The effort has already developed and the 
results obtained have to loom over months, but the goals in view only be attained by the enthusiastic support of 
the Brazilian families. The food, as much as the number of weapons and fighters, was one of the factors most 
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sense, we support the fight against Italy and Germany. The housewives of Brazil became a kind of the soldiers 
'front'. 
The awareness of the obligations of war passed by greenery and also reflects the status of the poster in the 
period. In March 1943, the Ayer & Son sought educate readers of the newspaper A Noite on the importance of 
the poster and the obligations of war: 
 
The National Coffee Department is distributing throughout the country, a series of suggestive 'posters' 
destined to become even more popular among us the 'war bonds'. Imagination, color and taste, combined 
with a rare sense of balance and sobriety, make this happy coffee advertising of the most expressive, using 
even these 'posters' for real gems sensitivity, as shown by the picture above stamped. 
 
Thus, the poster alluded exhorted: "Defend the Earth where the coffee plantations flourish. Buy War 
Bonds!." It was another poster with slogan "the American way" according to the newspaper A Noite. In an 
article of 7 April 1942, A Noite tried to warn against espionage and saboteurs. And the best way would be the 
poster. According to the report, "The poster has the advantage of expressing the entire image: in the most 
hidden corners of the earth, he comes to penetrate through graphic suggestion, all understandings, even the 
uneducated or illiterate." 
Although the density of Brazilian advertising based on the U.S. occurred primarily from early 1943 (with 
the input of Brazil in World War II alongside the Allies in August 1942), it is clear that the alignment with 
U.S. propagandistic system has begun before the arrival of U.S. subsidiaries of advertising agencies and under 
the auspices of the Good Neighbour Policy. 
 
2. Making poster with the other poster 
 
The posters were common propaganda pieces in Brazilian big cities like São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. 
From the beginning of 1942 some exhibitions of posters of war began to be made in Brazil, such as posters 
made for the Brazilian Legion of Assistance at the National Museum of Fine Arts. 
In the United States and Canada, a standard practice was the making of posters for the promotion of 
competitions and young talents. On April 28, 1942, the newspaper A Noite published about the biggest 
continent poster contest, whose theme was the Union of the Americas, to be coordinated by the Museum of 
Modern Art in New York. Would be rewarded in cash the 34/1 placed. The themes are: long live of the 
Americas together, only one America, a single action, united America, the world peace and against a common 
enemy together." Other contests were seeking young talents interested in the 'union of the Americas'. The 
designer Nelson Boeira Faedrich, for example, an employee of Brazilian Radio Advertising Prósper, S/A, won 
fourth place in the contest coordinated by the Museum of Modern Art, and the first and second places a poster 
competition organized by the League of National Defense of Rio Grande do Sul state, in 1942. It is possible 
that many designers as Faedrich take knowledge of U.S. billboards through newspapers, catalogues, magazines 
and exhibitions, such as that organized by the Brazilian Press Association in 1943, where about a hundred 
posters Americans were exposed as a model campaign for war bonds, saving, production, rubber, victory 
gardens, among others. 
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Before the circulation of posters in Brazil, in June 1943 was released by a certain Central Executive 
Committee a contest for the election of the best poster for National Propaganda of War Bonus. According to 
the notice, the work presented should be simple and incisive, allowing 'a scam', the presentation of the patriotic 
purpose of purchasing war bonds, and have words or short phrases that could be made 'slogans' stressing the 
intention of the poster. The awards would be Cr$ 10,000.00 for first place, one of Cr$ 5,000.00 for the second 
and a Cr$ 3,000.00 for third, plus five honourable mentions. 
In an article published in the newspaper A Noite on June 16, 1943, during the selection for the competition, 
the reader was informed that: 
 
In the United States, the poster has reached an absolute technical perfection. Not only because of the 
specialized designers and artists, but also because of the large printing presses, equipped with all the 
features. The poster is there, widely used. Was also employed to mobilize American public opinion on 
matters of war. And it continues to be used all the time. 
 
In late June, after enrolment of 411 posters coming from states like São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Rio de 
Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul, 71 were chosen for the grand finale. The next day, the Jury of the Poster 
Competition for national advertising war bonds concluded its work with a final ranking of competitors. After 
the vote, it was found by a majority vote, the following result: 
 
The 1st place, poster n.97, under the pseudonym 'Ariedan', the 2nd place, the number of 308, under the 
pseudonym '9' and 3rd place, the n.2-A, from São Paulo, under the pseudonym 'And you?'. Then the 
identification was made with the opening of the envelopes that were over the names of competitors, 
calculating that the prize of ten thousand cruise fell to Mr. Silvio Lira Madeira, author Poster n.97, the five 
thousand cruzeiros, to Mrs. Paulo and Américo da Rocha Gomide Lani, authors of the poster n. 308, and 
three thousand cruzeiros to Mr. Carlos Klanke resident in São Paulo, author of the poster n.2-A (...). The 
Commission also proposes a grant of five thousand cruzeiros to each awarded honourable mentions. 
 
Two days after the contest, a surprise: "In the judgment of the posters: Three plagiarisms at the same time - 
Was the commission convened to hear the protests of artists’ competitors - None of the winners had the 
original idea - not one, but three plagiarism...". 
During the debate on the alleged plagiarism committed by the first place, came the revelation that not only 
what had been plagiarized off first: the first three posters had plagiarized Americans: "The third, it was said, 
was a reason that had wide publicity when a pharmaceutical company increased advertising of a drug against 
headaches", and the second, "plus a poster American who had been exposed to a few days ago at the place 
where the lecture is developed, was the same as another drug maker had done in their print ads for a restorative 
lifeguards and the hand of drowning man looking grim hold on to it". 
Unfortunately it was not possible to locate the poster that served as inspiration for the "avenge us". 
Although the paper makes mention of plagiarism posters pharmacists, pharmacists believe that the posters 
were inspired by American counterparts. 
Among the authorities who discussed the thorny event reported in the first edition of the newspaper A 
Noite, on July 03, was Ary Fagundes: 
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Devoted authored posters and holder of many awards for vowel present. Ary Fagundes spoke about, saying 
that drawing who devolved the biggest prize was a blatant plagiarism. The claims made by the author - an 
amateur - an evening continued, were inaccurate, since until the words were the same... 
 
Ary Fagundes had already won several poster competitions, among them one on Accident Prevention, 
sponsored by the Institute of Pensions of Stowage, another Posters for the Gala of the hall, and a competition 
sponsored by the Inter-American Posters Ryverside Museum. Moreover, had won the contest to choose the 
cover of the special issue - in celebration of the Day of Advertising - Magazine Advertising, in November 
1941, considered the "synthesis of year Brazilian advertising" and would be distributed in all capitals U.S. 
The alleged amateurism on the poster formerly awarded first, was also mentioned by another artist who 
composed the jury. At that time, 
 
Antonio Breno Junior took the word also talking about plagiarism and saying he did not know the author of 
the award-winning work in the 1st place, but that the provision of sayings revealed an amateur. This 
provision, gathered, contradicted the established technique for such work. 
 
Interesting to note that allegations of amateurism by renowned experts emerged only after the outcome of 
the contest. However, plagiarism was not always a problem. In the second edition of the same day, July 3, just 
hours after the plagiarism scandal have come to light, the other poster was shown by the same newspaper as an 
example of civic campaign for war bonds. It was the "Rubber Used Campaign": 
 
The Campaign Rubber Used - No one is unaware of the importance of rubber for the perfect equipment of 
the forces of democracies fighting against Japanese and Nazi fascism. The campaign which sometimes 
develops in this direction is of great opportunity. Each Brazilian who contributes to the Campaign Used 
Rubber will be working for our victory, victory to the United Nations. 
 
At first glance there seems to be something strange, a poster clearly inspired by a U.S. counterpart, 
something that literally the day before had caused so much confusion? The answer was in a report, published 
in the same newspaper issue, where Ary Fagundes, the famous designer winner of an honourable mention in 
the controversial contest, explaining to the reader the difference between coincidence and plagiarism. In the 
article "Plagiarists today... plagiarisms of tomorrow", Fagundes argues that in poster competitions of war in the 
United States there would be the slightest problem when a good idea is copied from another poster, what 
would have been a common practice in the contest held by MoMA, Union of the Americas. Himself would be 
inspired by a U.S. poster for preparing yours. 
Nevertheless, it may be a coincidence that only historians to scour these posters might notice a few decades 
later. Later that week, on July 09, the controversial tender was cancelled and another was opened and then was 
chosen another poster. In an article published in the Jornal da Manhã on July 27, the posters on the fateful 
contest plagiarized demonstrate a set of bad qualities, as "the clumsiness of the design, the color of poverty, 
lack of originality, no imagination in the words and still lacked a synthesis that would quickly arrest so 
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persuasive and strong, than wanted to express." But maybe that was just the opinion of an aspiring drawing 
frustrated, even before the U.S. copies, so praised in other situations. 
However, as can be noted, did not treat it simply a case of plagiarism. The episode of condemnation, 
justification, and ultimately legitimizing copy, is a strong indication of how some individuals experienced the 
intricate interplay of relations between States and certain groups at a time of crisis and social unrest. Also 
indicates how art, politics and propaganda were imbricated during World War II. 
 
Conclusion  
As noted earlier, while the state invested in new campaigns that created mobilization effects, albeit 
limited, alignment with the United States involved problems for the regime. The United States, as indicated, 
ostensibly attending this propaganda through the private sector. The relationship that some individuals had 
with government agencies and private sector suggest less stable and consistent processes and, indeed, profound 
social and political ambiguities. The intense involvement of the private sector in the field of propaganda, in an 
area considered highly sensitive by the New State , put into question not only the statement that had absolute 
control of the state over the media. Also indicated, and in the opposite part of historiography that treats 
political propaganda Vargas, the effective influence of assumptions and ideals aligned with the United States, 
even before the entry of Brazil in World War II. If political advertising was one of the pillars that held power 
in the period, the posters and the organization of Brazilian advertising indicate important influences beyond the 
German and Italian. 
In the period of state expansion that left traces even in the most unlikely recondite social areas, there was 
a significant impact not only in terms of design, technical and artistic perception and propaganda, but mostly in 
U.S. and Brazilian social life. These insights, as outlined, went beyond the aesthetics, were the basis of 
political trends, and socioeconomic materials that have become hegemonic after World War II. 
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Fiction films and the Algerian war: post-war propaganda and 
competition of memories 
 
Bénédicte Chéron, 
Institute de recherches stratégiques de l’École militaire 
 
 
Introduction 
 
French people have the reputation to be ignorant about how to make movies about their wars, especially 
about the Algerian War. But it is wrong: in fact, there are around 50 French movies about the Algerian War, 
less or more famous and successful. The impression of absence is due to the ideological difficulties to speak 
about this topic. Benjamin Stora explains: « Each group carrying a specific memory about Algeria expects to 
see “his” own movie, to find his own desperate and betrayed hopes”959 . It’s true but it is also true for any war 
and any memory of wars when some fighters are still alive and can tell what they went through during the 
conflict. In this case, the Algerian War is not an exception. What is different with the Algerian War is that they 
always tell the same stories, with the same systems of representations. These are often similar, and movies 
makers would use the same patterns. Movies about other wars of the French history are diversified with a lot of 
different way to tell the conflict but the Algerian War seems to offer only on way to moviemakers that has 
been constructed just after the Evian accords in 1962 and confirmed in the seventies.  
Indeed, nearly all movies are constructed around the duality between victims and executioners. In the 
sixties and seventies, the picture was very simple: victims were those who fought for the Algerian 
independence, as well as the conscripts because as they had fight in a war they had not chosen. Executioners 
were French professional soldiers and officers. The movies of those years seem would mean the French 
soldiers fought for a bad ideal, as they were soldiers without a conscience, without scruple, as they were able 
to justify and use torture. However, in eighties and nineties, all became victims, even executioners of years 
before: French militaries, Algerian independence fighters, “pieds noirs”, “harkis”, and also civilians… All 
became the victims of a historical chaos. Voluntarily or not, movies play with the competition of memories. 
Each group asks to be recognized as the most important victim of the war. Each group is like a small 
community that wants to be a subject for compassion of the nation. In this competition, all movies appear to be 
arms of propaganda after the end of the conflict: a lot of years latter, each of them defends actions of different 
fighters. In this case, propaganda is not aimed at representing of national identity in fight. Each national 
community is divided in several groups.  
 
During the 60’s, cinema never shows the war itself. What interests moviemakers is what fighters have done 
before and after the conflict, but hardly ever during the war. There are only a few exceptions. In all those 
movies, you can already find all stereotypes that have been kept until now. The first film after the end of the 
war is Le petit soldat by Jean-Luc Godard. It was considered, and it is still considered as an exceptional movie. 
It is true if we consider the form of the movie. But what the film wants to say is not very original: it doesn’t 
show the war itself but men who became marginal and violent because of it as they torture and they chose 
illegality. 
 
In the 70’s and 80’s, representations are not very different. All films are stories of torture, marginality and 
violence. Bad guys are always French soldiers or “pieds-noirs”. Positive heroes are conscripts, independence 
fighters and Algerian civilians. During the next decades, films did not explore others approaches, becoming 
maybe less Manichean than years before in the manner they used to describe actors of the war and 
circumstances of their choices.  
 
In the 90’s and 00’s, there are two kinds of films. The first keep on on telling about the destiny of the 
Algerians and the “pieds-noirs” after the end of the conflict and their arrival in France. All the others try to tell 
war stories. These are rarely epic. Most of the time, war is a pretext to show characters of French soldiers, 
conscripts, officers that are more complex than in the years before (especially the seventies). Even sometimes 
they gave way for Algerians who wore the French uniform. These attempts help draw a less caricatural picture 
of the actors of the war but they do not really renew the artistic way to explore the history.  
 
As a consequence, every time a new film comes out, the defensors of each community’s memory go on 
explaining their unsatisfaction and their frustration. In the newspapers, journalists make the trial of the war one 
                                                          
959 Benjamin Stora, Imaginaires de guerre, La Découverte, 2004, p. 190. 
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more time. Every time, everybody, especially those who were invalued in the war, accuse these movies to be 
propaganda films. Propaganda is a crucial question during the war, because it’s a revolutionary war. But we 
are going to see that it goes on being a crucial question after the end of the conflict, as French cinema is one of 
the media that spread systems of representations of the Algerian war. Can we talk about propaganda like a 
systematic action supposed to convince the opinion? In the case of cinema, there is a lot of different authors 
and picture makers and propaganda doesn’t rise in a person we can identify. But the systematism of 
representations leads us to work about this question of propaganda.  
 
 When films deliver a message 
 
If we consider in our study that the film director is the author, analysing the author’s purpose in a film 
implies to take into account the relationship between “what to tell” or the meaning - that is a message -, and 
“what to do” or the making - that is how to build a work -.  
 
This idea that the film director is the author dates from 1949: Astruc, a famous cinema critic published a 
manifest asking that the film director be recognized as the author of the work even if all the others who take 
part in the making of the film are not forgotten. The “authors’ policy” has been defended by a French review 
called “Les cahiers du cinema” since the fifties. The reflexion still goes on and the question is to define how a 
film director can be the author. Jean Collet960, a French specialist of cinema, explains that the notion of author 
cannot amount to the message of an only person or group of persons; it cannot amount to the “what to tell” of 
the film. The author is the one who succeeds in making a work with several persons. Les Cahiers du cinema 
worked to defend this conception of the author of the film. So, the film director is the author because he carries 
out a “what to do” and the film is not only a way to deliver a message with pictures. The author can have 
intentions but the work not depends only on him.  
When “what to tell” prevails over “what to do”, the film carries a message first, around which artistic 
creation is oriented. When “what to do” comes first, it means that the film is truly a collective work which is 
made possible because of one’s creative will, able to make it emerge from technical or economic constrains 
proper to that art.  
 
In the overwhelming majority of French films about the Algerian war, “what to tell” prevails over “what to 
do”, that is the message prevails over the making of a work. There is clearly, every time, a message – that is a 
will to propagate a point of view over the conflict and to stand in the continuing dispute that occurred during 
the war, speaking in favour of a view against another.  
 When film directors are interviewed, they often explain what they wanted to do not with artistic 
considerations but with historic considerations. The film directors would say: “I wanted to explain…” “I 
wanted to prove that…” They compare their project with the common conception of Algerian war history of 
the moment. They also would always compare their film with the others films about the same topic. For 
example, if a lot of films in those years are about Algerian independence fighters, they would explain they 
have wanted to explore another way or to nuance the usual storytelling about this theme. Most of the time, the 
film-directors don’t succeed in leaving behind themselves a very hot argument context.  
 
 
War characters and post-war propaganda 
 
The systematic dimension of representations appears to be particularly accurate when dealing with direct 
protagonists of the war: French soldiers of any rank, independence fighters, politicians, civilians, harkis, pieds-
noirs… All are always presented as actors of a tragedy made of victims and persecutors. Depending on films, 
victims and persecutors change. In more complex stories, victim and persecutor may meet in the same 
character. But the opposition between systems of representations remains, in which each category is associated 
with same features, so that a post-war propaganda is set up. That is the starting point of a new conflict: the 
competition of memories.  
 
 The conscripts, archetypal characters of fighting victims  
 
There are a lot of conscripts in early films about the Algerian war. Film directors are very interested in that 
kind of characters. At the beginning, the conscripts in those films could be conscripts of all other wars. They 
                                                          
960 « Auteur », Jean Collet, in Jean Collet, Michel Marie, Daniel Percheron, Jean-Paul Simon, Marc Vernet 
Lectures du film , Editions Albatros, 1980, p. 29. 
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are archetypes of young men who are going to fight. The most important film showing this is Les Parapluies 
de Cherbourg (Jacques Demy, 1964). More than 1,3 million went to see that musical. The central figure is 
played by Catherine Deneuve, which explains how famous this film is; however a lot of other movies show the 
same ‘conscripts’ characters types: a young man has to leave his family, his job and his fiancé; when he comes 
back, war and military life has changed him. His fiancé may have chosen another man. It is not easy for the 
young man to find a new job and also to find his place in a society in which people do not want to hear about 
what he went through. In these films, the conscript can be a conscript of all contemporary wars: the specificity 
of the Algerian war is not mentioned. The conscripts are no more and no less traumatized than conscripts of 
other wars before. 
 
From the 70’s, this point has changed. In films, the conscripts and the soldiers are fighters of a special war, 
the Algerian war. In the 70’s cinema becomes an actor of the war of memories. In the most militant movies, 
the conscripts are the total victims; they have to fight but they did not choose it, and more than everything, 
they have to discover what torture is. Sometimes they do have to torture civilians. In this respect, the two most 
important films are Avoir vingt ans dans les Aurès by René Vautier (1971) and RAS by Yves Boisset (1972). 
When these two films go out a lot of journalists considered that they were quite caricatural. Only 336 000 
people went to see Avoir vingt ans dans les Aurès but they were more than 1,3 million for RAS. In these films, 
conscripts are the victims of professional militaries and officers; they are definitively traumatized by the 
Algerian war. In the years after, there are more nuances in the films. But until the 00’s, the conscript is always 
a victim even if he wears the French uniform. Even when a moviemaker wants to show conscripts as heroic 
fighters who willingly defend the flag of their country, as Pierre Schoendoerffer in L’honneur d’un capitaine 
(1982), the story favours compassion for these young men who had to fight, rather than an epic tonality.  
 
French soldiers: from violence to trauma 
 
In the 70’s films, French professional soldiers are most of the time executioners, first executioners to the 
conscripts since the latters have to fight against their conscience and then executioners to the civilians and the 
independence fighters. They torture without remorse. Here again, the two most important films are Avoir vingt 
ans dans les Aurès by René Vautier (1971) and RAS by Yves Boisset (1972). Torture is the focal point of these 
films: the conscript who is a victim can become in his turn an executioner because of his chiefs. Some rare 
movies show the officer as a character who accepts to sacrifice himself. He is also a victim because of 
politicians who do not want to take their responsibilities. The officer in Pierre Schoendoerffer’s L’Honneur 
d’un capitaine is this kind of character.   
 
In the years after, until today, professional French soldiers are more and more often shown as victims of 
politicians. They are also their own executioners: they hit their enemies but also themselves because of the 
chaos of history. The stories want to explain how professional soldiers happen to get a taste for war and even 
for torture. These films are not aimed at justifying; they only try to explain. Then, officers are not presented as 
executioners any more but as merely men able to think and cry. Florent-Emilio Siri’s L’Ennemi intime stages 
this type of character: the chief warrant officer, interpreted by Albert Dupontel is a professional soldier, a good 
fighter who turned to be an executioner because he was first a victim of politicians when he fought in 
Indochina before the Algerian war.  
 
So the narratives are less caricatural than before. But they participate in the war of memories by always 
staging characters that are victims. There are not still epic stories even when the central figures are 
professional soldiers.  
 
The civilians, between romantic destiny and tragedy 
 
The civilians become central figures in French cinema about the Algerian war in the 70’s. In those years, 
spectators of the tragedy and victims of the war (Le coup de Sirocco, Alexandre Arcady, 1979); face others 
fighting with the FLN for the Algerian independence (Elise ou la vraie vie, Michel Drach, 1973) or with 
partisans of the French Algeria (Le complot, René Gainville, 1973).  
 
The first, those who are only spectators of the war are often women and children, which increases the 
impression of victimization. Their husbands or fathers die because of the war, as in other wars in the history. 
They are not specifically characters of the Algerian war even if the particular destiny of “pieds-noirs” is often 
explained. But some of these civilians are not only victims: in the bend of a scenario, a “pied-noir” can be 
shown beating a Muslim worker. In this case, the film wants to denounce what is presented as a cause of the 
war: the injustice of the social situation in colonial Algeria.  
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In other movies, some civilians are really engaged in the war. Heroes are most often on the side of the 
Algerian independence. They are men or women, and their destinies are mythical. There are very few films 
that show French Algeria partisans, and in these movies characters are always men and are not really heroes 
but rather disreputable figures.  
 
From the end of the 80’s (Ici, là-bas, Dominique Cabrera, 1988, Des feux mal éteints, Serge Moati, 1993, 
Les roseaux sauvages, André Téchiné, 1995), several films talk about destinies of civilian populations or about 
Algerian people who finally came in France after the end of the war and about « pieds-noirs ». Most of the 
time, the tonality of the scenarios is very emotional. The moviemakers want to show the chaotic destinies of 
the victims of the war.  
 
The Algerian war, matrix of marginality 
 
The Algerian war, with its particular violence and its ideological context, is also a matrix of marginality. 
When films show men who became thieves, gangsters, criminals or murderers after their experience of the war 
in Algeria, they take part in the competition of memories, as they mean that all protagonists are in fact victims. 
There is a lot of this kind of films since the 60’s: L’Insoumis, by Alain Cavalier, in 1964 ; Objectif 500 
millions, by Pierre Schoendoerffer, in 1966 ; Le paria, by Claude Carliez, in 1968 ; Adieu l’ami, by Jean 
Herman, in 1968. In these films, the war is the moment that makes men leave the straight way. This kind of 
representations already exist for others conflicts and it is not a new way to tell the war. What is new is that 
torture is the favourite moment for a man to fall over. Torture abolishes any moral border more and better than 
fights do, even when they are especially violent. 
 
 
How the Algerian war participates to the competition of memories 
 
Can we talk about propaganda since there is no coordination in the diffusion of these representations, while 
each movie is a work in itself, and in no way a single part of a global communication plan? Yes indeed, if we 
consider that each of those who started a film situated themselves – consciously or not, willing or not – in any 
of both sides who had developed an obvious propaganda during the conflict. So propaganda might have 
continued in peacetime so as to justify in retrospect behaviours of both sides.   
 
This observation can also be done about others conflicts. Although the First World War is the subject of a 
lot of very different films, the others French wars of the XXth century remain complex topics for the French 
cinema. We have to precise here that showing the war is not easy for the French cinema as in the origin it 
comes from theatre and is more intimist than American cinema, which comes from circus and visual arts. So, 
French film directors often choose an intimist way to show the war; in this aspect, war is not a spectacle in 
itself but as a particular context to tell individual destinies. But it is also true that the ideology is still crucial: 
film directors have difficulties in showing the wars that still hurt French memories. It is true for the Second 
World War, but above all for the Algerian War.   
 
The torture, focal point for the French cameras 
 
In the 60’s, torture is nearly totally absent in French films, as if it were a wound impossible to study since it 
still hurts too much. Le petit soldat by Jean-Luc Godard is an exception: the moviemaker chooses to show 
torture explicitly. Executioners are members of the FLN. There is only one other exception in Muriel ou le 
temps d’un retour by Alain Resnais (1963) : a young man comes back from Algeria where he fought as a 
conscript. He feels bad and once, at the end of the film, he shows to an old man a short film he had made 
during the war. There is nothing about the fights, since what is at stake is the relationship between young 
conscripts: the boy tells about an episode of his war, when other conscripts tortured a young woman called 
Muriel. He saw her wounded and dead body. 
 
The topic became focal in the 70’s. All films about Algerian war talk about torture at a given moment. The 
question is how to show torture. Some moviemakers choose not to show it, only suggesting it by words and 
images. This is what Pierre Schoendoerffer does in L’Honneur d’un capitaine. All the film talks about torture 
but torture never appears on the screen. We never see the man who is supposed to die because of torture. In 
contrast, in La Question, by Laurent Heynemann (1977), the audience can see the horror of a tortured body. 
Between these two examples, all types of representation exist and the question has been asked to all 
moviemakers since the 70’s.  
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Every time, torture is an important point of the war of memories about the Algerian war because its use 
disqualifies those who used it. They cannot be pitied if they tortured. Only since a few years, scenarios try to 
explain and describe figures that are both executioners and victims.  
 
The duality between victims and persecutors 
 
From the 60’s to our days, the cinema has evolved: scenarios are less caricatural and manicheist. There are 
no more good fighters in the camp of the Algerian independence and bad guys under the French uniform. 
There are no more perfect victims (conscripts, Algerian civilians or Algerian independence fighters) facing 
persecutors (professional French soldiers, officers…). There is really a will to propose differentiating movies.  
 
But all movies are built on the duality between victims and persecutors even if the moviemakers make an 
effort to understand destinies and choices made in a very complex context – even if the victims are no more 
only the conscripts, the Algerian civilians and the Algerian independence fighters, and even if Pierre 
Schoendoerffer’s films are quite different from other movies. The tone of every film about the Algerian war is 
built around the question of the victims, which participates in making the war of memories go on.  Indeed, 
there is neither epic films about the Algerian war, nor politic films. About other contemporary conflicts, the 
cinematographic landscape is a quite varied and contrasted. The films talk about a lot of topics, such as 
political responsibilities or how war can also be an epic adventure. About the Algerian war, all films analyse 
individual fates with a mostly emotional approach, for actors supposed to be victims.  
 
Conclusion 
 
So, speaking of propaganda might be a little excessive but the repetition of narratives which date from war 
time or immediate post-war years lead us to use this word of “propaganda” in this particular signification. 
Representations released by these movies are systematic and raise the issue of a conflict going on in images. 
The French cinema about the Algerian war suffers from a lack of diversity of points of view and scenarios. It is 
true that the nature of the conflict contributes to cause emotional narratives. It was really a collective and 
individual tragedy. When we think of this war, we first feel a deep sadness. The way the end of the war was 
negotiated, the fates of the populations after the end of the conflict, the fate of Algeria itself since 1962 lead us 
to a tragic approach. It is also true that the French cinema is more able to talk about emotional narratives than 
epic narratives. But it could be possible to diversify the cinematographic landscape about the Algerian war, 
even with a dramatic scenario. A lot of French films deal with politics or international relations, but these 
topics appear to be totally absent in films about the Algerian war. Maybe the evolution since the beginning of 
the 21st century announces a change; maybe it will incite moviemakers to look further to understand this war 
and to help the audience understand it. But they will need boldness, since each new movie initiates a new trial 
of the war and its different protagonists in the media. It is a fact that such disputes usually do not increase the 
audience, and cinema is first an industry with obligations of rentability.  
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THE COUNTER-SPINOLISM  
of AMÍLCAR CABRAL and the PAIGC: 
THE WEAPON of PROPAGANDA 
 
Márcio Barbosa, 
CEIS20-UC 
 
 
«I'm just a simple African, doing my duty in my own country, 
in the context of our time» 
Amílcar Cabral 
 
 
«The only effective way for the definitive achievement of the 
aspirations of peoples is through the armed combat»961 
Idem. 
 
 
«A revolution is dead when it has no friends in the outside 
world»962 
Idem. 
 
I - Introduction 
 
According to Manuel Brito-Semedo 963 , «the Cape Verdean national identity emerged during specific 
moments of socio-economic and political-ideological crisis»964.  
The first of those moments appeared as a result of the British Ultimatum. Faced with the greater 
requirements of an oversized empire, expressed in the constancy of an insufficient colonizing capacity exposed 
by the humiliation imposed by his Majesty, the King of England,  the idea of selling the colonies begins to 
spread. This consequently caused deep rift and revolt, especially in Cape Verde, which had for some time, 
been supporting the idea of acquiring a status similar to that of the archipelagos of Madeira and Azores.965 It 
would mean a greater and effective integration with the metropolis.  
The second moment was caused by the international economic crisis of 1929-1934, relayed by the minor 
crises «of 1920-1922 and 1947-1949, which brought misery and death. This, in turn mobilized the intellectual 
elite to defend their land and assert its regional identity as a special case within the Portuguese Empire.»966 The 
                                                          
961 CABRAL, Amílcar; Guiné-Bissau: nação africana forjada na luta, Nova Aurora, Textos Amílcar Cabral, Lisboa, 1974, 
p.7.  
962 GUINEA (BISSAU); Guinea (Bissau): the struggle continues: Amilcar Cabral 1925-1973. - Durham : The Southern 
Africa Committee(South), 1973.  
963 Cabral no Cruzamento de Épocas, communications and discourses produced in II International Symposium Amílcar 
Cabral, Alpha Communications, Cape Verde, 2005. BRITO-SEMEDO, Manuel; Do nativismo ao Nacionalismo: a 
construção da identidade nacional, pp.325-339.  
964 Idem, p.327.  
965 Claim that, in fact, found an echo in Portuguese Government. A decade before the Ultimatum, «o Almirante Ferreira do 
Amaral, então Ministro da Marinha e Ultramar, no Decreto de 24 de Dezembro de 1882, que aprovou a “Organização 
Administrativa da Província de Cabo Verde”, escrevia: a muitos se tem afigurado que á província de Cabo Verde se 
deveria dar uma organização semelhante à dos archipelagos dos Açores e Madeira […]. Tal desideratum só poderá, 
porém, obter-se, quando pela diffusão da instrução, tanto agrícola como litteraria, pelo desenvolvimento sucessivo das 
forças vitais da província, se possa esperar que o que hoje se nos afigura menos pratico, venha a constituir uma 
aspiração e um objectivo […] como a consequência de um progresso effectivo que represente um direito e uma 
realidade.» Idem, pp.328-329.  
966 Idem, p.331. 
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decline of the Porto Grande, which contributed with two-thirds of the total income of the colony, and the 
inadequacy of measures taken by the Portuguese government, led the Cape Verdean elites to express the order, 
voiced by Baltazar Lopes in 1989: «we had to intervene.» This intervention basically assumed two forms: a 
popular revolt (the famous "revolt of Nhô Ambrose", June 7, 1934) and the political, social and civic 
associations (creation of "Cape Verdean" Regionalist Union, extinguished by Ordinance nº 22: 468, April 11, 
1933, which aimed to control the free associations, the publication of the Journal News in Cape Verde and the 
journal Claridade - revista de arte e letras).  
The third moment culminated in the theorization of the Guinea Cape Verde unification project and in the 
formation of the independentist movement – the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde 
(PAIGC) – in 1956. With the once young opponent to the dictatorial regime and the Student’s House of the 
Empire (Casa dos Estudantes do Império – CEI) – Amílcar Cabral (1925-1973) participating decisively. This 
entity, whose creation fit into the wider plan of Assimilation, but that, according to Adriano Moreira (Overseas 
Minister between 1961-62) «completely backfired», because «everybody became revolutionaries».967  
As a logical sequence of the events briefly summarised, the fight for independence in the context of 
Portuguese overseas territories is also a logical product of the post-war historical conjuncture of 1939-45. The 
Portuguese persistence in maintaining an imperialist/colonialist model unsustainable and anachronistic for its 
overseas territories, supported by a dictatorial regime, in international dynamics reportedly antagonistic, 
characterized by Eurocentric perspective failure and consequent return of Europe to its original geography, 
would contribute greatly to add complexity and difficulty to a public problem materialized in a long armed 
conflict. 
By structurally following a chronological order, we will start by presenting the fundamentals-challenged 
basis of the theological and ideological struggle of PAIGC until 1968, uniquely expressed by its charismatic 
leader – Amílcar Cabral.  
In the year of 1968 the then Brigadier António de Spínola (1910-1996) was appointed to the Office of 
Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces (AF). Using the dynamic political action 
carried out by Spínola (studied in more detail in another text968) as a starting point, we will attempt, in the next 
chapter, to understand the changes in the anti-colonial struggle of PAIGC and to what extent they were 
influenced by it and vice versa.  
   
 II – The thought of Amílcar Cabral and the early years of anti-colonial struggle  
 
«Africa is in crisis»; «Africa is ill». These were the widespread African intelligence diagnoses after the 
huge independence movement spreading throughout the former European colonies, at a time (1961) in which 
almost only Portugal still remained on this continent. Frantz Fanon, great reference of the African struggle for 
independence, in particular for Amílcar Cabral, advances an explanation, in his major work – Les Dannés de la 
Terre (1961) – for African’s "affliction": «the absence of ideology of their leaders».969  
                                                          
967 Interview, 05/06/2012.  
968 BARBOSA, Márcio, Spínola, Portugal e o Mundo: pensamento e acção política nos anos da Guiné – 1968-73, in 
Revista de História das Ideias, Vol. 28, FLUC, 2007, pp.391-427. 
969 In BRAGANÇA, Aquino de; Amílcar Cabral, Lisboa, Iniciativas Editoriais, 1976, p.5.  
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The void left by the disappearance of European and colonial domination, constituted the main concern of 
African leaders. This was, in fact, initially explored by European powers after the first countries became 
independent.970 
Identified as the origin of African’s leaders élite, the small-urban bourgeoisie, paradoxically associated 
with colonialist exploitation, was quickly identified as the source of the post colonialists difficulties, because, 
after independence, it didn’t defend the collective interests of the masses that fed it, but their own specific 
interests. Fanon has prescribed the immediate need to «neutralize» it, recognizing, however, that the African 
reality was completely different from the European or Russian reality.  
Cabral, for his side, sought to go deeper, to the central question, which was about «who will be able, in the 
destruction of the colonial power, to take control of the State apparatus?».971 Fanon claimed it would be the 
peasantry, considering that in the former colonies only they were revolutionary. This position would prove 
itself to be wrong 972 and one that Cabral would distance himself from, providing his own explanations, 
processes of thought and a solid path, but also original and consequent that was being built.  
Demarcating himself early from the of the great African ideologies and movements, and questioning their 
«key concepts» (the so-called concepts-caoutchouc) – blackness, African socialism – considering them an 
«ideology of imagination», Amílcar himself indicates the origin of the ideological African failure, doing it in 
the form of warning: «the crisis of the African revolution, far from being a growth crisis, is primarily a crisis of 
knowledge [...]. In many cases, the practice of liberation struggle and the prospects for the future are not only 
devoid of theoretical basis, but also detached from the concrete reality of the environment».973  
In the period of time that goes from 1953 to 1961, when the the armed conflict in Angola started, Cabral 
takes special interest in 974 the Guinean and Cape Verdean reality, to firmly identify the problems and build his 
conceptual building.  
Trained as an agricultural engineer, Cabral got a job in colonial administration and in the years 1954-58 he 
devoted himself to conducting a series of surveys in Guinea that allowed him to know thoroughly the entire 
Guinean territory. A fact that, obviously, would be of vital importance in the near future and would allow him 
to understand the importance of the complex and atomistic peasant reality of Portuguese Guinea975, structurally 
                                                          
970 When it comes to the Government in 1961, Adriano Moreira expressed his scepticism about the success of the "African 
Revolutions", saying that "the political practice has shown more often than to wish that active minorities reached the 
power could not, in the face of assumptions received the October revolution, nor respect the traditional cultures that 
said want to defend, nor the secular institutional groups that found themselves obliged to attack and destroy nor 
maintain easily – when did the appearance of independence – the actual exercise of sovereignty». In Estudos de 
Homenagem ao Professor Adriano Moreira, ISCSP – UTL, Lisboa, 1995, p.37.  
971 Idem, p.7.  
972 In line with Nygen Nghe, from Vietnam Workers Party, who said that «a peasant revolution cannot be more than an 
adventure without tomorrow», Renate Zahar stated that «Fanon gives us a properly phenomenological description of 
neo-colonialism but it turns out that the categories that uses have nothing to do with the analysis of the structure of the 
classes, I mean, the economic relations of dependence». In ZAHAR, Renate, L’oeuvre de Frantz Fanon, Ed. Maspero, 
1970, p.105.  
973 CABRAL, Amílcar, Uma crise de conhecimento, Departamento de Informação do PAIGC, 1961, p.13.  
974 The ability and the taste for "learning" continuous in is life was a feature very much and which also imposed their party 
comrades:  
«Require party officials engaged seriously to the study, which are interested in the things and problems of life 
and struggle in its fundamental, essential, and not just in their appearances; We should force each charge to improve 
day by day, their knowledge, their culture, their political formation, convincing each that nobody can know without 
learning and that the most ignorant person is one who knows without having learned. Learn in life, learn from our 
people, learn in books and on the experience of others. Learn always.» In PARTIDO AFRICANO DA 
INDEPENDÊNCIA DA GUINÉ E CABO VERDE; Manual político do PAIGC, 2ª ed.; S.l., Edições Maria da Fonte, 
1974, p.11.  
975 At the time, the population of Guinea was evaluated in approximately 800,000 inhabitants, with the following "tribal" 
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characterized by very particular social levels, from «semi feudalist» companies (Fulas, Manjacos) to «stateless 
societies» (Balanta). A reality that, in fact, only confirmed the criticism addressed to Fanon.  
In the process of consolidating his ideas, Amílcar realized that it wasn't only the peasantry that had no 
conditions to, of their own resources and action, engage in the fight anti-colonialist. In fact, for him, none of 
the social classes in formation in Guinea was in a position to do so. Not the proletariat, virtually non-existent, 
due to the fact that the slow and recent urbanization process was not, according to Cabral, accompanied by an 
industrial development.976 This apparently obvious but original finding, lead to the rejection of a so-called 
«institutionalised Marxism», i.e. a sort of priori and anachronistic «recipe», homogenizing and indifferent or 
outside reality, proclaiming the universal vocation of the revolutionary proletariat (in this case African) even 
when this did not exist (the most common).  
The analysis made by Adriano Moreira in 1977, in his Chronicle of the revolution, goes in that sense: 
«within Portuguese reality only one man stood out, by his vigour and personality, this was Amílcar Cabral. He 
separated Marxism perfectly, as methodology and theory, from Leninism, which is a doctrine for action and 
implementing soviet ideals. He was the only one who sought to regionalize Marxism, elaborating his thinking 
out of the African reality».977 
Excluded paths historically pointed, for his theoretical and practical infeasibility, Guinean nationalist elite 
(in fact, Cape Verdean) discovers in the urban petty bourgeoisie the social support that it considered 
indispensable to the survival of the PAIGC (created in 1956) and to the anti-colonialist struggle success, for if 
he think be the only social category/class with a totalizing vision of the colonial situation and the only «able to 
drive and to use the instruments that the colonial State served himself against the people».978  
By an individualized and adapted interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, as no one had done before him 979, 
Cabral didn’t propose some kind of historic bourgeoisie «rehabilitation». For otherwise, he proposed guide it 
in the direction of the party reason, exploiting the advantage of its existence in the less developed territory, at 
all levels, of the Portuguese overseas territories.980  
According to the Secretary-General of PAIGC, while «in the capitalist countries the bourgeoisie is a layer 
which serve without that she can change the historical orientation of the country»981, in the specific case of 
Guinea and Cape Verde, due to the social and economic characteristic archaism, the situation could be very 
different if she'd taken the «suicide». In other words, if it were subjected to the popular «control» and barred 
from ascending to what Cabral called «pseudo-bourgeoisie». In the sense of «revolutionary consciousness» 
development, as he said, quoting Fidel Castro. 982 
However, don't think that the question was resolved. To achieve a really national revolution, Cabral knew 
to be necessary to bring together and coordinate the different classes and ethnicities. Because, as confirmed the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
composition: Balantas – 250.000; Manjacos – 140.000; Fulas – 100.000; Mandingas – 80.000; Papéis – 5.000; Bramas 
– 35.000; Bijagós – 15.000.  
976 In the years 60, Bissau, the most important city, administrative capital of the province, had about 25,000 inhabitants.  
977 MOREIRA, Adriano, O Novíssimo Príncipe: análise da revolução, Prefácio, Lisboa, 2003 (edição original de 1977), 
p.61.  
978 BRAGANÇA, Aquino de; p.8.  
979 Cabral no Cruzamento de Épocas, communications and discourses produced in II International Symposium Amílcar 
Cabral, Alpha Communications, Cape Verde, 2005, pp.723-739: Contribuição teórica de Amílcar Cabral, por Amady Aly 
Dieng.  
980 According to the scheme itself advocated the «Portuguese Guinea» was a «colonial factory», no white settlers, a 
typology absolutely outdated. MOTA, Teixeira da, Guiné portuguesa, Agência Geral do Ultramar, Lisboa, 1954)  
981 BRAGANÇA, Aquino de; p.8.  
982 PARTIDO AFRICANO DA INDEPENDÊNCIA DA GUINÉ E CABO VERDE; Manual político do PAIGC, p.20.  
 350 
recent experiences of the «third world», if it was around and by the action of urban petty bourgeoisie who was 
formed the core of contestation, there were the peasants who constituted the «army of liberation».  
In the first years of life, there was a constant review of the policy guidelines of the party, caused by the 
difficulties associated to the militancy activity.  
In August 3, 1959 happens the "Dockers' strike" on the docks of Pigjiguiti, where the "colonialists" forces 
shot down several dozen of strikers, in what became known as the «Massacre of the Pigjiguiti». This event was 
significant in the evolution Cabral’s ideas and in the guidance of the party and the fight anti-colonialist. In a 
hard exercise of self-criticism, Cabral says: «the party had followed a line wrong [...]. The lack of experience 
made us think that we could fight in cities through strikes and other peaceful actions forgetting the peasants 
who make up the majority of the people of Guinea-Bissau».983  
The indispensable popular mobilization had been insufficient until the tragic event. The same checked on 
partisan activism and membership of the PAIGC. The recruitment effort, accompanied by a more judicious 
selection, was substantially increased. For about two years (1960-1962) have been prepared about a thousand 
"future paintings" in the foyer of the PAIGC in Conakry, party headquarters until the end of the war. 
The priority was no longer the relatively peaceful claim984, but the conquest and the immediate exercise of 
power through armed fight985, initiated internally, amongst the Balanta, on the night of June 30 to July 1, 1962. 
Six months later, in January 1963, when PAIGC massively attacks the Portuguese military positions, the 
military command admitted that the «rebels» had controlled about 15% of the Guinean territory. Between days 
13 and February 17 1964 takes place the Congress of Cassacá, where (said Cabral) there was the «courage to 
create a new life to the party, decide on the creation of a Regular Army (the revolutionary armed forces of the 
people), of people's militia, of schools, hospitals, to train nurses, etc., and opened a new path for the pilot 
School, where they started to form young men and women to be useful to the people and to fight».986 
With a extensive vision of what should be the «liberation fight», Cabral, in these years ranging from 
«Pigjiguiti» Massacre to the "colonialist" counteroffensive, along with the armed fight, increments its effort to 
deepen theoretical and conceptual structure, fundamental element of the party and its purpose. 
It will be under the great motto – «The Weapon of Theory» – that Cabral will develop its revolutionary 
theory. He says that «if it is true that a revolution can fail even fuelled by theories perfectly designed, yet no 
one held a victorious revolution without revolutionary theory».987  
Without rejecting the “class struggle”, he tried to flexible and relativizedg the concept, both the historic as 
geographically. «If the class struggle – says Cabral – is the driving force of the story, all is in a given period. 
This means that before the class struggle – and necessarily after – a factor or factors, was and will be the 
                                                          
983 Idem, p.12.  
984 «We believed then that only a proper and effective UN intervention in favour of the inalienable rights of our people, 
would lead the Portuguese Government to respect international legality and moral of our time.»  
«As our proposals have not had favourable acceptance, even on the part of the Portuguese Government, nor the 
UN, patriotic forces of our country began a widespread action against colonial forces in January 1963.» CABRAL, 
Amílcar; Textos políticos, S.l., PAIGC, s.d., 32 p.. Colonialismo e Luta de Libertação dos Povos Africanos, 5, pp.7 e 8 
respectivamente.  
985 «The unique and effective route to the final realization of the aspirations of peoples, i.e. for obtaining the national 
freedom, is the armed struggle». Idem, p.10.  
 «No force can prevent the complete liquidation of Portuguese colonialism». Idem, p.6.  
986 CABRAL, Amílcar, Evolução e Perspectivas da Luta (Seminar of frames held from 19 to November 24, 1969), Serviço 
de Informação do PAIGC, 1969, p.26.  
987 Idem, p.14. Taken from the speech made by Cabral in the first Conference of solidarity of the peoples of Africa, Asia 
and Latin America, in January 1966, in the city of Havana, Cuba.  
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engine of history. We easily admit that this factor in the history of each human group is the mode of 
production – the level of the productive forces and the regime of property – that characterizes this group».988 
This permanent and distinctive effort to harmonize their main theories and philosophical currents of history 
with the regional particularities, extended to the imperialist phenomenon against which directly fought and, 
above all, to the so-called phenomenon of "neo-colonialism".989 Defending the end of the first, he says that 
«the liberation struggle of colonial peoples is the essential characteristic, we would say the main motor, of the 
March of history in our time». 990  In relation to the second point he advises that «the neo-colonialist 
phenomenon showed us that one cannot doubt the close relationship that exists between our fight and the fight 
of the working class internationally».991 
Associating the liberation movements in Africa to «European left» and «international workers movements» 
through the common bond – "revolution" — he waits for his support. «In Guinea we fight with guns in hand; 
fight, you also, I'm not saying in which way, because the problem is yours; but we must find the means and the 
way to fight against the common enemy; will be the best proof of solidarity which you can give us».992  
However, the situation on the ground was favourable to the PAIGC. Cabral says, in 1966, be on move a 
«progressive reversal of the situation of the two forces in presence».993 
Faced with the growing pessimistic scenario for the Portuguese armed forces, practically conducted to a 
defensive action (about 60% of regions with 50% of the population find themselves partially or totally 
controlled in late 1966), begins to hover the spectre of defeat. In 1968, in a last-ditch effort to prevent the 
collapse, Salazar invites the then Brigadier General António de Spínola to the Office of Governor-General and 
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces in Guinea.  
 
III – The Counter-spinolism of Cabral and the PAIGC  
 
The arrival of Spínola coincides with the maximum point of tiredness, even exhaustion, of Guinean 
guerrilla.994 That, of course, greatly contributed to the initial impact of political action of Spínola. That would 
begin soon, by the reorganization, for example, of the organic framework of the military Cabinet of the Chief 
Command of Guinea, established by Ordinance No. 23627, September 26, 1968, with particular attention to 
the «Psychological Operations» and «Sub-section of Broadcasting» in the Information Section.  
Wielding at the beginning the Eagles of «multicontinentality», «multiracialism», «multiculturalism»995, 
«Africanism»996 and «self-determination»997, synthesized in the formula «unity in diversity» widespread during 
                                                          
988 Ibidem.  
989 «We are aware of the fact that our victory will not be easy. We have an organisation which has experience about the 
nature of our enemy and the particularities that characterize in relation to other forces colonialists. Even though he is 
isolated, we must not forget that there is also much destruction forces superior to ours and that of open or secret way, is 
helped and supported by other enemy forces of freedom and progress of the African peoples. So we fight against world 
imperialism.» Idem, p.18.  
990 “Guiné e Cabo Verde, face ao colonialismo português”, Article published in paragraph 7 of the “Partisans”, 1962. Idem, 
16.  
991 Ibidem.  
992 Idem, p.17.  
993 BRAGANÇA, Aquino de; p.15.  
994 PEREIRA, Aristides; Uma luta, um partido, dois países, Notícias Editorial, Lisboa, 2002, p.175.  
995 «The African societies are tribal societies in which the concept of tribe translates our concept of Nation. The European 
presence in Africa is seen by indigenous mass as a supranational power that establishes the synthesis of various 
Nations.» SPÍNOLA, António de, Linha de acção, Agência-Geral do Ultramar, Lisboa, 1971, p.53. 
996 As seemed to him to be «pure utopic intends to accomplish lasting work in Africa without the anchoring in solid pillars 
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Marcelo government (1968-74), in power only a few months after the departure of Spínola to Guinea, the 
Commander-in-Chief undertook an absolutely revolutionary policy in the Portuguese context, based on the 
theory (already developed in the main Western military schools) that «to the social subversive revolution must 
be oppose, cleverly, a progressive social revolution, or, in other terms, a counter-revolution anti-
reactionary»998. Aware that «the force of arms can perpetuate the problem, but never solves it»999, as he has 
observed in Angola, in the command of the Cavalry Battalion No. 345, its «big policy school».  
Spinolist political action aimed at the peaceful conquest of the Guinean population and the positive 
achievement of international public opinion, at a time when Portugal was heavily criticized and found 
himself in accelerated political isolation process, in particular at the UN. 
The PAIGC's response was, of course, in the same direction.  
Externally, the successes of the fight of Cabral had begun in 1960, with public denunciations of 
Portuguese colonialism, with extensive international projection, by the leader of PAIGC, when in the 
second half of this year the UN Trusteeship Council defined the Portuguese Government bonds as 
administrator of «non-autonomous territories» (art. 73º), requiring him to pay information about the 
conditions of existence and situation of peoples subject to their sovereignty and dominion.1000 
In December 14, 1960, at its XV session, the UN General Assembly adopted the 1514 resolution by a 
large majority1001. The PAIGC had achieved international recognition. Always challenged by Portugal, in 
particular by Spínola, for whom liberation movements have always been «terrorists». 
The political-diplomatic work of PAIGC (until 1960) was mainly focussed to win the maximum support 
possible to the Republic of Guinea, Senegal and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to affirm the 
party.  
Paradoxically, it would be as a result of a serious problem with the Conakry’s authorities, the traffic of 
arms from Morocco to the Republic of Guinea, that this would provide the support that only stated 
intention.1002 Later, in 1970, Spínola would preciously contribute to deepening its relations with «green sea 
operation» 1003. In fact, this operation was the height point of the hypothesis, not discarded yet, of a military 
victory. During 1970 the balance of power has evolved quickly. The military potential of PAIGC, according 
to information from PIDE/DGS (intelligence policy), allowed him, «at any time, speed up the evolutionary 
process of war»1004, since they had «each time more material»1005. The operation failure would moralized 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
of African social traditions.» Idem, No Caminho do Futuro, 1972, p.202.  
997 His «self-determination» concept was basically this: unanimous manifestation of national will, and the people, «the 
nation's moral reserve», decide on their political organization, «in the light of the principle enshrined in that 
sovereignty resides in the nation». Idem, Linha de Acção, 1971, p.329.  
998 SPÍNOLA, António de, Linha de acção, Agência-Geral do Ultramar, Lisboa, 1971, pp.56-57.  
999 SPÍNOLA, António de, Por uma Portugalidade Renovada, Agência-Geral do Ultramar, Lisboa, 1973, p.287. 
1000 DUARTE, Manuel, Cabo-Verdianidade e Africanidade e Outros Textos, Spleen Edições, 1999. 
1001 Resolution 1514 (XV), based on the fundamental principles of human rights and the free determination of peoples, 
condemned in generic terms all forms of colonialism, stating that «all peoples have the right to free determination; in virtue 
of this right, freely determine their economic, social and cultural development»; and that, moreover, «the lack of 
preparation in the political, economic or social domains or in the field of education, should never be taken as a pretext for 
delaying independence». 
1002 PEREIRA, Aristides; idem, p.183.  
1003 «The operation may be discussed in some aspects of driving, there are always two or three solutions to a problem. But 
the one Calvão chose was, in my point of view, entirely correct, I would have done exactly the same, technically his 
performance was perfect. Today I have no doubt that the responsibility of this failure was entirely by PIDE, all the 
information provided were false.» Interview to Carlos Fabião. In:  
 http://www.uc.pt/cd25a/wikka.php?wakka=ecfabiao. 
1004 IAN/TT, Arquivo da PIDE, SC, Pastas Organizadas por Províncias Ultramarinas – Guiné, caixa 2, fls. 1-45. Cit. em 
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the guerrillas who, in 1971, attacked systematically Bissau and other secondary cities with rockets.1006  
One of the diplomatic strategies that Cabral skilfully will use was to proposed tours for the foreign 
delegations into the territories under PAIGC command. Spínola also would try to do it.  
Mandated by the OAU Liberation Committee, a delegation of military experts of the Republic of 
Guinea, Mauritania and Senegal visited some regions controlled by PAIGC, in August and September 
1969. Thanks to initiatives like these ones, the personal prestige of Amílcar Cabral and PAIGC was 
considerably strengthened.  
In response to the propagandised Spinola’s policy «By a Better Guinea »1007, that Cabral qualified by 
being «demagogic» and «last-minute reforms of Portuguese Government», he says that «in the current 
conditions of the fight, despite the high costs of travel and stay in Western countries, we are determined to 
allow the sacrifices needed to develop these activities, because, at this stage of the struggle, the 
intensification of armed action must go in parallel with an intense political action at international level»1008.  
In the month of June of the year following the OAU delegation, in 1970, Pope Paul VI receives at the 
Vatican the leaders of liberation movements – Amílcar Cabral, Agostinho Neto and Marcelino dos Santos. 
It was another PAIGC hard blow to the Portuguese "Catholic" authorities, in this case accompanied by, 
showing enormous diplomatic and propagandistic diligence.  
In 1972, the (very) expected constitutional review, in which we could highlight the Statute of autonomy 
for the overseas territories, called «Progressive Autonomy» of Overseas Provinces. Spínola was already 
rehearsing in Guinea an attempt at administrative decentralization and autonomy, implementing in fact a 
progressive policy, once the constitutional review, with swiftly and media exploitation.  
However, the PAIGC was prepared for the «constitutional gimmick», as he called it. At the first meeting 
of the Security Council, held in Addis Ababa in February 1972, Cabral deconstructs what it calls 
Portuguese policies «moves», categorically manifesting the irreversible intention of the party in 
proclaiming, in due course, the existence of the sovereign State of Guinea.1009  
In the following June, in the IX Conference of the OAU, Cabral presents a document1010 which explains 
the steps and the mechanisms leading to the desired proclamation of the Guinean State in order to get the 
support of the African heads of State.  
The best diplomatic/propagandistic coup of Cabral would be the call for UN to visit the zones occupied 
by the PAIGC. In the report of the special mission led by party between 1 and April 8, 1972, was the 
recognition of vast areas controlled by PAIGC, which resulted in the establishment of cooperative 
relationships with some specialized agencies of the United Nations, and, with more international impact, in 
the adoption by the Security Council, chaired by Jeanne Martin Cisse of Guinea, of the resolution 
condemning the Portuguese Government.  
Before the external pressure and growing internal political difficulties, Spínola increments the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
MATEUS, Dalila Cabrita, A evolução das guerras coloniais na perspectiva dos relatórios de informação, Revista 
Portuguesa de História, t.XXXVIII, 2006, pp.155-180.  
1005 IAN/TT, Arquivo da PIDE, SC, Pastas Organizadas por Províncias Ultramarinas – Guiné, caixa 4, fls. 313-315. Idem.  
1006 IAN/TT, Arquivo da PIDE, SC, Pastas Organizadas por Províncias Ultramarinas – Guiné, caixa 8, fls. 227-364. Idem.  
1007 Vide BIBLIOGRAFIA: SPÍNOLA, António de.  
1008 CABRAL, Amílcar, Discurso do Camarada Secretário-geral na Reunião do Conselho de Segurança em Adis Abeba, 
Serviços de Informação do PAIGC, Fevereiro de 1972. 
1009 Ibidem.  
1010 CABRAL, Amílcar, Situation de la lute du PAIGC en Janvier 1973 – Rapport à l’intention de l’OUA, s.d., p.8.  
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propaganda and dramatizes the discourse: shots harsh criticism to the nation’s «rear» and, in the summer of 
1972, travels to Lisbon to obtain authorization from the President of the Council to open negotiations with 
the PAIGC, mediated by the President of Senegal, which could lead to an end of the conflict. Amílcar had 
not closed the door of negotiations: «if the Government of Portugal wants to discuss or negotiate on the 
situation in Guinea and Cape Verde, he must and can do it with our combatant Party».1011 The President of 
the Council refused. Guinea was not the priority, he «rather a military defeat to negotiate with terrorists». 
Spínola kept temporarily the revolt and frustration, proportional to their political ambitions.  
The successive diplomatic victories achieved by the move would allow to Cabral affirm, representing 
PAIGC, «that our national liberation fight is not only the most advanced of Africa but also one of the most 
advanced in the general framework of the fight of the oppressed people against imperialism and 
colonialism»1012.  
The General Spínola policy of «smile and blood»1013, according to the guerrillas, wasn't to produce 
positive results. On the contrary, was being exploited by the PAIGC. In June 1972, when Spínola was 
preparing to go to Lisbon, says that «the war cannot be won by military means». Cabral takes advantage of 
the outburst to announce to the international public opinion the military and diplomatic victories of the 
PAIGC. Consistent with the politic and diplomatic war, the fight for the conquest of the indigenous peoples 
was fundamental.  
With the Portuguese military forces at a critical moment, limited in combat initiative and drive capability, 
Spínola could in the early years of his term rebalance the conflict, as is unanimously recognized1014, essentially 
by psychological action and the policy for a «Best Guinea».1015   
Against Spínola’s attempt to cause division between Guinea and Cape Verde and consequent dissolution of 
PAIGC, this one adopted the motto «Unity and Struggle». Appealing directly to the two peoples, Cabral stated: 
«if we just take Guinea, we see many contradictions within it. In Cape Verde, taking only Cape Verde, there 
are many contradictions. But taking on the whole, the contradictions decrease.»1016 We now know how much 
this project depended on Amílcar Cabral.  
With significant irony, the PAIGC including use in his favour Portuguese colonialism emblematic phrases, 
such as the following: «Children of Guinea and Cape Verde, you are one under the Portuguese flag»!1017 And 
to combat the intense social and cultural activity of the Governor of the province, Amílcar Cabral truly strives 
                                                          
1011 Idem, Mais Pensamento para melhor Agir mais Actividade para melhor Pensar, mensagem de ano novo, 1972.  
1012 Idem, Memorandum a l’intention dês Chefs d’Etat ou de Gouvernement d’Afrique, 9ème Conférence de l’OUA, Rabat, 
1972, p. 9.  
1013 «les colonialistes portugais, dont le premier représentant en Guinée est un homme qui avait déjá les mains teintées du 
sang des peuple portugais et angolais».CABRAL, Amílcar; Dix ans aprés le massacre de Pidjiguiti: rapport sur la 
situation de la lutte, PAIGC, 1970, 25 p.  
1014 PEREIRA, Aristides; idem, p.190. CARVALHO, Otelo Saraiva de, Alvorada em Abril, Bertrand, Lisboa, 1977, p.51 e 
segs.  
1015 Characterized by: 
-impact on the populations in urban centres; 
-simultaneous development of psychosocial and military actions, based on the realization of social works 
(People's Congress) and infrastructure; 
-promotion of divisionism between Guinea and Cape Verde; 
-recruitment of Guineans to the war (africanization of war); 
-distribution impassioned tradition on the populations under direct influence of PAIGC; 
-strengthening of military action to bring about the complete demoralization of the combatants, using preferably 
helicopter transported actions against "enemy" positions. 
1016 CABRAL, Amílcar; Alguns princípios do partido, Lisboa, Seara Nova, 1974, p.17.  
1017 Idem, p.35.  
 355 
in what he designated by «cultural resistance»1018, aimed at the settlement of colonial culture, demystifying the 
historic flag of European settlement – the “civilizing mission” – considering incapable of it «the latest people 
of Europe», but also the fight against the negative aspects of their own indigenous culture – all that might 
prevent the economic development and social progress of the people.  
Valuing greatly the significance of culture in the fight for independence1019 – «the liberation fight is first 
and foremost an act of culture»1020 –, says that the «liberation movement should establish accurately the 
objectives so that the people that represents and directs regain the right to have its own history and to freely 
dispose of their forces of production, with a view to the further development of a richer culture, deep, national, 
scientific, and universal»1021.  
Although advocate for a revival and revaluation of African cultural matrix, Amílcar recognized the 
importance of the portuguese language – «is one of the best things that the tugas left us» – and defended their 
maintenance – «if we want to take forward our people, advancing in science for a long time, we will have to 
use the Portuguese».1022  
The constant appeals of  «sinister General Spínola»1023 to «reconciliation», offering «peace of the brave to 
everyone who wants a better Guinea under the Portuguese flag», were disarmed by the PAIGC, saying that 
«our African people know very well that the snake can change your skin, but is always a snake», and that «the 
story retains only with honour the names of those who, refusing to collaborate with the enemy of our people 
and Africa, give their valid contribution to the triumph of the fight»1024.  
The permanent «messages» and «reports»1025 releases were more than simple information. They pretend to 
conquer and even intimidate populations. The following passage is revealing: «is it true that we put out many 
of Portuguese military combat and we had to kill some dogs Africans who still serve the colonialists».1026  
In the "material" aspect, spinolist’s infrastructures construction, cultural and social promotion and direct 
support to the population policies through extremely attractive campaigns1027, could only be fight back when 
the external direct support arose, especially the humanitarian one. The Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palm, 
who Amílcar would have great diplomatic and personal relationship, was a precious support. The USSR also 
provided some support at this level, although he was in the military camp that their help, by Fidel’s Cuba, was 
most noted.  
However, it would be in the internal propaganda, main weapon of «psychosocial» Spínola’s war1028, very 
similar to practice by the Americans in Vietnam1029, the PAIGC would try to win. In 1969, Cabral warranty the 
                                                          
1018 CABRAL, Amílcar; A resistência cultural: texto escrito, a partir de uma gravação da intervenção em crioulo no 
Seminário de Quadros do Partido, realizado de 19 a 24 de Novembro, pelo camarada Amílcar Cabral, Serviços de 
Informação do PAIGC, 1974.  
1019 «Develop in each one of us patriotism, love of land, is a major breakthrough of our culture.»; «Culture is to instil the 
spirit of each certain of our victory.» Idem, pp.4-5.  
1020 CABRAL, Amílcar; Textos políticos, PAIGC, s.d., 32 p..  
1021 Idem, p. 20.  
1022 Idem, pp.11-12.  
1023 Idem, The eighth year of the armed stuggle for nacional liberation: report of the situation in the struggle, s.l., 1971, 
p.2.  
1024 Idem, Textos políticos, p.23.  
1025 View attachments A – 04 and A – 05.  For space saving, we select only a few copies of the extensive bibliography and 
documentation consulted in the April 25 Documentation Centre. 
1026 CABRAL, Amílcar; Mensagem relatório of Comrade Amílcar Cabral to frames, fighters and militants of the party, 
1969, p.2.  
1027 «In population centers, the "colonialists" said to them: «Bring the rice, we buy, sell, give.» It was humanly impossible 
not to accept such an offer.» PEREIRA, Aristides, idem, p.192.  
1028 View attachments B – 1 e B – 2.  
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party commitment to «neutralize the enemy liar propaganda», which aimed to «demobilise our people, to 
create divisions within the nationalist forces»1030.  
The PAIGC’s counter-propaganda was carried out by media and used the same means that the Portuguese 
forces. The first aim was to deconstruct the «specious» messages in Portugal broadcast, just like the «warnings 
to the population»1031, and attract the people controlled by the "forces of order", mainly concentrated in the 
urban and greater concentration areas. In what way? Whether using strong slogans such as «is the time of unity 
and action» or «total and immediate independence»1032, whether displaying images of Portuguese armed forces 
deserters, accompanied by extremely discouraging words1033, and driving messages in conjunction with the 
other liberation movements to all indigenous peoples of Portuguese overseas space. All through pamphlets 
distributed to the population "hand-to-hand" and not through the less effective air, whose means lacked.  
The second objective would relate to the "white" population, both resident in the colonies as the 
metropolitan. Due to the superior education of the "tuga", the requirement of the messages was also higher. 
Distributing press releases with messages directed at potential opponents of the Portuguese dictatorship, 
looking to join the struggle for independence, necessarily linked by PAIGC of the struggle for democracy in 
Portugal: «we are confident that the settlement of the Portuguese colonialism drag the destruction of fascism in 
Portugal.»  
However, the most affected sector by the movement’s propaganda were the Portuguese armed forces, 
exploring, in a wrestle with Spínola, the profound discouragement and demobilization which grew among the 
soldiers. Closing the year 1972, the delegation of PIDE/DGS present in Guinea confirmed the following: 
«Unfortunately we are forced to admit that Cabral will have opportunities to achieve their objectives», since 
the PAIGC, contrary to the "colonialists", continued to receive considerable reinforcements «personnel and 
light material».1034 In the same way, Mai/Jun 1973 reports focus repeatedly the «evident lack of resources» and 
«clear lack of determination of European troops, including permanent officers»1035. A few months later, the 
situation got into the point that PIDE/DGS consider that the «ineptitude of the Portuguese troops is practically 
total».1036 
There were well produced and massively circulated pamphlets with messages such as: «prove you're man 
who refuses to commit crimes and pointlessly dying in a war already lost. Abandon the colonial troops that 
you will be well received»1037. After the April’s Revolution the intensity does not decrease.1038  
Something that entirely ran out of Spínola’s control, despite the warnings to the nation “rear”, was the 
exploitation by the PAIGC, through the Cape Verdean students in the metropolis, of the opposition to the 
portuguese regime, promoted mainly by the PCP. Examples of it are the successive demonstrations in support 
of the PAIGC and all movements convened in Lisbon.  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
1029 View attachment B – 3.  
1030 CABRAL, Amílcar, Idem, p.3.  
1031 View attachment B – 1.  
1032 View attachment A – 03.  
1033 View attachment A – 01.   
1034 IAN/TT, Arquivo da PIDE, SC, Pastas Organizadas por Províncias Ultramarinas – Guiné, caixa 14, f. 450. Cit. em 
MATEUS, Dalila Cabrita, idem, p.176.  
1035 IAN/TT, Arquivo da PIDE, SC, Pastas Organizadas por Províncias Ultramarinas – Guiné, caixa 15, fls. 425, 447/448, 
450 e 505. Cit. em MATEUS, Dalila Cabrita, idem, p.177.  
1036 MATEUS, Dalila Cabrita, idem, p.178.  
1037 View attachment A – 02.  
1038 View attachment A – 06.  
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However, in January 1973 Amílcar Cabral dies. The one who «came up with the idea, at the time had 
reached the military stalemate, to overcome the deadlock using an indirect strategy: diplomacy, with the blow 
of the three United Nations observers. It was very strong. After all, he was the first who invented the 
thing.»1039 
In August of that year, the man that had imposed the «military standoff» and inspired the change of 
strategy definitely returned to the metropolis. The legacy of both men, inseparable, retold and would have its 
consequences.  
The PAIGC was already a well organised and structured party, with a line of action set, whose survival was 
assured without its charismatic leader, and would achieve its goal of independence in short term. As early as 
September 24, 1973, in the sector of Madina do Boé, the PAIGC unilaterally declares independence. 
Definitively confirmed an year later. But not least, «was he Amílcar Cabral, more than Angolans, more than 
the Mozambicans, who sparked the revolution of 1974 ...».1040 
The Spínola’s deeps disappointment and frustration would project themselves in the emerging Armed 
Forces Movement (Movimento das Forças Armadas – MFA), born and structured in Guinea. The movement 
itself had already made progress, partially, in the rebellion shadow of the ambitious general, which General 
Costa Gomes would later join, at the regime end.  
The greatest consequence and meeting point of both men’s legacy, as paradoxical as it may seem, it would 
be precisely the April 25 Revolution.  
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1039 Gérard Chaliand, in PEREIRA, Aristides, idem, p.208.  
1040 Ibidem.  
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From manifests to «direct action»: propaganda in the Angolan 
liberation movements (1955/1961) 
 
Anabela Silveira, 
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On the February 20th,  1961, Liberia and another thirty four countries of the Afro-Asian bloc proposed the 
discussion of Angola's political situation. Between March 10th and 15th 1961, the Security Council of the 
United Nations discussed the Liberian proposal, as Angola was considered as a threat to the international peace 
and safety. Meanwhile, news came from the north of that territory. On March 15th, colonial administration 
officials, colonists and their families, as well as many of the contracted workers, had been slaughtered. The 
climate of terror that followed these events pushed the Portuguese executive to admit the  inevitability of war, 
a war that only ended after that the April Revolution of 1974 overturned Salazar's regime. 
Holden Roberto, UPA's1041 representative in the discussions held at the United Nations in New York, 
refused to recognize that his organization had any responsibility for the massacres, arguing they were a 
consequence of peoples’ rebellion against a Portuguese "terrorism" that lasted five hundred years. However, it 
had been UPA - which recruited militaries among people of ethnic Bakongo - the responsible for the 
mobilization. By the end of February, UPA handed out a pamphlet that called indigenous people to the 
"festivities"1042, beginning the March 15th. Using a simple encrypted writing, similar to a missionary sermon, 
this pamphlet provided in fact organized procedural instructions for the insurgents 1043. 
Two other rebellions against the Portuguese colonial power preceded the one of March 15th, i.e. the 
Uprising of February 4th in Luanda and the rebellion of the cotton workers of Baixa do Cassange, that lasted 
from January 4th until the middle of March. For this reason, there are a few questions that should be addressed. 
The first question is how Angolan liberation movements mobilized populations for the fight against Portugal, 
aiming at autonomy and independence. The second one is focused on the way in which these groups tried to 
gain international visibility, at a time when not only decolonization was on the agenda, but also the newly 
independent countries of Asia and Africa constituted a block with renewed emphasis within the UN, 
contributing to the discussion and to the almost unanimous condemnation of the colonial model. The third 
question concerns the media used for the propaganda, which first emphasised the ideas of emancipation and 
denunciation of colonialisms and, later, the inevitability of "direct action", meaning a "liberation" war which 
had as its main objective to force the Portuguese executive to a negotiation that, in fact, did not happen during 
the thirteen years of war. From petitions to the UN to pamphlets calling for insurrection, from articles 
published in newspapers or read at radios microphones to participation in international conferences or 
                                                          
1041 União das Populações de Angola / Union of the Peoples of Angola. 
1042 Direct translation from "festividades", the word in use on the pamphlets meaning rebellion and  slaughters. 
1043 "As from March 15th festivities shall begin in all localities honouring the matrimonial union of the Lord, meaning that 
each one in its region and its place in all Angola shall proceed this way: 1) Women and children shall abandon their 
villages and head where festivities will take place; 2) Native's farms or small fields shall be cleared [as well as] State 
employee's residences, State friends, white man responsible for farms and commercial houses shall be cleaned and 
whitewashed. State and private vehicles shall be cleaned and painted.; 3) Each must have a well stocked backpack, as 
well as a rod to help him travel large distances (...); 5) Soldiers and sepoys must go amongst the people during 
festivities (...) If they do not show by their actions adherence to this will, they can be assured the Lord considers them 
enemies of the Homeland." / "A partir do 15 de Março deverão começar as festividades em honra da união matrimonial 
do Senhor em todas as localidades, quer dizer que cada um deverá na sua região e no seu posto em toda a Angola 
proceder da seguinte maneira: 1) As mulheres e crianças deverão abandonar a sua aldeia e dirigir-se ao posto onde as 
festividades irão decorrer; 2) As fazendas agrícolas ou as simples lavras dos nativos devem ser limpas [bem como] as 
residências dos empregados do Estado, os amigos do Estado, os brancos encarregados das fazendas e as casas 
comerciais devem ser limpas e caiadas. As viaturas do Estado e dos particulares devem ser lavadas e pintadas; 3) Cada 
um deverá ter a mochila bem aprovisionada, bem como uma vara que o ajudará a percorrer grandes distâncias (…) 5) 
Os soldados e os cipaios devem ir para o meio do povo durante as festividades (…) Se eles não mostrarem pelos seus 
actos a sua adesão a estes sentimentos, podem ter a certeza que o Senhor os considera inimigos da Pátria". (Quoted in 
PÉLISSIER, René, (1978), La colonie du minotaure, nationalisme et revoltes en Angola (1926-197), authors edition of 
the cultural services of Diamang, Angola, pp. 484/485). The pamphlet drew the uprisings plot, whereby "matrimonial 
union of the Lord" would be nothing more than the rebellion and the slaughters that followed the massive attack on 
administration posts, the destruction and arrest of colonists properties and goods, the preparation of rails into the woods 
to escape aircraft raids, the appeal to the defection of Africans who worked for the white people. 
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distribution of manifests, the representatives of the Angolan liberation movements undertook multiple 
activities aiming at the independence of the territory.  
Several events took place between the end of the Second World War, when the phenomenon of 
decolonization increased, and the first months of 1961, when the war in Angola began. On December 15th 
1951, a group, self-proclaimed as the leader of the African cause, sent a petition to the UN where it described 
the situation of the black population, focusing on the work relations between colonizers and colonized, and in 
particular on the issue concerning the work by contract. After this description, the document demanded the 
territory to be placed  under a protectorate regime1044.  
Meanwhile, among the "intellectuals" of Luanda, within a generation that had been educated on the ideals 
of respect towards the Portuguese culture, a cultural movement emerged. Under the motto Vamos descobrir 
Angola1045 and through the publication of the magazine Mensagem, this movement sought to find the ancestral 
roots of a lost angolanity. Thus, literature was held as an ambiguous and undercover way of fighting the 
Portuguese colonialism. The poet António Jacinto, that took part in the movement, confessed in an interview 
with Michel Laban that since 1947 independence was a common topic  of conversation and that "through 
story, through poetry, the concern was political"1046.  In 1952, after that the Mensagem had shut down,  its 
mentors organized in another movement, MNIA1047, which focused on the "creation and organization of small 
groups of clandestine political action (...) influenced by leftist thought, mainly Marxist"1048.  
In turn, in the Metropolis, Angolan students that gathered around the Casa dos Estudantes do Império 
(House of Students of the Empire), were not only influenced by the wave of pro-independentist angolanity, but 
also took part in the movements against the regime, joining the juvenile MUD1049. Some of them, such as 
Agostinho Neto or Lúcio Lara, would become key figures of the Angolan nationalism by taking prominent 
places in MPLA1050.  In 1952, in the Belgian Congo, a group of Angolan Bakongo wanting to restore the 
former kingdom of Kongo, came in contact with the consul of the United States of America in Leopoldville, 
who advised them to chose a king both distant from and unconnected with the Portuguese. The king Pedro 
VII's death at April 17th 1955, a king that for the Portuguese administration was nothing more than a soba1051, 
represented the perfect moment for following the American advice. However, disputes between protestant and 
catholic Bakongo, as well as the strong role played by the general-governor, Sá Viana Rebelo, made the 
succession unfeasible. 
The end of 1955 was characterized by two events. On the one hand, the Angolan Communist Party was 
founded in Luanda, proclaiming in its statutes the struggle for independence and the construction of a socialist 
society. On the other hand, a new petition was brought by the Bakongo restorationist to the UN, requesting the 
Angolan territory to become a protectorate. The following three years were of intense activity, as the political 
objectives gained priority and autonomy leading to the formation of several independentist groups in the 
Angolan capital1052, as well as to the regrouping, in the Belgian Congo, of Bakongo emigrants under the name 
of UPNA1053. Following the example of other African colonies that granted autonomy through a negotiation 
process with the European colonial power, Angolan nationalist leaders aimed at a similar procedure. An 
objective that they forgot or did not want to acknowledge was that the Portuguese rulers would never accept 
negotiations, as the "imperial" structure was one of the fundamental bases of the regime. Having no effective 
                                                          
1044 "Thus, the undersigned aboriginal group, leader of the African cause, representing and interpreting the feelings of 4 
million aboriginal that inhabit the colony of Angola, in the terms of the 15th and 16th articles of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, appeal the UN to cease as urgently as possible the Portuguese administration in Angola 
and Congo, being the government given to the aboriginal that would administer the country as a Protectorate of a 
Nation chosen by the aboriginal." / "Assim, o grupo de aborígenes abaixo-assinado, líderes da causa Africana, 
representando e interpretando o sentir de 4 milhões de aborígenes que habitam a colónia de Angola, nos termos dos 
artigos 15º e 16º da Declaração Universal dos Direitos do Homem, imploram às Nações Unidas para que (…) mandem 
cessar o mais urgentemente possível a administração de Portugal em Angola e no Congo, devendo o governo ser 
integre aos aborígenes que administrariam o país sob Protectorado de uma Nação que seria indicada pelos aborígenes". 
Carta do povo aborígene de Angola à Organização das Nações Unidas, December 15th 1951, fax-simile in CDHI 
(2008), História do MPLA (1946-1966), Edited by MPLA, Luanda, Angola, pp. 357/383). 
1045  In a direct translation: Let's discover Angola. 
1046 Entrevista a António Jacinto in LABAN, Michel (1991), Encontro com escritores, 1st volume, Fundação Eugénio de 
Almeida, Porto, Portugal, p. 149. 
1047 Movimento dos Novos Intelectuais de Angola / Angola's New Intellectual Movement.  
1048 Our translation from BITTENCOURT, Marcelo (1999), Dos jornais às armas, trajectórias da contestação angolana, 
Vega Editora, Lisboa, Portugal, p. 126. 
1049 Movimento de Unidade Democrática / Movement of Democratic Unity 
1050 Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola / People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola  
1051 A Soba is a traditional regional authority in Angola. 
1052 Later, the majority of these groups will lead to the MPLA [People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola] 
1053 Founded in July 1957, UPNA stands for União das Populações do Norte de Angola / Union of Peoples of Northern 
Angola.  
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presence on the ground, PCA almost disappeared. Its place was taken by a new organization, the PLUA1054, 
which was founded in December 1956 in an attempt to gather those who shared independentist ideas, and even 
the communist. The Manifesto de 1956, the programmatic text of the new "party" (the MPLA) that would 
characterize part of the Angolan nationalism, was presented as an organization instruction book for the 
clandestine groups that aimed at national independence.  
In December of the same year, a spokesman of the Bakongo restorationist confided to Georges Houser, a 
member of ACA1055, the importance of the Portuguese retreat from the former kingdom of Kongo so that the 
Americans could "civilise" it. In June 1957, a new petition handed by this group to the UN revealed more of a 
tribal facet of those who looked for the seizure of power, than a structured independentist movement. 
Following the advice of the Americans, who thought that the restoration of the kingdom of Kongo would have 
been an archaism hard to be accepted by the international community, the group founded the UPNA, which 
had been already presented as the UPA1056 by Holden Roberto at the Accra Conference, in Ghana, between the 
December 6th and 13th,1958. 
The 1st All-African Peoples' Conference, held in Accra, gave Angola an international spotlight. In the 
opening, Holden Robert distributed to the attendants a demolishing manifest against Salazar's regime, 
denouncing the characteristics of Portuguese colonialism, including the abuses of human rights, the 
exploitation of African peoples by white colonists and authorities, forced labour, corporal punishments, land 
subtraction, imprisoning, torture, and exile. The manifest ended demanding the independence of the 
Portuguese colony. At the end of the Conference, a resolution was approved, stating that  
 
"considering the material and moral impossibility of African territories of admitting that they are 
part of Portugal (...); considering that the immediate recognition of the independence is the 
condition «sine qua non» of a real promotion of the underdeveloped countries to the realization 
of world peace and fraternal cooperation among peoples; considering that all the abuses are in 
contradiction with the United Nations Charter that Portugal accepted to ratify. The Conference 
(...) decides to protest strongly in order for Portugal to cease immediately these abominations 
that are meant in nature to compromise peace, [and] demands that the nation cited  above 
promotes an effective development in all domains to allow the independence of Angola to be 
possible"1057.  
 
This was how the Angolan questions accessed the international circuits. During the debates, the charismatic 
leader of the Argelian National Front, Franz Fanou, took a stand that excelled all other, defending the right of 
"Positive Action", i.e. the right to act using "violence in self-defence", invoking as example the case of the 
Portuguese colonies. Thus, the use of armed struggle in national liberation actions was unleashed. 
In Luanda, the repression of October 1958 that followed a  popular rebellion led many of the insurgents to 
flee in exile to southern Angola. Subsequently, MIA1058 delivered an extended pamphlet to the population of 
the neighbourhoods and musseques of the capital, entitled Aos Africanos, o grito da luta pela liberdade [To the 
Africans, the scream of the struggle for liberty], in which it summoned the "conscious Angolans" for the fight 
for total independency.  
 
"Africa", it was argued, "is agitated in its liberation struggles, brothers. And it is funny to think that 
men, that are at the same time so responsible for, and irresponsible in (...)the government of those black 
lands, are packed in the illusion that these are passing riots, that in the confidence of their machine-guns 
and a few tactics of domination, the white men will stand as lords of Africa, as was stated by the 
demagogue Sá Viana de Rebelo (...)"1059.  
 
      In its turn, another movement, MINA1060, in its pamphlet Ao povo de Angola [To the people of Angola], 
addressed specifically 2to the black people of Angola (blacks and miscegenated)" stressing the need for an 
union in the fight against "the pernicious, filthy, inhuman and coward enemy", that is, the Portuguese colonial 
regime.  
                                                          
1054 Partido da Luta Unida dos Africanos de Angola / Party of the United Struggle for Africans in Angola. 
1055 American Committee on Africa. 
1056 UPA stands for União das Populações de Angola / Union of Peoples of Angola. 
1057 Resolução de Acra, in N’GANGA, João Paulo (2008), O Pai do nacionalismo angolano- as memórias de Holden 
Roberto (1923/1974), 1st volume, Editora Parma, S. Paulo, Brazil, p. 76. 
1058 Movimento para a Independência de Angola / Angola's Movement for Independence. 
1059 Our translation from Aos africanos,1958, fac-simile in CDHI (2008), História do MPLA (1946-1966), Edited by 
MPLA, Luanda, Angola, p. 431. 
1060 Movimento para a Independência Nacional de Angola / Movement for the National Independence of Angola, founded 
December 1959, by occasion of the ILO Conference for África in Luanda. 
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"The moment we live", it continued, "is of great works and struggles. Let's work united (...) 
fearless, to achieve our ideal - TOTAL INDEPENDENCE!1061 Let's fight the imperialist yoke 
and our victory is certain."1062  
 
In the pamphlet Aos Angolanos [To the Angolans], the MLNA1063, after delivering a heavy attack on 
Salazar and Américo Tomás, advocated that "we, the sons of Angola, have to fight hard to achieve the 
INDEPENDENCE OF OUR PRESTIGIOUS ANGOLA" 1064 . Addressing the conviction of Angolan 
nationalists that were part of the known "Trial of the Fifty", MLNA issued another pamphlet exhorting to 
struggle, paying special attention to the young.  
 
"Everywhere in the world,  the young have been the heroes of the struggles for liberty. This 
happened in Cuba, in the African Republics that are now independent, and it will happen in 
Angola. The conviction of your fathers, uncles, relatives, friends, is no reason for you showing 
defeated. The independence of Angola is already a reality. The Portuguese colonialists are now 
showing symptoms that are proper of a madman. Compare them to the French in Algeria, you 
will see they are behaving likely in many things: massacres against the Freedom fighters (...). 
Algeria is about to get its independency [and] the Portuguese will be obliged to take identical 
actions or, as they already demonstrated, resort to bloody fighting [that] will have as denouement 
the complete annihilation of all Portuguese in Africa. Everything depends on them, is up to them 
to choose."1065  
 
 By the end of 1959, the neighbourhoods and musseques of Luanda were on fire. While the 
propaganda against the Portuguese sovereignty, even if clandestine, became increasingly  more aggressive, the 
colonial model designed by the Colonial Act of 1930 remained unchanged. At the same time, Salazar's horizon 
was far from any autonomy, even if mitigated. In May 1960 in Luanda, Agostinho Neto, talking about his role 
in the recently constituted MPLA1066, explained that,  
 
"not unaware of the diverse problems faced by the black population (...) he fought the tendency 
for violent acts and advocated a direction that led the individuals to the legal reivindication of 
the most human economical and social conditions, as well as the presence next to the Governing 
Bodies of legitimate representatives of the active population"1067. 
 
At the end of August 1959, Holden Roberto travelled to the United States of America, where he denounced 
to the 4th UN Committee - the actual Special Political and Decolonization Committee - as he had done in 
ACRA, the forced labour and human rights abuses in Angola. Representing the UPA, Holden Roberto lobbied 
against the Portuguese political regime, being received by the then senator John Kennedy, of the Democratic 
Party1068. On the other hand, in Leopoldville – Belgian Congo –  the UPA handed out its manifest A luta pela 
independência de Angola [The struggle for the independence of Angola], also addressed to colonists and the 
Portuguese state. Beginning by declaring that its purpose was the "immediate independence by peaceful and 
democratic means", it exhorted the contribution of the "peasants, the unemployed and the forced labourers" to 
the "liquidation of the Portuguese colonialism in the national territory". Explaining that independent Angola 
would have "a democratic regime, without distinction of sex, race or colour", the pamphlet ended with the 
motto "Africa for Africans", while appealing to the  
 
                                                          
1061 Capitals in the original. 
1062 Our translation from Ao Povo de Angola, s/data, fac-simile in CDHI (2008), História do MPLA (1946-1966), Edited by 
MPLA, Luanda, Angola, p. 432. 
1063 Movimento para a Libertação Nacional de Angola / Movement for the National Liberation of Angola.  
1064 Capitals in the original. Our translation from Aos Angolanos, 16/12/1959, fac-simile in CDHI (2008), História do 
MPLA (1946-1966), Edited by MPLA, Luanda, Angola, p. 433. 
1065 Our translation from Panfleto do MLNA, 1959, fac-simile in CDHI (2008), História do MPLA (1946-1966), Edited by 
MPLA, Luanda, Angola, p. 435. 
1066 Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola / People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola 
1067 Our translation from Auto de perguntas a Agostinho Neto, ANTT, PIDE Archives, Process 88760-1, September 16th 
1960, sht. 76/85. 
1068 "His office [John Kennedy's] in the senate started to be attended by prominent African nationalists [as] Mboya; Holden 
Roberto, the Angolan nationalist (...)". Our translation from SCHNEIDMAN, Witney W (2005), Confronto em África. 
Washington e a queda do Império Colonial Português, Tribuna da História, Lisbon, Portugal, p. 45.  
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"international organizations to pressure Portugal to cease the exploitation regime and the 
conscientious politics of genocide and that this territory might find its former independency"1069. 
 
Meanwhile, in 1957 in Europe, Angolan, Guinean and Mozambican nationalists founded the MAC1070 and 
published the Manifesto do MAC [MAC Manifest], a long text with a thorough analysis of the Portuguese 
colonialism.  
 
"The MAC", it recited, "has as its objective the immediate conquer of the National independence 
of African Countries under the Portuguese colonial domination and the total liquidation of the 
Portuguese colonialism in Africa".  
 
Following Franz Fanon thesis, it advocated the right to insurrection as a "fundamental right against the 
colonial oppression [recognized] by International Law"1071. Three years before that MPLA declared in London 
the inevitability of "direct action", armed struggle was not an option for these nationalists. By the end of 
January 1960, the MAC prepared a text for the 2ndAll-African People's Conference, held in Tunis, advocating 
political, illegal, clandestine, popular and African struggle, the formation of a national front and the adoption 
of a program common to all Portuguese colonies organizations. It also accused the Lisbon executive of getting 
ready to war, with the NATO's support and the implementation of other alliances, namely with South 
Africa1072. However, in disregard of the conference regulations that allowed only for the participation of 
national political movements, the MAC Angolans presented themselves as spokesmen of the MPLA, thus born 
officially in Tunisia, and met with Holden Roberto, representing the UPA. In Tunis the MAC became the 
FRAIN 1073  and the Declaração de Compromisso [Declaration of Commitment] was signed by all the 
Portuguese colonies participants. At the same time, they advanced the decision of "a joint action against the 
Portuguese colonialism [and the prompt establishment of] a concrete program for action in 1960"1074. 
1960, the year of Africa, would be also paradigmatic for the Angolan nationalism. From the Belgian 
Congo, the UPA performed party work not only with Angolan exiles, but also in the Portuguese colony. They 
had active cells in the north and northwest of Angola, and in particular among the cotton planters of Baixa do 
Cassange and in the musseques of Luanda and Lobito. In the capital, UPA militaries gathered with other 
clandestine groups, namely the MPLA 1075 , which sought to attract militants and form cells in several 
musseques and popular neighbourhoods in Luanda, as well as in the region of Catete. Strongly watched by the 
political police that, in 1957, had settled in Angola, the MPLA suffered its first setback in June 1960, when a 
delegation was intercepted by the PIDE at Sanza Pombo, near Congo's frontier. Through the arrest of these 
militants and the seizure of their  documents, it was easy for the political police to cut off the movement 
leadership in the interior. The arrest of Agostinho Neto by June 8th and its subsequent transfer to Lisbon gave 
rise to a wave of indignation, namely in the area of Catete, Agostinho Neto's homeland and a region where 
MPLA already had a large number of militants. The fierce repression that befell the protesters had 
international repercussions.  
 
"After the arrest of Dr. Agostinho Neto (…) people from Bengo (…) decided to go to this 
district Office of Catete (…) and demand the release of Dr. Neto. When the district officer came 
to know about the decision, he called for reinforcements from Luanda, and about 200 soldiers 
                                                          
1069  Our translation from 1069 Manifesto da UPA de 1959,in N’GANGA, João Paulo (2008), O Pai do nacionalismo 
angolano- as memórias de Holden Roberto (1923/1974), 1st volume, Editora Parma, S. Paulo, Brazil, p. 84/85. 
1069Movimento Anti Colonialista. 
1070 Movimento Anti Colonialista /Anti-Colonialist Movement 
1071 Our translation from Manifesto do MAC, Mário Soares Foundation, Digital archive of Mário Pinto de Andrade, Pasta 
04 357.001.001, p. 15/18. 
1072 Cf. Manifesto do MAC à Conferência de Túnis, ATD, Lúcio Lara Archive, original in French, 1960, doc.436. On the 
accusation of an alliance between Portugal and South Africa, cf. AFONSO, Aniceto e GOMES, Carlos Matos 
(2013),Alcora, o acordo secreto do Colonialismo, Terreiro do Paço Editores, Lisbon, Portugal. 
1073 Frente Revolucionária Africana de Independência Nacional dos Povos sob Domínio Português / Revolutionary African 
Front for the National Independence of the Peoples under Portuguese Domination. 
1074 Our translation from Declaração de compromisso da FRAIN, (copy of the original text), ATD, Lúcio Lara Archive, 
1960, Janeiro 31st, document not numbered. 
1075 Os Levantamentos de 4 de Fevereiro de 1961 [The Uprisings of February 4th 1961], in Luanda, prove the connection 
between militants of both organizations. Cf. MATEUS, Dalila C e Álvaro (2011), ANGOLA 61 – Guerra Colonial, 
causas e consequências, Texto Editores, Lisbon, Portugal, p.73/108 and SILVEIRA, Anabela (2012), Dos 
nacionalismos à Guerra: os movimentos de libertação angolanos -1945/1965, Ph.D thesis, FLUP, Oporto, Portugal, p. 
199/207. We must point out that MPLA had at his foundation former militants from MINA, a movement that was 
extinguished. 
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with guns that were sent to Catete fired against the crowd without any warning and killed  30 
people and injured over 200”1076.  
 
Meanwhile, on July 6th, UPA handed out a communication where, once again, inveighed against the 
executive and the Portuguese colonial policy, defining themselves as "the union of all blacks of Angola that 
cry for Independence".1077  
By the middle of the 1960’s, as the independence of Congo was approaching, the anti-Portuguese 
propaganda spread in northern Angola. Disturbing information arrived to Salazar's office.  
 
"A common saying spread among the indigenous living close to the frontier with Angola, claiming that 
after June 30th they will mass invade that region of ours to liberate it"1078.  
 
Or news on the 
 
 "pamphlets [arriving from Matadi] urging the indigenous Portuguese to follow the Congolese  
brothers examples, inviting them to all effort in managing Angola's independence [having] 
enticed 10 natives from S. Salvador to attend a school of turmoil in Ghana"1079.  
 
The previous 's independence of the Belgium colony and the election of Patrice Lumumba as Prime-
Minister, a friend of Holden Roberto, provided UPA with a new freedom for action, namely by accessing 
Congo's National Radio and, from there, broadcasting to northern Angola.  The communication broadcasted on 
August 23rd urged not only for rebellion, but also explained that Angola's condition would rise to higher 
international instances.  
 
"The Portuguese colonialists have the scrupulous awareness of keeping the most profound 
silence and an iron curtain around our country. So that nothing sweats out and they can keep 
rumouring the lie that Angola's inhabitants live in an Eldorado (...) UPA decided to appeal to the 
superior instance of international opinion [and] once more demand to the Portuguese executive 
to end its colonial regime"1080. 
  
Adding the interesting remark "Do not collect! Read and hand out", new pamphlets were distributed to the 
population.  
 
"After five centuries (...) you are still condemned to spend all your strength to enrich Portuguese 
colonialists. You create the richness and you have no right to enjoy it. (...)The UPA is committed 
expressly to end so much suffering in Angola.  It invites you to contribute to the extinction of the 
Portuguese colonialism"1081.  
 
In turn, the article signed on August 3rd by Holden Roberto and José Manuel Peterson in the newspaper 
Congo, foresaw the UPA's position a year later. While accusing the Portuguese executive of choosing war over 
negotiation, it summarized the outcomes of the 14th session of The United Nations General Assembly.  
 
"One of the most precious benefits of the Afro-Asian Group in UN", they wrote, "was to impose 
(...) a debate where the Portuguese colonialism was harshly denounced before the world. As a 
result of this debate, a committee of six member countries was appointed to study the situation 
of non-autonomous territories in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter". The article 
ended with a request. "Starting today, August 3rd, we ask the unification of our efforts to make 
life impossible for the Portuguese colonialism in Angola (...) Our patience is running out, the 
                                                          
1076Comunicado do representante do MPLA em Inglaterra, ATD, Lúcio Lara Archive, 1960, doc.761. 
1077 Our translation from Comunicado da UPA, ANTT, PIDE Archive, Process 2126/59, box 1, July 1960, shts. 999/1000 
1078 Our translation from Agitação no norte de Angola, ANTT, Oliveira Salazar Archive, AOS/CO/UL-32E, May 17th 1960, 
shts. 33/34 
1079 Our translation from Agitação no norte de Angola, ANTT, Oliveira Salazar Archive, AOS/CO/UL-32E, July 23rd 1960, 
shts. 87/88 
1080 Our translation from Comunicado da UPA lido no RNC, ANTT, PIDE Archive, Process 2126/59, box 1, August 23rd 
1960, shts. 959/960. 
1081 Our translation from Comunicado da UPA, ANTT,  PIDE Archive, Process 2126/59, box 1, September 21st, shts. 955. 
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Portuguese colonialism must resign or refuse itself (...) If Salazar has not yet understood what is 
happening in Africa, he will never understand it"1082. 
 
On January 18th 1961, when the cotton planters of Baixa do Cassange's rebellion was at its peak, the 
official UPA's media, A Voz da Nação Angolana [Angolan Nation's Voice], published an extended article 
where it transcribed the "Memorando sobre a situação de Angola" [Memorandum on Angola's Situation] 
presented to the deputies of the 15th United Nations General Assembly, and drew the future of the Portuguese 
colony.  
 
"If the Portuguese executive expects the uprising of the Angolan people before eventually 
negotiating more or solidifying its position, we advise caution as it is difficult to negotiate in a 
hectic situation and further pacify a colonized and angry territory (...) The arrests, executions, 
deportations of African nationalists (...) are nothing more than a stimulating appeal to their 
successors [and the Portuguese of Angola] may be at the mercy of the outraged people or 
perhaps want to suffer sabotage, looting, the strikes, the murders, the humiliation of the owners 
and bosses as it happens throughout Africa"1083,  
 
in what can be interpreted as a warning for future actions of upist militants supported by indigenous peoples. 
The massacres of March 15th and the early months of guerrilla had all these ingredients. 
 If, on the one hand, the PIDE's attack on the MPLA cut off its recently constituted leadership, which was 
promoting the organization of the movement in Angolan territory, on the other hand it did not hinder the 
development of clandestine cells in several capital musseques, as it happened in Rangel, from where many of 
the February 4th rioters  came. But the MPLA pursued its struggle against the Portuguese government abroad. 
In the 1st Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference, held in Conakry, Ghana, from 11th to 15th April 1960, 
Viriato da Cruz not only attacked the Portuguese colonialism, but he also asked for the unconditional support 
by the Afro-Asian block to the Angolan liberation movements, while requesting for a complete cut of the 
relations with Portugal and soliciting an international campaign against its colonial policy. However, the 
moment in which the inevitability of an armed struggle became visible happened on December 5 th 1960, in the 
Press Conference of London, in the House of Commons. Representing Angola and MPLA, Viriato da Cruz 
threatened the Portuguese executive with "direct action", claiming that, to do so, they would count on the 
organization of a national liberation army. The war was then publicly taken as a form of struggle. 
During the second half of the 1950's, two liberation movements were founded, movements that upraised 
against the Portuguese colonial power. With their leaderships outside the territory, they were playing in two 
trays. In Angola, they sought to raise supporters for the cause, knowing that this was done in very difficult 
circumstances of secrecy, constant surveillance and harassment by the political police, with arrests and 
summary trials of indigenous activists. The distribution of pamphlets, articles in newspapers and, in the case of 
the UPA, radio programs, not to mention the personal contact, present themselves as the preferred way to bring 
the African population to join armed struggle. But the liberation movements operated otherwise. Using 
platforms that decolonization opened to them, they not only deliver to the international community complaints 
about the Portuguese colonial practice, which, in a dictatorship, was maintained in complete secrecy, but they 
also called for a negotiated autonomy, which Salazar never wanted to hearken. In London the following steps 
were announced: War. 1961 was just at the door. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1082 Our translation from Artigo da UPA no jornal «Congo», ANTT, PIDE Archive, Process 2126/59, box 1, August 3rd 
1960, shts. 973/977. 
1083 Our translation from A Voz da Nação Angolana, ANTT, PIDE Archive, Process 2126/59, box 1, January 18th 1961, 
shts. 942. 
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“Histórias de Unidade - HU” (Military Units Reports): 
Another form of propaganda 
 
João Moreira Tavares, 
 AHM/IHC 1084 
 
After the World War II, in Cold War scenario, the emergence and development of pro-independence 
organizations in colonial territories under European administration and the anti-colonialist position assumed by 
two major emerging powers, the U.S. and USSR, led to the questioning of the continued Portuguese presence 
in Africa. 
First, in the political field, through external pressures within international organizations. Then, in a second 
phase, the diplomatic pressure that the country was subjected was joined by the armed struggle, a subversive-
oriented combat by independence movements in the three main Portuguese colonial territories. In Angola in 
1961, Guinea-Bissau in 1963, and finally the following year in Mozambique. 
A type of armed conflict in which what mattered to both contenders was mainly the conquest of the 
population to their cause, thus seeking the physical and psychological exhaustion of the opponent in order to 
force him to give up the fight, propaganda and counter-propaganda played an important role and was widely 
used by both warring parties. It was used by the liberation movements engaged in raising the necessary support 
not only of material nature but also political and financial able to sustain and reinforce their war and pro-
independence policies. On the other hand, it was also used by the Portuguese government to prevent the spread 
of internal subversion, strengthen the national cohesion between Mainland and overseas and thus justify the 
idea that Portugal was a pluricontinental, multiracial and indivisible country. Posters, leaflets, newspapers, 
films, radio programs, television reports were some of the major media propaganda, with a range as broad as 
possible. 
This communication is focused, however, on a set of restricted documents and therefore much less known, 
the “Histórias de Unidade – HU” (Military Units Reports), belonging to the collection of the Military 
Historical Archive (AHM). Designed to report the feats of arms of the military units of the Portuguese Army, 
these Military Reports (See fig. 1), unlike the examples listed above, had no immediate propagandistic 
purposes. They were not intended to refute the pro-independence arguments, they were not a tool to tarnish the 
image of the enemy or captivate the people for the cause of Portugal as a multi-racial country and, above all, 
these documents were not intended for wide diffusion, which in itself contradicted the essence of propaganda. 
They rather sought to be a repository of information not only about the Portuguese Army but also on the 
enemy that was fought and the physical and social environment in which the fight took place. 
We will deal, therefore, with another form of propaganda, if this expression is correct, considering its 
ambiguous nature. In fact, propaganda is not intended to the contemporaries but rather to the forthcoming to 
emphasize “the memory of the effort, enthusiasm and dedication of the Portuguese Army in defending the 
homeland” so that they would not be forgotten “in the course of time”. If these words can define the HU as 
propaganda tools, instructions to its wording give them yet another direction:  “a record of simple events, 
accurate, objective and succinct”; in short, working documents within the campaign service, as if they were 
simple and trivial reports. But this coldness requested in the description of the facts was not always followed 
by those who wrote the HU as the reporter was also the protagonist in the events and therefore unable to 
guarantee the necessary objectivity, devoid of any comments and feelings. 
The genesis of HU dates back to November 1962 when, in the Military Region of Angola (RMA), the 
commanding general instructed to prepare  the official record of operational forces of RMA not only by 
imperatives of campaign services but also for the interest and projection that this record could be for the future. 
To make this possible, it was necessary that all Commands and Military Units that took part in operations in 
Northern Intervention Zone (ZIN) draw up their reports. This procedure did not bring anything new, since 
during the 1st World War narratives had already been written, under the form of monograph, about the Units 
engaged in combat both in Flanders and in Africa. On the other hand, the timing of the request is not 
surprising. In fact, it occurred a few months before the end of the service commissions of the first Units that 
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had been sent to Africa in response to the outbreak of subversion in Northern Angola. Before their return to 
Mainland, it was important to collect all elements of interest to the History of Campaign lived then. Initially, a 
model was not required for the narratives but this would happen later. However, some rules were established to 
form the basis of the narrative as well as the future HU. Units in charge of the draft were duly selected as well 
as the periodicity of sending data (monthly), the elements to be mentioned (location of the Unit and its activity 
in the field and in time) and how these should be presented (objective and succinct)  1085. 
In the following months (April and May 1963), the experience acquired during the course of the process, 
upon receipt of the first data sent by the Units, led to the establishment of new and more accurate procedures. 
To improve the speed and efficiency of gathering elements of statistical, operational and historical nature, it 
was decided to prepare a Unit Sheet with the precise type of data to be provided and their presentation1086. It 
was properly clarified which Units were responsible for sending the data, particularly those under the organic 
dependence of other Units of upper echelon (platoons and companies under the dependence of battalions or 
regiments), the periodicity of sending data became quarterly and it was decided that copies to be provided by 
Units should be delivered “stripped of unnecessary ornaments – such as bindings”. These ornaments could be 
accepted in other copies (of the Units themselves or for their mobilizing Units) but not in the copies that were 
sent to Headquarters (QG) of RMA 1087. This alert as a matter of detail is, however, the first sign of a 
phenomenon that would happen several times: the personalization and individualization of the Unit Report by 
its reporter, protagonist of events, regardless of the uniformity desired by superiors. Not with a clear intention 
of subversion and contestation of the rules, but, within the limits, with the purpose of enhancing and 
beautifying for future memory the achievements and experiences of nearly two years of service far from home 
and family. With the spread of the war to Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique and the consequent intensification 
and prolongation of the conflict, the imposition of preparing a history was also extended to the Military Units 
sent to those territories. In August 1970, when the rules for the drafting were broadcast in Guinea-Bissau, the 
organizational model of HU1088 was already defined. From its beginning, this organization has tended to be 
based on three chapters: 
 
- I) Mobilization, composition and displacement; 
- II) Activity in the Theater of Operations (TO); 
- III) Losses suffered, punishments, praises and decorations. 
 
Of the three, the one with greater size and greater wealth of information is Chapter II which, in the case of 
Units of upper echelon like battalions and grouping/operational commands, is, as a rule, an important source of 
information, with available data and comments on the land (topography, hydrography, flora, fauna, climate, 
economic resources, roads and settlements) in which the Unit was based and exerted dominance; the 
Population (historical background, distribution area, ethnicities, beliefs, dialects and ways of life); the Enemy 
(generalities, organization, location, means and forms of action) and the Unit itself, in a subchapter entitled: 
“Our Troops” (generalities, device, missions, moral, activity developed, health status and logistics). 
As far as the remaining two chapters (I and III) are concerned, the information provided is essentially 
nominative and administrative, while continuing to receive attention and development, particularly with 
respect to praise and decorations awarded, often subject to detailed exposition of the achievements that led to 
their assignment. The standardization imposed on the narration, which was intended to be “methodical, 
successive in time, impersonal but nevertheless dynamic”, encouraged, however, the existence of reviews seen 
as useful on any fact or situation exposed in the course of the narrative as well as a “procedure or decision on 
their positive or negative aspects”1089. And so it happened sometimes when the HU contained critical opinions 
and considerations on internal procedures, including acts of high superiors, such as the commander-in-chief of 
the Armed Forces in Guinea-Bissau1090. Daring attitude but whose impact was limited by the restricted nature 
of the distribution of HU, either by its reduced number of copies intended to perfectly defined receivers within 
the military institution, or by the security classification system, at least Reserved, that these documents were 
subject to, while secrecy was imposed at least during the two years following the end of the service 
commission to which the Unit concerned. 
                                                          
1085 Cf. PT AHM/DIV/2/2/156/10 – Circular-note n.º 96 302, of  November 15, 1962, of RMA/QG/3rd Division. 
1086 Please see a copy duly filled up of the Unit Sheet relating to the Company of Artillery n.º 294 of the Battalion of 
Artillery n.º 346 in PT AHM/DIV/2/2/147/10.  
1087 Cf. PT AHM/DIV/2/2/156/10 – Circular n.º 1 424/3, Proc. 347.13, of April 22,  1963 and Note n.º 1786/3, Proc. 347.0, 
of May 18, 1963, of RMA/QG/3rd Division. 
1088 Cf. PT AHM/DIV/2/4/260/2 – Circular n.º 2 295/3, Proc. 365, of August 3, 1970, of the Independent Territorial 
Command of Guinea-Bissau/Headquarters/3rd Division.  
1089 PT AHM/DIV/2/4/260/2 – Circular n.º 2 295/3, Proc. 365, of August 3, 1970, of the Independent Territorial Command 
of Guinea-Bissau/Headquarters/3rd Division, p. 6.  
1090 Cf. PT AHM/DIV/2/4/83/3 – Military Unit Report of the Company of Cavalry n.º 1744”, p. 29. 
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The objectivity, simplicity and synthesis that were required in the narrative were, as already noted, 
overturned several times, not with a purpose contrary to the rules, but as a result of the subjectivity and 
emotion of those who reported the events experienced by themselves, having their own political and 
ideological convictions thus transferred to the HU. That explains how some HU were prepared. By its form 
and style, they transform what was intended to be simple working papers in propaganda tools, although there 
are two distinct directions in the version which intercross sometimes into a single document. One is dominated 
by the ideological doctrine emanating from the regime and therefore based on patriotic exaltation, actions and 
sacrifices experienced, expressed in different ways: 
 
- In the words and language used in dedications, prefaces and in the text of the chapters (See fig. 2 e 3); 
- The careful selection of quotes from the cantos of the Lusíadas by Camões1091 or sayings by Mouzinho de 
Albuquerque1092, thus building a bridge to a glorious past considered as an example to follow, by equating 
the recent achievements to those made by the ancestors, conveying the ideas of preservation of a sacred 
heritage and continuity of a heroic deed that should not be interrupted but perpetuated in name of “Eternal 
Portugal”, a pluricontinental and multiracial country; 
- In the photographs that sometimes illustrate the HU, whose choice helps emphasize the activities 
undertaken, not only strictly military but also civilizational conducted among the population, thus justifying 
the continuation of the Portuguese presence in Africa. After all, a picture is worth a thousand words; 
- Furthermore, the use of refrains1093, reinforcing and clarifying the message. 
The other direction derives from the emotion and creativity of the military that formed the Unit and the 
logic that prevailed was that of self-praise. It was a period spent away from home and family, lived intensely in 
the fulfillment of a duty which required heavy sacrifices for a cause that most people did not understand, but in 
the course of which bonds of friendship and camaraderie were created. And thus was born another family who 
did not forget, at the end of the service commission, the fellow soldiers who had fallen in the line of duty, 
paying them a final homage. That was their History and, as such, should be presented with their personal 
touch, praising their action in the course of events. 
Thus, alongside cold stories, devoid of any literary or aesthetic concern and limited to the canons dictated 
by high superiors, new copies of HU were emerging, completely different from all the others, with the 
complicity of the Unit commander or even following his guidance. They were distinct in their presentation, 
more careful, having in some cases the format of a book profusely illustrated with photos or drawings and 
chronicles written by some of the soldiers who made up the Unit (See fig. 3). They were different too by the 
touch of humor in certain cases, thus relieving the narration of lived experience (See fig. 4). Distinguished also 
by the care with which they were created, visible in the ornamental details and the richness of its content, 
going beyond what was required. 
This collective self-praise also contributed to the enhancement of the action of the Unit commander with 
his superiors, which could help him to get a faster and desired career and explains his attitude in the course of 
the construction of the narrative. 
In a universe of over 2 600 documents (The HU that refer only to grouping commands and operational 
battalions and independent companies) these HU, distinct from the others, are a minority and do not stand by 
their number but by their uniqueness and tone of propaganda. This, however, is subtle and ambiguous because 
there is no use of advertising techniques to spread a message, nor is there a clear purpose to discredit and 
counter the actions of enemy propaganda. 
There is, however, since the genesis of the HU, the desire to preserve for future memory the feats of arms 
of the past so that they are not forgotten with the passage of time. This is not a propaganda addressed to 
contemporaries, but essentially to those who are to come. It is a propaganda based on the original meaning of 
the term derived from the Latin propagare referring to the idea of diffusion, planting in agriculture and only 
later evolved into the act of spreading an idea, opinion or doctrine. More than imposing ideas and ideologies, it 
is important to narrate facts, although the narrative is sometimes made with a mixture of feelings and 
considerations by their reporters. These interpretations and personal assessments, however, do not deprive the 
HU of informative value, as the wealth of information contained therein, which goes far beyond the strictly 
military nature, helps us to know the true degree of development of the Portuguese African territories and their 
populations, particularly in the most remote regions and therefore less known. A local reality much worse than 
the official version propagated by the then-Government. 
 
                                                          
1091 Luís Vaz de Camões was considered the Prince of Portuguese poets and author of the epic Os Lusíadas, which tells the 
story of Portugal in the form of epic, from its foundation until the period of the Discoveries. 
1092  Joaquim Augusto Mouzinho de Albuquerque, Army officer and colonial hero who distinguished himself in the 
Campaign of 1895 in Mozambique, where with a reduced force arrested the powerful tribal king Gungunhana, 
subjecting him and his people (the Vátuas) to the Portuguese rule. 
1093 Simplified ideas intended to be easily propagated. Slogans. 
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Attachments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 – Military Unit Report of the Battalion of Caçadores n.º 1935. 
(PT AHM/DIV/2/7/104/1) 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 – To Salazar …from Salazar Soldiers. (PT AHM/DIV/2/2/118 
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Fig. 3 – Your work within the work of the Army in the overseas territories. (PT AHM/DIV/2/2/118/4) 
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Fig. 4 – A humoristic drawing. (PT AHM/DIV/2/4/94/1) 
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War propaganda: 
Salazar, Caetano and the impossible balance 
 of the public finances 
 
Luís Filipe Madeira, 
Universidade da Beira Interior 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper aims at demonstrating that the official financial documents of the territories under Portuguese 
Administration which underwent the colonial war are not an adequate source to study their respective public 
finances. In this context, the quantification of the amount of public revenues and expenditures that may not be 
registered in the official accounts of Angola, Guinea and Mozambique - although indispensable as they should 
have been to the exercise of the Portuguese sovereignty during the colonial war -, and the correction of the 
colonies’ official financial annual accounts in accordance with the financial flows, which might not have been 
registered, constitute two stages of a process aiming to demonstrate that, in war time,  the public accounting of 
the Estado Novo will have played a role which is not restricted to the registration of public revenues and 
expenditures. As a matter of fact, Salazar’s government is characterized by an authentic exceptional 
phenomenon – according to the official accounting documents, throughout the whole period of the Estado 
Novo and, subsequently, of the Social State, both in the mainland and in each and every one of the seven 
territories under Portuguese colonial administration, a budgetary deficit had never been registered. Between 
1928 and 1973, in spite of the extreme diversity of economic, social and political circumstances, or still the 
multifariousness of geographical or weather variants to which the different components of the Portuguese 
colonial Empire where submitted, the revenues cashed by the fiscal administrations of the mainland and those 
of the overseas territories in every budgetary year would have been superior to the budgetary expenditure. 
From a political view point, the constant production of financial balances was far from neutral. A great deal 
of the national and international prestige attained by both Salazar and the Estado Novo was the result of their 
capacity to successfully balance the public accounts of the Portuguese Republic. Thus, for the colonial regime, 
in the second and third quarters of the 20th century, the balances in equilibrium of all budgets, in any 
circumstance, became a political imperative which did not tolerate the slightest deviation. However, in what 
concerns economic and financial matters, theoretical and ideological inflexibilities of this nature, in practice, 
cannot not peacefully coexist with the evolution which generally occurs, without pre-announcement, in the 
economy, society, politics or natural milieu. Since, by definition, the material reality is not to adapt itself to the 
public administrations’ budgets and that, on the contrary, the budgetary documents are those which must be 
adjusted to the alteration of the material circumstances in which they are inserted, any production of income 
surplus over the public expenditure which involves a permanent character cannot but raise perplexity. 
Thus, although researchers and other academics dealing with the public finances of the Salazar’s or 
Caetano’s epoch, have very seldom put in question the righteousness of the budgetary equilibrium registered in 
the financial annual accounts, and have never expressed any doubts whatsoever regarding the consistency of 
the data inscribed in the official financial documents, the great improbability of the permanent and universal 
equilibrium registered in the public finances being genuine must be considered. The inexistence of deficits in 
the eight budgetary universes which composed the Portuguese colonial Empire, during a period of 46 
consecutive years, despite their dispersal across four continents, of their anchorage in economies with  slightly 
different development levels, and of their integration in widely varied social and political contexts, suggests 
that the financial annual accounts of the overseas territories must be regarded as records which may not truly 
mirror the reality of the financial flows which enabled the exercise of the Portuguese sovereignty overseas. 
 
 
1. Methodological aspects 
 
The hypothesis according to which the financial annual accounts of the overseas territories which 
underwent a colonial war may not truthfully mirror the volume of revenues and public expenditure which 
made possible both the government and the colonial administration can only be assessed by dint of the 
submission of the official financial documents’ contents to a set of tests. In fact, the apparent discrepancy 
between the data supplied by the public accounting and the volume of the colonial administration’s real 
financial activity can have three distinct origins. On the one hand, the official registration model of the 
revenues and expenditure can mask the structure of the public financial flows, on the other, the official 
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financial annual accounts may not thoroughly register the resources which have been essential to the 
government and the colonial public administration, and, at last and in variable degrees, may these two factors 
intervene in a competitive manner and both contribute to the adulteration of the accounting of the revenues and 
expenditure of the annual accounts. 
The accounting record of the revenues and expenditures adopted in the Portuguese colonies, so-called 
equilibrium of the ordinary balance sheet, divided the financial flows in four categories: revenues and 
expenditures, ordinary and extraordinary. Thus, the ordinary flows corresponded to resources and liabilities 
which repeated themselves in all annual accounts while the extraordinary flows were revenues and 
expenditures which did not correspond to annual permanent necessities. So, besides being subjective, this 
classification criterion of the budgetary flows cannot guarantee great transparency of the public accounting. 
Since, in the accounting system of equilibrium of the ordinary balance sheet, to classify one expense as 
extraordinary suffices towards enabling it to be financed by means of extraordinary resources such as loans or 
subsidies, in such a way that the recourse to indebtedness, regardless of the involved amounts, does not affect 
the formal equilibrium of the budget. This registration model lacks the degree of transparency which permits 
one to perceive the profound structure of the official public finances. 
The limits of the official accounting models, and the relatively obscure manner through which the financial 
balances verified in Angola, Guinea or Mozambique were produced, requires that the data registered in the 
financial annual accounts be structured in a more transparent way. The accounting registration model, so-
called equilibrium of the effective balance, by its simplicity and clarity presents itself as much more adequate 
to the understanding of the public financial flows’ profound structure. Classifying the revenues and 
expenditures as effective and non-effective, this registration model of the flows focuses its attention on the 
treasury movements. Thus, if all the revenues increase the treasury assets, only the effective revenues increase 
its cash assets without, at the same time, increasing its passive. In this perspective, a loan would be a non-
effective revenue, since when the resources owned by the treasury increase, the passive is automatically added. 
Reversely, if all the expenditures reduce the treasury monetary availability, the effective ones have no effect 
over the passive, while the non-effective reduce the treasury liabilities and, simultaneously, the passive, as in 
the case of the amortization expenditures of the public debt principal.  
It must, however, be noticed that a subsidy is an effective revenue, but it is not a generated revenue. The 
notion of generated revenue, more than that of effective revenue, is fundamental in the present study, since it 
highlights the financial sustainability and the real equilibrium of the public finances. Thus, except for the 
calculation of revenues, dominated by the concept of generated revenue, any time flows regarding Angola, 
Guinea or Mozambique which have not been registered in the respective financial annual accounts will be 
corrected according to the criteria which arise from the equilibrium system of the effective balance.  
 
 
2. Financial equilibrium: official version 
 
According to Angola, Guinea and Mozambique, all the annual accounts were closed with a revenue surplus 
over the expenditure. Graph 1 displays the balance of the financial year in percentage of the revenue registered 
in the official accounts. Although the referred colonies had only become theatres of war in 1961, 1963 and 
1964 respectively, the presentation of the public finances evolution in the last twenty years of the colonial 
domination has the intention to clarify the impact of the armed conflict on the financial life of the colonies. 
 
Graph 1: Official accounts: annual accounts balance as a percentage of the total revenue1094 
 
 
 
                                                          
1094 Conta da Gerência e do Exercício de Angola (1961-1973); Conta da Gerência e do Exercício de Moçambique (1961-
1973); Conta da Gerência e do Exercício da Guiné (1961-1973). 
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So, paradoxically, the graphic analysis of the official public accounts of Angola, Guinea and Mozambique 
reveals that the outbreak of the colonial war has had no influence over the pattern of the budgetary executions. 
In reality, the fact that the volume of the financial annual accounts’ positive balances, in relative terms, in the 
years 1954-1957, acquired a gross and irrational expression, having become a lot more reasonable between the 
years 1957-1959, has no relation with the colonial war. Indeed, this strange evolution of the annual accounts’ 
balance reveals the execution difficulties of the first development plan and the slow transformation process of 
the colonies’ ‘net public savings’ in public investment. 
The apparent financial insensitivity of the colonies vis-à-vis the colonial war, which can be observed after 
the analysis of graph 1, and the consequent maintenance, in the years 1960-70, of the budgetary executions’ 
pattern established at the end of the 50’s decade, presents a real enigma which deserves considering. 
Furthermore, in the model of equilibrium of the ordinary balance sheet, the production of the financial 
equilibrium is made easy for the fact that it must be declared even if the annual accounts’ ordinary revenue – 
taxes, fees and income from properties – is not sufficient to cover the total expenditure. The covering rate of 
the annual accounts total amount by the ordinary revenue is a fundamental indicator of the sustainability as 
well as the financial autonomy and, therefore, of the ‘normal’ public revenue capacity to secure the payment of 
the public expenditure.  
 
Graph 2:1095 Coverage rate of the total expenditure by the ordinary revenue, minus the flows of the autonomous services 
 
 
 
Graph 2 exhibits the coverage rate of the total expenditure of the annual accounts by the ordinary revenue. 
In order to enable the comparative analysis of the three colonies, the value of the annual revenues and 
expenditures of the autonomous services which operated in each colony were deducted from the financial 
aggregates in which they were integrated.  Although the revenues and expenditures of the autonomous services 
were registered in the financial annual accounts of the colony by means of identical amounts and, therefore, 
were neutral in what concerns the calculation of the financial balance, their presence in the public revenues and 
expenditures of the financial annual accounts distorts the evaluations, in relative terms, and hinders 
comparisons due to the disparity of their volume in each colony.  
Although the annual accounts, from a formal view point, according to the patterns in usage in the model of 
the ordinary balance, were in equilibrium, during the period concerned, the ordinary revenues were always 
insufficient to secure the payment of the total expenditures. Thus, due to the incapacity of the ordinary 
revenues to cover the thorough amount of the annual accounts’ expenditure (100% in Graph 2), the subsidies 
of the mainland, the balances of previous years, and the loans constituted public expenditure sources of 
payment which, though not having the nature of generated revenues, curiously enough, did not determine that 
the budgetary execution should be declared loss-making. 
Since the presence, namely, of subsidies and loans within the revenues of the annual accounts, according to 
the official accounting model, do not prevent the accounts from being declared in equilibrium, the attempt to 
have access to the concealed structure of Angola’s, Guinea’s and Mozambique’s public finances imposes that 
the financial flows registered in the colonies’ annual accounts be structured according to a less lenient    and 
less permissive accounting model than the so-called equilibrium of the ordinary balance sheet.  
 
3. An alternative structure 
 
When revealing that, in the annual accounts which are formally in equilibrium, the ‘normal’ revenues do 
not cover the total expenditure, Graph 2 demonstrates that the accounting  registration system, so-called 
                                                          
1095 Conta da Gerência e do Exercício de Angola (1961-1973); Conta da Gerência e do Exercício de Moçambique (1961-
1973); Conta da Gerência e do Exercício da Guiné (1961-1973). 
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equilibrium of the ordinary balance sheet, is not adequate to the understanding of Angola’s, Guinea’s and 
Mozambique’s public finances’ profound structure. So, the imperative to have access and to reveal the 
concealed structure of the public finances of these colonies demands that the data included in the annual 
accounts be submitted to alternative methods of registration, a procedure which will allow to clarify in a 
definite manner whether the equilibrium of the official public accounts was a mere consequence of the flows’ 
registration method. 
To approach the financial flows, according to the perspective of the equilibrium of the effective finances, 
due to its transparency, proves to be more adequate than that adopted by the official accounting of the Estado 
Novo if the profound structure of the public finances is to be disclosed. In fact, the effective equilibrium arises 
from the capacity of the taxes, fees and financial revenues of the state – excluded other resources, such as 
loans and previous annual balances – to cover the total amount of expenditure of the annual accounts after the 
deduction of the principal and loans’ amortizations. Graph 3 exhibits the coverage rate of the effective 
expenditures by the effective revenues.  
Considering that, according to the calculation model of the equilibrium underlying the notion of effective 
finances, unlike the official version presented in Graph 1, in the last twenty years of  the colonial domination, 
only Angola, in 1954 and 1955, and Guinea in 1954 and 1961 would have registered a surplus of effective 
revenues over the effective expenditure; it is proved that the public accounts of these Portuguese colonies owe 
their state of equilibrium to the accounting model chosen by the Estado Novo. While not being liable to be 
replicated with other accounting models of financial flows such as the model of equilibrium of the effective 
balance, the financial equilibriums produced according to the model of the ordinary balance lose both 
significance and authority. 
 
Graph 3: Official accounts: coverage rate of the effective expenditure by the effective revenue1096 
 
 
 
The demonstration that Salazar’s financial miracle was an accounting artefact, the result of the use of a 
specific model of organizing the public financial flows did not require the questioning of the pertinence or the 
integrity of the registered data in the official annual accounts of Angola, Guinea or Mozambique. The question 
of the correspondence between the official accounting registrations and the financial life of the Portuguese 
colonies is, nonetheless, a central aspect concerning the study of the overseas public finances in war time.  
 
 
4. The financial equilibrium no matter what 
 
More closely analysed, the data presented in the Graphs 2 and 3 are improbable. According to the 
registered data in Angola’s financial annual accounts, for example, throughout the years of the colonial war, on 
average, 76, 9% of the annual accounts expenditure would have been covered by revenue cashed by the 
Angolan government. Since that average percentage coverage, which reaches 86% if one is to adopt the 
calculation method which arises from   the notion of effective balance, does not correspond to the historical 
reality of the Angolan finances in war times, it is absolutely essential to detect financing sources of colonial 
expenditures which are not registered in the official annual accounts.  
In the cases of Angola and Mozambique there are two major sources of expenditure and revenue which are 
not registered in the respective annual accounts and that have never been taken into consideration when 
studying their the public finances. 
                                                          
1096 Conta da Gerência e do Exercício de Angola (1961-1973); Conta da Gerência e do Exercício de Moçambique (1961-
1973); Conta da Gerência e do Exercício da Guiné (1961-1973). 
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4. 1 The Portuguese economic space 
 
In spite of the nationalistic rhetoric of the Estado Novo which conceived the overseas provinces as integral, 
inalienable and indivisible component of a multi-continental Portugal, the economic and financial integration 
of the mainland and its colonies, paradoxically, was very superficial. In fact, until the 60’s, the Portuguese 
colonies, for customs’ purposes, were autonomous territories which practiced their own customs rates, their 
quantitative restrictions and where the circulation of goods and capitals, not to mention the people’s 
movements between the different national territories, depended on the acquisition of previous administrative 
authorizations. 
So, the annexation of the State of India by the Indian Union, in 1960, the outbreak of the Liberation War in 
the Province of Angola, in 1961, as well as the economic integration process in progress in Europe made the 
economic relating model in force between the mainland and the overseas provinces obsolete. In this context, in 
November 1961, the project to create a free commercial zone including all the territories under Portuguese 
administration was materialized. According to the plan drawn by Lisbon, till the 31st December 1971, all the 
obstacles to the free circulation of national or nationalized goods should be gradually eliminated from the 
inter-territorial relations. 
However, the liberalization of the commercial relations did not run the way it had been foreseen. The 
liberty of commerce did not permit to balance the deficit which characterized the commercial relations of the 
colonies with the mainland, having even aggravated the commercial deficit of the overseas territories. In 
Angola, the regime of free circulation of goods exhausted the whole of the currency reserves in the very year 
of its coming into force; a process which was to be repeated in Mozambique, after four years of free commerce 
regime. 
The consequence of the exhaustion of foreign currency in Angola and Mozambique was the accumulation 
of debts in mainland escudos to the suppliers located in Continental Portugal and in its Islands. Since Angola 
and Mozambique had only internal currency, the new liberty to import goods implied that, although the 
Angolan and Mozambican importers could pay the importations from the mainland in local currency, the 
Banco Nacional Ultramarino in Mozambique and the Banco de Angola, within the framework of the regular 
functioning of the inter-territorial payment system, must guarantee the exporters’ payment in mainland 
escudos.  
Notwithstanding the fact that the commercial balances of Angola and Mozambique with the rest of the 
world registered a surplus, the annual currency thus produced was insufficient to cover the deficit arising from 
the commercial relations with the mainland and, in spite of the various loans in escudos granted by the Escudo 
Zone Monetary Fund, an accumulation process of debts in escudos was established vis-à-vis the suppliers 
located in mainland Portugal. 
Angola’s and Mozambique’s problem of overdue payments, apparently, only regards the Continental 
exporters and the Angolan and Mozambican importers. However, the free commerce zone deficiencies of 
functioning acquired such a dimension that it led to the collapse of the Portuguese economic space itself, in 
December 1971. Thus, the suspension of the proceedings which should lead to the creation of a free commerce 
zone in the Portuguese economic space and the high loans granted by the mainland to Angola and 
Mozambique towards the solution of the overdue payments discloses the public nature of the issue. In 
December 1973, the estimated value of Angola’s and Mozambique’s debt to the continental exporters still 
amounted to circa 1 547 000 000 and 1 728 600 000 Escudos respectively. 
 
Graph 4 :Charges arising from the inter-territorial payments1097 
 
 
 
                                                          
1097 Banco de Portugal. Sistema de Compensação e de Pagamentos Interterritoriais. Relatório do Agente (1961-1973). 
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Graph 4 exhibits an estimation of the annual financial burdens resulting from the malfunctioning of the 
inter-territorial payment system and of the collapse of the free commerce regime designed for the Portuguese 
economic space. 
The annual charges with the malfunctioning of the inter-territorial payment system are neither registered in 
any of the annual accounts of the mainland nor of the colonies. However, the financing of the overdue 
payments involves the allowance of a real continental subsidy to the inter-territorial commerce which, having 
initially  had a private source, in 1971, was transformed into  Angola’s and Mozambique’s public debt, by 
means of a loan granted by the mainland. Thus, within the framework of the equilibrium of the effective 
balance accounting model, it seems legitimate to consider the annual burdens regarding the malfunctioning of 
the inter-territorial commerce liberalization policy as a subsidy which was due to secure the payment of 
effective expenditures. 
 
 
4.2. The colonial war 
 
The outbreak of the colonial war in Angola, in 1961, in Guinea, in 1963, and in Mozambique in 1964, was 
perhaps the most significant source of public expenditure in the Portuguese Colonial Empire after the Second 
World War. So, paradoxically, the analysis of the annual accounts official balances evolution proposed in 
Graph 1, the evaluation of the total expenditure coverage rate of the annual accounts by the ordinary revenues 
shown in Graph 2, or the appreciation of the effective coverage rate of the public expenditure suggested in 
Graph 3, do not reveal any sort of impact due to the breaking out of the national liberation armed struggle on 
the financial life of Angola, Mozambique or Guinea. Hence, the only logical explanation for such a situation is 
that the annual accounts of the territories which were the theatre of the colonial war did not, partial or totally, 
register the amount of the flows which provided the funding for the armed conflict. 
In fact, the General State Account of the mainland registers a significant amount of financial resources as 
extraordinary expenditure in a position designated as ‘Extraordinary Military Forces Overseas’ allocated to the 
payment of the expenditure arising from the maintenance of the colonial war. In spite of the secrecy which 
involves the military matters in war time, having determined that the General State Account could only include 
the total annual amount of the extraordinary expenditure, this research is in the position to suggest a 
breakdown of that global amount by colony. Thus, admitting that all the revenues and expenditures that 
enabled the exercise of the Portuguese sovereignty in a certain colony must be taken into consideration when 
studying its respective public finances, Graph 5 presents, in relative terms, the volume of the public 
expenditure allocated to the colonies’ military defence.  
 
 
Graph 5: Non-registered military expenditure as a percentage of the colonies’ effective official expenditure1098 
 
 
 
The financial flows regarding the funding of the colonial war have never been taken into consideration 
when studying the public finances of Angola, Mozambique or Guinea. However, the volume of those flows is 
relevant and justifies the correction of the official annual accounts. Throughout the colonial war, the 
mainland’s funding of Angola’s defence represented on average 59, 7% of the annual effective expenditures 
registered in its annual accounts; a value that in Mozambique amounted to 31, 1%. As far as that matter is 
                                                          
1098 Source : Conta Geral do Estado (1961-1973); Conta da Gerência e do Exercício de Angola (1961-1973); Conta da 
Gerência e do Exercício de Moçambique (1961-1973); Conta da Gerência e do Exercício da Guiné (1961-1973); Conta 
das Forças Militares Privativas do Ultramar (1961-1973); Conta das Forças Militares Extraordinárias no Ultramar 
(1961-1973); Ordens de Pagamento do Fundo de Defesa Militar do Ultramar (1961-1973). 
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concerned, the case of Guinea is of a different dimension. In 1963, the mainland’s funding of Guinea’s military 
expenditure represented 280, 8% of the official effective expenditure registered in the annual accounts of the 
colony; a percentage which subsequently increased and that, in 1973, amounted to 738, 3%. Thus, during the 
years of war, the annual financial contribution of the mainland for the military defence of Guinea, on average, 
attained 532, 6% of the total annual effective expenditure registered in the annual accounts of the colony. 
 
 
5. Correction of the official accounts 
 
Like the financial flows regarding the malfunctioning of the inter-territorial free commerce space, the 
mainland’s financing of the colonies’ military defence has all the characteristics of a subsidy, an exogenous 
revenue, due to the payment of effective public expenditures whose existence thoroughly  justifies the 
corrections of the official revenues and expenditures – it is a public expenditure carried out in the colonial 
territories, it is at the origin of the economic activity level registered during the war and enabled the exercise of 
the Portuguese sovereignty in the territory. 
 
Graph 6: Non-registered expenditure as a percentage of the generated revenue1099 
 
 
 
 
Graph 6 exhibits the non-registered financial flows in the colonies’ annual accounts as a percentage of their 
own annual revenues. In the sequence of the outbreak of the liberation armed struggle, in 1963, the financial 
resources transferred by the mainland which were not registered in Guinea’s annual accounts amounted to 
354,3% of the revenue collected by the colony’s administration. In 1973, the financial resources granted by the 
mainland to Guinea’s military defence represented 1007,7% of the generated revenues of the colony; the 
annual average of those contributions attained, during the war years, 709,6% of the generated revenues 
collected each year. 
Less spectacular, though, the subsidies granted to Angola and Mozambique are quite significant. During 
the war years, Angola benefited from various subsidies which, on average, amounted to 73, 4% of its annual 
generated revenues (42,6% in Mozambique) which reveals an absolute financial dependency on the mainland’s 
budget. 
 
 
 
6. The aggravated imbalance 
 
Once the necessary changes to the official accounts of the colonies have been made, the relation between 
generated revenue and the effective expenditure is presented under a totally different perspective. Graph 7 
exhibits the coverage rate of the total corrected effective expenditure by the generated revenue of the colonies 
during the last twenty years of the Portuguese colonial rule.  
 
 
                                                          
1099 Source : Conta Geral do Estado (1961-1973); Conta da Gerência e do Exercício de Angola (1961-1973); Conta da 
Gerência e do Exercício de Moçambique (1961-1973); Conta da Gerência e do Exercício da Guiné (1961-1973); Conta 
das Forças Militares Privativas do Ultramar (1961-1973); Conta das Forças Militares Extraordinárias no Ultramar 
(1961-1973); Ordens de Pagamento do Fundo de Defesa Militar do Ultramar (1961-1973); Banco de Portugal. Sistema 
de Compensação e de Pagamentos Interterritoriais. Relatório do Agente (1961-1973). 
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Graph 7: Coverage rate of the total effective corrected expenditure  by the generated revenues1100 
 
 
 
In the exact opposite of the public finances’ permanent equilibrium, the correction of the official accounts 
according to the financial flows which, having been absolutely essential to the government and to the colonial 
administration, are not registered in the colonial accounts  reveal a profound imbalance of the public finances. 
During the war years, on average, Mozambique was incapable of securing the payment of 38% of the annual 
effective expenditure carried out in its territory, while Angola revealed itself incapable of paying 50% of those 
burdens and Guinea circa 87% of the financial commitments.  
The reality exhibited in Graphs 1 and 7 is clear as regards the propagandistic dimension of the accounting 
methods carried out in the colonies which underwent a colonial war. The case of Guinea is paradigmatic.  
Stage of the Portuguese forces’ military eminent defeat, although it had only had capacity to secure, on 
average, the payment of 13% of its annual public expenditure, Guinea enjoys the reputation, supported in its 
annual accounts as any other Portuguese colony, of having always closed its annual accounts in equilibrium. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In spite of the gross fictional character which involves the equilibrium of the public finances of the 
Portuguese colonies which underwent the colonial war, and which does not withstand a critical analysis of the 
flows registered in the official accounts, it is paradoxical that the latter have always been the only source of 
information used by researchers and other academics dealing with the Portuguese colonial finances. The origin 
of this strange phenomenon can, however, reside in the Estado Novo’s propaganda itself. In a society which 
lacks freedom of expression, where the alternative sources of information are inexistent, the systematic 
dissemination of reports and studies, some of them with alleged scientific ambitions, which a-critically 
reproduced, with no right to adversarial debate, the governmental perspectives about the evolution of the 
public finances in each colony granted the annual accounts of the colonized territories an artificial and 
unjustified reliability which, very likely, might have conditioned, till the present days, the research of other 
funding sources of colonial public expenditure.  
One way or other, the official balance of the annual accounts was the result of the application of the official 
accounting model, so-called equilibrium of the ordinary balance sheet, which proved to be highly permeable to 
the manipulation of the classification and registration of the financial flows. Submitted to different modalities 
for the    accounting of the public financial flows, the Portuguese colonies’ official revenues and expenditures 
would by no means be in perfect balance. 
Furthermore, the annual accounts of the colonies under scrutiny did not register the whole of the financial 
resources and charges which enabled the exercise of the Portuguese sovereignty. A significant amount of the 
public revenues and expenditures were not registered in the colonies’ accounts but rather in the mainland’s 
General State Account. On the assumption that, regardless any juridical or political arguments, all revenues 
and expenditures granted to the government and public administration of a colony must be taken into 
consideration when analysing its public finances; the correction of the official accounts presents itself as a line 
of work which allows the accounting records to match the financial reality which it is supposed to mirror. 
                                                          
1100 Source : Conta Geral do Estado (1961-1973); Conta da Gerência e do Exercício de Angola (1961-1973); Conta da 
Gerência e do Exercício de Moçambique (1961-1973); Conta da Gerência e do Exercício da Guiné (1961-1973); Conta 
das Forças Militares Privativas do Ultramar (1961-1973); Conta das Forças Militares Extraordinárias no Ultramar 
(1961-1973); Ordens de Pagamento do Fundo de Defesa Militar do Ultramar (1961-1973); Banco de Portugal. Sistema 
de Compensação e de Pagamentos Interterritoriais. Relatório do Agente (1961-1973). 
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Thus, Angola’s, Mozambique’s, and Guinea’s annual accounts appear as a powerful and effective 
instrument of the Estado Novo and its colonial policy image management. When concealing the negative 
impact of the war on the finances of the territories under Portuguese administration, the colonies’ official 
accounts display piecemeal and fictional financial realities which cover negative aspects of the adopted 
policies by the Lisbon Government overseas. Under these circumstances, it does not seem excessive to 
consider that, throughout the colonial war, the annual accounts of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea, rather 
than financial documents, were effective vehicles for war propaganda of the Estado Novo. 
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«War Propaganda in Portugal (1940-1945): Analysis of 
photographies of the World War II in propaganda press 
published in Portugal» 
 
 
Débora Cardoso, 
ISCTE-IUL 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Aside from military confrontation and disputes between political ideologies and territories, World War II 
was also the stage for intense propaganda. Not only did this propaganda take place in countries involved in the 
war, it also extended in the same manner across the states considered neutral, using messages and 
representations with the goal of attracting followers to their cause. It is known that, in this conflict, Portugal 
decided to remain neutral. Regardless of its stand, the country was still a target for the belligerents’ 
propaganda, which transformed the society by dividing it between Anglophiles and Germanophiles. Under the 
influence of the belligerency, those two factions took positions that were either pro-Allies or pro-Axis. 
Among the main means of communication, the images shown by the press were a very important element 
for strengthening its stand with the people. Given these aspects, the goal of this study is to analyze propaganda 
magazines that were edited and distributed in Portugal, starting with the observation and interpretation of war 
propaganda photographs published in Portugal beginning in the year of 1940 – those being A Esfera (pro-Axis) 
and Mundo Ilustrado (pro-Allies). 
That being said, this work will start out with a context on war propaganda, namely in photography, and in 
the press, with a characterization of the propaganda and the steps used so that its effect is the desired one. 
Another goal of this work is to also understand how war propaganda is an effective weapon, hence the focus 
given it’s been given in this introduction. 
Portugal’s neutrality throughout the conflict will be a central theme in this study. By explaining its 
geographical importance of a country whose population is small and whose resources are few, a social and 
geographic context of Portugal will be carried out so as to understand how important the country was in order 
to be considered a “target” for the belligerents. 
There will also be given some prominence to the presence of war propaganda in Portugal, to the groups that 
were influenced and the ones which influenced the others and what ended with Portugal’s collaboration with 
the belligerents even though its position was assumedly neutral. 
Afterwards, specific cases and photographs will be analyzed through the presentation and scrutiny of the 
propaganda magazines published in Portugal. With central elements such as Germany as a front for the Axis 
and England as a front for the Allies, a study will be made in a perspective of comparison, a cross between 
information when it comes to the themes each of the belligerents presented. Two big themes will be examined: 
the power of the military and the human side of the conflict. With this methodology it will be possible to study 
the image the two belligerents sought to build and the message they wanted to broadcast to the public. 
 
Wartime Propaganda 
 
Like publicity, the term propaganda implies giving knowledge through ideas so that supporters can be 
recruited. Those in charge of propaganda seek to create and transform opinions in an informative process. 
Their main goal is to promote the mutual understanding between the sender and the receiver, transmitting data, 
sharing ideas and, subsequently, explain and instruct. In terms of access, the chiefs of propaganda need to 
promote constant communication with their target audience while always keeping their response as a basis. 
Hence the need to define another process of communication: persuasion. Persuasion is a communicative 
process whose key is in the receiver’s response. The phenomenon of persuasion is essential for propaganda to 
be effective. However, to reach success, propaganda needs to act in a complex social media, becoming 
inherent to a state’s organization. 
Within the political perspective, war propaganda has identical objectives. Like political propaganda, this 
type is directed mainly towards civilians, who, in the specific case of armed conflict and along with the 
military when the need arises, sustains the war effort. 
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The subject of World War II, with great theoretical preparation, allows to tackle war propaganda with new 
views. During this conflict, the development of propaganda was enormous, counting with the use of new 
media, like radio and cinema. 
The use of black propaganda – in which the source is altered regardless of falsity or faithfulness of the 
message – was the most used method. The exaggeration, the minimization or the disfiguration of information 
allows to pinpoint exactly what truly mattered. As Goebbels stated, “The bigger the lie, the more credible it 
is.” 
 
 
Portugal and war propaganda (1940-1945) 
 
During the conflict, the countries at war were dependant of the results of “indirect war” that came from the 
outsider. The image they let out to different people was a determinant factor in their campaign against and for 
the enemy. 
Even though the country had few resources and its population was small when compared to the great 
European potencies, Portugal was important in regards of its geographical placement. Portugal was the main 
route for information and espionage and the belligerents considered Lisbon to be the main point of entrance 
and exit of agents between Europe and the rest of the world. It was due to these conditions that, in a first phase, 
Germans and English and, in a second phase, Americans, decided to unleash their actions of propaganda. 
The countless refugees and an intense propaganda from the belligerents caused a great impact in a 
population that had little contact with the exterior, as all the information was filtered through censorship and 
communication control. With conflict, everything changed. First the Germans, followed by the English and the 
North Americans, started to spread information around the Portuguese population about the tales of a war 
people were living, whether in terms of conquests, power and destruction of the enemy, as well as acts of 
courage and solidarity. 
The Portuguese government knew about the importance foreign propaganda carried. However, it was with 
sheer surprise that Portugal’s ruling body realized its impact. They observed the arrival and expansion of the 
belligerents’ propaganda with great reservations, regardless of origin or content, and fought the propaganda 
and its bad influences, keeping Portugal’s neutrality in the war. The main organizations in charge of the 
control were the Secretariat of National Propaganda and the Censorship Services. 
The Censorship Services were in charge of the military, who kept a close eye on the entire press, be it 
national or regional. All writers intending to publish their books had to go through Censorship, which not only 
cut their texts, but also supervised publishing deals and made lists of the publications that could reach the 
Portuguese. By defending and trying to reinforce the idea of neutrality in the country and through the organs of 
information, Censorship evaded frontal attacks from the belligerents. 
 
 
Anglophiles and Germanophiles 
 
The actions of propaganda published in the time period covered by this study will be presented in this 
chapter. Following the chronological context of the war, photographic sources will be analyzed and inserted in 
the Portuguese reality.  
In terms of public opinion, the tendency towards the anglophiles was clear and significant. From the 
regimen’s point of view, propaganda coming from the two belligerents ended up having an important role in 
the necessity born out of avoiding tendencies and divisions in society. In 1941, A Esfera was regarded as a 
German magazine and Mundo Gráfico as a British one. Both came out in a bi-weekly basis and their 
headquarters were located in Lisbon. A Esfera was distributed on the 5th and 20th of each month. Its first 
number was published on the 6th of July 1940, and its last edition was on the 20th of April 1945. Mundo 
Gráfico was published on the 15th and the 30th of each month. Its first publication was at a later date than A 
Esfera’s, as its first number was distributed on the 15th of October 1940, and it continued to be released after 
the conflict, until February 1948.  
The A Esfera magazine had Álvaro Maia as its first editor, who was in charge of the numbers until 
November 1940, with Félix Correia assuming his position afterwards. Mundo Gráfico’s direction was ran by 
Artur Portela, and there are no registries that say the magazine changed directors during its Portuguese 
existence. Both magazines were constantly illustrated with photographic coverage about the war. 
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 Military Power 
 
The propaganda present in both magazines can be divided in three main periods: from June 1940 to June 
1941; from June 1941 to the end of 1942; and from October 1942 to May 1945. 
 
A discreet anglophilia (June 1940 to June 1941) 
 
It’s possible to see a discreet anglophilia in this time period. Its propaganda was limited to showing the 
actions of the Allies and reinforce the strength of the British people and between the states belonging to the 
Allied cause and the British Empire. It also highlighted the power of their Navy and Royal Air Force. Those 
intentions were well exposed by showing the defensive strength of their ships against the enemy’s airplanes. 
This was achieved by presenting the loading of an anti-aerial Gatling gun with four barrels, with the goal of 
intimidating the adversary with their weapons, as well as the anglophiles’ superior military prowess (Figure 1). 
This propaganda was also a response to the Germans’ very own, as months before a photograph of a German 
airplane factory was published with the very same objective: intimidation (Figure 2). 
English propaganda was very careful. Within certain limits, it was careful enough not to crash with the 
ideals of the Portuguese regiment so as not to complicate the diplomatic relationship between Portugal and 
England. It sought to counter the German’s propaganda ideas and, in a way, supported itself in the methods 
and results of the enemy’s propaganda. 
The ambition towards defeating the enemy was, to the Axis’s forces, seen as an objective to free Europe, 
thus beginning a crusade against bolshevism and fake democracies. It tries to convey the idea of union in the 
Axis’s forces and their supporters in defending their noble cause and, with that, to intimidate the enemy with 
the unification of their men by showing the troops of other European states such as Italy, who had the same 
want and ambition (Figure 3). 
Once more, as a response, England presents what a patrol of Australian soldiers does to the prisoners 
belonging to a group of Italian soldiers. With this, England wanted to emphasize the superiority and the dignity 
of the Allied Forces’ military. There’s also a theory that claims the enemy surrendered easily, without the 
Allied Forces needing to resort to violence and armed forces (Figure 4). 
 
The anti-bolshevist crusade (June 1941 to late 1942) 
 
After the summer of 1942, due to the course of the war, there’s a visible Germanophile inclination in the 
regiment’s actions. The beginning of the fight against the East front as a goal to conquer the territories under 
Soviet rule and the addition of the United States of America as England’s allies in the conflict, turned the war 
into a stage for disputes between ideologies and totalitarianism, thus putting to test the survival of the 
Portuguese authoritarian regimen post-war. The danger of a German invasion was always ever-present in the 
form of pressure from Hitler’s part, in an economic, political and military levels. 
However, in the propaganda published by the Axis, anti-bolshevism is highlighted, as well as the fight 
towards freeing the territories dominated by the enemy. This idea was presented in a pavilion where a big 
committee met against the bolshevist enemy, shown as a crushing element of photography in a massive 
billboard with a soviet soldier, ran over and destroying a cross, with the Axis’s forces ready to confront the 
“monster” (Figure 5). 
The Axis’s supremacy gave the idea that the enemy surrendered without violence by the defeated look of 
the prisoners. At this point, the successive images of its main ambition began: the destruction of the threat that 
was bolshevism. In Ukraine, all German troops are gloriously received, walking under a decorative archway 
built by the villagers (Figure 6). There’s an idea of feast and liberation from the enemy’s oppression and the 
soviet threat. It also tries to discreetly pass on that the victory was pacific, with no resort to violence. In 
Bucharest, the liberation of its territory from bolshevism is celebrated, as well as their joining the German 
cause (Figure 7).  
The English found a way to counter this tendency. By amplifying the still unexpected and still timid 
resistance that the Red Army began to show in the beginning of 1942. This picture (Figure 8) is supposed to 
show the courage and resistance of the soviet soldiers regardless of how much they’ve been attacked by the 
enemy and despite how far away victory might be, stressing, once more, the supremacy of the Allies — in this 
case, the allies from USSR. This is the first image that shows an indication of inevitable victory and 
destruction of the enemy. 
However, Salazar did not manifest goodwill towards this situation, and didn’t allow England to become a 
transmission channel for soviet propaganda in Portugal, taking measures to that effect. He had all news about 
USSR shortened. For contrast, the German news could be published without the Censorship’s intervention. 
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The end of the war (October 1942 to May 1945) – Liberation or “Liberation” 
 
Towards the end of 1942, the war’s course began to change, as did its luck, to the side of the Allies, in the 
Pacific, in Stalingrad and in El-Alamein. With this, the belief in Germany’s invincibility is put to the test, and 
the Allies’ conviction of their victory surges, due to the fact that the Allies had been advancing more and more 
into Northern Africa, Northern Europe and the Eastern front, with Germany as their final destination. The 
Portuguese regimen’s activity shifted and adapted itself to the changes, and so did the German and English 
purpose in their propaganda. 
English propaganda keeps its registry of answering the Axis’s propaganda by quoting Goering and a 
sentence he said in the beginning of the war: “No enemy plane will fly over the Reich territory.” (Figure 9). 
Once more, the superior military prowess stands out when the English pilot flaunts the number of bombs 
dropped by his plane in enemy territory like he would a war trophy. It is therefore reinforced the goal of 
intimidating the enemy, as well as their destruction. Imminent victory for the Allies is also highlighted and, 
consequently, the defeat and destruction of the enemy (Figure 10).  
Even after losing territory to the enemy, German propaganda didn’t give up on showcasing their military 
prowess. This time it was done through unveiling new weapons at the 5th year of war (Figure 11). This was 
their way of showing the enemy that the Axis’s forces wouldn’t surrender easily, intimidating the enemy with 
their powerful weapons. 
It was in July 1944 that the Allies displayed their strongest action in terms of propaganda: by presenting 
their main victory: the battle of the Normandy. The idea of an unwanted war is represented in this image 
(Figure 12). That no matter the victory, there will always be mourning for those killed in action, whether 
they’re supporters or enemies, as can be seen by the expression of sorrow in the Allied forces when faced with 
the enormous pyramid of German helmets. 
Nevertheless, this photograph has another interpretation: it’s a demonstration of power and destruction of 
the enemy, with a presentation of their weapons and helmets as trophies of war. 
The weight of the events that transpired during the conflict was felt in two distinct manners: on one side, 
the Portuguese regiment was afraid the USSR would expand communism throughout Europe and destroy the 
Christian culture. In this case, a strong critique to the methods used by the North Americans to establish order 
with the intention of devaluating democracy brought by the Allies was presented (Figure 13). They anticipated 
an Europe that was condemned to capitalist oppression and a false idea of liberation. 
On the other hand, the Portuguese regiment wanted to collaborate with the remaining Allies and 
demonstrate that the nationalist ideals lived by the Portuguese were not based on false principles. 
This change brought on doubts when it came to the permanency of the Estado Novo in Portugal, all due to 
the imminent defeat of the Nazi and fascist regimens. Still, the regimen remained, and was an indispensable 
factor when it came to defending the colonial interests and Europe’s stability after the war. 
 
During the entire war period, the Axis supporters defended the anti-bolshevism and that the regimes ruling 
England and the USA were false democracies. After 1944, when the end of the war approached, those 
statements were accentuated.  
Unlike pro-German propaganda, the Allies’ supporters were obligated to now do an anti-fascist campaign 
due to the fact that the features of the Estado Novo were very much alike to those found in the Nazi regime and 
Italian fascism. 
Therefore, they limited themselves to publishing images about their armada and the conquests made 
throughout the war period, thus assuming a pacific propaganda. This type of propaganda lasted until the end of 
1942, until the conflict was turned around and the propaganda afterwards became more energetic and victory-
oriented.  
 
The Human side of the War 
 
Even with all the displays of military prowess that showed men and guns, as well as the conquest and 
destruction of the enemy, the belligerents’ propaganda was also based on an equally important aspect: the 
human side of the War. Throughout the war period, both publications demonstrated the courage of their people 
in the face of adversity, the care and dedication to their war mascots, solidarity to the enemy wounded by the 
violence of the battles and the freedom of the people. 
 
The Courage of the People 
 
These pictures seek to demonstrate the more humane side of the war through the courage of the civilians 
faced with hardships of the war and the bombings, as well as the protection of the weak, like what happened in 
an English city, with this lady, who’s shielding a child with her own body (Figure 14). In this second picture, 
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(Figure 15) the human side of the war is more visible, showcasing civilians and their courage before the 
destruction and the bombings. Wandering through the streets of Berlin, life goes on, even with the aerial terror. 
The time in which these pictures were published is to be highlighted. While the British propaganda 
displays the courage of their people when faced with the war in the beginning of the conflict, the Germans only 
presented that same theme in 1944, in a period that precedes the end of the war. Nonetheless, the people’s 
reaction to the calamity is identical. 
 
The Mascots 
 
This theme is similarly presented by the two parties, and it’s about the displaying the importance of their 
war mascots. The dedication given to them is visible, as the mascots were the pride of their clutch. 
Here resides the idea that the war is more than destruction and that it’s also made of episodes of good 
disposition. (Figures 16/17) 
 
 
Solidarity to the enemy 
 
Through this title is possible to notice that the conveyed idea is one of unwanted war. Once again, there’s 
the surging of the impression that not everything is destruction.  
As for English propaganda, it’s shown how England treats her prisoners. A German pilot is wounded and is 
carefully aided by a solder and a policewoman, both English (Figure 18). 
The Axis’ forces demonstrate solidarity to the English pilot rescued from the sea. The soldier’s life was in 
danger and his enemies helped him by giving the Englishman water so he could recover his strength (Figure 
19). 
 
 
Freedom 
 
This theme shows the many ideas of freedom displayed by each belligerent. This title lets out the 
impression of goodwill and solidarity towards the conquered people, brushing aside the idea of oppression. Its 
common goal is to clear the idea that war is only comprised of violence and destruction. 
Germany’s propaganda has the intention of showing the terror lived by the people when the citizens were 
dominated by their bolshevism enemy, namely hunger. In Lithuanian territory, a German soldier shows an act 
of kindness by offering food to the young (Figure 20). 
In the photograph that illustrates the good intentions of the Allied propaganda, it’s clear that the main 
subject is of celebration and liberation (Figure 21). To this French woman, who’s embracing one of the 
English soldiers who’s entered the city, the Allies’ victory is the very best of news. 
 
When it comes to presenting the human side of the war, the similarity between both blocks is obvious. Both 
present dedication to an idea of freedom, to protecting the weak against the enemy and to fight against the 
opposing forces no matter what. 
Both highlight the dedication to their mascots and how they provide the troops with carefree moments 
before the violence of the war. They reveal the best of intentions by arriving a territory previously held by the 
enemy, giving away an indication of freedom, as well as dedication and help towards the endangered, 
wounded enemy. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
When the possibility of interpreting photographs of the war in a compared perspective appeared, it was 
assumed that both themes and objectives would be different. Nevertheless, throughout the research and 
analysis of the photographs by themes, the conclusion was the opposite of that.  
In fact, the two big blocks found in the conflict, centered in Germany and England, cover two main themes: 
they stress out military prowess and strength, but also, the other side of the war, its more human aspect, 
attempting to prove that war is not just destruction. When it comes to military prowess, both belligerents tried 
to highlight their supremacy and show the people that both victory and the enemy’s destruction were 
inevitable. This leads to their pictures displaying superiority when faced with the enemy, who will be easily 
defeated, in a pacific way without any excessive resort to violence and armed conflict. The dignity of their 
troops when compared to the enemy’s is emphasized, as well as the idea of union between the supporting 
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countries of each cause, as well as the exhibition of their powerful weapons and conquering war trophies that 
used to belong to the enemy. 
Both blocks in the conflict also state that should the enemy be victorious, Europe will be condemned to 
oppression, thus giving the impression of false liberation as well as the opinion that a free Europe will only be 
possible if their forces win the war. It’s therefore highlighted that the coming of each party and conquering of 
the enemy territories is a sign of freedom and the end of the threat and oppression generated by the war. The 
goal of intimidating the other side with their powerful weapons and war trophies is also present. 
The human side of the war also has many similarities when it comes to the opinions it seeks to entice. Acts 
of solidarity towards the enemy are displayed with the objective of showing that not everything is violence and 
destruction. The people’s courage when faced with adversity and the defending of the weak factor into the idea 
that the war was unwanted, only existing because the enemy forced and encouraged it. In the same way, the 
troops’ dedication to the war mascots during the conflict is also highlighted, as well as the mascots’ 
importance when it comes to bringing about episodes of great disposition. 
For each conquered territory, the idea of celebration and freedom is transmitted. But even with all the 
joyous celebrations, the mourning for the defeated enemy is also present. Within the conquering of the 
territories, in order to brush away the idea of oppression, the demonstration of good intentions and solidarity 
for the subjugated people is also emphasized, as well as denunciation of the terror in which the conquered 
people lived when dominated by the enemy. 
That being said, both belligerents present identical themes with similar goals. There is, however, a small 
difference when it comes to the time period they were published in, as well as how they differentiated each 
other through the ideas they attempted to pass onto the people, ideas in favor of the political ideals each 
belligerent defended.   
It can therefore be concluded that each of the belligerents underlines their objectives, which are complete 
opposites. Sill, both are similar when it comes to how they’re approached. 
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Image 13. ESFERA_1945.03.05_009  
 
 397 
      
Image 14. MG_1940.12.30_016 
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Spies, Media e Diplomacy:  
The new challenges for the intellegence agencies 
 
 
José Manuel Diogo, 
AGS Comunicação 
 
Since World War I until today, press, radio, television and cinema ended up somehow to serve as propaganda 
platforms. The massified information and not having an individualized subject of enunciation gains a reach 
unknown until then. And in this mix propaganda has proved to be, in the following century, as an efficient 
weapon and many times crueler as those which are handled by soldiers on battlefields. 
Technology made this weapon democratic. It positioned it literally at the world´s fingertips. This weapon, 
which can be used by anyone and anywhere allows with a least of knowledge to disseminate any content in 
every stage and format. For everyone to see. 
Over the years there were many changes on the paradigm of worldwide information services, but none as big 
as today´s, silence is the most important. 
As opposed to most professional activities that very often are appreciated for having echo on public 
opinion, when it comes to Espionage and Secret Agencies it should be making the opposite, making silence. 
Whenever the media refers to spies and secret agents we can be sure of one thing: something went wrong. 
Spies will always report to the boss, never to the newspapers, which also applies to journalist spies. It is 
nonsense. When ink has actually been spent, it is because someone´s life is in danger or great amounts of money are 
involved. 
We went through the essential history of the major Secret Agencies since the beginning of its creation until the end 
of the XX century so that we can meditate about what might happen in the future. Nowadays, with information 
technologies development and democratization, the activities that we all connote to classic espionage and with the 
romantic spies that American cinema helped to popularize, using disguises, micro cameras, have changed forever. Spies 
are now much more about technologies and less athletic. They know computer programming, calculus and are 
sociologists; probably they do not even go to the gym. 
The more efficient current spies are not dangerous CIA operatives, MI6 or Mossad, nor professional killers, nor 
elite agents, nor soldiers; they are those who through internet know how to find the paths to dominate the world. 
Hackers, men and women who can enter and change supposedly safe computer systems, are now at the recruitment 
front row for the present secret agencies. Places such as West Point, Sandhurst or Resende the prefered nurseries to find 
a candidate for secret agent do not exist anymore. The new spies start their activity during the tenderest teenage, going 
through at their place, in their room, the most obscure paths of the virtual world. They do it hiding from their parents 
and society, not following any code of honor or moral parameter. Their only goal is being able to discover what is 
hidden on internet; and the great danger for society is that everything, from each individual, is on the world wide web. 
In the espionage world relations are guided by one single goal: interest, aim for information. And, it is a 
practice that comes from long ago. Sun Tzu, the wise Chinese general who lived five centuries before Christ, 
used to say that what enables the intelligent sovereign to conquer its enemy is the power of prediction, and that 
this knowledge can only be acquired by men who are well aware of its enemy steps.   
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Propaganda represented the sacrifice of soldiers in war and 
praised the power of the country. It has been around these 
images that all over the world entire populations were 
mobilized on the expectation of victory. Through the static 
image of printed posters or the newspaper news projected 
in cinemas all over the globe, governments sought to 
promote a patriotic spirit, encouraging the effort of 
individual sacrifice by sending a clear set of messages that 
directly appealed to the voluntary enlistment in the armies, 
messages that explained the important of rationing 
essential goods, of the intensification of food production or 
the purchase of war bonds, exacerbating feelings, arousing 
emotions and projecting an image divided  between the 
notion of superiority and the idea of fear of the opponent. 
From press, in the First World War, to radio in World War II, 
to television and cinema from the 1950s onwards, 
propaganda proved to be a weapon as deadly as those 
managed by soldiers in the battlefield. That’s why it is 
essential to analyse and discuss the topic of War and 
Propaganda  
in the Twentieth Century. 
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